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Letter
No.

March 25th. 1858.



Animadversions

UPON

Dr. SHERLOCK's Book,

ENTITULED

A Vindication of the Holy and Ever-Blessed Trinity, &c.

TOGETHER

With a more Necessary Vindication of that Sacred, and Prime Article of the *Christian Faith* from his New Notions, and False Explications of it.


Humbly offered to His Admirers, and to Himself the *Chief* of them.

By a Divine of the Church of England.

Robert South

L O N D O N,

Printed for *Randal Taylor*, near *Stationers-Hall*,
M DC XC III.

A very faint, light-colored watermark or background image of a classical building with four columns and a triangular pediment occupies the center of the page.

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A

P R E F A C E,

O R,

I N T R O D U C T I O N

To the following

Animadversions.

TO be Impugned from without, and Betrayed from within, is certainly the worst Condition that either Church or State can fall into ; and the best of Churches, the Church of England, has had experience of Both. It had been to be wished, and (one would think) might very reasonably have been expected, That, when Providence had took the Work of destroying the Church of England out of the Papists Hands, some would have been contented with her Preferments, without either attempting to give up her Rites and Liturgy, or deserting her Doctrine. But it has proved much otherwise. And amongst those, who are justly chargeable with the latter, I know none, who has faced the World, and defied the Church with so bold a Front, as the Author of Two very Heterodox Books ; the first

Entituled, A Discourse concerning the Knowledge of Jesus Christ, &c. Published in the Year, 1674. And the other, A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever-Blessed Trinity, &c. Published in the Year 1690. And (as one would think) Wrote purposely, to let the World see that the Truth cannot be so much shaken by a direct Opposition, as by a Treacherous, and False Defence. I shall in this Preliminary Address to the Reader, pass some brief Remarks upon both these Books. But first upon this, which I have here undertook to Animadvert upon. It is now of about Three Years standing in the World, and I have wondered, even to Astonishment, that a Book so full of Paradoxes, and those so positively, as well as absurdly delivered, could pass Unanswered for so long a time. For the Author, having therein advanced a Notion immediately and unavoidably inferring Three Gods, has yet had the Confidence not only to Assert it, but to Declare it Heresie and Nonsense to think, or hold otherwise; that is, in other Words, to call the whole Christian Church, in all Ages and Places, Fools and Hereticks. For I do here aver, and will undertake to prove it, (as far as a Negative may be proved) That no Church (known to us by History, or otherwise) ever held this Notion of the Trinity before. And must we then be all Fools and Hereticks, who will not acknowledge the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity to be Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits, that is, in other Terms, to be Three Gods? And can so Learned, and every way Excellent a Clergy bear this? For if they could not, whence is it that some Writers amongst them, while they are declaring their dislike of his Opinions, yet do it with so soft an Air, and so gentle a Touch, as if they were afraid either to Condemn the Opinion, or to Attack the Author? Nay, and some I find creeping under his Feet with the Title of Very Reverend, while they are charging him with such Qualities and Humours, as none can be, justly, chargeable with, and

and deserve Reverence too. For my own part, I frankly own, That I neither Reverence, nor Fear him ; that is, I Reverence none, who gives whole Communities and Churches such Words, nor Fear any One, who Writes such Things, and in such a manner. For even those Mean Spirits, who can both Court, and Censure him in the same Breath, complain, That he gives no Quarter, where he supposes he has his Adversary upon the least Advantage. And if this be his Way and Temper never to give Quarter, I am sure he has no cause to expect any, whatsoever he may find. But still, methinks, I can hardly believe my Eyes, while I read such a Pettit Novellist Charging the Whole Church as Fools and Hereticks, for not Subscribing to a Silly, Heretical Notion solely of his own Invention. For does he, or can he think to Live and Converse in the World upon these Terms ? and to throw his Scurrility at High, and Low, at all About him, Above him, and Below him (if there be any such) at this insufferable rate ? Does he, (I would fain know) in this speak his Judgment, or his Breeding ? Was it the School, the University, or Gravel-Lane, that taught him this Language ? Or does he never reflect upon himself, nor consider, That though he does not, others assuredly will ? One would think by his Words and Carriage that he had ingrossed all Reason and Learning to Himself : But on the contrary, that this his scornful looking down upon all the World besides, is not from his standing upon any higher ground of Learning, and Sufficiency, than the rest of the World ; and that he Huffs and Dictates at a much more commanding rate than he Reasons, the perusal of my Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Chapters will, or (I am sure) may sufficiently inform the Impartial Reader ; and shew him how many things there are in this our Author's Vindication, which too much need Another, but admit none. In the mean time, I do, and must declare both to himself, and to all others, That the forementioned Charge of Heresie and Nonsense (as he has laid it) is sc : very

very Rude, Scandalous, and Provoking, that it is impossible for the Tongue, or Pen of Man to reply any Thing so severely upon him, which the foulness of the said Expression will not abundantly warrant both the Speaking and the Writing of.

The Church of England is certainly very Merciful ;
Ch. Justice Merciful (as a Great Judge once said of K. Charles II.)
Scrogs. even to a Fault. For who, by her silence upon what this Bold Man has Wrote, and the Encouragement he has since received, would not be shrewdly induced after some considerable number of Years (if his stuff should live so long) to believe, that his Notions were the Current Doctrine of our Church, or, at least, of our Church-men at that time ? None then opposing them, most over-looking them, and some countenancing and advancing the Author of them ; and, perhaps, for them too. This is truly the Case ; and I hope to do the Church of England so much Service at least, as to break the Universality both of the Silence, and the presumed Acceptance, by one plain, resolute and full Negative put in against it. For upon a due Consideration of the Things vented by this Author, and comparing them with the Proceedings and Zeal of the Primitive Church in its Councils, I do from my Heart believe, That had he lived and published this Book in those Days, and Asserted, That the Three Divine Persons in the Trinity were Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits. And that Their Personal distinction consisted only in Self-Consciousness, and their Unity only in Mutual-Consciousness. And withall, That the Terms Essence, Nature, Substance, Person, and Hypostasis, or Subsistence, &c. applyed to the Godhead and the Divine Persons, served only to perplex, obscure, and confound Men's Apprehensions of them ; and for that cause ought to be laid aside ; I say, I do not in the least question, but that all and every one of these Propositions, would have been

been publickly and solemnly Condemned in Council, and the Author of them (as high as he now carries his Head, like another Abbot Joachim) severely dealt with for Asserting them; and that upon great Reason. Forasmuch, as the Two chief of those Terms, viz. *σοια* and *ὑπόστασις*, Substance and Subsistence, were equally with the ὁμοότιον it self opposed by those Two grand Arian Hereticks and Furious Disturbers of the Church, Ursacius and Valens, who with their Accomplices vehemently contended to have them all wholly suppressed and disused. So that as for the *σοια* of the Father and the Son, they would have παντελῶς ὑδεμίαν μηδέν, no mention at all to be made of any such Thing; and as for the *ὑπόστασις* it ought αὐτοῦ ὄνομαζεῖσθαι not so much as to be named concerning any of the Three Persons. And, as one Reason for this, they alledged the satisfaction of Tender Consciences. Which shews, That Tender Consciences are such Things, as may, some time or other, put the Church, not only to part with its Liturgy, Rites, and Ceremonies, but its very Faith also for their sake. But right, or wrong, those Two Arian Incendiaries pressed hard for the Abolition of these Two Words; as this Author also does in this his

Having first rejected the ὁμοότιον in those Words. Τὸ μὲν ὁμοότιον καὶ τὸ ὁμοίότιον ἐκβίλλομεν ὡς ἀλλοτερον τῶν γεγράφων. Athanas. de Synodis Arimini & Seleucie, Tom. I. P. 904. Edit. Colon. 1686. In the next place, p. 906. they proceed to cashier the Terms *σοιας* and *ὑπόστασις*, in the following Words. Τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τῆς σοιας, ὅπερ ἀπλάσεεν ἀπὸ τῶν παλέρων ἐτέθη, ἀνούσιενον δὲ τοῖς λαοῖς σκάνδαλον ἔφερε, διότι μηδὲ αἱ γεγραπτῶτο περιέχουσιν ἡρεσε περιειρεθῆναι, καὶ παντελῶς μηδεμίᾳ μηδὲν τῷ λοιπῷ γίνεσθαι. Ἐπειδὴπερ καὶ αἱ θεῖαι γεγραπταῖς ἐμπιῆσονευσαν περὶ σοιας. Παλέρος καὶ νῦν, καὶ γὰρ εἰδὼς ὑπόστασις περὶ παλέρος καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀγίας πνεύματος ὄνομαζεῖσθαι. For this see also Socrat. Hist. lib. 2. cap. 29. and Theodore's Histor. lib. 2. cap. 18. & 21. & Sozomen's Histor. lib. 4. cap. 18.

Vindication;

Vindication; treading hereby exactly in the steps of those Blessed Leaders ; who, no doubt, understood the Interest of their base Cause well enough, and were both Self-Conscious, and Mutually-Conscious, how much they served the design, they drove at, by what they did. And, since Things were so in former days, what hinders, but that in these latter Days likewise, the same, if not prevented, may happen again ? And, that One, who, (though he carries himself, as if he were able to teach the whole World, yet, for some certain Reasons, professes

* See his himself a * Learner still) having already exploded the Preface to Terms Substance and Subsistence, as not to be used about the his Case of Allegiance, p. 5. ing Advantage, (as, where Advantage is the Teacher, some line 15. care not how long they continue Learners) be very easily prevailed upon to send the εμοσίον packing after its Fellows, and to abandon and cast off that too ? For, though such an One should give the Church his Oath to the contrary, there is no security from thence, but that a Perpetual Learner (by a due waiting upon Providence) may, all in convenient time, Learn to forget it too : And a Self-Contradictor having freely allowed a Thing at one time, as freely and fully disown it at another.

Wherefore it was, no doubt, upon a most serious consideration of the force of Words in Conjunction with the Tempers of Men, That the Sixth General Council (and Third of Constantinople) was so jealously concerned, and so remarkably strict to fence against all Heretickall Mischief from that Quarter ; as appears from the Concluding Article of the Synodical Sentence pronounced by the said Council against the Monothelites, as we find it thus set down in

the Acts thereof. These Things therefore, being thus with the utmost care and exactness, on all sides, formed and drawn up by

Τέτων τοινυν μετὰ πάσους πανταχόδεν ακερβείας τε καὶ ἐμμελείας παρ' ἡμῖν διατυπωθέντων, οὕτ-

by us, We Decree and Enact, That it shall not be lawful for any one to Produce, Write, Compose, Conceive, or Teach another Faith, or this in any other way, or manner. But as for those who shall presume to Compose, or Contrive another Faith, or Publish, Teach, or deliver forth another Creed, to such as shall be ready to come over to the Acknowledgment of the Truth from Heathenism, or Judaism, or any other Sect whatsoever, or shall introduce any *unusual* way of speaking, or *new Invented Terms*, as tending to Subvert all that has been defined by us, if they be Bishops, or in Clerical Orders, we decree, That they shall be deprived of their Bishopricks, or said Orders ; or if they be Monks, or Lay-men, that they shall be Anathematized. So that we have here a clear and full Declaration of a General Council, against all teaching, not only ἐτεχόν τι, but also ἐτέρως ; that is, not only against delivering another Faith, but against delivering the same in another way, or manner, than the Council had settled, and against the use of all new-Invented Terms, all καινοφωνία, or ἐφεύρεσις τὸ λέξεως, (Self-Consciousness, and Mutual-Consciousness themselves not excepted) as in the Judgment of the Council, destructive in their consequence to the Faith declared ; and all this upon pain of Deprivation, or Anathematization, as

ζομεν ἐτέχων πίστιν μηδεὶς ἔξ-
αται ὡραφέται, οὐγεν συγβάφεται
ἢ ουντιθέται ἢ φερεται ἢ διδάσκεται
ἐτέρως. Τὰς δὲ τολμωνίας ἢ ουν-
τιθέται πίστιν ἐτέχων ἢ πειθαρί-
ζειν ἢ διδάσκειν ἢ παρεδιδόται
ἐτεχών συμβολον τοῖς ἐπέλεστοις
Ἐπιτρέφεται εἰς ἕπ. γνωστον τὸ ἀλη-
θεῖας ἔξ Ἐλληνισμοῦ ἢ ἔξ Ἰα-
δαϊσμοῦ ἢ μην ἔξ αἱρέσεως οἰαστοῦ
ἢ καινοφωνίαν ἢ τοι λέξεως ἐφεύ-
ρεσιν ὡρὸς αἰατερπλις εἰσάγειν
τῶν νυνὶ παρ' ἡμῖν διοχετεύσιν
τέττες εἰ μὲν Ἐπισκοποι ἄνευ, ἢ
κληρικοὶ, ἀλλοτρεῖς δὲ τὰς
Ἐπισκόπους τὸ ηλίρρ, εἰ δὲ μορά-
ζοῦται εἰεν ἢ λαϊκοὶ ἀναθεματί-
ζεσθαι ἀντές. Concil. 6. in
Actione 17. seu ultimiā, circa
finem.

the *Quality* of the Persons concerned should happen to be. According to the rigour of which Sentence, and the Proceeding of the Church in those Ages suitable to it, Deprivation, or Suspension, would, no doubt, have attended this Author, had he then lived and produced his new Terms, in defiance and reproach of the former received ones. And if such a punishment had actually befallen him, he would have found, that in those Days, Men were not wont either to be Suspended, or Deprived in order to their Promotion.

I know indeed, that in the Apology lately put out by him for Writing against the Socinians, he utters some Things contrary to what he had Asserted in this his Vindication of the Trinity. But this the Reader ought not at all to be surprized at ; it being as Natural to some Men to Write as to Breath, and to Contradict themselves as to Write : And no Man of Sence, who knows this Author, will reckon that he knows his Judgment, or Opinion from any Book Wrote by Him, any longer, than till he Writes another ; nor from that neither, till he has Wrote his last.

Having given the Reader this short Prelibration, or Tastē of the Book, which I shall more particularly and fully examine presently, I think fit to remark something also upon that other Piece mentioned by me, and Entituled, A Discourse concerning the Knowledge of Jesus Christ, &c. A Book fraught with such Vile and Scandalous Reflexions upon God's Justice, with reference to Christ's Satisfaction, that it may deservedly pass for a Blasphemous Libel upon both. And I do seriously think, that never was any Book Licensed, Published, and suffered to pass Uncontrolled, more to the Disgrace of the Church of England than this, which the Reader will quickly see upon his Reading some Passages of it ; which, I am sure, if he be but Christianly disposed, he cannot do, but with extreme Horrour. But before I direct the Reader to his Blasphemies, I shall lay before him

him one Grand leading Absurdity, which utterly Evacuates and Overthrows the whole Doctrine of Free Grace, and the Redemption of Mankind thereby ; and indeed, by Consequence, the whole Oeconomy of the Christian Religion.

And it is that Wonderful Assertion concerning the Goodness of God, in Page 44. of his Knowledge of Christ, viz. That it is not possible to understand what Goodness is, without Pardonning Grace. Now certain it is, that Natural Reason, by its own light, is able from the Common Works of God's Providence, to collect the Knowledge of God's Goodness ; as St. Paul expressly told those Heathens of Lycaonia, Acts 14. 17. and therefore, if the Knowledge of God's Goodness, necessarily implies in it, the Knowledge of Pardonning Grace, it will follow, That the Heathens by understanding one from the Works of Providence, must needs understand and know the other also ; and consequently, that the Knowledge of Pardonning Grace is not owing to Revelation, nor the Gospel necessary to make a Discovery of it to Mankind. A Bless'd Principle, and Foundation, no doubt, to establish the New-de-signed Scheme of a Natural Religion upon ! For it is not unknown, what Projects were on foot amongst some, when this Book was Wrote, though the Author had the ill luck to be left in the Lurch, and not seconded in the Attempt.

But in opposition to this Paganish Assertion, I do here affirm, That if God may be Good, and that, both as to the Essential Attribute of his Goodness, and as to the actual Exercise of the same, without the Pardon of Sin, then it is not impossible to understand the Goodness of God without Pardonning Grace. The Consequence is evident. For whatsoever any Thing is, it is capable of being understood to be. And as for the Antecedent, that is manifest from these Considerations.

First, That God was Good, and exerted Acts of Goodness, before there was any Sin in the World, and therefore might be, and undoubtedly was, understood both as good, and as exercising his Goodness, by the Angels before the Fall of any of them, and for that reason before Pardon of Sin could come into Consideration.

In the next Place, God had been Good, and had exercised his Goodness, had Men and Angels been Created Impeccable; and, I am sure, it is no Contradiction to hold, That they might have been Originally made such, as all Glorified Spirits now actually are.

And Lastly, God is and may be understood to be Good, even in respect of those, whose Sins shall never be pardoned. And therefore that Assertion of this Author, That it is not possible to understand what Goodness is without Pardoning Grace, is apparently false and absurd; as drawing after it One of these Two Consequences.

First, That either we cannot understand the Creation and Support of Angels, and of this visible World, and particularly of Mankind, to have been Acts and Instances of the Divine Goodness (which yet, no doubt, were very great ones.) Or,

Secondly, That we cannot understand them as such, but by understanding them also to imply in them Pardoning Grace. And if so, then, supposing the Creation of Man, and his Sin after his Creation, and the Goodness of God remaining still entire, notwithstanding Man's Sin, (as it certainly did) it will follow, that Pardoning Grace, having (according to the forementioned Principle) a necessary Connexion with, or result from the said Goodness, must have fallen in of course, and by necessary consequence from thence. And then, Where could be the Freedom of this Grace? Nay, Where could be this Grace it self? For the very Nature of Grace consists in this, that it be an Act perfectly Free; so free,

free, that God might have chosen, after Man had sinned, whether he would ever have offered him any Conditions of Pardon, or no ; And if he had not, Men might, notwithstanding that, have abundantly known and understood the Goodness of God, by several other Acts and Instances, in which it had sufficiently declared it self. So that the foregoing Assertion is nothing but a gross Paradox, and a Scurvy Blow at all Revealed Religion besides, if the Knowledge of Pardoning Grace could, or may be had without it.

And now after this Absurdity presented to the Reader's Examination ; I shall point out to him some of the Blasphemies also that occur in the same Book. Such as are these that follow. The Justice of God (*says he*) having glutted it self with Revenge on Sin in the Death of Christ, henceforward we may be sure he will be very kind, as a Revengeful Man is, when his Passion is over. *Knowledge of Christ*, P. 46. Again, The Sum of the Matter is, That God is all Love and Patience, when he has taken his fill of Revenge ; as others use to say, That the Devil himself is very good when he is pleased, P. 47. Again, The Death of Christ (*says he*) discovers the Naturalness of Justice to God ; that is, That he is so Just, that he has not one Dram of Goodness in him, till his Rage and Vengeance be satisfied ; which, I confess, is a glorious kind of Justice. And presently after. Now the Justice and Vengeance of God having their Actings assigned them to the full, being glutted and satiated with the Blood of Christ, God may pardon as many and great Sins as he pleases, P. 59. And suitable to this, he likewise calls the Method of God's saving Sinners upon a Previous Satisfaction made to his Justice, as necessary for the Remission of Sin, God's Trucking and Bartering with Sin, and the Devil for his Glory, P. 52. Concerning which and the like Expressions uttered by this Great-Good

Good Man (*as a certain poor Wretch calls him*) I cannot but out of a due Zeal, and concern for that Eternal Truth, by which, I hope to be Saved, declare, That the Tongue that should Speak such things, deserves to Speak no more; and the Hand that should Write them, to Write no more. And great pity it is, that at this time, and in this case also, his Ascendant had not tyed up his Hands from Writing. For see, how one of the Leading Dissenters Insults over our Church, upon occasion of these Horrid Passages. Is this (*says he*) Language becoming a Son of the Church of England? Ought it not more justly to have been expected from a Jew, or a Mahometan? From Servetus, or Socinus, (from whom also it was borrowed) than from a Son of the Church, in a Book published by Licence and Authority? And thus he goes on, equally Chastising his Arrogance, and Exposing his Ignorance; the poor Church's Reputation all the while paying the Scores of both. As to the Licensing of which Book, here so severely reflected upon, it did indeed meet with a Person (*as it were*) framed for the very purpose. For none certainly could be so fit to stamp an Imprimatur upon a Book Wrote against Christ's Satisfaction, as One, who while he was Eating the Bread, and Wearing the Honours of the Church, could stab the Doctrine of it to the Heart, by Writing for Transubstantiation. And then in the next place, for its passing Uncontrolled, it had really been to be wished, That the Clergy in Convocation, in the last especially (in which so many of them acquitted themselves so exceeding worthily upon other Accounts) would have vouchsafed to wipe off this gross Blot from the Church by a due Censure passed upon the forementioned Positions; so reproachful to that, and so Contumelious to our Common Christianity. For what vast advantage the Dissenters have taken from hence to Scandalize and Besplat-
ter the Government and Governours of our Church, is but too

Owen's
Vindicati-
on against
sk. p. 47,
48, &c.

too well known, and cannot be too much Lamented; and I heartily wish, That it had been a Scandal only Taken, and not Given. And the rather do I represent this as a Work fit for the Convocation; since this Author has given ~~the~~ ^{See in} World such a Notable Proof, That nothing but a Convocation can Convinc, or work upon him.

And thus I have given the Reader a Specimen of the Doctrines of ~~this~~ ^{All greate} Author in these Two Books of his. In the former of which, he affects to be the Socinian's humble Servant, by Riotting and Exploding Christ's Satisfaction of God's Justice; and so in effect, the whole Mystery of the Gospel: And in the latter he pretends to oppose them by such a Vindication of the Trinity, and of Christ's Incarnation, as one would think, were Wrote by themselves. But whatsoever it is, that he either pretends, or intends (as it is hard to know the latter by the former) this Character I shall give of him as a Writer, That there is hardly any one Subject which he has Wrote upon (that of Popery only excepted) but he has Wrote both for it and against it too: Not that I say, that he has Printed all which he has so Wrote; but Printing is not the only way of Publication; and this I will say besides, That where he has not Printed, he has Acted it with a Witness. And yet even for Printing; could any thing be Wrote and Printed more sharp and bitter against the Dissenters, than what this Man Wrote in his Answer to the Protestant Reconciler? And yet how frankly (or rather falsely) does he open both his Arms to embrace them in his Sermon Preached before the Lord Mayor, on Nov. . 1688? Though I dare say, That the Dissenters then lives are of that Constancy as to own, That they were of the same Principles in 88, that they were of in 85. But the Truth is, Old Friendships cannot be so easily forgot. And it is been an Observation made by some, that hardly can any one be found, who was first tainted with a Conventicle, whom a Cathedral could ever after

Prefac to
his Cis. of

P. 5.

after cure ; but that still upon every cross Turn of Affairs against the Church, the irresistible Magnetism of the Good Old Cause, (as some still think it) would quickly draw him out of the Good Old Way. The Fable tells us of a Cat once turned into a Woman, but the next sight of a Mouse quickly dissolved the Metamorphosis, cashiered the Woman, and restored the Brute. And some Virtuosi (skilled in the Useful Philosophy of Alterations) have thought her much a gainer by the latter change ; there being so many unlucky turns in the World, in which it is not half so safe and advantagious to Walk Upright, as to be able to fall always upon one's Legs.

But not to hold the Reader too long in the Entrance of the Work, which I am about to present him with, I do here assure him, That, in the following Animadversions, I have strictly pursued this Author in every part of his new Hypothesis, I have answered all his Arguments, not omitting so much as one, or any Thing that looks like one. And if I have thought fit sometimes in a short Remark or two, here and there to refresh the Reader and my self, by exposing his Bold and Blind side together ; yet this has still been my method, throughly to dispatch the Argument, before I offer to divert upon the Author.

As for that part of his Book, which peculiarly concerns the Socinians, I leave him and them to fight it out. My business is to shew, That the Doctrine of our Church is absolutely a stranger to his Novel and Beloved Notions : It knows them not : It owns them not ; nor ought we to look upon him, so far as he Asserts and Maintains them, to be any True and Genuine Son of it : And consequently, whether he worries the Socinians, or (which is much the more likely) the Socinians worry him, the Church of England is not at all concerned.

T H E
C O N T E N T S
O F T H E
C H A P T E R S.

C H A P T E R I.

R epresenting the Sence and Signification of the Word Mystery ; as also a Vindication of the Use and Application of it to some of the most Difficult and Sublime Truths of the Gospel ; and lastly, a full Proof, That the Account given by this Author of his Explication of the Article of the Trinity, is wholly inconsistent with the Mysteriousness of it ; together with some Remarks upon his needless Apology for Writing against the Socinians.

C H A P. II.

Containing an Account of several Terms commonly made use of in discoursing of the Divine Nature, and Persons, and particularly shewing the Propriety of Applying the Words Essence, Substance, Nature, Infinity, and the like, to this great Subject ; and lastly, proving this Author's Exceptions against the use of them about the same, False, Groundless and Impertinent : With some further Remarks upon his forementioned Apology.

The C O N T E N T S.

C H A P. III.

In which this Author's New Notion of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness is briefly declared ; Self-Consciousness made by him the Formal Constituent Reason of Personality in all Persons, both Create and Increate ; and on the contrary proved against him in the first place, That it is not so in Persons Create.

C H A P. IV.

In which is proved against this Author, That neither is Self-Consciousness the Formal Constituent Reason of Personality in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity ; nor Mutual-Consciousness the Reason of their Unity in one and the same Nature.

C H A P. V.

In which is proved against this Author, That the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

C H A P. VI.

In which is considered, what this Author pretends to from the Authority of the Fathers and the Schoolmen, in behalf of his New Hypothesis ; and, in the first place, shewn, That neither do the Fathers own the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Infinite Minds ; nor Self-Consciousness to be the Formal Reason of their Distinction.

C H A P. VII.

In which is shewn, That the Passages alledged by this Author out of the Fathers, do not prove Mutual-Consciousness to be that wherein the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity does consist ; but that the Fathers place it in something else.

C H A P. VIII.

In which is set down the Ancient and Generally received Doctrine of the Church concerning the Article of the Blessed

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The C O N T E N T S.

fed Trinity, as it is delivered by Councils, Fathers, School-men, and other later Divines; together with a Vindication of the said Doctrine so explained from this Author's Exceptions.

C H A P. IX.

In which this Author's Paradoxes, both Philosophical and Theological, as they occurr in this Discourse, are drawn together, Examined, and Confuted.

C H A P. X.

In which this Author's Grammatical (and other such like) Mistakes, as they are found here, and there in his Writings, are set down and remarked upon.

C H A P. XI.

In which is given some Account of this Author's Temper, and Insolent way of Writing, as well in Extolling himself, as in Depressing and Scorning his Adversaries; in both which he has not his Parallel.

C H A P. XII.

Containing a Brief Review, and Conclusion of the whole.

Some of the most considerable Errata of the Press, are thus to be Corrected.

P Reface, Pag. V. lin. 19. Marg. for ἐμνησόνευσαν read ἐμνησύευσαν. Book. p. 2. l. 7. for מְשֻׁתָּרִים read מְשֻׁתָּר, the last Letter, which should be a Resh, in most Copies disappears. p. 3. l. 29. for quod r. quid l. p. 7. l. 23. and 26. p. 8. l. 8. for inadequate r. inadequate p. 18 l. 16. & passim. for Ariains r. Arians. p. 25. l. 30. for plainness r. plainnes. p. 41. l. 15. for Subjlance r. Substance. p. 61. l. 25. for it self r. her self. p. 106. last line, for consci- r. moist. p. 111. l. 13. for communicated to r. in common belonging to. p. 119. l. 26. for εὐ τῇ θεότητι r. εὐ θεότητι. p. 123. l. 6. for 10th. Book r. 11. Book. p. 131. l. 23. for σταχοσιλάντε r. σταχοσιλάντε. p. 155. last line, for ἐπιθέν r. ἐπιθέν. p. 165. l. 18. for πνευματικός r. πνευματικό. p. 173. l. 15. for Unity r. Unity or Singularity. p. 177. last line, for διμοσίους r. διμοσίοτης. p. 196. l. 5. Marg. for ἐργάζεται r. ἐργάζεται, and after μία put a Colon, ibid. p. 196. l. 7. for ἀρξά r. ἀρξ. p. 205.

l. 6. Marg. for ἐν ἑστόδῳ τ. ἐν ἑστόδῳ for ἐν, ἐπι, οἱ τ. ἐγένεντο, ibid. p. 209. l. 2. Marg. for ejusdemque r. ejusdémque. p. 210. l. 5. Marg. for eademque r. éademque. p. 213. l. 1. Marg. or propria r. propriâ, for divinaque r. divinâque, ibid. p. 213. l. 2. Marg. for natura r. naturâ. p. 228. l. 23. for purpu, c r. purpoe. p. 222. l. 2. Marg. for ἀρρώστῳ τ. ἀρρώστῳ τ. p. 232. l. 4. Marg. for δαύματι τ. δαύματa p. 342. l. 18. Marg. for ipsā r. ipsâ. p. 236. l. 2. Marg. for beatamque r. beatâ. que. p. 253. l. 4. and 6. for ἡ r. ë. p. 255. l. 8. & p. 257. l. 28. for γάετιν τ. γætætin. p. 260. l. 1. for ταιρίν τ. tairin. p. 260. l. 22. for λεωστίν τ. leostein. p. 262. l. 27. for ἵστησαστι τ. hîstessans. p. 263 l. 16. for ita r. itâ. p. 264. l. 26. for apritis r. Spiritus. for dissimilis r. dissimilis. ibid. p. 266. l. 16. for audierant read audie-
rant. p. 268. l. 9. for quæm r. quâm. p. 268. l. 10. for rationemque r. rationé. que. p. 273. l. 25. for hoc r. hòc. p. 274. l. 5. for cum r. cùm. p. 276 l. 7. for er. sine. p. 276. l. 10. for τεχπω τ. teχpô. p. 276. l. 31. for esse ἄτιττον r. atitton. p. 88. l. 5. Marg. for ἐναρθάτι τ. énarthat. p. 289. l. 10. Marg. for κατεργάσατο πως. p. 304. l. 33. for director r. director. p. 325. Sensible. p. 335. l. 10, 11. for of the Lateran r. of Lateran. p. 343. pag. 358. l. 1. instead of r. for r. for. p. 361. l. 6. for anteque. for ideoque r. ideóque, l. 27. for cum r. Cùm, l. 29. for αὐτίσσι τ. autissi. l. 30. for quaque r. que. p. 362. l. 20. for antequam r. an-que-m. When such words as dicaments, and such like Words occur, let them be read with a single c instead of an a.

If the Reader chance to meet with any more such Faults in Accents, he is desired to Correct, or Excuse them; together with all Mispointing, which in Books of any length are commonly too many to be particularly and exactly set down.

Animad-

Animadversions, &c.

C H A P. I.

Representing to us the Sence and Signification of the Word Mystery, as also a Vindication of the Use and Application of it, to some of the most difficult and sublime Truths of the Gospel; and, lastly, a full Proof, That the Account given by this Authour, of the Explication of the Article of the Trinity, is wholly inconsistent with the Mysteriousness of it.

IN Order to the better Examination of what this Authour has wrote about the Holy Trinity, I think it requisite to premise something concerning the Signification, Sence, and Nature of a Mystery. For certainly the Unity of One and the same undivided God-head, in a Trinity of distinct Persons, is one of the greatest Mysteries, if not absolutely the greatest in our Christian Religion. Now a Mystery, according to the common signification of the word, is derived either from the Greek word $\mu\nu\acute{e}w$, which signifies to *initiate*, or enter one into *Sacred Rites, or Doctrines*, or from $\mu\nu\omega$, another Greek word (and that in the judgment of *Eustathius* and *Stephanus*, more regularly

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regularly and naturally) signifying to *shut or close up*, and most commonly apply'd to the *shutting of the eyes or mouth*, the solemn posture of the *μυεψθαι*, or *Initiation* in the Rites of the Gentile Worship. And, *lastly*, one of no small Note for Critical as well as other Learn-

See C. sub. Exer 16. ad Ann. Baron. 43. p. 542, &c. will needs run it up even to a *Hebrew Original*, deriving it from *רִזְקָנָה*, which signifies *res abscondita aut secretum*. Concerning which, it must be confessed, That

there is a more than ordinary agreement between the *Hebrew* and *Greek* word both as to Sound and Signification. But whether this be not wholly accidental, is left to the Criticks in these Languages to determine. In the mean time, most account *μυστεῖον* a word purely and perfectly *Greek*: and the Original of it lies so manifestly in one of the two fore-mentioned *Greek* words, that it seems a needless Curiosity, or rather a meer Fancy to seek for it elsewhere. But whatsoever the Origination of the word is, it always imports *something hidd'n or concealed*, especially with reference to *Sacred or Religious Matters*; And in this Sence it occurs frequently, if not always, in prophane Writers; from whence the Holy Pen-men of the New Testament seem to have borrow'd and apply'd it to some of the Great and Arduous Truths of Christianity, such as human Reason cannot give a clear and explicit Account of.

This therefore being the undoubted Notation and Signification of the Word, I shall deliver the Nature of the thing it self in this Definition, *viz. That a Mystery is a Truth reveal'd by God, above the Power of natural Reason to find out or comprehend*. This, I take, to be a full and proper Definition of a Mystery. And accordingly I shall consider the several Parts of it distinctly. As,

First,

CHAPTER I.

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First, That it is a Truth. By which we exclude every thing from being a Mystery that is absurd or contradictory ; since a Truth can by no means be so. And consequently hereby stand excluded also the Fooleries and Falsities of all other Religions, how Mysterious soever they may be pretended to be, and with how much Solemnity and Confidence soever delivered.

Secondly, The next Qualification is, *That it be revealed by God, viz. as to its Existence, That there is such a thing.* For otherwise, as to the Nature of the thing it self, and several other respects, in which it may be known, the Revelation of it is not suppos'd to extend so far. In a Word, as a Mystery implies some Revelation of a Thing ; so it follows, That all Revelation does not overthrow the Mysteriousness of it : but only such a plenary and entire Revelation of it, as leaves nothing in the Nature of it abstruse or undiscovered. But now, though Revelation be a necessary Ingredient in this Definition, yet it is not sufficient ; something more being still required. Since nothing hinders, but that the same thing may be both revealed by God, and known upon other accounts, too. As the Moral Law was revealed by God to his People, and may be drawn and demonstrated from Principles of Natural Reason also. And therefore, the

Third Property of a Mystery is, That it surpasses all the Power of Natural Reason to discover or find it out. And that not only as to the *Quid sit*, or particular Nature, but also as to the *Quod sit* of it too. For that there are or should be such or such things, (to consider only the bare Existence of them) no Principle of human Reason, by its own natural or improved Light, could ever have found out, as might be easily shewn by Induction, through the several Mysteries

Animadversions, &c.

of our Religion, such as are the *Trinity*, the *Incarnation*, the *Mystical Union of Christ with the Church*, the *Resurrection of the Body*, and the like; of all, and each of which, mere Reason could never have made a discovery.

Fourthly, The fourth and last Condition of a Mystery, express'd in the foregoing Definition of it, is, *That it be such a Thing, as bare Natural Reason (even after it is discovered) cannot comprehend.* I say comprehend, that is, know it perfectly, and as far as it is capable of being known. I do not say, That it is, or ought to be wholly Unintelligible. For some knowledge (no doubt) may be had of it. As, first, we may know the Signification and Meaning of the Words or Terms, in which it is delivered or revealed to us. Likewise as to the thing it self, we may have some imperfect, defective knowledge of that too. Such as the Apostle Paul calls *a knowing in part, and seeing as through a glass darkly*, 1 Cor. 13. 12. which words manifestly and naturally import, That something is known, though in a very imperfect manner and degree, and that something also remains still unknown, which shall hereafter be clearly and fully discovered, and made known unto us. So that I think nothing could give us a truer, and more satisfactory account of the Nature of an Evangelical Mystery, than this Scripture, *viz.* That it is a Truth, of which we know something, at present, though very imperfectly; but are ignorant of a great deal more belonging to it. And this τὸ ἄγνωστον, this obscure and abstruse part of it, is that which properly constitutes and denominates a Sacred Truth a Mystery; and consequently we may reckon the Account given us of a *Mystery* by St. Chrysostome, a true and exact Description of it by its principal Property, *viz.* Τὸ ἀπόφεντον & διηγεῖσθαι & ἀγνοεῖσθαι, Homily 7. on the 2 Corinth.

CHAPTER I.

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2 Corinth. and Homily 19. on the Epistle to the Romans. Where I desire the Reader still to observe, that I do not affirm, That this last Acceptation of the Word is either the Original Sence of it, or that the Heathen Writers used it in this Signification ; all that they intended to signify by the Word *Mysterium*, seeming to have been only that it was, *Quid sacrum & secretum*. But this I affirm, That the Fathers and Writers of the Christian Church generally used it in the Sence specified ; that is, They affix'd a farther Sence to it of their own ; but still such an one as carried with it something of Analogy and Cognition to the first, whereby it signify'd only something *obscure or occult in sacred Matters*. So that now, if any one should argue, That in the Writers of the Christian Church, *Mysterium* signified only, *Quid sacrum & secretum*, because it signified no more in the Heathen Writers, from whom they borrowed it, this would be very inconsequent and ridiculous ; and all one, as if, because *Sacramentum* in the Heathen Writers signified only a Military Oath : therefore in the Ancient Christian Writers it must signify so too. For the Christian Writers apply it, to signify those two great Rites of Christianity, *Baptism* and the Holy *Eucharist* ; though still (in this instance as well as in the former) with some Analogy, Reference, and Affinity to the first use of the Word, *viz.* That as by this Military Oath, Soldiers did solemnly devote themselves to their Emperor's Service, so in these two Religious Rites Men do much more solemnly devote and bind themselves over to the Obedience and Service of Christ, according to all the Rules and Precepts of his Holy Religion.

I conclude therefore, by a Parity of the Case, That *Mysterium*, according to the Christian Use of the Word, imports not only, *Quid in sacris secretum*, by reason of
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an actual Concealment of the same, but moreover something, that is so much a *Secretum* in Religion, as to transcend and surpass all Humane Comprehension. And it is the Authority of the Ancient Writers using the word thus, which I state this Sence of it upon, as abundantly sufficient to enfranchise and render it Authentick in the Church. Though, I confess, as to the Adversary whom I am to deal with, my purpose would be sufficiently serv'd against him, even by the first and narrowest Signification of the Word, as it imports only something in Religion actually secret, hidden, and not open to a common view or perception.

I have now given the *Notation*, *Signification*, and *Definition* of the word *Mystery*. But after all, there is a new Light sprung lately into the World, which tells us, the use of the Word in Scripture determines the Case quite another way; for that the Scripture knows no such signification of the word, as we have insisted upon; nor that any thing that is Incomprehensible, is, or ought to be accounted, a Mystery. The Afferter of this (as we may well perceive) is a bold Man, but being at present engaged with a much bolder, I shall only say thus much of this *Socinian* Tract here, *viz.* That as to the Argument which the Author would raise against the *Trinitarians* (as he calls them) from the Sence of the Word *Mystery*, as he has there stated it, it has been thoroughly baffled and overthrown by a Learned Person, in a short Discourse in *Vindication of the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, &c.* And when this *Anti-Trinitarian* has answer'd that Learned Person, if there appears need of any further answer to the foremention'd piece, he may, all in good time, receive one in a distinct Discourse by it self.

And so I immediately address my self to the Author undertook by me, who by pretending to defend the great Article

An Account of the word *Mystery*, as it is taken in the Holy Scripture.

Bishop
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steer's Ser-
mon on
the 1 Tim.
2. 15.
Printed
1591.

CHAPTER I.

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Article of the Trinity, has given the Adversary those great Advantages against it, which the bare Article left to defend it self, (as *the Faith* is generally its own *best Defender*) could never have given him. The *Socinians* charge it with Paradox, and downright Contradiction. For the repelling and staving off which Charge from this Doctrine, our Author has thought fit to give us some Rules to judge of a Contradiction by, and in so doing, has laid down this Remarkable Assertion, viz. *That it is a vain and arrogant presumption, to say, what is, or what is not a Contradiction, when we confess we do not understand, or comprehend the thing we speak of*, p. 4. This, I say, is a very remarkable Assertion, and the first thing remarkable in it, is, That (according to a Custom, very usual with him) he promiscuously joyns together words, as if they were of the same Import and Extent of Signification, when really they are very different. For to *understand* a thing, is to know it in any respect, or degree, in which it is knowable, and to *comprehend* a thing, is to know it in every respect in which it is knowable. And as it is certain, that we cannot know God this latter way; so it is ascertain, that we may know him the former: For we do, and may know him by inadaequate and imperfect, and uncommensurate Conceptions; as that he is Just, Wise, Good, and the like; which are several Inadaequate ways of representing him to our mind. But now, if this Author's Assertion should take place, *viz.* That we cannot say what is, or what is not a Contradiction, when we confess we do not comprehend the thing we speak of, then we cannot pronounce these Propositions, *Jupiter Olympius* is the Supreme God, the Sun is the Supreme God, or the World is the Supreme God, to be Contradictions: forasmuch as it is certain, that speaking here of God, we do not comprehend the thing we speak of.

of. And yet since *Jupiter Olympius*, the Sun, and the World are all of them finite Material Beings, and God both Infinite and Immaterial: I doubt not but that to affirm one of the other, is a real and manifest Contradiction. And to shew that it is so, this Author should do well to consider, That a Contradiction is not properly (or universally at least) oppos'd to the *compleat* and adæquate knowledge of a thing, but to the *true* knowledge of it. And we may have a true knowledge even by such inadequate, imperfect, incomplete Conceptions of it, as we have mention'd. For he who knows God to be Just, though he cannot comprehend every way and respect in which he is, or may be so, and much les all his other Perfections, has thereby a true knowledge of God, though an Imperfect one. That is, he knows and understands, though he does not comprehend him. But according to this Author's Assertion, we cannot say, that any thing is a Contradiction, with reference to God, since it is certain and evident, that we neither do nor can comprehend him. And what absurd, and insufferable Consequences, this must needs draw after it in our Discourses of God, I leave to any one but the Author of this Assertion to judge.

But the Consequences of it, as bad as they are, do not stop in God. For in the 7th Page, our Author proceeds farther, and affirms, That it is so far from being a wonder to meet with any thing, *whose nature* (or rather the *Nature of which*) we do not perfectly understand, *that he knows nothing in the World which we do perfectly understand*, or, in his other word, *comprehend*, (for to understand a thing perfectly, and to comprehend it, I take to be the same.) And now let us apply his former Rule, viz. *That we cannot say what is, or is not a Contradiction, when we confess we do not comprehend the thing we speak of.* I say, let us apply this

this Rule here also ; and since he positively avers, That there is nothing in the World which we *do comprehend, or perfectly understand* : it must roundly follow, That there can be no such thing as a Contradiction ; since whatsoever is so, is, and must be a Contradiction to something or other. Now for the Truth and Reason of his Assertion, I cannot undertake, but certainly the Prudence and Forecast of it is admirable, as being like to do him Knight's Service (as I shall shew hereafter) at many a turn, and, next to a Convocation-Book, help him out at a dead Lift.

In the mean time, let us see how our Author makes good this strange and loose Proposition, *viz.* That there is nothing in the World, *that we perfectly understand*. And in order to this, Let us bring and lay together what he Asserts in several places. And here first in *Page 7. line 20. &c.* It is agreed by all Men, *That the Essences of things cannot be known, but only their Properties and Qualities* ; and *that the World is divided into Matter and Spirit* ; and *that we know no more what the substance of Matter, than what the substance of Spirit is* : and then he enumerates some of the Essential Properties of each, and owns that we *know them* (in Confirmation, I suppose, of his fore-going Assertion, *that we know nothing*.) After which, in *Page 8. line 15.* he adds, *As for the Essential Properties, Operations, and Powers of Matter, Sence, Experience, and Observation will tell us what they are*. And then I hope we may *know also what they are*, when *Sence and Experience has told us*. So that we see here what our Author asserts ; but may we rely upon it, and hold him to his Word ? Alas ! That, I fear, may prove something hard and unkind. For a Man, to whom *a whole Convocation has given a large scope and liberty of thinking*, and who has given himself as large an one for speaking, loves not, of

all things in the World, to be held too strictly to what he says. For in *Page 4. line 25.* reckoning up some of the Absurdities, and Contradictions attending the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, he tells us, *That we know them to be so*; because *we know the Nature of a Body* (and this also we must suppose said in further Confirmation of his other Assertion, that we know not the *Nature of any thing*) and moreover, *That we know that such things* (as he there mentions) *are a Contradiction to the Essential Properties of a Body, line 26.* All this he says here, and that in very plain terms. But in the 7th Page (in which it is high time for a Man to forget what he said in the 4th.) He tells us, *That the Essences of things cannot be known*; and consequently one would think, *That the Essence of a Body could not be known*: And yet for one to *know the nature of a Body*, (which in the 4th Page he says we do) without *knowing the Essence of it*; (which in the 7th Page he says, we cannot know) is, I conceive, a way of knowledge peculiar to this Author. In the next place, as for the property of things, he tells us very positively in *Page 8. line 33, 34.* *That the Properties and Operations both of Bodies and Spirits, are great Secrets, and Mysteries in Nature, which we understand nothing of, &c.* And yet in *Page 7. li. 32.* he tells us, *That we know the Essential Properties of a Spirit, that it is a thinking substance with the Faculties of Understanding and Will, &c.* Now to *know the Essential Properties of a Spirit*; And yet for these Properties to be *such Secrets and Mysteries in Nature, that we understand nothing of them*, (both which this Author expressly affirms in the compass of two Pages) is another sort of knowledge, which ought in all reason to be reckon'd peculiar to himself. And thus having consider'd some of his Assertions in Contradiction to one another (if there be any such thing as a Contradiction) I will consider some of them severally by themselves. And

And here, as I have already shewn, That he says positively *Page 4. line 28.* That we have no clear and comprehensive Notion of a Spirit : So he adds in the next words, That it is impossible to know what is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit, if we know not what the Nature of a Spirit is, i. e. Comprehensively, as he must still mean. But this, by his favour, I very much question, and desire him to tell me, Whether we may not know, That it is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit to be Material, to be extended, and to be compounded of the Elements, &c. These things I take to be such as are contrary to the Nature of a Spirit, and such as may be certainly known to be so, and consequently such as may safely, rationally, and consonantly to all Principles of Philosophy, be pronounced to be so : And therefore this Author's Assertion, viz. That it is impossible to know what is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit, if we have not a clear, comprehensive Notion of the Nature of a Spirit, is apparently False, Absurd, and Ridiculous.

But to proceed, This Author having said, That he knows nothing in the World that we do perfectly understand : And for the proof of it alledged, That the Essences of things cannot be known ; and for the farther proof of that, affirm'd, That the whole World is adequately divided into Matter and Spirit ; the Natures of which (as he says) are wholly unknown to us : Suppose now, I should (as I do) deny this whole Argument, and affirm, That there is a third sort of Beings, which are neither Matter, nor Spirit ; which yet (as to some of them, at least) may be perfectly understood and known by us ; and these are Accidents, which, according to the ablest Philosophers hitherto, do together with substance, make a much better, and more comprehensive Division of the whole World, than Matter and Spirit. For certain it is,

That *Accidents*, as contradistinct to *Substance*, are real Beings, and have their respective Essences and Properties belonging to them, and such as may be matter of Demonstration ; which kind of Argument is known to be the proving of any Property, or proper Attribute of its Subject, by a third thing, or Principle, bearing an Essential Connexion with both. And amongst *Accidents*, I do particularly affirm this of Numbers, Figures, and Proportions, that they are such things as may be perfectly understood by us in the strength of Natural Reason. For I think it may be perfectly, and comprehensively known, That two and two make four ; and that a Circle is a Figure, every part of the Circumference whereof is equidistant from the Centre ; and a thousand more such things, all which are capable of being Scientifically made out to us by Demonstration : And this indeed to such an height, that as some will admit of no Demonstrations, but in the Mathematicks, *viz.* in Numbers, Figures, and Proportions : so there are few, or none, but readily grant, That the Demonstrations about these Matters, are the Clearest, the most Scientifick, and Convincing of all other Demonstrations whatsoever. From all which I conclude, That what this Author has affirm'd, *viz.* *That there is nothing in the World but Matter and Spirit, and withal, That there is nothing which we do perfectly understand,* is not only a crude, loose, unwary, but really, and, in strictness of truth, a very false Assertion.

And therefore, though this Author pleaseth himself with a fanciful Harangue about our Ignorance of the Philosophy ; *How the Fire burns, and the Waters are condens'd* (as he calls it) *into Ice? How Stones fall to the Ground, and Vapours ascend and thicken in Clouds, and fall down again to the Earth in gentle Showres, &c.* (for it must be granted, That it is much easier

to change like the Weather, than to understand it) and moreover, though he is pleased to say, *That he who thinks he understands these matters, would make a Man question, Whether he has any sense at all?* (which is his usual Complement to most whom he deals with) yet all this confident Talk will neither clear him from the Absurdity and Paradox of the forementioned General Position laid down by him; nor convince such as are conversant in the experimental part of Natural Philosophy, but that a very true, rational, and satisfactory Account may be given of all the fore-mentioned Phænomena in Nature, which this Man, with so much Confidence, or rather Insolence, says, *No Man of unquestion'd Sence will pretend to give the Reason, or Philosophy of.* Accordingly I will direct him to some who took the boldnes to give a Philosophical Account of his *Unresolvable* Problems. As for instance, That of the congealing of Water by Cold, into such a solid Body as Ice, he will find excellently, and rationally accounted for, by the Learned Mr. Boyl, in his Treatise of *Cold*, containing new Experiments, and Observations touching it, and an Experimental History of it begun. Likewise a reason of the same given by those Learned French-men, the Authors of the *Philosophia Vetus & Nova*, commonly called, the *Colbertine Philosophy*, in the 2 Vol. p. 213, 214, 215, 216. And then, for the Descent of heavy Bodies, or Stones falling to the Ground; he will find the cause of it assigned by Galileo, in his *Systema Cosmicum*, Collat. 1. & 2. And since by Gassendus, in his Accurate Tract *de motu impresso à motore translato*. As also, an Account of the Gravitation, or Descent of such Bodies, judiciously given by Claudius Berigardus, Professor of Philosophy first in *Pisa*, and then in *Padua*, in his *Circulus Pisanus* 3d part, and the 6. Dial. p. 291, 292. in the Person of *Aristeus*. And last

last of all, in the Causes of Gravitation briefly, but ingeniously given by *Isaac Vossius*, in his *Observationes variae*, p. 201, &c. In like manner he will find a Philosophical, and Historical Account of Winds, by that great Man, the Lord *Bacon*, in his Treatise upon that Subject; which, I am sure, is as difficult an one, as any mentioned by this Author. And as for what he here says of the *Ascent of Vapours* (which is easily accounted for, from the Sun and other Celestial Bodies) and their *Descent again in Showres*; (which might easily be stated upon their own Gravity, being combined into bigger Bodies, as is lively exemplified in an Alembick) this Author ~~and~~ seems to give us some Philosophical Account of Rain, and consequently for presuming so to do, ought to bear his share in the same Reproach, which upon the like account he hath so insolently fastned upon others. But as touching Rain and Vapours, Snow and Frost, and innumerable more such Subjects; there is not a Natural Philosopher, whether *Peripatetick*, *Gassendian*, or *Cartesian* of any note, but professeth to give a Philosophical Reason of the Nature of them, both as to what they are, and how, and by what means they are caused. Concerning all which, Learned Men, who have avowedly travelled, and employed themselves in such Studies, and that with great Applause of all the Learned World; I desire his *Haugh-tiness* to speak out, and declare freely, whether he taketh them to have been such Persons, *as a Man would question*, *Whether they had any Sense, or no?* For as these famous Men were far from *denying their Senses*, in *Complement to their Understanding*; so they were as far from passing such a Complement upon their Senses, as to own, That their Understanding could look no farther, and that where *Sense* had started the Game, *Reason* might not follow it, and by a diligent, and sagacious pursuit, at length overtake

take it. The Things treated of by these mighty Searchers into Nature, I acknowledge to be very difficult ; but every thing that is difficult, is not therefore impossible, even to him that thinks it so. And therefore, as to the ignorance of such like matters, let our Author (in God's Name) and others like him, pronounce each Man for himself, and not undertake for others. For there may be several things, which one Man may not know, and yet others may : As for instance, It may sometimes so fall out, That a Man *may not know himself*, and yet others may *know him very well* : which is an Observation, I conceive, not unworthy of this Author's Remark.

But to go on : Whereas he is very positive, and decretry, *That the Essences of things cannot be known* : I very much question, (and allow him, if he pleases, to question my *Sense* also, for so doing) whether this be absolutely true ? For a thing may be known more ways than one ; and if it be perfectly known, any *one* way, according to the utmost extent of that way, it cannot be truly said, *not to be known*. Now, if by *knowing*, he means the knowledge of a thing, by a direct *Apprehension*, and *Intuition* of it, so as to have an exact Idea, or resemblance of it thereby imprinted upon the mind : I pretend not that the *Essences of things* are by any Humane Intellect so known. But then, this is still but one way of knowledge ; and what is not known one way, may (for all that) be very well known another. But if on the other side, by *knowing a thing* be meant, the knowing it to be of such, or such a Nature, by such peculiar Properties, such peculiar Effects, and Operations, as discriminate it from other things, and that, to know it thus, be truly to know it : Then I affirm, *That the Natures, or Essences of things may be truly, and (one way at least) perfectly known*. And accordingly, I think it a
very

very good Account of the Essence of any thing, to say, That it is such a thing as always, and necessarily has such Properties, such Operations, and produces such Effects. For this is an Answer, not only to that Question, that enquires, *Whether there be such a thing, or Essence, or no?* But also, and much more properly to the Question, that enquires, *What kind of Nature, or Essence such a thing is of?* For when that is askt, to say, in reply to it, That the Essence, or Nature of that thing is a certain Principle, always attended with such Properties, and always, or generally operating in such a manner, and producing such effects, is a full, and satisfactory Answer to that Question.

If now this Author replys here, that he grants, That the *Properties of things may be known*; I Answer, That sometimes indeed he grants it, and sometimes again he positively denies it, as I have shewn. But if in the issue he will stand by the Concession of it, then he must stand by the Consequence of that Concession too, and grant, That Properties are declaratory of the Quality of the Essence they flow from, and belong to. For, I hope, he will grant, that the effect declares the Nature of the Cause: And consequently that the Nature of the Cause may be known by it; not by way of simple and immediate *apprehension* of the Cause it self, I confess, but by way of Inference and Discourse, collecting one thing from another; which is one sure way of knowing. And therefore I do here affirm, and own to this Confident, Assuming Man, That to assert absolutely (as he does) *That the Essences of things cannot be known*, is, by no means, a justifiable Proposition; or, in the Latitude it is laid down in, to be admitted: But is really that fallacy, that concludes *à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*.

Well,

Well, but since this Author has concluded the whole World in Ignorance (himself, I suppose, still excepted from so general a Doom) What must we do in so sad a Condition? Must we all take up in Scepticism, and acknowledge, that nothing is to be known? What then will that old Principle of Nature, *πάντες ὁρῶσι τὸ εἶδος*, serve for, but to tantalize and torment us? For must we thus think, and thirst, and desire to know, and, after all, find nothing to be known with any thing of plainness, evidence, and demonstration? Why, Yes; to comfort us under this Cimmerian darkness, and to shew, that God has not given us our Intellectual Faculties wholly in vain: There is one certain thing in the World, *viz.* *The Doctrine of the Trinity*; That is, to say, *of three distinct Persons, all united in one and the same numerical Divine Nature*, which is *wonderfully plain, easie, and obvious to be known*: Though still, thanks to our Author for it, who by a New-found Exposition, and Explication of it, has bestowed this piece of Charity upon the World as to render it so. For thus, in *Page 58. line 2.* of his Book, Explaining the Union of the three Persons in the God-head, by *Self-Consciousness, and Mutual-Consciousness*, (which words shall be throughly considered in their due place) he says, *That this is very plain, and intelligible, and makes the three Persons to be as much one, as every Man is one with himself.* And certainly it is hardly possible for any thing to be more plain and clear, more evident and intelligible, than *that every Man is one with himself.* (Except it be only when he contradicts himself.) Again in *Page 65. line 31.* he tells us, *That his Notion of Self-Consciousness, and Mutual-Consciousness, seems to him to make a Trinity in Unity as intelligible, as the Notion of one God is.* And in *Page 66. line 2, 3.* *That it gives a plain, and intelligible Solution to all the Difficulties, and seeming Contradictions*

dictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity. And surely that thing, from which all difficulties are removed, and about which, all Contradictions are solved, cannot be imagined to have any difficulty remaining in it at all. And again, in *Page 68. line 26.* he roundly tells us, That the Explication given by him of *a Trinity in Unity, is a very plain and intelligible Account of this great and venerable Mystery; as plain and intelligible as the Notion of one God, or of one Person in the Godhead.*

And in good earnest, the Notion of one first Cause of all things, and of one Supreme Being, and consequently of one God, is so easily demonstrated, or rather, with such a broad light, stares all Mankind in the Face, even without any demonstration, that if the *Trinity in Unity* be as plain as this is, it is hardly possible for any thing to the Reason of Man to be plainer: and the *Arrians, and Socinians* are ten times more inexcusable, than ever I thought them before. Again, in *Page 73. line 11.* having affirmed, *The Trinity to be a most Sacred and Venerable Mystery;* within 6 or 7 Lines after, he says, *If Men would but consider it according to his Hypothesis* (which he there sets down) *then a Trinity in Unity is a very plain, intelligible Notion.* Again, in *Page 74. line 9.* There will appear (says he) *no difficulty, or absurdity in the essential Union of Three Minds by a mutual Consciousness to each other.* But will this Man conclude, That where there is no *Absurdity*, there is therefore no *Difficulty* neither? So that, that which removes one, must needs remove the other too? It is strange to me, That any one who pretends to argue closely, should place two words so vastly different upon the same level. But again, in *Page 82. line 30.* he tells us, *That this gives an intelligible account of one of the most difficult Problems in all School-Divinity, viz. That the whole Trinity is not greater than any*

any one Person in the Trinity. And again, in Page 85. line 14. This Notion (says he) gives a plain account too of that Maxime of the Schools, That all the Operations of the Trinity, ad extra, are common to all the Three Persons. So that by this time we see here all things relating to the Trinity, made plain, easie, and intelligible; and that, since this Man has shewed his skill upon it, all knots and difficulties are wholly cleared off; so that now none are to be found, though a Man should beat his Brains as much to find them, as Divines did heretofore to solve them. And therefore well may he magnifie the Exploits of such a Triumphant Hypothesis, as he does, first in his Preface, Page 1. line 13. (which though it be always placed first in Books, yet is generally written laſt) Having told us, That his Original Design was to vindicate the Doctrines of the Trinity, and Incarnation, from those pretended Absurdities, and Contradictions which were ſo confidently charged on them: He adds these words, This (says he) I am ſure I have done; for I have given a very easie and intelligible Notion of a Trinity in Unity. If he has, 'tis well. But (how great foever the assurance is, which he utters this with, as he had always a very great ſtock of it) I dare aver, That he has here ſaid more of himſelf, than any Divine of Note, ſince Christianity came into the World, ever durſt say, He was ſure of, before. But as high as this sounds, in Page 85. line 27. he raifes his Voice ſomething higher, or at leaſt is more particular in the Encomiums he bestows upon this his Performance in theſe words: Thus (says he) I have endeavoured to explain this great and venerable Mystery of a Trinity in Unity. And this I may ſay, That I have given not only a very poſſible, and a very intelligible Notion of it, but ſuch alſo, as is very agreeable to the Phrase, and Expressions of Scripture, ſuch as preserves the Maſtety of the Article, and ſolves all the diſculties

culties of it. By which account, as we see that our Author is not wanting to the Commendation of his own Hypothesis (as it is pitty but *Self-Consciousness*, and *Self-Commendation* should go together) so we see also, that he does it upon three distinct Heads, or Topicks, which, therefore, by his good leave, we will as distinctly consider.

And First, for it's being so agreeable to the *Phrase and Expressions of Scripture*, I hope amongst these, some consideration ought to be had of such Texts of Scripture, As that forementioned one in the *1 Corinth. 13. 12.* Where (no doubt, with reference to the Mysteries of the Gospel, of which this is one of the chief) *we are said to see but as through a glass darkly, and to know but in part, &c.* neither of which, can I perswade my self to think, is only another Expression for *knowing a thing plainly, easily, and intelligibly, and without any difficulty.* The like may be said of that place in *1 Pet. 1. 12.* where the Apostle speaking to the Saints, he wrote to, of the things reported to them by such as had preached the Gospel (amongst which, this Doctrine, doubtless, had it's place, or an equal difficulty at least) he adds, *That they were such things as the Angels desire to look into.* The Greek word is *ωδεινός*, which all Interpreters lay a peculiar weight and Emphasis upon; as importing both the earnest intention of the Inspector, and the difficulty of the object inspected, from the Posture of such as use to stoop down for the better discerning of such things as cannot otherwise be well perceived, or look'd into. And now, is not this (think we) a most proper and fit posture for such as view and look into things very *plain, obvious, and intelligible?* And yet, I doubt not, but the *Angels*, who are said to use it, could very easily give us the Philosophy of *Rain, Snow, and Ice, of the Fires burning, and the descent of Stones,*

Stones, and other heavy Bodies, which yet this Author will allow no Man of sense and reason (without forfeiting the reputation of both) to presume to give a Philosophical Account of: Whereas, in the mean time, the Trinity is declared to be a very plain, easie, and intelligible Notion, even to such Persons as can give no such Account of the other. And thus much for the Agreement of his Hypothesis with the Phrase and Expressions of Scripture.

The next head of its commendation is, That it preserves the *Majesty* of this great Article (as he words it:) But in much the same sense, I suppose, as his *Refusing the Oath*, preserved the *Majesty* of King *William*, and his taking it, the *Majesty* of K. *James*: But, that it preserves it so, as to have a singular virtue to encrease Men's *Veneration* of it, this I very much question, and demur to: forasmuch as that old Observation that *Familiarity breeds Contempt*, holds too frequently, as well as undeservedly, no less in Things than in Persons; which we are more apt to venerate at a distance, than upon a clear, plain, and full knowledge of them. I do not say, That Men ought to do thus; but such is the present state of Nature, that thus they use to do. And it is worth our marking; That where a Man is said to know a thing perfectly, he is said *To be Master of it*; and *Mastership* (one would think) is not naturally apt to create in the mind, any great awe for the thing, it is thus Master of. But be it, as it may; this I am sure of, That as the Scripture tells us, *That things revealed belong to us*, so the same Scripture tells us also, *That there are secret things, which (by a kind of sacred enclosure) belong only to God*, Deut. 29. 29. And till God shall think fit to reveal to us the Nature of the *Trinity*, I, for my part, shall reckon it amongst those *Secret things*: And, accordingly, with all the Pious submission of an humble Reason

Reason falling down before it, adore and admire it at a distance; not doubting, but that for this very cause, That Men should do so, God in his Infinite Wisdom thought fit to spread such a Cloud and Veil over it. And therefore I cannot but think, that that Man expressed the due measures of our behaviour to this, and the likeMysteries, extremely well; who being pressed in the Schools with an Argument from the Trinity, in opposition to the Question held by him, gave it no other Answer but this: *Magister, hoc Mysterium Trinitatis ex quo argumentaris, est potius flexis genibus adorandum, quam curiosâ nimis indagine ventilandum.* The Respondent who made this Reply, had the Repute of a Learned and Eloquent Man; and I think this Reply represents him a very Pious, and Discreet one too.

And therefore, as for the third and last Topick, upon which our Author would recommend his Hypothesis about the Trinity, *viz.* *That it solves all the difficulties of it.* I fear, from what hath been last said, that it will prove as far from being a *Commendation*, as it is from being a *Truth*; especially when the Author himself, after his saying so, in page 85. immediately adds, and that in the very next words, Page 86. line 1. *That there may be a great deal more in this Mystery than we can fathom, &c.* But now, if our Author will in this manner utter one Assertion, and immediately after it subjoyn another which quite overthrows it, who can help this? *For that a great deal more should remain in this Mystery than we can fathom*, or that there can be any thing unfathomable in that, in which there is nothing difficult; or that any thing can be difficult, after such an Explication given of it, as *solves all the difficulties of it* (for that is his very word in Page 85. the last Line) I must freely confess, surpasses my Understanding, to conceive; and God bless his Understanding, if it can. It

It must be confessed indeed (as I hinted before in my Preface) that in a short Treatise lately Published by him, and entituled, *An Apology for Writing against the Socinians*, he seems to deny the Notion of a Trinity to be comprehensible and easie, Page 15. telling us, "That there Some Re-
" must be infinite degrees of knowledge, where the Object is marks
" Infinite; and that every new degree is more perfect than upon his
" that below it: and yet no Creature can attain the highest
" degree of all, which is a perfect Comprehension; so that the
" knowledge of God may encrease every day, and Men may
" write plainer and plainer about these matters every day,
" without pretending to make all that is in God, even a Tri-
" nity in Unity, comprehensible and easie, which he calls, a
" Spightful and Scandalous Imputation. By which angry
words it is manifest, that he would fain rid himself from
those Inconveniences which his former unwary, and ab-
furd Assertions had involved him in. But by his favour,
the Truth of the Charge shall take off the Scandal from
such as make it, wheresoever else it may fix it. For I
have fully shewn, That in this his *Vindication*, &c. he
has frequently (and as clearly as words can express a
thing) affirmed, a Trinity in Unity to be a plain, easie, in-
telligible Notion: Where, by Plain must be understood
either 1st. such a Plainness, as excludes all Doubts and
Difficulties whatsoever: In which sense alone a thing
can be said to be simply and absolutely plain: And in this
sense also it can admit of none, and much less of Infinite
degrees of plainer and plainer; since that, which excludes
all doubts, certainly can exclude no more. Or 2dly, The
word may be taken in a Lax, Popular, and Improper
sense; for that which is so Plain, as to have no consider-
able doubt, or difficulty remaining about it. But,
now, the Notion which Men have of God, or of the
Trinity, can never be truly said to be Plain, in either of
these

these Senses, and therefore not at all. For in the first, to be sure, it cannot : No, nor yet in the second. For let Men know never so much of any Object, yet if there remains more of that Object actually unknown, than either is, or can be known of it, such a knowledge can never render, or denominate the Notion of that Object (even in the common sense of the word) *Plain*. And so, I hope, our Author will allow it to be in the *knowledge*, Men have of *God*, and the *Blessed Trinity*. And, whereas he lays no small stress upon this, *That Men may write plainer and plainer of these matters every day*: I must here remind him, That the word *Plainer* in the Comparative Degree does not couch under it the *positive* signification of *Plain*, but denotes only a less degree of difficulty, and signifies no more than, That a Thing, or Notion, is not quite so difficult, or obscure, as it was before ; which it may very well not be, and yet be far from being *Plain*, in either of the two foregoing senses, laid down by us. And therefore, though we should admit, *That Men might write plainer and plainer of the Trinity every day*; yet I affirm notwithstanding, that the *Notion of a Trinity in Unity*, can in no sense be truly said to be *plain and easie*, and much less, *very plain and easie*, as this Author has expressly affirmed it. So that if this be a *Scandalous Imputation*, it is easie to judge, to whom the Scandal of it must belong.

But besides all this, I see no cause to grant this Author that, which he so freely takes for granted, (for I think it very questionable) viz. *That Men may write plainer and plainer of the Trinity every day*. For, so far as the Writers of the Church have informed us about this great Mystery, the Catholick Church for above these 1200. Years past, has not only had, and held the same Notion of a Trinity, but has also expressed it in the same way

way and words, with the Church at this very day. And for so much of this Mystery, as Divines could give no Account of then, neither have they given any clearer Account of it ever since ; nor has the Church hitherto advanced one step further in this Subject : which is an evident demonstration, that it has already proceeded as far in it, as the Reason of Man could, or can go. And as for any further Discoveries of it, which this Author pretends to from two Phantaftick words, found out by himself, it will not be long, before they shall be throughly weighed in the Balance, and found as inconsiderable as the *Dust of it*.

But there is one thing more, which I must not pass over ; and it is this : That in the Passage, I transcribed from him, he lays down that for a certain Principle, which is indeed an Intolerable Absurdity, viz. *That where the Object is infinite, there must be infinite degrees of knowledge.* Now it is most true, That nothing but *Infinite knowledge can adequately comprehend an infinite Object.* For which reason, God alone can comprehend himself, and he does it by one simple, indivisible act, uncapable of Parts, or *Degrees.* But as for *Degrees* of any sort, whether of *knowledge*, or any thing else, nothing but a Finite Being is capable of them ; and therefore for this Man to assert *infinite degrees of knowledge*, when Uncreated knowledge is uncapable of *Degrees*, and Created knowledge uncapable of *Infinite Degrees*, is a gross thick piece of Ignorance, in the first, and commonest Rudiments of Philosophy.

But to return to his Absurdities about the *plainness, and easiness of the Notion of a Trinity in Unity*, and therein to be as short with him as I can, I shall only demand of him, Whether he does in this *Apology* retract and renounce all that in his *Vindication* he has Asserted quite contrary to what he has since delivered in his *Apology.*

If he does, let him declare so much, and I have done ; but till then, no regard at all ought to be had to his *Apology* ; as serving for nothing else, but to shew, That according to his accustomed way, and known Character, he has denied some things in one of his Books, which he had positively, and expressly affirmed in another ; and consequently proving, *That the Apology, which denies a Trinity in Unity to be comprehensible and easie, and the Vindication, which forty times over affirms it to be plain and easie* ; nay, *very plain and easie*, ought to pass for the genuine, undoubted Works of this Author, though they had never born his Name.

Wherefore upon the Result of all, what shall we, or what can we say to the fore-cited Particulars, which with so much positiveness over and over assert the *plainness, and intelligibility of the Notion of a Trinity !* Which yet has hitherto amazed and nonplus'd the whole Christian Church. For if it be really so *plain and intelligible*, as this Author tells us, it must to my Apprehension unavoidably follow, either that a *Mystery is a very plain intelligible Notion*, or that the *Trinity is no Mystery*. I shall not here presume to take this Author's beloved word out of his Mouth, and cry *Nonsense, and Contradiction*. But certainly if the *Trinity be a Mystery*, and a *Mystery in the nature of it imports something hidden, abstruse, and by bare reason not to be understood* ; then to say, *we may have a plain, as well as an intelligible Notion of it* ; nay, *plain even to a demonstration* ; this, to say no more, is as like a *Contradiction*, as ever it can look.

But really our Author has shewn himself very kind and communicative to the World : For as in the beginning of his Book he has vouchsafed to instruct us how to judge of *Contradictions* ; so in the Progress of his Work he has condescended to teach us (if we will but learn)

Icarn) how to speak and write Contradictions too. There remains therefore only one favour more, viz. That he would vouchsafe to teach us how to reconcile them also. For I, for my own part, think it every whit as hard a task to reconcile Contradictions, *as to reconcile* Protestants ; and, I hope, much harder. And yet this latter he has endeavoured to prove in a certain Book, wrote by him in the Year 1685, a thing not to be done. But whether it can, or no, I am sure, he has hardly published any Book since, but what manifestly proves, *That there is great need of some Reconciler to do the other.*

But why do I speak of reconciling Contradictions ? It would be a very troublesome work, if it could be done ; and a very uncomfortable one, when it could not : And therefore our Author (to give him his due) has attempted a much surer, and more compendious way of clearing himself of this imputation, than such a long and tedious way of reconciling inconsistent Propositions, could possibly have been. For having Asserted, *That we cannot justly charge a Contradiction, where we cannot comprehend the Nature of the thing said to be contradicted*; and that, in the next place, *there is nothing in the World (which he knoweth of) the Nature of which we can thoroughly understand, or comprehend*: I hope it follows, That, where nothing can or ought to be contradicted, none can be guilty of a Contradiction. And this, I suppose, none will deny to be an Expedient, every way answerable, and equal to our Author's Occasions : For otherwise I cannot see what can stand between him and the charge of many Scurvy, Contradictory Assertions ; but that which shall effectually prove, and make out to us, *That indeed there neither is, nor can be any such thing as a Contradiction.*

Answer to the Protestant Reconciler, Chap. 3.

C H A P. II.

Containing an Account of several Terms, commonly made use of in Discourfing of the Divine Nature and Persons ; and particularly shewing the Propriety of applying the Words, Essence, Substance, Nature, Infinity, and the like, to this great Subject ; and lastly proving this Author's Exceptions against the use of them about the same, false, groundless, and impertinent.

OUR Author seems so desirous to advance nothing upon this sublime Subject, but what shall be perfectly new, that in order to the making way for his particular Novelties, he Quarrels with almost all the old words, which Divines, in their Discourses about the Divine Nature, and Persons, were heretofore accustomed to make use of. He can by no means approve of the words *Essence*, *Substance*, *Nature*, *Subſtance*, and such like ; as reckoning them the *Causes of all the Difficulties, and seeming Absurdities*, that are apt to perplex Mens minds in their Speculations of the Deity, and the Trinity, 4 Sect. p. 68, 69, 70. and therefore they must be laid aside, and made to give way to other Terms, which he judges properer, and more accommodate to those Theories. To which purpose, though our Author has fixed upon two purely of his own Invention, (which are to do such

such wonderful feats upon this Subject, as in all past Ages were never yet seen nor heard of before, and which I therefore reserve in due place to be considered of particularly by themselves) yet at present the Author seems most concerned to remove, and cashier the fore-mentioned useless, cumbersome words, and to substitute some better, and more useful, in their room: Such as *Eternal Truth and Wisdom, Goodness and Power, Mind and Spirit, &c.* which being once admitted, and applyed to all Disputes about the Divine Nature (and an *Act of Exclusion* past upon the other) the way will become presently smooth and open before us, and all things relating to the Mystery of the Trinity (according to our Author's own excellent words) be made *very plain, easie, and intelligible*. Nevertheless, *as I may so speak* (to borrow another of our Author's Elegancies) *let not him that putteth on his Armour boast as he that putteth it off*. A great *Promissor*, with a great *Hiatus*, being much better at raising an expectation, than at answering it. And hitherto I can see nothing but words, and vapour: Though after all, it is Performance, and the issue of things alone that must shew the strength and reasen of the biggest *Pretences*.

Now for the clearer, and more distinct discussion of the matter in hand, I shall endeavour to do these 4 things.

I. I shall shew, That the ground upon which this Author excepts against the use of the Terms, *Nature, Essence, Substance, Subsistence, &c.* in this Subject, is false and mistaken.

II. I shall shew, That the same Difficulties arise from the Terms, *Truth, Wisdom, Goodness, Power, &c.* used for the Explication of the Divine Being, that are objected against *Essence, Substance, Nature, and the like*.

III.

III. I shall shew, That these Terms do better, and more naturally explain the Deity, or Divine Being, than those other of *Truth, Wisdom, Goodness, &c.* And,

IV. And Lastly, I shall shew, That the Difficulty of our Conceiving rightly of the Deity, and the Divine Persons, does really proceed from other Causes.

These four things, I say, I will give some brief Account of.

But because the Subject, I am about to engage in, is of that Nature, that most of the *Metaphysical, and School-Terms*, hitherto made use of by Divines upon this occasion, will naturally, and necessarily fall in with it, I think it will contribute not a little to our more perspicuous proceeding in this Dispute, to state the Import and Signification of these Terms, *Essence, Substance, Existence, Subsistence, Nature and Personality*, with such others, as will, of course, come in our way, while we are treating of, and explaining these. And here, first of all, according to the old Peripatetick Philosophy, which, for ought I see, (as to the main Body of it at least) has stood it's ground hitherto against all Assaults : I look upon the Division of *Ens, or Being* (a summary word for all things) into *Substance* and *Accident*, as the Primary, and most Comprehensive (as we hinted before in our first Chapter.) But that I may fix the sense and signification of these Terms, all along as I go, by giving them their respective Definitions, or at least Descriptions, where the former cannot be had, I look upon *Ens, or Being*, to be truly and well defined, *That which is*; tho, I must confess, it is not so much a perfect Definition, as a Notation of the word from the original Verb *est*. For to define it by the Term *Essence*, by saying, *That Ens, or Being, is that which has an Essence*, though it be a true Proposition,

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Proposition, yet I believe it not so exactly proper a Definition ; since the Terms of a Definition ought to be rather more known than the thing defined : Which in the fore-mentioned Case is otherwise. As for *Substance*, I define that to be a *Being not inhering in another* ; that is to say, so existing by it self, as not to be subjected in it, or supported, this way, by it. *Accident*, I define, a *Being inherent in another*, as in a Subject supporting it, and without which it cannot exist, or support it self. Which Division being made by Terms contradictory, viz. *Inhering in another*, and *not inhering in another*, must needs be adequate, and perfect, and fully comprehensive of the whole that is divided thereby.

But now, besides these two Terms of *Substance* and *Accident*, there is another assigned by Logicians, Metaphysicians, and School-men, called, a *Mode of Being*, viz. such a thing, as being added to another, does not make any addition of another Being, or degree of Being to it, but only restrains, and determines it ; and may be defined an *Affection of a thing, or Being*, by which the Nature of it, otherwise indeterminate and indifferent, is determined to some certain respect, state, or condition. Thus, whereas the Nature of a thing may be considered either as yet in it's Causes, or as actually produced, and existing out of them, either of these is a *Mode* of that Nature ; the first rendring it only *Potential*, the other *Actual* : Nor is this a meer *Ens Rationis*, forasmuch as it affects the Being of a thing antecedently to any Operation of the mind passing upon it. And the Reason assigned by some Logicians for the allowing and asserting these *Modes*, is this : That some things must necessarily be admitted to belong to *Being*, which are not *Beings* themselves, to prevent an *Infinite progress in Beings*. For since every thing is capable of being defined, or described,

bed, and yet nothing can be defined merely by it self, (an Identical Proposition being no Definition) it must needs be defined by some thing or other, distinct from it self ; but now if that be also a *Being*, then that likewise must be defined by another *Being*, and that by another, and so on *in infinitum* ; which would be most absurd : whereas, if this definition, or description of a thing be made by some *Modus of it*, which is not strictly and properly a *Being* it self, the thing presently stops here, without any necessity of proceeding to any more *Beings*. But perhaps it will be here said, if these *Modes* are not so many meer *Nothings*, or *Entia Rationis*, what order, or rank shall they be placed in ? Since those ten heads of *Being*, which we call *Prædicaments*, cannot seem the proper Receptacles of things, which we own not to be properly, or formally, *Beings*. I Answer. That though they are not *Beings*, properly so called, and so not directly, and upon their own Account, placeable under any of the Ten fore-mentioned Heads of *Being* ; yet since they are Appendages of *Being*, as cleaving to it, and depending upon it, they are accounted under, and reduced to those respective Heads, or *genera* of *Being*, to which the *Beings* modified by them, do directly belong. Now the Nature of these *Modi* being thus accounted for, we are, in the next place, to take notice of the *difference* resulting from them, which we call *Modal* ; and that is either between two, or more, such *Modes* differing from one another ; as the Personalities belonging to several Persons, differ amongst themselves ; or when a thing, or *Being*, differs from the Mode affecting it ; or Lastly, when several things thus modified, or affected, do by virtue of those Modes differ from one another ; and thus the Persons in the Blessed Trinity may be said to differ amongst themselves.

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I proceed now to those other Terms of *Essence*, *Existence*, *Nature*, *Subsistence*, and *Personality*. And first for *Essence*: as I shewed, that *Ens*, or *Being*, might be truly defined, *That which is*; so *Essence* may be as truly and properly defined, *That by which a thing is what it is*; that is to say, by which it is Constituted in such a kind, or order of *Being*: And this difference I take to be founded in the different ground, upon which we conceive of the same thing. Accordingly the *Essence* of a thing, no less than the thing it self, may be considered, either as yet in the *Power of its Causes*, and only producible by them, or as *actually existing*, and produced by them. By which we see, that an *Essence*, as such, may be indifferent to exist, or not exist; and that from hence springs the difference between *Essence* and *Existence*. There is indeed a Reality ascribed to it, even without *Existence*: But that is not properly a reality in the thing it self, but partly in respect of the power of its *Causes* enabling them to produce it; and partly, because it is properly the Subject of *Science*, and capable of having true Propositions formed of it, and Demonstrations built upon it: As we may form as true Propositions of a Rose in Winter, and demonstrate all the Properties of it, as of their proper Subject, by their proper respective Principles, as well, as while it is actually flourishing upon the Tree. And this is all the reality which I think can be ascribed to *Essence*, in its separation from *Existence*. As for *Existence* it self, it may be defined, that *Mode*, or *Affection of Being*, by which *a thing stands actually produced out of the power of its Causes*; or, at least, not actually included in any Cause; in which sense God himself does exist. From whence it appears, That in Created Beings, *Essence* bears no such necessary Connexion with *Existence*, since it is not necessarily included in the Nature

ture of any finite Being, that it must needs be produced, or actually Exist. But it must be confessed, That *Existence* being a perfection, and, in God especially, a very great one, must of necessity be included in his very *Essence*, as containing in it (formally, or eminently) all sorts, or degrees of perfection. The next Term is *Subsistence*, which is a Mode of Being, by which a thing exists by it self, without existing in another, either as a part in the whole, or an *Adjunct* in the *Subject*. I say an *Adjunct*, not an *Accident*, for a Substance may be an *Adjunct*. And, I think, if we would assign a way, by which the humane Nature of Christ exists in the Person of the λόγος, we shall hardly find out a fitter, than to say, That it exists in it, as an *Adjunct* in the *Subject*. For it is certain, That it does not exist in it, as a part in the whole; since by this means, the second Person in the Trinity, must, till his Incarnation, have wanted one part of his Person. But I shall not be positive in the Application of this Term here. In the mean time it must be observed, That *Essence* and *Subsistence* really differ, (so far as a Modal difference is reduced to a Real) not only in Created Beings, but also in Uncreate. In Created, it is evident; forasmuch as a part divided from the whole, loses the Subsistence which it had from thence, but still continues its Existence, as being still a Substance actually subsisting by it self, and not inhering in any *Subject*, as Accidents do. Nor is it less evident in the Deity it self, and the Divine Persons belonging to it. For one and the same undivided *Existence*, as well as one and the same *Essence* or Nature belongs to all the three Persons equally, whereas yet every Person has his own proper distinct *Subsistence* by himself; which must make as great a difference between Existence and Subsistence, as that which unites several Persons into one Nature, and that which

which personally distinguishes them from one another. And then also for Christ's Person, with reference to his humanity ; though this *subsists* by the Subsistence of the *λόγος*, yet it do's not properly *subsist* by the *Existence of it*, (since every distinct Nature must have its own distinct *Existence*) which shews, That even in the Oeconomy of this Divine Person, *Existence* and *Subsistence* must be considered as formally different ; since something, we see, may relate to, and be affirmed of one, which cannot be affirmed of, or bear the same relation to the other. Now, whatsoever Being, or Nature, this *Mode of Subsistence* does belong to, that is properly called a *Suppositum* ; as being a thing, which by no means exists in any other, but as a Basis, or foundation, supports such things, or Beings, as exist in it ; from which also it receives its Name of *ὑπόστασις*. And the Consequence of this is, That as *Subsistence* makes a thing, or Being, a *Suppositum* ; so suppositality makes it *incommunicable* ; since that which makes it incapable of existing in another, must also hinder it from being *Communicated* to another. And another Consequence of the same is, That every *Suppositum*, or *Being*, *thus Subsisting by it self*, is a compleat Being ; that is, such an one as is not made for the *Completion of any other* : For whatsoever is so, must naturally exist in it, as a *part* does in the *whole*, or at least be originally designed so to do. This Account being given of *Subsistence*, and of a *Suppositum*, which is Constituted such by it, it, will be easie to give an Account also what a *Person* is ; which is properly defined *Suppositum Rationale*, or *Intelligens*. So that as a *Suppositum* is *substantia singularis completa per se subsistens* ; so the *Ratio Intellectiva*, being added to this, makes it a *Person*, which is a farther perfection of Suppositality , and the utmost perfection of Subsistence, as Subsistence and Suppositality is the utmost

Bound and Perfection of Existence in all Beings not Intelligent.

If it be here now asked : Whether *Subsistence*, or *Suppositality* added to bare *Nature*, does not make a Composition ? I Answer, That in Created finite Persons it does, but not in Uncreated and Infinite : And the reason is, Because though all Composition implies Union; yet all Union, is not therefore a Composition, but something higher and transcendental ; so that in the Divine Persons of the Trinity, the Divine Nature, and the Personal Subsistence coalesce into one, by an Incomprehensible, Ineffable kind of Union and Conjunction. And if this does not satisfie, (as I think it rationally may) I must needs profess, That my Thoughts and Words can neither rise higher, nor reach further.

Having thus slated and fixed the signification of the fore-mentioned Terms, I cannot but remark these two things of the Term, or Word, *Essence*. As,

1. That it is sometimes taken not only for the *Ratio formalis entis*, but simply and absolutely for an entire Entity, or Being it self. And,

2. That those two other Terms, *Nature* and *Form*, are for the most part used as Terms equipollent, and of the same signification with it : *Nature* being the *Essence* of a thing considered as an Active, Productive Principle ; and *Form* being the *Essence*, or *Nature* of a thing, as it is the chief Principle, giving Being and Perfection to it, in the way of Composition. Nevertheless it is sometimes also applyed to simple uncompounded Natures promiscuously with the other. So that we see here, That *Essence*, *Form*, and *Nature*, generally taken, are only three formally distinct Considerations of one and the same thing ; which I thought fit to take notice of, to prevent all cavil, or mistake about the use of these Terms.

I have now gone over, and severally given an Account of the Notions of *Being*, *Substance*, *Accident*, *Modes of Being*, *Essence*, *Form*, *Nature*, *Subsistence* and *Personality*; and hereby, I hope, laid some foundation for our clearer, and more intelligible discoursing of the great Article we have undertook to rescue from a false *Vindication*: There being hardly any one of all the foregoing Terms, of which a clear and distinct Notion is not highly requisite to a clear, explicite, and distinct consideration of the Subject now before us. Concerning which, I think fit to note this, That (so far as I can judge) the thing now in dispute is not, what fully and exactly expresses, or represents the Nature of God (for nothing can do that:) But what is our best and most rational way of conceiving and speaking of him, and subject to fewest Inconveniences; and for this, we shall debate it, whether this Author, or we take the best course.

These things being thus premised, and laid down, we shall now resume the four Heads first proposed to be spoken of by us, and Discourse of them severally: And,

1. I shall shew, That the Ground upon which this Author excepts against the use of the Terms *Substance*, *Essence*, *Subsistence*, &c. in treating of this Subject, is false, and mistaken. His Exceptions against them we find in Page 68, 69, and 70. of his Book. “*The great difficulty* (says he) *of conceiving a Trinity of Persons in one Infinite and undivided Essence, or Substance, arises from those gross and material Ideas, we have of Essence and Substance, when we speak of the Essence, or Substance of God, or Created Spirits.* We can form no Idea of Substance, but what we have from matter; that is something extended in a triple dimension of length, breadth, and depth, which is the Subject of those Qualities, which are here

" here and subsist in it. And therefore, as matter is the
 " Subject of all sensible Qualities, so we conceive some such
 " Substance of a Mind, or Spirit, which is the Subject of
 " Will and Understanding, Thoughts and Passions; and
 " then we find it impossible to conceive how there should be
 " three Divine Persons, which are all Infinite without three
 " distinct Infinite Substances, each distinct Infinite Person
 " having a distinct Infinite Substance of his own: And if
 " we grant this, it seems a plain Contradiction to say, That
 " these three distinct Infinite Substances are but one Numeri-
 " cal Infinite Substance, &c. Thus far our Author: And
 I freely grant, That this does not only seem (as he says)
 but really is a *Contradiction*. And, before I have done
 with him, I will prove to him also, That to say, *That*
three distinct Infinite Minds are but one Numerical Infinite
Mind, (which shall be effectually laid at his Door) or,
That three distinct Infinite Minds, are not three distinct In-
finites Substances, or Essences, are as gross, and palpable
Contradictions as the other. But he goes on in the same
 Page a little lower. " *We know nothing* (says he) *of the*
 " *Divine Essence, but that God is an Infinite Mind; and if*
 " *we seek for any other Essence, or Substance in God, but an*
 " *Infinite Mind; that is, Infinite Wisdom, Power, and*
 " *Goodness, the Essence of God, though considered but as*
 " *one Numerical Person is as perfectly unintelligible to us, as*
 " *the one Numerical Essence, or Substance of three Divine*
 " *Persons in the ever-blessed Trinity.* In which words, I
 think this Author guilty of a double Absurdity. One,
 That he supposes a *Mind* not to be an *Essence, or Sub-*
stance; and it is manifest, that he does so, since he finds
 fault with *Substance*, and puts *Mind* in the room of it:
 Whereas a *Mind* is really a *Substance, or Nothing;* not
 that there is *nothing* in the World besides *Substance*, but
 nothing else which a *Mind* can be properly said to be.
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His other Absurdity is, his supposing *Mind, Wisdom, Power,* and *Goodness,* to be the same; whereas *Wisdom* and *Goodness,* are not properly a *Mind,* but the Affections, or Attributes of a *Mind.* And here let not our Author tell me, That they are all one and the same thing in God: For that is no News; yet nevertheless, *Mind, Wisdom, Power, Goodness, &c.* are *formally* distinct from one another, and so not affirmable of one another: And in speaking of things, the *formal* differences of them must still be attended to: God's *Justice* and his *Mercy* are one pure simple *Act* in Him; but he that says, His *Justice* is his *Mercy,* speaks absurdly for all that: And he who says, That a *Mind* is *Wisdom,* or *Goodness,* or *Power, &c.* speaks just at the same rate.

But again in *Page 70.* “ *It is this gross and material imagination* (says he) *about the Essence and Substance of the Deity, which occasions all the difficulties about the Notion of one God, as well as of a Trinity in Unity.* For *we cannot imagine how any Substance should be without a beginning, how it should be present in all places without parts and without extension, how Substance, Essence, Existence, and all Divine Attributes and Powers (which are distinct things in Created Spirits) should be all the same and one simple Act in God, &c.* From all which we are (according to this Author) to conclude, That the Terms *Substance, Essence, and Existence,* ought to be laid aside in all Discourses of the Deity; as serving for nothing but to cause in us those false Notions of it. Nor are those only excepted against, but also all *Divine Attributes and Powers;* for in his last words (newly quoted) he equally joyns and puts them all together. And what monstrous work this must needs make in our Conceptions and Discourses of God, shall, I hope, in the proceſs of this Dispute, be made to appear.

In order to which, I do here first of all in opposition to what this Author has Asserted about *Substance* and *Matter*, lay down this Proposition, *viz.* That Substance in the proper Nature, and Notion of it, includes no Communication with, or respect to Matter at all. And this I prove to him by one plain Argument, before I proceed to any thing that is Metaphysical, *viz.* *That there was Substance in the World before ever there was Matter*; and therefore the Notion of the former does not essentially include in it the Notion of the latter: For, surely, if the Being of one might be without the Being of the other, the Notion of the one may be no less without the Notion of the other too. Now that there was Substance in the World before Matter, I prove from this, That there was a *Being existing by it self*, in the World, before Matter, and therefore there was *Substance*: For this is the very definition of *Substance*, *That it is a Being existing by it self*, and consequently they must reciprocally infer one another, as the definition and the thing defined by it always do. And then, that there was a *Being thus existing by it self*, before Matter, is proved from hence, *That there was a Being which produced Matter*, which nothing but a Being existing by it self could do. And now I would fain know of our Author, Whether we may not have a clear and distinct Conception of such a Being, without so much as thinking of Matter. And if we may, (as I see nothing to hinder us) then it is false, that the Notion of Substance does necessarily engage our thoughts in, or confound them with the Idea of Matter. Besides, all the World does, and must allow, that we may have a full and perfect Conception of a *Genus*, or Generical Nature of a thing, without considering any of its *Species*. And withall, that it is impossible, that such a Generical Nature should include in it any one of the Specifick

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cifick Differences of the things, which it is Communicable to, and which are contained under it ; for if so, then one *Species* would include in it the Specifick difference of the other opposite *Species* ; forasmuch as including in it the Generical Nature, it must include all that is included in that Nature too : Which would be infinitely absurd. But now Substance is a Generical Nature, equally communicable both to Material and Immaterial Substances, as to two distinct *Species* ; and consequently in its Precise Conception, implys nothing of Materiality in it ; and for that cause may be conceived and known, and distinctly represented to our minds without it. Nay, and to shew further the difference between *Substance*, and *Matter* in the proper Notions of each, This Proposition, *Substance is not Matter*, is certainly true ; true, I say, particularly though not universally ; that is, with reference to all those Substances, the Nature of which excludes all Matter, as the Nature of Angels, and of the Souls of Men, confessedly does. But now, if the general Nature of Substance essentially implyed in it Matter, it could not be truly said of any one particular Substance in the World, *That it is not Matter*. Mr. Hobbs I know, makes *Substance* and *Matter* Commensurate, or rather the same. But methinks, though some have lately wrote after him in his lewd Politicks, no Divine should venture to fall in with him in his Natural Philosophy too, for fear of some certain Consequences, which, it is too well known, must follow from it. In a word, the first thing to be conceived in God, is, *That he is a Being* ; the next, *That he is a Being existing by it self* ; that is, in other words, *He is a Substance* : And therefore, I hope, we may both form an Idea of Substance, and afterwards apply it to God, without plunging our selves into the gross Imaginations

nations of Matter. And so far do all other Divines, and Philosophers differ from this Man, that they affirm the word *Substance* much more properly, and really applicable to God, than to any of the Creatures ; which certainly it could never be, if it implied any such essential cognition to Matter, either in the Nature, or Notion of it.

It is evident therefore, That there is no necessity from the thing it self to justifie this Author's Obje~~c~~tion. And as for those gross and Material Imaginations of Substance, taken up and borrowed from Material Corporeal things, nothing can be inferred from thence to his purpose. For is it good arguing to conclude, That because a thing is actually thus or thus, it cannot possibly be otherwise? Do not some form to themselves gross and absurd Imaginations of God the Father, from that Expression of the *Ancient of Days*, Dan. 7.9. representing Him to their thoughts, as an Old Man sitting in Heaven ? But may not others therefore, who are wiser, conceive more worthily of him, without laying aside that Scripture-expression ? If it be a good Argument (as it is all our Author brings) that Terms, which may occasion gross and Material Imaginations in the minds of Men, ought not to be applyed to God ; then I hope it is as much an Argument in one thing as in another. And accordingly I desire to know of him, Whether the Terms *Begetting*, and *being begot*, *Father* and *Son*, are not very fitly applyed to, and used about the Divine Persons ? And if so, Whether they are not altogether as hard to be abstracted from material Imaginations, as the Notions of *Essence*, or *Substance* are, or rather, indeed, much harder ? I believe all thinking Men will conclude they are. Nay, and I shall venture to tell him further, That these two words, partly through their Corporeal signification, and partly through

through the weakness of Men's minds, have occasioned more difficulties about the Notion of a *Deity*, and a *Trinity* too, than ever the words *Essence*, or *Substance* did, or perhaps could do: And yet, for all that, the Spirit of God has thought fit to make use of them to express so sacred a Mystery by. But this Man should have remembered, That how gross and Material soever the Representations of things are, which our senses first make to us, there is a *Judicium Correctivum* in Reason, as the superior faculty, which is to consider and separate what is gross and Material in them, from what is otherwise, till at length by rejecting some Notions, and retaining others, it finds out something even in the most Material things, which may truly, properly, and becomingly be applyed to the purest and most Immortal. But to give a fuller Account of this matter, we must observe, That the Idea of *Substance* may be said to be taken from *Matter* two ways.

1. Remotely and *Occasionally*; as the Observation of Material Things may first set Reason to work, which in the strength of its own Discourse may draw from thence the knowledge of Immaterials, as the Apostle tells us in *Rom. 1. 20*. That the *Invisible things of God, from the Creation, were clearly seen and understood from the things that are made*, viz. Such visible sensible Objects, as Men daily converse with: And if so, then surely these do not necessarily dispose the mind of Man to gross and Material Imaginations of the things so apprehended by it. But

2. The Idea of Substance may be said to be taken from Matter *immediately and exemplarily*, as when the Imagination does, (as it were) transcribe and copy one from the other, and take one for the representation of the other; and this, I confess, must needs imprint a ver-

ry gross Idea of *Substance* upon the Imagination : And to this way may be referred all those gross and Material Ideas of Substance, which this Author so much exclaims against. But then, all this is from the neglect of the Person, in not employing his Reason to correct and refine the first reports of Sence, as it might and ought to have done ; and if from hence we conclude an utter Incapacity in the thing it self to be improved and heightened into Immaterial Representations, and thereupon to be conceived and spoken of agreeably to them, we must even expect a Teacher to be sent down from Heaven to furnish us with a new Language, or we must shut up our Mouths, and put up our Pens, and not speak, or write of Divine matters at all.

And therefore whereas this Author further adds, in Page 70. *That we cannot imagine how any substance should be without a Beginning, and how it should be Present in all places.* I tell him, This is not the Point in Controversie, Whether we can imagine it, or no ? But I tell him withal, That it is as easie for the mind of Man to conceive all this of *Substance*, as of any thing else whatsoever. For, Why not a *Substance without a Beginning*, as well as *Truth, or Wisdom, or Goodness*, without a Beginning ? I say, Let him shew me some solid Reason why. In the mean time, I can tell him, That of the two, it should seem less difficult to imagine the Eternal Existence of *Substance*, than of *Truth* ; since Substance is in order of Nature before it ; as the Subject must needs be before that which affects it. Though in very deed, the main difficulty here, is not so much to find out which of those Perfections may be the most easily conceived to have been without a Beginning, as it is to bring the mind to a full and clear Conception, How any thing at all is so ? while it finds it self wholly at a loss in running up its thoughts.

thoughts still higher and higher, without any bound or stint to determine them. And this it is, and not the particular Nature of Essence, or Substance, that nonplusses and confounds our Reason in these unlimited Speculations. And whereas he goes on in the next words, and tells us, That we cannot imagine, How *Substance*, *Existence*, and all the Divine Attributes and Powers should be all one and the same simple Act in God? I Answer. What if we cannot? Must nothing be applyed to God, but what shall let us into the full knowledge of all that is difficult and mysterious in the Divine Nature? Or will this Man say, That the Application of the Terms *Essence* and *Substance* to God, is the true cause and reason, why we cannot apprehend, How *Substance* and *Existence*, and all the Divine Attributes and Powers, are one and the same simple Act in God? For this is the thing that he has been professedly driving at, and therefore ought to prove. And besides, as what he has here alledged, is nothing to his purpose, without the proof of that, so it is all but a meer fallacy, *a fallacy of the Accident*: For albeit, we cannot apprehend how all these Attributes are one and the same simple Act in God, yet surely it will not follow hence, that we cannot apprehend them singly and severally by themselves, and as we so apprehend them, apply them properly and fitly to God. And here I cannot but take notice of a way of Arguing usual with this Author, as, *I cannot conceive*, and *I cannot understand*, and *I cannot imagine*, &c. After which, as if he had laid down irrefragable Premises, he concludes, That the thing it self is not to be conceived, understood, or imagined. But for my part, I must be excused, that I cannot allow this Man's single Judgment (or prejudice rather) for the universal Standard, or measure of humane Reason; or that such a way of discoursing proves any thing but the assuming

assuming humour of him who uses it ; and one strangely full of Himself, instead of better things.

In conclusion therefore, I do here assert, That the gross and Material Imaginations which Men form to themselves of *Substance*, proceed not from the thing it self, but from the grossness and fault of the Persons who take up these Imaginations. And accordingly I affirm to this Author, That that Assertion of his in *Page 69.* *That we can form no Idea of Substance, but what we have from Matter,* is false, and manifestly proved to be so. And moreover, That it is not only as possible, but as easie to form in the mind, a conception of a *Substance*, or *Being Existing by it self* (which is all one) as abstracted from, and strip'd of all conception of Matter and Corporeity, as it is to frame to our selves a conception of *Truth*, or *Wisdom*, or of a Being eternally True and Wise, separate from all those gross Qualifications : And consequently that the word *Substance*, with others of the like import, may be most fitly and significantly applyed to the Divine Nature and the Persons of the Holy Trinity, which was the thing to be proved.

But because our Author avers, in *Page 70.* *That if we consider God as Truth and Wisdom, which is his true Nature and Essence, without confounding our mind with some material conceptions of his Substance* (as he had already affirmed all conceptions of Substance must needs be) *then these things (viz. the Difficulties before-mentioned concerning our Apprehensions of God) are all plain and easie.* Where, by the way it is observable, That he calls *Truth and Wisdom the true Nature and Essence of God* ; whereas in this very *Page*, as well as in *68.* he had excepted against the Term *Essence*, no less than that of *Substance*, as (by reason of the gross Material Ideas raised by it in the mind) very unfit to be applyed to God. So happy

is this Author above other Men, that he can rectifie the most improper words and expressions barely by his own using them.

But because he is so positive in making the Terms *Truth* and *Wisdom* an effectual Remedy against all the Inconveniences alledged from the Terms *Essence* and *Substance*, as applyed to the Deity, this brings us to our second *Proposition, viz.* That the same Objection lies against the Terms *Truth*, *Wisdom*, *Goodness*, &c. as applicable to the Deity, that are made against *Essence*, *Substance*, *Existence*, and the like. In order to the proving of which, I shall observe, That *Truth* may be taken in a three-fold sense.

First, For the truth of Propositions, which is called Logical.

Secondly, For an Affection of Being, which is Truth Metaphysical. And

Thirdly and Lastly, As it is a Qualification of Men's Words and Actions, and consists properly in an Agreement of the mind with both.

Concerning all which I observe, That the Truth of Propositions is no further eternal, than as it exists in the mind of God. That the Metaphysical Truth of Things is eternal, or not eternal, as the Being, or Thing it belongs to, is, or is not so. And for the Moral Truth of Men's Words and Actions, it is no more eternal than the said Words and Actions, the proper Subject of them, can be said to be. This premised, I would here ask our Author, Whether the first Notions we actually entertain of *Truth* and *Wisdom*, are not drawn from the Observations we make of these things in Men; that is, in Beings sensible and Material, and consisting of Body as well as Soul, and accordingly cloathed with sensible Accidents and Circumstances? I cannot imagine that he will

will deny this, since we do not speak immediately, or converse visibly with God, or Angels ; and I suppose also, that he now speaks of *Truth, Wisdom, Goodness, &c.* not as they are exhibited to us in Books, or Propositions, but as they actually exist and occur in persons, and consequently as they are first apprehended by us in *Concretion, or Conjunction with Men* ; that is, with Beings so Compounded, Qualified, and Circumstantiated, as above expressed, and as we find, see and observe them, in Men's Words and Actions, in what they speak, and what they do ; and these are certainly very sensible things, and such as incur into, and affect the sense as much as Matter it self can do. And if so, I desire to hear some satisfactory Reason, Why the Observation of *Substance* in Material Beings, and our first Occasional collection of it from thence, should so necessarily pervert, and cause such a grossnes in our Conceptions of it, as to make it hardly (if at all) possible to conceive of *Substance*, without the gross Conception of Matter ; and yet that the same consideration and cause should not equally take place in *Truth* and *Wisdom*, and equally pervert and thicken our Apprehensions of them, when they are equally drawn from sensible, gross, and Material Objects, viz. the Words and Actions of Men, which they both Exist in, and Converse about ? For I can see no ground why the same Reason should not infer the very same thing, and the same Antecedents draw after them the same Consequents, whatsoever they are applyed to. For the Argument à *Quatenus ad omne*, &c. is certain and infallible.

If it be here said, That *Truth* and *Wisdom* in the proper Notion and Conception of them, imply no Communication at all with Matter : I Answer, That as the Notion of them is Abstracted, and gathered up by the Discourses

Discourses of Reason it does not ; but so neither does that of *Substance*, after such an *Act* of the Mind has passed upon it. So that hitherto the Case is much the same in both.

But to carry the matter a little further. *Truth* and *Wisdom* as observed in and amongst Men, are certainly finite Things. For whatsoever exists in a finite *Subject* (whatsoever the *Object* be which it converses about, or is terminated upon) is certainly it self finite also. And here I would have this Author tell me, Why a Notion drawn off, and borrowed from finite Things, should not be as apt to perplex and confound our Minds, when applyed to an Infinite Being ; as a Notion abstracted from a *Material Being*, can be to distract and confound our Thoughts when applyed to an Immortal ? I must confess, I can see nothing allegable for one, which may not be as strongly alledged for the other. All that can be said, is what has been mentioned already, *viz.* That Reason may, and does, extract some Notions from a finite Being, that may be properly applicable to an Infinite, due allowance made for the disproportion between both ; and in like manner I affirm, That it can and does draw Notions from a thing endued with Matter, which may as well agree to Things Spiritual and Immortal. So that I cannot perceive, that *Truth*, *Wisdom*, or *Goodness*, have upon this Account any Preheminence, or Advantage over *Essence*, *Substance*, *Existence*, and the like Terms at all, but the one may be applyed to the Divine Nature as well and properly as the other.

But this is not all; for I affirm in the 3d Place, *That Essence, Substance, Nature, Existence*, and other Terms equipollent to Being, considered precisely in and by themselves, are naturally fitter to express the Deity by, than those other Terms, *Truth, Wisdom* and *Goodness*, contended for by

our Author. This is our Third Proposition ; and for the proof of it I first appeal to that high and glorious Account, which God himself gave of his own Nature, when *Moses* desired to be informed of it, viz. *I am that I am*, Exod. 3. 14. In which he describes himself only from his *Being* and *Substance*, which indeed rendered him more eminently, and even more *substantially*, and truly a *Being or Substance*, than all other Beings, or Substances whatsoever, which, in comparison of him, can hardly be so much as said to *Exist*, or *Be*. And I am perfwaded, that God knew his own Name and Nature, and withal, how to give the best and most proper Declaration of Both, as well as the Author of *Self-Consciousness, and Mutual-Consciousness* does or can pretend to do. And indeed this seenis to have been the very Character by which God would be then known to all the World, viz. All the Rational part of the Creation ; for it was sent to his People, then living under, and with a Heathen Prince, to answer them and him even in those Nations of a God, which meer Nature suggested to all Mankind ; and consequently were so known and received by them, that they could not easily question, or deny them. For otherwise we know God addressed himself to the same People afterwards in a Character extremely different, and more peculiar, viz. *A God Merciful and Gracious, Long-suffering, abundant in Goodness and Truth, and pardoning Iniquity, Transgression, and Sin*, Exod. 34. 6, 7. Which, it seems, was the Opening a Particular Attribute to them, which the bare Account of his Being (as known as it was) could not sufficiently inform the World of before.

But to proceed to other Considerations, vastly indeed inferiour to this, but yet of singular use in their degree, to direct our Speculations about these Matters,

I have some other Things to offer in behalf of the Proposition laid down by us.

As First, That all Divines hitherto have looked upon, and professedly treated of the *Divine Nature and Attributes*, as different and distinct from one another ; still considering the first as the *Subject*, and the other as the *Adjuncts* of it ; or, at least, as Analogous to these Terms as they stand properly applyed to other Things. According to which Notion, as the *Subject*, or that which is Analogous to it, naturally both precedes and supports the *Adjuncts* ; so all Notions importing the Divine *Nature, Being, or Substance*, are to be accounted as the *Subject*, in respect of all God's other Attributes, or Perfections, whether they be *Truth, Wisdom, Goodness, Power, Eternity, Omiscience*, or any other whatsoever. Which being so, I do here affirm, That the Terms *Essence, Substance, Existence*, and others Synonymous to them, ought to have the Precedence of the other Divine Perfections, commonly called *Attributes*, in their Application to God, and that upon a three-fold Account, *viz.*

1. *Of Priority.*
2. *Of Simplicity.*
3. *Of Comprehensiveness.* Of each of which severally.

1. For that of *Priority*. As we have already observed. That the first thing in order of Nature Conceivable of God, is, *That he is a Being* ; and the next to it, *That he is a Being existing by it self*, or (in another word) *a Substance* ; so the same is yet further evidenced from this, That the Notion of Being, or Substance, is that, which fully answers and determines the last Question and Enquiry, which can be made concerning God. For if we describe his Nature by any particular Attribute, or Perfection,

fection, and be thereupon asked, *What that is?* And having given an Answer to that Question, be afterwards urged with another, and perhaps another; and accordingly, after an Answer given to those also, the Enquiry be still continued, till at length we Answer, *That God is a Being; a Being existing by it self, that is, a Substance.* Then we must of necessity stop, and can go no further; which makes it evident even to a Demonstration, That this is the first and Original Notion which we have, or can have of God. Forasmuch as that which answers the last Enquiry, or Question, naturally made concerning any thing, is certainly the first Thing into which the Being, or Reason of that Thing is resolved. And thus much for *Priority.*

Poss we now to the *Second Thing*, which is the *Simplicity* of these Terms. For *Primum in omni genere simplicissimum.* So that when we say, *God is a Being existing by it self, viz. A Substance;* this includes in it no respect to, and much less any *Conjunction* with any other Thing or Notion whatsoever: But on the contrary, *Truth, Goodness, Power, &c.* are all Affections of Being, or Substance, and so connote a Relation to, and a *Conjunction* with it, as their *Subject.* So that to give you the same thing in words at length, *Truth and Goodness* are nothing else but *Being, or Substance, with these Qualifications,* or *Being and Substance under such certain respects formally determining them to such a condition, viz. either of Conformity to the Understanding, as Truth determines them, or of Conformity to the Will, as Goodness does.* So that in these, and all other the like Attributes, *Being or Substance do, as it were, pass from their absolute and Original Simplicity by the Accession of the fore-mentioned Perfections superadded to them.*

And then in the *Third and last place*. For the *Comprehensiveness* of Being, or Substance, above any one, or more of the Divine Attributes, This also is evident ; forasmuch as it runs through and contains them all, which no other particular Attribute does, or can be said to do. And certainly that which signifies *Being* in the whole compass and perfection of it, should be much more properly applicable to God ; than that, which signifies *Being* only under some certain and particular determination of it, as every one of his Attributes does, and no more. For we cannot say, That *God's Justice, Mercy, Wisdom, Holiness and Power*, are properly contained under, and formally attributable to his *Truth*, but they are all contained under, deducible from, and referible to his *Being or Substance*. So that it may properly be said, That God is an *Infinitely True, Wise, Good, Holy, Omnipotent, Omnipresent Being or Substance*. But we cannot with any propriety of Speech pitch upon any one of the other *Divine Attributes*, and in like manner affirm all the rest of that one. As to say that God is an Infinitely Wise, Good, Eternal, Omnipotent, Omnipresent *Truth*. This (I say) cannot be equally said : For though the Thing be fundamentally true, yet the Expression is neither Proper, nor Natural : Forasmuch as *Goodness, Justice, Omnipotence, Omnipresence*, and the like, are not the proper Affections of Truth, but they are properly so of *Substance, or Being*. And moreover, Whereas this Author will needs have the Terms *Substance, Essence and Existence* discarded, and the Terms *Truth, Wisdom and Goodness* put in their room, when we speak of the Divine Nature ; I desire him to give me some good Reason, why he pitches upon *Truth, Wisdom and Goodness*, rather than upon *Eternity, Omnipotence and Omnipresence*. For these, in their proportion, express the *Divine Nature*

ture as much as the other ; but neither the one nor the other can grasp in the whole Compass of the *Divine Perfections*, so as to be properly denominable from all and every one of them, as *Substance*, and *Essence*, and such other Terms as barely import *Being*, are found to be. I conclude therefore, that in our Discourses of God, *Essence*, *Substance*, *Nature*, and the like, are so far from being necessary to be laid aside, as disposing our Minds to gross and unfit Apprehensions of the Deity ; that they are much fitter to express and guide our thoughts about this great Subject, than *Truth*, *Wisdom*, or *Power*, or all of them together, as importing in them both a *Priority*, and a greater *Simplicity*, and larger *Comprehensiveness of Notion*, than belong to any of them ; and these surely are Considerations most peculiarly suited to, and worthy of the Perfections of the *Divine Nature*.

I have now done with my *Third Proposition*, and so proceed to the *Fourth and last*, viz. *That the Difficulty of our Conceiving rightly of the Deity and the Divine Persons, does really proceed from other causes, than those alledged by this Author.* I shall assign three : As,

First, *The Spirituality of the Divine Nature.* For *God is a Spirit*, Joh. 4. 14. And it is certain that we have no clear, explicit and distinct Idea of a Spirit. And if so, must we not needs find a great difficulty in knowing it ? For we know things directly by the Ideas, the *Species Intelligibiles*, or Resemblances of them, imprinted upon the Intellect, and these are refined and drawn off from the *Species Sensibiles*, and sensible Resemblances of the same imprinted upon the Imagination. And how can a Spirit incur directly into that ? Indeed not at all. For we can have no knowledge of a Spirit by any direct Apprehension, or Intuition of it ; but all that we know of such Beings, is what we gather by Inference, Di-

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Discourse, and Ratiocination : And that is sufficient.
But

2. The Second Reason of our Short and Imperfect Notions of the Deity, is, *The Infinity of it.* For this we must Observe, That we can perfectly know and comprehend nothing, but as it is represented to us under some certain Bounds and Limitations. And therefore one of the chief Instruments of our knowledge of a Thing, is the Definition of it. And what does that signify, but the bringing, or representing a Thing under certain Bounds and Limitations, as the Greek Word *διορισμός* manifestly imports. Upon which Account, what a loss must we needs be at, in understanding or knowing the *Divine Nature*, when the very way of our knowing seems to carry in it something opposite to the thing known ? For the way of knowing, is by *Defining*, limiting and determining ; and the Thing known is that, of which there neither are nor can be any Bounds, Limits, Definitions, or Determinations. And this, I think, is not only a sufficient, but something more than a sufficient Reason, why we stumble and fail, when we would either have, or give a distinct Account of the Deity.

3. A Third Reason of the same, especially with reference to the Trinity of Persons belonging to the *Divine Nature*, is, *The utter want of all Instances and Examples of this kind.* For when a long and constant course of Observation has still took notice that every numerically distinct Person, and every *Suppositum* has a numerically distinct Nature appropriate to it, and Religion comes afterwards, and calls upon us to apprehend the same Numerical Nature, as subsisting in three Numerically distinct Persons ; we are extreamly at a loss how to conform our Notions to it, and to conceive how that can

can be in three Persons, which we never saw before, or in any thing else, to be but only in One. For humane Nature, which originally proceeds by the Observations of senſe, does very hardly frame to it ſelf any Notions, or Conceptions of things, but what it has drawn from thence. Nay, I am of Opinion, That the Mind is ſo far governed by what it fees and obſerves, that I verily believe, that had we never actually ſeen the beginning or end of any thing, the Generality of Men would hardly ſo much as have imagined, That the World had ever had any beginning at all: Since with the greatest part of Mankind *what appears*, and what does *not appear*, determines *what can*, and *what cannot be*, in their Opinion.

And thus I have shewn three Causes (which I take to be the True Causes) why we are ſo much to ſeek in our Apprehensions of, and Discourses about the Divine Nature, and the three Glorious Persons belonging to it. And the Reaſon of them all is founded upon the Eſſential Disparity which the Mind of Man bears to ſo diſproportionate, and ſo tranſcendent an Objec̄t. So that it is a vain thing to Quarrel at Words and Terms, eſpecially ſuch as the best Reaſon of Mankind has pitched upon as the fitteſt, and properſt, and moſt ſignificant to express theſe great things by. And I queſtion not, but in the Issue of all, Wiſe Men will find, That it is not the deſect of the Terms we uſe, but the vast incompreheſibility of the thing we apply them to, which is the True Caue of all our Failures, as to a clear and diſtinct Apprehenſion and Declaration of what relates to the God-head.

From all which I conclude, That the Terms, *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Nature*, &c. have had nothing yet objected againſt them, but that they may ſtill claim the place, and continue

continue in the use, which the Learned'ſt Men the Christian Church has hitherto had, have allotted them in all their Discourses and Disputes about the Divine Nature, and the Divine Persons; which are confessedly the greatest and most Sacred Mysteries in the Christian Religion. But as in my time, I have observed it a practice at Court, That when any one is turned out of a considerable Place there, it is always first resolved (and that out of *merit foreseen*, no doubt) who ſhall ſucceed him in it: So all this ado in dismounting the Terms *Essence*, *Subſtance*, *Nature*, &c. from their ancient Poſt, I perceive, is only to make way for these two ſo highly uſeful and wonder-working Terms, *Self-Consciousneſſ*, and *Mutual-Consciousneſſ*. And therefore let us, with all due and aweful Reverence (as becomes us) expect their August appearance, and for a while ſuffer the Mountain to ſwell, and *heave up its Belly*, and look big upon us, and all in good time, no doubt, we ſhall have the happiness to fee and admire, and take our measures of the Mouse.

But before I close this Chapter, to ſhew how like a Judge upon Life and Death, this Man ſits over all the formerly received Terms, by which Men were wont to discourse of God, Sentencing and Condemning them as he pleases; not content to have cashiered the words *Essence*, *Subſtance* and *Nature* from being uſed about this Subject, he has as great, or greater a Quarrel at the word *Infinite*, as applyed to God; and I ſhall here give his Exceptions againſt it in his own words, being ſuch, as I believe few would dare to utter but himself, and approaching ſo near, or rather quite coming up to Blasphemey, that it may be truly ſaid, That he has not ſpoke more blasphemouſly of God's *Vindictive Justice* in his ^{See my} *preface*. *Book of the knowledge of Christ*, than he has ſpoken

of God's Infinity in this : For in the 77, 78, 79. Pages he expresses his thoughts of it thus. *The truth is* (says he) *this very word Infinite confounds our Notions of God, and makes the most perfect and excellent Being the most perfectly unknown to us.* For Infinite is only a Negative Term, and signifies that which has no end, no bounds, no measure, and therefore no positive and determined Nature, and therefore is Nothing (mark that) and withal, *That an Infinite Being, had not Use and Custom reconciled us to that expression, would be thought Nonsense and Contradiction.* Which I am so far from granting him, that I affirm, if there had never been any thing in the World besides God alone, it had yet been most True and Rational. But he goes on. *For (says he) every Real Being has a certain and determined Nature, and therefore is not infinite in this sense, which is so far from being a Perfection, that it signifies Nothing Real.* Thus he discourses : And yet this word *Infinite* has been universally received and applyed to the *Divine Nature*, by Learned Men in all Places and Ages ; and I desire this Man to tell me, How, if this word *Infinite* were so liable to be thought *Nonsense* and *Contradiction*, this could possibly come to pass. For what he speaks of *use and custom reconciling us to this Expression*, is Impertinent, and begs the Thing in dispute. For still I would know of him, how a word so utterly unfit to express the thing it was applyed to, could ever pass into *Use* and *Custom*, so as to be took up, approved, and made use of by all Mankind. Let him prevail with the whole World to speak *Nonsense*, and to use words that *signifie nothing*, if he can. But this Man, before he played the *Aristarchus* at this rate, should have done well to have considered, That every Term is not *Negative*, which has a *Negative Particle* in the Composition of it. Of which, innumerable Instances may be given. And if he

he does not know this, for all his flirting at his *Socinian Adversary*, as if he knew neither Greek nor Latin, P. 95. it is a scurvy sign that he is not so over-stocked with either of them as to have any to spare.

And therefore, whereas he goes on in *Page 78.* and pretends there to explain this word *Infinite*, he might have kept his explication to himself. For no body ever used it otherwise, but so as to signify a *Positive Perfection* by it, but yet withal connoting an *Illimitation* belonging to it. It signifies, I say, a Thing *Real, Absolute and Positive*, but still with a Connotation of something, which is to be removed from it, and denied of it ; such as are all *bounds and limits* in respect of that Substantial, all-comprehending perfection of the *Divine Nature*. In a word, the thing principally signified by this Term, is *Positive*, the Thing *Consignified*, or *Connoted* (which is but Secondary and *Consequential*) is a *Negation*. And this sufficiently overturns all his odd Descants upon it. But if, after all, our Minds cannot fully master this Notion, Persons, as thinking as he can be, know and acknowledge, that it is not the word *Infinite*, but the *Thing Infinite*, that renders them so short and defective in this matter.

But it is pleasant to see him take his Turns backwards and forwards in speaking of this Thing. *There is* (says he) *Page 78*, *a measure of the most Absolute and (in this sense) Infinite Perfections*; and if such a *measure* there be, then I hope there is as much *Nonsense* and *Contradiction* in the word *Immense*, as in the word *Infinite*; and withal, if there is even in the most *Absolute and Infinite Perfections*, a *ne plus ultra*, and an *ultimum quod sic* (as the School-men, who were never bred at St. Mary *Overties*, are apt to speak) then I confess, That an *Infinite*, with all these Qualifications about it, must needs (ac-

cording to his beloved Dialect) be *Nonsense and Contradiction*; and that of the highest rank. And again, P.79. *We know not* (says he) *How far Infinite Wisdom, and Power, and Goodness reaches*, (and thus much is very true) but then (says he again) *we certainly know that they have their Bounds, and that the Divine Nature is the utmost Bounds of them*. By which words if he means, That they have their fixed determinate Notions, whereby they are formally distinguished among themselves, as well as from other Things, it is right. For the Notion of *Infinite Wisdom* is so bounded, that it cannot be said to be *Infinite Power*, or *Infinite Power* to be *Infinite Goodness*, or the like; but still the Thing couched under all these is *Infinite*, and neither has nor can have any *Bounds* set to its Being. And if he should here reply, That then the Notion of *Infinite Wisdom, Power, and the like*, are false Notions, as not answering the Things they are applyed to. I Answer, That they are indeed imperfect and *inadequate*, as not fully answering the Thing it self, but they cannot be said to be *false* for all that. But on the contrary, if he will needs have the thing hereby signified to have any Real Bounds or Limits of it's Being; then it will and must follow, That in the forecited words he has with Accurate and Profound Speculation presented to us *An Infinite with Bounds, and the Divine Nature* (which has no Bounds) *made the Bounds of it*. These are the very words he uses; and withal delivered by him with such a Magisterial Air and Contempt of the whole World besides, who have hitherto approved and made use of these Expressions (and that in a sense and signification not to be born down by every self Opiniator, after so long and universal a Prescription) that so much Confidence cannot be sufficiently wondred at, nor too severely rebuked.

And

And therefore to review a little the foregoing particulars, and thereby to take some estimate of the Man ; Where shall we find such another Instance of a *private Presbyter*, who in the Communion, or rather in the very Bosom of so pure and Orthodox a Church, as this our **Church of England**, ever before durst, in so great an Article of the *Christian Faith*, draw his Pen against all the Writers of the Church Ancient and Modern, Fathers and School-men, and with one dash of it explode and strike off all those received Terms by which they constantly explained this Mystery, as not only useless, but mischievous in all Discourses about it ? Whereas (not to anticipate what I intend more particularly and fully upon this Head in my eighth Chapter) I shall only affirm thus much at present ; That the Greek Writers in expressing the *God-head*, or *Divine Nature*, whensoever they do not use the words, Θεότης, or Θεός, constantly express it by φύσις and ἕστια, and sometimes by τρίτης, while εἶδος and τρίτης were commonly used in the same sense. And likewise the *Latines*, where they express not the same by *Deitas*, or *Divinitas*, do as constantly express it by *Natura* and *Substantia* ; which words stand now particularly condemned by this Presuming Man ; and that, not only in defiance of all the Ancients, but also of the **Church of England** it self, which has set her Authorizing stamp upon those two words *Substance* and *Person*, by applying them to this Subject both in her *Articles* and *Liturgy*. In the first of them teaching us, *That in the Unity of the Godhead there are three Persons, of one Substance, Power and Eternity.* Artic. I. And in her *Liturgy* rendring the *Athanasian Creed* by the same words, *Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance.* As likewise that Passage in the *Nicene Creed*, by the Son's being of one Substance
with

with the Father. And again in the Doxology at the Communion on *Trinity Sunday*, it gives us these full and notable words, *One God, one Lord, not one only Person, but three Persons in one Substance*. After all which, with what face can this strange, Anomalar Son of the Church (while he is fucking her Breasts, and at the same time poysoning the Milk, with which she should feed her Children) I say, with what face can he aver to the World, That this word *Substance* thus embraced, owned and used by her, ought to be thrown away, as the Direct Cause of all the Errours Men are apt to fall into, about this great Mystery? and that we can have no *Notion of Substance*, but what *implys in it something gross and material?* Which, were it so, can any one imagine, that the Church of *England* would ever have made use of such a word, as could serve for nothing, but a Snare and a Trap to betray the Understandings and Consciences of Men, into such Errours as may cost them their Souls? This is so foully Reflexive upon her, that I would have any Man living give me a good Reason, Why this Author should not be call'd upon by Publick Authority to give the Church satisfaction for the scandal given to all the Orthodox Members of it, by the Contumely and Reproach which he has passed upon those *Terms and Words* which she has thought fit so solemnly to express her *Faith* and her *Devotions* by. But some Men, (such is the Regard had to her Laws and Discipline) will venture to utter and write any Thing, that the Bookseller will pay them for, though they throw their Conscience and Religion into the Bargain.

Some fur-
ther Re-
marks up-
on his Ap-
ology.

But *God himself, who resisteth the Proud*, seems to have took the Matter into his own Hands, and (to shew his Controlling Providence over the Minds and Hearts of Men) has at length brought this Scornful Man *to eat his own*

own words (the hardest Diet certainly that a proud Person can be put to) and after all the black Dirt thrown by Him upon the *School-men* and their *Terms*, to lick it off again with his own Tongue. So that after he had passed such a Terrible killing Doom upon these words, *Essence*, *Substance*, *Subsistence*, *Suppositum*, *Person*, and the like, here in his *Vindication*, all on a sudden, in a relenting fit, he graciously reaches out his *Golden Scepter* of *Self-Contradiction*, and restores them to Life again, in his *Apology*. And that the Reader may behold both sides of the Contradiction the more clearly, I think it the best and fairest way to give him the *sense* of this Author (if it may be so call'd) in his own words.

*Vindication.**Apology.*

“ **I** Have not troubled my Reader with the different signification of *Essence*, *Hypostasis*, *Subsistence*, *Persons*, *Existence*, *Nature*, &c. which are Terms very differently used by the Greek and Latin Fathers, and have very much obscured this Doctrine instead of explaining it, P. 101. l. 12.

“ The School-men have no Authority where they leave the Fathers; whose sense they sometimes seem to mistake, or to clog it

“ **H**E (viz.) the melancholy Stander-by, is very angry with the School-Doctors, as worse Enemies to Christianity, than either Heathen Philosophers, or Persecuting Emperours. “ Pray what hurt have they done? I suppose he means the corruption of Christianity, with those Barbarous Terms of Person, Nature, Essence, Subsistence, Consubstantiality, &c. which will not suffer Hereticks to lie concealed

" with some peculiar Niceties
" and Distinctions of their
" own, P. 138. l. 28.

" The Truth is, that
" which has confounded
" this Mystery (*viz.* of the
" Trinity) has been the
" vain endeavour to reduce
" it to Terms of Art, such
" as *Nature*, *Essence*, *Sub-*
stance, *Subsistence*, *Hypo-*
stasis, and the like, P. 138.
" l. the last, and p. 139.
" l. 1.

And speaking of the Ancient Fathers in the same Page, he tells us : " They nicely distinguished between *Person* and *Hypo-*
stasis, and *Nature*, and *Essence*, and *Substance*; that they were three Persons, but one *Nature*, *Essence* and *Substance*: But that when Men curiously examined the significance on of these words, they found that upon some account or other, They were very unapplicable to this Mystery.

Hercupon he asks the following Questions in an upbraiding manner, *viz.*

" under Scripture-Phrases.
" But why must the School-
" men bear all the blame of
" this? Why does he not
" accuse the Ancient Fa-
" thers, and Councils, from
" whom the School-men
" learnt these Terms. Why
" does he let St. Austin e-
" scape, from whom the
" Master of the Sentences
" borrowed most of his
" Distinctions and Subtle-
" ties? But suppose, these
" unlucky Wits had used
" some new Terms, have
" they taught any new
" Faith about the Trinity
" in Unity, which the
" Church did not teach?
" And if they have only
" guarded the Christian
" Faith with an Hedge of
" Thorns, which disguised
" Hereticks cannot break
" through, is this to wound
" Christianity in its very
" Vitals? No, no: They
" will only prick the Fin-
" gers of Hereticks, and se-
" cure Christianity from be-
" ing wounded; and this
" is one great Cause, why
" some Men are so angry

*What is the Substance and
Nature of God?*
*How can three
distinct Persons
have but one
Numerical Sub-
stance?* And,
*What is the Distinction be-
tween Essence, and Perso-
nality, and Subsistence?*

See these empty Questions distinctly answered in my 7th. Chapter.

And Lastly, at the end of the same Page, “ He confesses, that some tolerable Account of the School-Terms and Distinctions might be given, but that it would be a work of more difficulty than use.

“ with the School-Doctors; “ though the more General “ Cause is, because they “ have not Industry enough “ to Read, or understand “ them. *Apology, P.4,5.*

I have (to prevent all Exceptions) given the Reader the whole Paragraph ; in which the last Clause strikes Home indeed ; tho' in such Cases, some think this Author would do well to take heed of striking too Home and Hard, for fear the Blow should rebound back again, and do execution where he least intended it.

Now here the Reader is desired to observe the Sovereign usefulness ascribed by our Author to those School-Terms: *Person, Nature, Essence, Subsistence, Consubstantiality, &c.* As, *That they will not suffer Hereticks to lie concealed under Scripture-Phrases.* That the Schools learned all these Terms of the Ancient Fathers. That they have guarded the Christian Faith with an Hedge of Thorns, which disguised Hereticks cannot break through. That instead of wounding Christianity in its Vitals, they only prick the Fingers of Hereticks, and secure Christianity from being wounded. All these great and good things he tells us have been done in behalf of Christianity by the Schoolmen, and their fore-mentioned Terms, here in this *Apology* ; and now if the Reader will but look back into the

Vindication too, our Author will there tell him also, *How*, and by what Way and means the said School-men and their Terms have Atchieved all these worthy Feats, viz. By their obscuring instead of explaining the Doctrine of the Trinity. By their mistaking the meaning of the Fathers, or clogging it with peculiar Niceties of their own. Also by confounding the Mystery of the Trinity, through a vain endeavour to reduce it to such Terms of Art, as Essence, Substance, Subsistence, Nature, Person, and the like. As likewise by the said Terms being found very unapplicable to this Mystery. And lastly, Because though some tolerable Account might possibly be given of their meaning, yet that it would be of little or no use to give any such Account, or Explication of them: So useful (it seems) does he account them, to secure Christianity against Hereticks, that it is of no use at all to explain them. And now, I hope, when the Reader has considered, what this Author has said on both sides, he will acknowledge, that Hand and Glove cannot more exactly agree, than the *Vindication* and the *Apology*. And as for that *Melancholy Stander-by*, upon whose Account this *Apology* is pretended to have been written, if he will but read and compare the *Apology* and *Vindication* together, I dare undertake, that he will not be half so *Melancholy* as he was before.

But does this Author, in sober sadness, think that this is the way to *Confute Hereticks*, thus to play backwards and forwards, to say, and unsay, and only to set two Books together by the Ears? Let me tell him, That God is not mocked, nor the World neither; and that he owes an Account, of what he has wrote, to both. For my own part, so far as my Converse reaches, I meet with no serious and judicious Person, who does not reckon, that this Author, by his *Desultorius, Inconsistent,*

fent, but withal *Imposing* way of writing, will in all likelihood make twenty *Hereticks*, before he Confutes one.

It is indeed an amazing Thing to consider, That any one Man should presume to Brow-beat all the World at such a rate ; and we may well wonder at the force of Confidence and Self-Conceit, that it should be able to raise any one to such a pitch. But *Naturalists* have observed, That Blindness in some *Animals*, is a very great Help and Instigation to Boldnes. And amongst Men, as *Ignorance* is commonly said to be the *Mother* of *Devotion*, so in accounting for the Birth and Descent of Confidence too, (whatsoever other Cause some may derive it from) yet, certainly, He who makes *Ignorance* the *Mother* of this also, reckons its Pedigree by the surer side.

C H A P. III.

In which the Author's New Notion of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness, is briefly declared. Self-Consciousness made by him the formal Constituent Reason of Personality in all Persons, both Create and Uncreate; and on the contrary, proved against him in the first place, That it is not so in Persons Create.

OUR Author not being satisfied with the Account given of the Mystery of the Blessed Trinity by the Schools, nor with those Notions about it, which have hitherto obtained in the World, till he came into it (no doubt as a Person peculiarly sent and qualified to rectifie all those Imperfect, and Improper Notions, which had been formerly received by Divines.) He, I say, with a Lofty Undertaking Mind, and a Reach beyond all *before*, and indeed *beside* him, and (as the Issue is like to prove) as much *above* him too, undertakes to give the World a much better, and more satisfactory Explication of this great Mystery, and that by two new Terms, or Notions (purely and solely of his own invention) called, *Self-Consciousness*, and *Mutual-Consciousness*; which, though still joyned together by our Author in his Explication of the *Blessed Trinity*, have yet

yet very different Effects, as we shall presently see.

For by *Self-Consciousness*, he means, a Mind's, or Spirit's being Conscious to its own Thoughts, Reasonings and Affections (and I suppose all other Internal Motions too) which no other finite Spirit is, or can be naturally Conscious to, but it self. And this (he says) makes a finite Spirit Numerically one, or *one with it self* (for he uses both Expressions) and withal separates and distinguishes it from all other Spirits; so that hereby every Spirit feels only its own Thoughts, Passions, or Motions, but is not Conscious to the Thoughts, Passions, or Motions of any other. And this (so far as his own words import) he means by *Self-Consciousness*.

As for *Mutual-Consciousness*. That takes place, when two or more Spirits, or Minds know all that of one another, which each Mind, or Spirit knows of it self, by a particular *Self-Consciousness* of its own. And this, I conceive to be a just Account of what this Man means by *Mutual-Consciousness*.

Now the Effects of these two (as I noted before) are very different.

For *Self-Consciousness*, (according to him) is the Constituent Principle, or formal Reason of Personality. So that *Self-Consciousness* properly Constitutes, or makes a Person, and so many *Self-Consciousnesses* make so many distinct Persons.

But *Mutual-Consciousness*, so far as it extends, makes an Unity, not of Persons, (for Personality as such imports distinction, and something personally Incommunicable;) but an Unity of Nature in Persons. So that after *Self-Consciousness* has made several distinct Persons, in comes *Mutual-Consciousness*, and sets them all at *one* again; and gives

gives them all but one and the same Nature, which they are to take amongst themselves, as well as they can. And this is a True and strict Account of this Author's New Hypothesis ; and such, as I suppose, he will not except against, because justly, I am sure, he cannot ; howsoever I may have expressed the Novel Whimsey something for the Reader's Diversion.

Now, by what has been said, it is evident, that the Author assigns *Self-Consciousness* as the formal Reason of Personality, in all Persons Universally, whether Finite, or Infinite, Create, or Uncreate. For having first stated it so in Finite and Created Spirits, *Page 48.line 26.&c.* He afterwards applys it to Infinite and Uncreate, *viz.* the three Persons of the *God-head*.

And therefore, that we may proceed fairly, and without any ground of Exception in the Case, we will examine,

I. Whether or no *Self-Consciousness* be the Reason of Personality in *Finite Persons*? And,

II. Whether it be so in *Infinite* ?

And First, For *Finite*, or *Created Spirits*. I deny *Self-Consciousness* to be the formal Reason of Personality in these. And before I give my Reasons against it, I shall premise this one Consideration, *viz.* That wherefover the formal Reason of Personality is, there is Personality. And again, That wherefover Personality is, there is the formal Reason of Personality, *viz.* That they exist Convertibly, and that one Mutually and Essentially infers the other.

Now this premised and laid down, my Reasons, why I deny *Self-Consciousness* to be the formal Reason of Personality in *Finite*, or *Created Beings*, are these.

i. *Argument.*

CHAPTER III.

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1. *Argument.* According to the natural order of Things, *Self-Consciousness* in Persons, pre-supposes their Personality, and therefore is not, cannot be the Reason of it. The Argument, I conceive, is very plain. For whatsoever pre-supposes a Thing, is in order of Nature Posterior and Subsequent to the Thing so pre-supposed by it ; and again on the other hand the formal Reason of any Thing is in Order of Nature precedent to that thing, of which it is the Reason. We will therefore prove the Major Proposition. And we do it thus. Personality is the Ground and Principle of all Action, wheresoever it is. For where there is a *Suppositum*, whether it be *Rational* (which is another word for Person) or not, still it is the whole *Suppositum*, which Acts. So that there must be a Person before there can be an *A&t*, or Action proceeding from, or Attributable to a Person. In a word, there must be a Person in Being, before any Action issues from him ; and therefore the *A&t* must essentially and necessarily pre-suppose the Person for the Agent. But now *Self-Consciousness* does not only do this ; but (which is more) it also pre-supposes another *A&t* Antecedent to it self. For it is properly and formally a *Reflex A&t* upon the *Acts*, Passions, or Motions of the Person whom it belongs to. So that according to the Nature of the Thing, there is not only a Person, but also an Action (which is, and must be subsequent to a Person) that is Antecedent to *Self-Consciousness* ; which being a *Reflex A&t*, must needs in order of Nature be Posterior to the *A&t* reflected upon by it. And therefore *Self-Consciousness*, which is by two degrees Posterior to Personality, cannot possibly be the *formal Reason* of it. This I look upon as a Demonstration of the Point. And I leave it to our Author (who is better a great deal at scorning

scorning the Schools, than at confuting them) to answer and overthrow it *at his leisure.*

2. Our Second *Argument* is this. The Humanity, or Humane Nature of Christ, is perfectly Conscious to it self of all the Internal Acts, whether of Knowledge, Volition, Passion, or Desire, that pass in it, or belong to it ; and yet the Humanity, or Humane Nature of Christ is not a Person, and consequently *Self-Consciousness* is not the proper formal Reason of Personality ; forasmuch as it may be in that, which is no Person. That the Humane Nature of Christ is thus *Self-Conscious*, is evident, since it has all the Principles and Powers of Self-reflexion upon its own Acts, whereby it intimately knows it self to do what it does, and to be what it is, which are in any particular Man whatsoever ; so that if any Man be ~~Conscious~~ to himself of these things, the Humane Nature of Christ, which has the same Operative Powers in perfection (and those essentially proper to, and inseparable from it self) which the rest of Mankind are endued with, must needs be so too. And then, as for the Assumption, *That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a Person*, is no less evident. Since it is taken into, and subsists in and by the Personality of the second Person of the Trinity, and therefore can have no distinct Personality of its own ; unless we will with *Nestorius* assert two Persons in Christ, an Humane, and a Divine. And the Truth is, If *Self-Consciousness* were the formal Reason of Personality, since there are two distinct *Self-Consciousnesses* in Christ, no less than two distinct Wills, an Humane, and a Divine, viz. One in each Nature, I cannot see how, upon this Author's Hypothesis, to keep off the Assertion of *Nestorius*, That there are *Two distinct Persons* in him also.

3. My Third Argument against the same shall be taken from the Soul of Man in a state of separation from the Body. And it is this : The Soul in its separate Estate is Conscious to it self of all its own Internal Acts, or Motions, whether of Knowledge, Passion, or Desire, and yet the Soul in such an Estate is not a Person : And therefore *Self-Consciousness* is not the formal Reason of Personality ; for if it were, it would and must constitute a Person, wheresoever it was. Now, that the Soul, in its separate Estate, is thus *Self-Conscious*, I suppose no body will pretend to deny, but such as hold a Psychopannychisme, *viz.* such a dormant Estate, as renders it void of all Vital Motion or Action, during its separation from the Body. But this being an error which few now a-days think worth owning, neither shall I think worth the disproving.

But for the Minor Proposition, *That the Soul in its separate Estate is not a Person.* In this I expect to find some Adversaries, and particularly our Author himself, who expressly affirms, *That the Soul in such a separate state is a Person*, Page 262. *A Soul* (says he) *without a Vital Union to an Humane Body, is a Person.* Nor does he bestow the Name and Nature of a Person upon the Soul only as separate from, but also (as shall be afterwards made appear) as it is joyned with the Body ; which Assertion of his, together with some others of near affinity with it, shall in due place be examined by themselves.

At present in Confirmation of my Argument, I shall produce my Reasons against the Personality of the Soul, held by this Author, and in order to it, shall lay down this Conclusion in direct opposition to his, *viz.* *That*

the Soul of Man is not a Person. And since (as we have noted) he holds, that it is so, both in its Conjunction with the Body, and its separation from it, I shall bring my *Arguments* against the Personality of it in both.

And First, I shall prove, That the Soul while joyned to, and continuing in the Body, is not a Person ; and as a ground-work of the Proof thereof, I shall only premise this one Thing, as a Truth acknowledged on all Hands, viz. *That the Soul and Body together constitute the Person of a Man :* The same being plainly asserted in the *Athanasian Creed*, where it tells us, *That the Reasonable Soul and Flesh, is one Man, [or one Human Person]* for both signify but the same Thing ; which being thus laid down, as a Thing certain and confessed, I Argue thus : If the Soul and Body in Conjunction constitute the Person of a Man, then the Soul in such a Conjunction is not a Person. But the former is true, and therefore the latter must be so too. The *Proposition* is proved thus. Nothing which, together with the Body, Constitutes a Person, is, or can be it self a Person. For if it be, then the Body must be joyned to it, either by being assumed into the Personal Subsistence of the Soul, as the Humane Nature of Christ is assumed into the Personal Subsistence of the *AḡyQ.* Whereupon the *Composition* and *Constitution* of a Man, will be an Hypostatick Union between Soul and Body ; which, I suppose, no Body will be either so bold, or absurd as to affirm ; all Divines accounting an Hypostatical Union so peculiar to Christ's Person, as not to be admitted in any other Person or Being whatsoever. Or,

Secondly, The Body must be joyned with the Soul, as one part, joyntly concurring with another, to the Com-

Composition of the whole Person. And if so, then the Soul being a Part, cannot possibly be a *Person*. Forasmuch as a *Part* is an Incomplete Being, and therefore, in the very Nature of it, being designed for the Completion of something else, must subsist in and by the Subsistence of the whole. But a Person imports the most compleat Degree and Mode of Being, as subsisting wholly by it self, and not in or by any other, either as a Subject of Inherence, or Dependence. So that it is a direct Contradiction to the very Definition and Nature of the Thing, for the same Being to be a *Part* and a *Person* too. And consequently that which makes the Soul the former, does irrefragably prove it not to be the other.

Besides, if the Soul in the Composition of a Man's Person, were an entire person it self, and, as such, concurred with the Body towards the Constitution of the Man; then a Man would be an Imperfect, Accidental, and not a Perfect, Natural Compound. He would be that which Philosophy calls *Unum per Accidens*, that is, a thing made up of two such Beings, as cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into one. For a Complete Being (as every Person essentially is) having received the utmost degree of Subsistence, which its Nature can give it, if it comes afterward to be compounded with another Being, whether Complete, or Incomplete, it must necessarily make such a loose, unnatural Union and Composition. But to assert, That the Person of a Man is such a compound, would be exploded by all who understood any thing of Natural Philosophy. So that it would be a very idle thing to attempt any further Confutation of it. Let this Author overthrow these Reasonings, and support his Assertion against them if he can.

But having thus disproved the Personality of the Soul while in Conjunction with the Body, I go on to disprove it also while in a state of Separation from it: Which I do thus. If the Soul in such a state be a Person, then it is either the same Person, which the Man himself was, while he was living and in the Body; or it is another Person: But to Assert either of them, is extreamly Absurd, and therefore equally Absurd, that the Soul in such a state should be a Person.

And First, It is Absurd to affirm it to be the same Person. For a Person compounded of Soul and Body, as a Man is, and a simple uncompounded Person, as the Soul (if a Person at all) must needs be, can never be numerically one and the same. For that, differing from one another as *Simple* and *Compound*, they differ as two things, whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other. A Compound, as such, including in it several parts compounding it. And a simple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Composition. So that if a Man, while alive, be one Person, and His Soul after his Death be a person too, it is impossible for the Soul to be one and the same Person with the Man.

And then for the other part of the Disjunction. To Assert, That they are two distinct Persons, is as Absurd as the other, as drawing after it this Consequence, *viz.* That it is one Person who lives well or ill in this World, to wit, The Man Himself while he was personally in the Body; and another Person, who passes out of the Body into Heaven, or Hell, there to be rewarded, or punished (at least till the Resurrection) for what that other Person had done well or ill here upon Earth. And does not this look mightily agreeable to all the Principles of Reason and Divinity? Nevertheless so much is certain,

tain, That wheresoever there are two distinct Persons, we do, and must by all the Rules of Grammar and Logick, say, That one of them is not the other ; and, where one is not the other, we cannot in Truth, or Justice say, That one ought to account for what was done, or not done by the other. But then, if it be intolerably Absurd, (as no doubt it is) That the Soul in the other World should not be responsible for what the Man himself in Person had done in this, then it is altogether as Absurd and Intolerable, for any one to represent and speak of these Things under such Terms and Notions, as must necessarily throw all Discourse and Reasoning about them, into Paradox and Confusion.

But 'tis needless to insist any longer upon a thing so clear, or to add any other Arguments in so plain a Case. And indeed to me, the Soul's thus changing its state forwards and backwards, from one *manner of Subsisting* to another, looks very odd and unnatural. As, that from an *Incomplete state in the Body*, it should pass to a *Personal and Complete state out of the Body*, (which state is yet preternatural to it) and then fall back into an *Incomplete state* again by its re-union to the Body at the Resurrection (which yet, one would think, should rather improve our principal parts, in all respects, not merely relating to the *Animal Life*; as the bare *Subsistence* of them, I am sure, does not.) These Things, I say, seem very uncouth and improbable, and such as ought not, without manifest Necessity, to be allowed of; which here does not appear; since all this Inconvenience may be avoided, by holding, That the Soul continues but a *Part of the whole Person*, and no more, in all its Conditions.

And thus having proved our Assertion against the *Personality of the Soul*, Whether *in the Body*, or *out of it*; let us now see what may be opposed to it.

And,

And here, I suppose, some will object, That the Soul in a state of Separation, is not properly a Part, forasmuch as it exists not in any Compound, nor goes to the Composition of it. To which I Answer, That an Actual Inexistence in a Compound, is not the only Condition which makes a Thing a part, but its Essential Relation to a Compound; which Relation is founded partly upon its *Original Designation*, and partly upon its *Natural Aptitude* to be an Ingredient in the Constitution of a Compound. And this Relation to the Compound, I affirm the Soul to retain, even while it is separated from it; as is evident from what both Philosophers and Divines hold concerning the Soul, *viz.* That even in its Separation and Disjunction from the Body, it yet retains a strong Appetite and Inclination (as well as an Essential Aptitude) to return and be re-united to it: Which Reunion also we know will be effected at the great and last Day.

But you will say, Does not the Scripture, in *Heb.* 12. 23. speaking of Blessed Souls in a state of Separation from the Body, call them, *The Spirits of Just Men made perfect*, Πνεύματα ἡγίων πεπλευμένων; And if those Just Men were made Perfect, must it not have been in respect of the Perfection of their Souls, since their Bodies were then Rotting, or (rather) rotten under ground? And if they derived this Perfection from their Souls, must not their Souls have been eminently perfect themselves, which rendred them so? And if perfect, can we deny them the perfection of Personality, which (as we have shewn) in Rational Beings, carries in it the greatest Natural Perfection?

To all which I Answer, That the Perfection here spoken of, is not *Natural*, but *Supernatural*; and relates only to the Consummation of their *Graces*, and not to the manner

manner of their *Subsistence*. Which being the only Thing now in dispute, This Scripture , which speaks only of the former , can make nothing at all to the present Purpose.

Having thus evinced, That the Soul, notwithstanding its *Self-Consciousness* is neither during its *Conjunction* with the Body, nor its Separation from it, properly a Person ; and having withal shewn the grounds and Reasons upon which I conclude it impossible to be so , I shall however think it worth while something more particularly to examine (as I promised) this Author's extraordinary and peculiar Notions of *Person* and *Personality*, as he applies them to the Soul , even while it is joined with the Body also. And first in the 268th Page, he discourses of it in this manner. *All the Sufferings* (says he) *and Actions of the Body* , are attributed to the *Man*, though the *Soul is the Person*, because it is the *Superior and Governing Power*, and *Constitutes the Person*. These are his words, and they contain a very pleasant way of arguing, though wholly contrary to the common known Rules of *Philosophy*. For according to these, one would, and must have concluded, That for this very Reason, *That all the Actions and Sufferings of the Body* (and he ought to have added of the Soul too) are *ascribed to the Man*, therefore the Man himself, to whom these Personal Acts are ascribed, must indeed be the Person, and that for the same reason also, the Soul cannot be so. But our Author has a way of Reasoning by himself. For (says he) *The Soul is the Person*, because it *Constitutes the Person*. But for that very Cause, say I, The Soul is not the Person. For whatsoever Constitutes a Person, must do it either efficiently, or formally. That is, either as a Principle producing it, or a Principle compounding it. As for the first way, whatsoever Constitutes

stitutes a person efficiently, must do it either by Creation, or Generation ; but this the Soul (as much a *Superior Power as it is*) is not able to do. For will any one say, That the Soul can either Create or Generate the Person, or (to speak more plainly) the Man who is the Person ? And then, for the other way, by which it may be said to Constitute a Person, to wit, *formally*. This it can do no otherwise than as it is a *Constituent Part*, and therefore only as a *Partial*, and not a *Total Adequate Cause* of the Constitution. That is, in other words, the Soul, as the *Form*, must concur with the Body as the *Matter*, to the Constitution of the whole Person of the Man. But then for that very Reason again, the Soul cannot possibly be a Person, since it contributes to the Constitution of the Person only as a *Part* ; which, by reason of its *Incomplete Being*, can upon no Principle of Philosophy be a *Person*. And I would fain have this profound *Philosopher* give me but one allowed Instance, where one Person is the constituent Principle of another.

But to examine the forementioned Assertion yet more particularly, since this Man so peremptorily says, *That the Soul is the Person, because it is the Superior Power, and Constitutes the Person.* I must tell him, That the *Superior Power* is not therefore the sole Power, and consequently cannot solely Constitute the Person, which yet this Author pretends it does. If indeed he had said, *That the Soul as the Superior Power bears the chief and principal part in the Constitution of a person*, this had been fence, but by no means sufficient for his purpose ; for still this would not prove the Soul to be a Person, (which he contends for) but on the contrary, by proving it to concur thereto only as a *Part*, demonstrate it, upon the same Account not to be a *Person*.

But

But this is not all, for in Page 169. he calls the *Mind* of Man a *Person*, and thus Discourses about it. *Faculties*, (says he) *Vertues and Powers have Personal Acts and Offices ascribed to them only upon the Account of their Unity and Sameness with the mind in which they are, which is a Person, and Acts by them.* Now this alſo is very odd and ſtrange (could any thing in this Author, which is odd, be ſtrange too;) For the thing Aſſerted by him amounts to neither more nor leſs than this, That *Powers, Faculties, and Vertues have personal Acts ascribed to them upon the account of their Unity and Sameness with that, which it ſelf neither is, nor can be a Person;* as we have abundantly proved, That the *Mind* of Man, (taking it in his ſenſe for the *Soul*) cannot be. And for his further Conviction, I could tell him of ſomething which has *personal Acts* very remarkably ascribed to it; and yet neither for being it ſelf a *Person*, nor for its *Unity and Sameness* with the *Mind*, in which it is, and which ſometimes acts by it. And that, if he pleaſes to turn to 1 Corinth. 13. he will find to be that notable Grace and Virtue, called *Charity*; which, being but an *Accident*, I believe, that even this Author himſelf will not affirm to be a *Person*; and, I am ſure, as little can be ſaid for any *Unity or Sameness* that it has with the *Mind*, which it is lodged in: Since, though it ſhould be utterly loſt, the *Mind* would nevertheless retain all the Essentials of a *Mind*, and continue as truly a *Mind*, as it was before: Which, I think, is but an ill *Argument* of any *Unity or Sameness* between the *Mind* and that; and this being indubitably true, all that this Author here diſcourses about *personal Acts* being ascribed to the *Mind*, and about their *Identity* with the *Mind*, as the Reason of it, is with equal miſtake and impertinence alledged by him in this caſe. For he might and ſhould

have known, That *personal Acts* are often ascribed to *Faculties, Vertues, and Graces*, not in strict propriety of Philosophical speaking, but *Tropically* and *Figuratively*, by a Figure (which he shall hear further of hereafter) called *Prosopopœia*; which represents Things, that are not *Persons*, speaking and doing as if they were so.

But besides this, there are here two Things which this Author takes for granted, which yet such dull Mortals as my self will be apt a little to demurr to.

As First, That he takes the *Mind* and the *Soul* of Man for one and the same Thing; whereas very Learned Men, both *Grammarians* and *Philosophers* hold, That in Men there is a great difference between *Animus* and *Anima*; and that as *Anima* imports the Spiritual Substance which we call the Soul, so *Animus* signifies only a Power or Faculty, *viz.* The Supreme Intellectual, Reasoning, Governing Faculty of the Soul, or at leait, the Soul it self considered, as exerting the fore-mentioned *Acts*. But whether it be one or the other, we have sufficiently proved against this Authour, That neither of them can be a Person.

The other Thing here supposed by him, is the *Unity* or *Sameness* of the Powers or Faculties of the Soul, with the Soul it self; which yet the *Peripateticks* generally, and most of the *School-men* with *Thomas Aquinas* in the Head of them do positively deny, and think they give very good Reason for such their Denial. For if Substances and Accidents are Beings really distinct, and if Qualities be Accidents, and the Powers and Faculties of the Soul come under the second *Species of Quality*, as *Aristotle* reckons them, then it is manifest, that they are really distinguished, and that there is no Identity between them. Nor does there want a further Reason for the same. For, since the bare *Substance* or *Essence* of

of the Soul, considered nakedly in it self, may rationally be supposed undetermined, and therefore indifferent to all those Acts or Actions that naturally proceed from it ; and since withal, bare Objects can of themselves neither enable nor dispose the Agent to exert any Action, there seems a Necessity of asserting the Intervention of some Third Thing distinct from both, which may thus enable, dispose, and determine the Soul to exert it self in such a particular way of acting rather than another, suitably to the several Objects which shall come before it; which thing is properly that Quality residing in the Soul, which we call a *Faculty* or *Power*. And this to me seems the true Philosophy of the matter. But I need not here press the Decision of the Case one way or other ; as not directly affecting the Point in debate between us. Only I thought fit to suggest these Remarks, to check this Author's bold unwary way of dictating and affirming in things disputable and dubious, and to remind him how much it becomes and concerns one that writes Controversies, to be more liberal in his Proofs, and less lavish in his Assertions.

But before I quit this Point about the *Personality of the Soul*. Since this Authour has so absolutely and expressly affirmed, *That the Soul, or Mind of Man is a Person*, and given this for the Reason of it, *That being the Superior Governing Power in Man*, it does, as such, *Constitute the Person*, over and above the Arguments which have been already brought for the Confutation of it, I desire to leave with him two or three Questions, which seem naturally to rise from this Wonderful Position. As,

First, Whether the *Soul, or Mind of Man be one Person*, and the *Man himself Another?*

Secondly, Whether the asserting of the Soul to be a Person, because it Constitutes the Person, does not infer so much, viz. That the Soul is the Person that Constitutes, and the Man the Person that is Constituted; unless we will say, That the Soul Constitutes it self a Person? And then,

Thirdly, Whether to say, or assert this, does not infer Two distinct Personalities in the same Soul, one in order of Nature before the other, viz. That, by which it is it self formally a Person, and that other, which by its Constituting it self a Person, is Constituted and confused by it?

But since it is too hard a Task to drain any one Absurdity (especially a very great one) so, as to draw forth and represent all its naturally descending Consequences, I desire the Author with the utmost (if Impartial) strictness to compare the foregoing Questions with his own Assertion and to see, First, Whether they do not directly spring from it: And next, Whether the Matter couched under the said Questions, if drawn out into so many Positive Propositions, would not afford as many Intolerable Defiances to Common Sense, Reason and Philosophy. But thus it is, when Men will be Writing at Thirty, and scarce Thinking till Threescore.

But to proceed and shew, That it is not only the Soul, or Mind of Man which our Authour dignifies with the Name and Nature of a Person; but that he has almost as free an hand in making every thing he meets with a Person, as K. Charles the Second had in making almost every Person he met with, a Knight; (So that it was very dangerous for any one who had an Aversion to Knighthood, to come in his way,) our Author, out of the like Over-flowing Communicative Goodness and Li-bera-

berality, is graciously pleased, to take even the *Beasts* themselves into the Rank and Order of Persons; in some imitation, I suppose, of the Discreet and Humble *Caligula*, so famous in History for making his Horse *Consul*. And for this, Let us cast our Eyes upon page 262. where he has these words, worthy (*in sempiternam rei memoriam*) to be wrote in Letters of Gold. *A Beast* (says he) *which has no Rational Soul, but only an Animal Life* (*as a Man has together with an Humane Soul*) *is a Person, or Suppositum, or what you will please to call it:* But, by your favour, Good Sir, the Matter is not so indifferent; for *Person* and *Suppositum*, are by no means the same Thing; and I pity you with all my heart, that you should think so. For any single Complete Nature actually subsisting by it self, is properly a *Suppositum*, but not therefore a *Person*. For as *Subsistence* superadded to Nature, Constitutes a *Suppositum*, so *Rationality* added to *Supposituality*, Constitutes a *Person*; which is therefore properly defined *Suppositum Rationale*, or *Intelligens*, as we have sufficiently shewn already in our Second Chapter: So that to call a *Beast* a *Person*, is all one as to call it a *Rational Brute*: Which this Author, who can so easily reconcile Contradictions, or (which may serve him as well) *swallow them*, may do, if he pleases; and so stand alone by himself in this, as well as (he says) he had done in some other Things. But others, who think themselves obliged to use Philosophical Terms only as Philosophers intended them, dare not venture to speak thus, for fear *Aristotle* should bring an *Action of Battery* against them; who certainly has a *Pate* to break as well as *Pristian*, and is as sensib^l of hard usage, how patiently soever he has took it hitherto at this Author's hands. But to give the said Author his due, he is not so much a *Slave to his word*, as to speak the same Thing

in all places of his Book. For, to quote his own Authority (though of little value, but when brought against himself) in page 62. of this very Tract, he has these words. *A Person* (says he) *and an Intelligent Substance* are Reciprocal Terms. And, are they so? Why, how then comes a Beast, in page 269. to be a Person? Is a Beast an Intelligent Substance? Or, can a Beast be a Person, and yet not an Intelligent Substance, when he affirms, That they are Terms Reciprocal? If I have not quoted this Author fairly and justly, let the Advantage be his, and the shame mine. But if I have, then let all the Learned and Impartial World (which I appeal to) judge, whether one who talks thus Ignorantly and Self-Contradictriously about the Nature of a Person, be fit to prescribe to the whole Church New Terms and Models never heard of before, to explicate the Persons of the Sacred Trinity by. But the Truth is, the distance between the 69. and the 262. pages, was so great, and the Contradictions which passed within that compass so Numerous, that how gross and bulky soever this one might be, yet with the help of a little good luck, it might well escape the Author's Eye in such a Crowd. And perhaps, it had been never the worse luck for the Author Himself, if it could as easily have escaped the Reader's Eye too.

And now, to sum up in short, the Chief Heads of what has been treated of in this Chapter, I have proved against this Authour, That Self-Consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in Created Beings. And that first by an Argument drawn from the very Nature of the Thing; For that, Self-Consciousness presupposes Personality, and therefore cannot be the formal Reason of it. As also from two Notable Instances, One of the Humanity, or Humane Nature of Christ. The

The other of the Soul of Man in its state of Separation from the Body : Both of which I have shewn to be perfectly *Self-Conscious* of all the Internal Acts, Motions and Passions respectively belonging to each of them; and yet that they were, neither of them, *Persons*. And pursuant to this Subject, I have, by clear, and solid Reasons overthrown the pretended Personality of the Soul, both in a state of Conjunction with the Body, and of Disjunction from it ; which in both is asserted by this Author. And Lastly, I have examined his Absurd Unphilosophical Assertions about these Matters ; in one whercof, he ascribes a Personality even to Beasts themselves. By all which, it is but too manifest against this Assuming big-talking Man, that, as loftily as he carries it, yet in very Deed and Truth he d̄oes not understand what those Terms *Suppositum* and *Subsistence*, *Person* and *Personality* mean. So fit is he (as I have said) to treat of the *Divine Persons* of the God-head ; whom yet he has made so bold with.

And here I should judge it high time to conclude this Chapter ; but that, methinks, it is pity to leave this fine Trim Notion of *Self-Consciousness* so ; without taking a little further View of the Curious Artifice and admirable Contrivance of so rare a production. For if it were not such, could this Authour vaunt of it at such a rate as he does, pleasing himself, and proclaiming his "Eupn̄ē, εὐπν̄η, as upon an Invention (forsooth) which all Antiquity before him could never yet reach to ?

Nevertheless to deal clearly and plainly amongst Friends, such a Cheating, Lurching thing does this Expectation usually prove, that after all these Pompous Shews, and Glorious Boasts of *Self-Consciousness*, *Self-Consciousness*, ushered in with twenty *Encomium's* (at least)

least) like so many Heralds, or Tip-staves, or (rather) *Yeomen of the Guard* marching before it; yet, in Truth, after all this noise, it is, (like an Owl stripp'd of its Feathers) but a very Mean, Meagre, Ordinary Thing; being, in down-right Terms, neither more nor less than only *one Property of a Rational, or Intelligent Being*; by virtue whereof, the Soul is (as the Schools express it) *Supra se Reflexiva*, that is to say, Able by a Reflex Act of Knowledge, intimately to know and consider it self, and its own Being, together with its own Acts, Motions, and Operations. This is the Sum Total of the Matter, and all that *Self-Consciousness* is, or can truly pretend to be.

And, (which is yet a further Diminution to it) as poor and mean a Notion as it is, it is Borrowed too. But you will say, From whom? Why? Even from Honest *Des Cartes*, and his *Cogito ergo sum*. Only with this unhappy difference in the Application of it, That this Proposition, which *Des Cartes* lays as the Basis and Ground-work of his Philosophy, our Author places with its Heels upwards in his Divinity. For whereas *Des Cartes* insists upon *Cogitation*, only to prove and infer Being, as one would prove a Cause from its Effects, or rather an Antecedent from its Consequent: our Author on the contrary, makes *Cogitation* the very Cause and Principle of Being and Subsistence, by making it the formal Constituent Reason of Personality in the Person who Thinks, or Reflects; than which nothing can be more false, and ridiculous.

And this, according to the Truest, and most Philosophical Account of the Thing, is the very utmost which this New, and so much bragg'd of Notion amounts to. And I do hereupon Challenge this Author to prove these two Things if he can.

First, That the *Self-Consciousness* hitherto spoken of by him is any Thing more than a bare *Property* of an Intelligent Being, whereby it reflects upon it self, and its own Thoughts and A&ctions.

And in the next place; That such a *Property* does, or can Constitute the Being or Nature which it flows from, and belongs to, properly a *Person*.

These two things, I say, I call upon him to prove; and if he does not by dint of *Argument* make them good, he exposes a poor, fenceless, infant Hypothesis to the wide World, and then very unmercifully leaves it to shift for it self. In fine, I cannot but again and again own my Amazement at the Confidence of some bold presuming Men, who set up for Enlightners of the Church, and new Modellers of Divinity in the strength of some odd upstart Notions, which yet are not able to acquit, or support themselves upon, and much less *against* the very first Elements and Principles of a long tryed, and never yet baffled Philosophy.

C H A P. IV.

In which is proved against this Author, That neither is Self-Consciousness the formal Reason of Personality in the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity ; nor Mutual-Consciousness the Reason of their Unity in one and the same Nature.

Having thus examined, and (as I think) overthrown our Author's Notion of *Self-Consciousness*, with reference to Created and Finite Persons, I shall now proceed to the Consideration of what he says of it with reference to the three Persons in the Glorious Godhead. And this I shall do under these following Heads, which shall be the Subjects of five distinct Chapters. As,

First, I shall treat of his two new Notions, *viz.* of *Self-Consciousness*, and *Mutual-Consciousness*, and shew, That *Self-Consciousness* is not the formal Reason of Personality in the three *Divine Persons*, nor *Mutual-Consciousness* the Reason of their Unity in one and the same Nature. And this we have here allotted for the business and Subject of this 4th Chapter.

Secondly, I shall prove, That the Three *Divine Persons* of the Godhead, are not Three *Distinct, Infinite Minds, or Spirits*, in the 5th Chapter,

Thirdly,

Thirdly, I shall Consider, what this Author pretends to from the Authority of the *Fathers* and *School-men*, in behalf of his New invented Hypothesis, and shew, That they speak nothing *at all for it*, or *towards it* : And this shall make the 6th and 7th Chapters.

Fourthly, I shall set down the Ancient and generally received Doctrine of the Church and Schools concerning the Article of the *Trinity*, and Vindicate it from this Author's Exceptions, in the 8th Chapter.

And when I shall have discussed and gone over these Particulars, I cannot imagine what can be found Considerable in this his Book (so far as I have undertook it) but what will have received hereby a full and sufficient Answer.

Though, when all is done, I confess I have some further Complements to make to this Author upon some other Accounts (though still occasioned by this Work of his) which, I should be extremely wanting both to him and the Cause now before me, should I not, with all due Address, pass upon him. And this will add three or four Chapters more to the former, and so conclude this Work.

And First, To begin with the first of these, I shall endeavour to prove, That *Self-Consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in the Three Divine Persons.*

In order to which, I shall premise and lay down these following Considerations..

Consideration 1. That although the *Divine Nature* be one Pure, Simple, Indivisible Act, yet in our Con-

ception of it (which are always inadequate to it) there is a Natural Order of *Prius* and *Posteriorius* founded in the Universal Reason of Things (according to which, the Conception of one Thing presupposes, and depends upon the Conception of another) which, though it can make no *Prius* and *Posteriorius* in the *Divine Nature*, yet is by no means to be contradicted, or confounded in our discoursing of *God*; forasmuch as without our admitting this Rule it is impossible for any Humane Understanding either to Conceive, or Discourse consistently, or intelligibly of Him at all.

Consideration 2. (Which, I think, affords us a Rule safely and universally to be relied upon) is this, That in Things having a dependence between them, where we may form to our selves a clear and distinct Conception of one Thing, without implying, or involving in it the Conception of any other Thing, there that Thing is in Order of Nature precedent to all those Things which are not essentially included in the Conception of it. Thus, for instance, we may have a clear and distinct Conception of *Entity and Being*, and of *Unity* too, without entertaining in our Mind, at the same time, any Notion, or Conception of *knowledge* at all; and therefore the *Ratio Entitativa* of any Thing must needs in Nature precede the *Ratio Cognitiva*, or rather *Cognoscibilis*, of the same.

Consideration 3. We must distinguish between the Affections, or *Modes* of Being (as they are strictly so called) and between the *Attributes* of it. The first sort are reckoned of the same Order with *Being* it self, and so precede whatsoever is consequent upon it, as the Attributes of it are accounted to be; which relate to the *Being*

Being or Subject they belong to, as things in Order of Nature *Posterior* to it. Accordingly in the first rank are *Existence*, *Subsistence*, *Personality*, &c. and in the second are all Acts issuing from a *Nature*, or *Subject* so Subsisting; whether they be of *Knowledge*, *Volition*, *Power*, *Duration*, or the like: The *Denominations* derived from which, are properly called *Attributes*.

Consideration 4. Though there can be no Accidents inhering in God, yet there may be *Accidental* Predications belonging to him. And I call those *Accidental*, which are not *Necessary*, or *Essential*. Such as are all *Extrinsic* *Denominations* of him founded on such Acts of God, as were perfectly free for him to do, or not to do; nothing in the *Divine Nature* obliging him thereto. Of which number are the *Denominations*, or *Predicates* of *Creatour*, *Redeemer*, and the like: Since there was nothing in God that made it necessary for him to be so.

Consideration 5. When the Terms [*Cause*, *Formal Reason*, *Constituent*, or *productive Principle*, and the like] are used about the *Divine Nature*, and *Persons*, they are not to be understood as applicable to them in the strict and proper signification of the said Terms, but only by way of Analogy; as really meaning no more than a Causal, or Necessary Dependence of one Notion, or *Conceptus objectivus* upon another; so that it is impossible for the *Mind* to Conceive distinctly of the one, but as depending upon, or proceeding from the other.

Consideration 6. That the *Divine Nature* may with all fair Accord to the Rules of Divinity and Philosophy be Considered as *Prescinding*, or *Abstracting* (though not as divided) from the *Divine Persons*.

Consideration

Consideration 7. That whatsoever is Essentially included in the *Divine Nature* thus Considered, is equally Common and Communicable to all the *Divine Persons*.

Consideration 8. That whatsoever is the proper *Formal Reason of Personality*, is utterly Incommunicable to any Thing, or Person beyond, or beside the Person to whom it belongs.

Consideration 9. That for any Absolute Perfection essentially included, or implied in the *Divine Nature* to be multiplied in the Three Persons belonging to it, is a manifest Multiplication of the *Divine Nature* it self in the said Persons. By which we are given to understand the difference between the *Multiplication*, and the *Communication* of the *Divine Nature* to those Persons.

These Rules, I thought fit to draw up and lay down before-hand, in order to the use which we shall have of them in the ensuing Disputation.

And so I proceed to my *Arguments* against this Author's New Notion of *Self-Consciousness*, with reference to the Persons of the *Blessed Trinity*. And the First is This:

Argument I. No Personal Act can be the formal Reason of Personality in the Person, whose Act it is. But *Self-Consciousness* is a Personal Act, and therefore *Self-Consciousness* cannot be the formal Reason of Personality in the Person, whose Act it is, and to whom personally it belongs. The Minor, I suppose, neither our Author Himself, nor any one else, can deny. For if *Self-Consciousness*

sciousness be not a *Personal Act*, let any one assign what else it is, or what it ought to pass for. It is certainly an *Act of Knowledge*, by which each *Person* knows and comprehends himself, and whatsoever belongs to him. The Major Proposition therefore is to be proved, *viz.* That no *Personal Act* can be the formal Reason of *Personality* in the *Person* whose *Act* it is. And I prove it thus: The formal Reason of every Thing, is in order of Nature, before the Thing of which it is the formal Reason; but no *Personal Act* is, in order of Nature, before the *Personality* of the *Person* whose *Act* it is, and therefore it cannot be the formal Reason of his *Personality*. The Major is Self-evident. And as for the Minor, 'That no *Personal Act* is before the *Personality* of the *Person* whose *Act* it is; This also is manifest; Because such an *Act* cannot be before the *Person* himself, and therefore not before his *Personality*: For as much as his *Personality* is that by which he is formally a *Person*; so that it is impossible to be before the one without being before the other too. And now, that it cannot be before the *Person* himself, is manifest from hence, that as every *Personal Act* in general bears a Relation of *Posteriority* to the *Person* to whom it belongs, as to the *Cause* or *Productive Principle* of all the *Acts* proceeding from Him; so this particular *Act* of *Self-Consciousness*, bears a Treble Relation of *Posteriority* to the *Person* whose *Act* it is, *viz.* as to the *Agent* or *Principle* producing it. 2. As to the *Subject Recipient* of it, and sustaining it. And Thirdly and Lastly, As to the *Object* which it is terminated to. All which Respects it sustains, not barely as it is an *Act*, but partly as it is an *Immanent Act*, and partly also a *Reflex Act*.

In the first place therefore, every *Person* being the *Agent*, or *Productive Cause* of all the *personal Acts* illusing

ing from Him, he must upon that Account, in Order of Nature, precede the said Acts ; and consequently every *Divine Person* must in Nature be before that Act of *Self-Consciousness*, which personally belongs to him. And moreover since it is likewise an *Immanent Act*, it relates to him, as the *Subject in which it is*, as well as the *Cause from which it is*, and upon that Account also, must bear a *Natural Posteriority* to Him. And then lastly, as it is also a *Reflex Act*, by which the *Person* knows himself to be a *Person*, and is *Conscious* to Himself, what he is, and what he does, it terminates upon him as its *Object* also. So that the *Cause*, the *Subject*, and the *Object* of this Act being the same *Person*, in this last respect, no less than in the two former, it bears another and third Relation of *Posteriority* to Him ; since every Act, not productive of something besides, and without the Agent, is in Order of Nature *Posterior* to the *Object* it terminates upon.

From all which I conclude, That that Act of *Self-Consciousness*, by which each *Divine Person* knows, or is *Conscious* to Himself of his own *Personality*, cannot be the *Formal Reason* of the said *Personality*, without being, in Order of Nature, *both before it*, and *after it too*, viz. Before it, as it is the *Formal Reason* of it, and yet *Posterior* to it, as it is an *Act proceeding from, lodged and received in*, and lastly, *Terminated upon the same Person*.

All which is so very plain, that hardly can any Thing be plainer : And indeed, the very word *Self-Consciousness* contradicts and overthrows its being the *ground*, or *Formal Reason* of *Personality*. For still *Self* must be before *Consciousness* ; and *Self* imports *Personality* ; as being that, by which a *Person* is said to be, *what he is* ; and they both stand united in this one Word, as the *Act and the Object*, and therefore *Consciousness* cannot be the *Reason*.

Reason of it. Or to express the same Thing by other Terms, *Self-Subsistence* must precede *Self-Consciousness*, and *Self-Subsistence* here implies *Personality*; and therefore *Personality*, upon the same Account, must in Nature precede *Self-Consciousness*, and consequently cannot be the *formal Effect*, or *Result* of it. For, surely, according to the most Essential Order of Things, *a Person must be what he is*, before he can *know what he is*.

And this *Argument*, I confess, being founded upon the *Priority of Subsistence* to all *Act*s, and particularly to those of *knowledge* in every *Person Self-Conscious*, does, and must Universally run through all Instances, in which *Personality* and *Self-Consciousness*, with reference to one another, come to be treated of. And as it affects *Self-Consciousness*, so it will equally take place in *Mutual-Consciousness* too.

What Allowances are to be here made for the absolute *Simplicity*, *Eternity*, and *Pure Actuality* of the *Divine Nature* and *Persons*, (when these Notions are applied to them) we have already observed, in the first of those Preliminary Considerations mentioned in this Chapter. The proper use and design of all which Notions, is to lead, guide, and direct our Apprehensions about that *Great Object*, so much too big for our Narrow *Faculties*; so that whatsoever contradicts the Natural Order of these Apprehensions ought upon no ground of Reason to be admitted in our Discourses of the *Divine Nature*, how much soever it may and does transcend the said Apprehensions. And this must be allowed us, or we must sink under the vast Disproportion of the thing before us, and not discourse of it at all. For I cannot think, that the Word *Self-Consciousness* has brought the *Deity* one jot lower to us, or raised our Understandings one degree higher and nearer to that.

Argument II. My Second Argument against Self-Consciousness being the Formal Reason of Personality in the Divine Persons, is this: Nothing in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative can be the Formal Reason of Personality in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity; but Self-Consciousness is in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative; and therefore it cannot be the Reason of personality in any of the said Persons.

Now the Major Proposition is proved thus. Nothing in the Nature of it Absolute can be the Formal Reason of any Thing in the Nature of it purely and perfectly Relative. But the Personality of every one of the Divine Persons is purely and perfectly Relative; and therefore Nothing Absolute can be the Formal Constituent Reason of their Personality. The Major of which Syllogism is also manifest. For Things Essentially different, and thereby uncapable of being affirmed of one another, cannot possibly be the Formal Reason of one another. And, that the Persons in the Blessed Trinity are purely Relative to one another, and consequently, that their Personalities are so many Relations, is no less evident from this, That Two of them relate to one another, as Father and Son, and the Third to Both, as proceeding from Both; and it is impossible for one Thing to proceed from another, especially by a Continual Act of Procession, without Importing a Relation to that from which it so proceeds; so that the very personal Subsistence of these Persons implies and carries in it a Formal Relation. For the Father Subsists personally as a Father, by that Eternal Communication of his Nature to his Son; which Act, as proceeding from him, is called Generation, and renders him Formally a Father, and as Terminated in the Son, is called Filiation, and Constitutes him Formally

mally a Son ; and in like manner the Holy Ghost Subsist personally by that Act of *Procession*, by which he proceeds from, and relates to both the Father and the Son. So that, that proper Mode of *Subsistence* (by which in Conjunction with the Divine Essence always included in it, each of them is rendered a Person) is wholly Relative, and so belongs to one of them, that it also bears a Necessary reference to another. From all which, it undeniably follows, That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity, are in the Formal Constitution of them Relative to one another ; and consequently, That the Three Personalities, by which they become Formally Three Persons, and are so denominated, are Three Eternal Relations.

But now, for the Minor Proposition in the first Syllogism, viz. *That Self-Consciousness is a Thing in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative*, that, I think, can need but little Proof ; it being that Act by which each Person intimately knows, and is Conscious to himself of his own Being, Acts, Motions, and every Thing personally belonging to him ; so that, as such, it terminates within, and looks no further than that one Person, whom it is an Entire Survey and Comprehension of. And as it is an Absolute and Irrelative Term, so it may be Conceived distinctly and fully without Conceiving, or implying the Conception of any Thing, or Person besides. And now, what Relation does or can such an Act of Self-Consciousness imply in it ? It is indeed on the contrary, a direct Contradiction to all that is Relative. For it incloses the Person wholly within himself ; neither pointing nor looking further, nor referring to any one else.

If it be here said, That each *Person*, by an *Act* of *Self-Consciousness*, intimately knows the *Relation* which he stands in to the other Two Persons.

To this, I Answer Two Things.

1. That to know a *Thing* or *Person* to be Relative, or to be Conscious of the Relation belonging to it or him, does not make that *Act* of Knowledge to be either a Relation, or of a Relative Nature.

2. I Answer , That this very Thing proves *Self-Consciousness* not to be the Constituent Reason of *Personality*. For, if the Father knows himself to be a Father by an *Act* of *Self-Consciousness*, it is evident, That *Self-Consciousness* did not make him so : but that he was a Father, and had the Relation of a Father, and thereby a *Personality* belonging to him as such, in Order of Nature Antecedent to this *Act* of *Self-Consciousness* ; and therefore that this *Self-Consciousness* cannot be the Reason of the Relation,nor of the *Personality* implied in it. Forasmuch as it is in several respects Posterior to the Person whom it belongs to,as in the foregoing *Argument* we have abundantly shewn.

But to take a particular and distinct Account of this Notion, in the several *Persons* of the *Trinity* ; Does the *Father* become a *Father* by being *Conscious to himself*, that he is so, or rather by that *Act* by which he Communicates his *Nature* to, and thereby generates a *Son*? Or does the *Son's Relation to the Father* consist in his being *Conscious to himself* of this *Relation*? Or Lastly, does the *Holy Ghost* proceed from the *Father and the Son*, and so personally relate to both by that *Act* of *Self-Consciousness*, by which he is *Conscious to himself* of this *Procession*? All this is *Absurd*; *Unnatural*, and *Impossible*. For

no Person is related to another by that Act of *Self-Consciousness*, by which he knows and reflects Personally upon himself. And yet it is certain, That to be a Father, is a *Relative Subsistence*, and to be a Son depending upon the Father by an Eternal Act of Generation perpetually begetting him, is also to have a *Relative Subsistence*; and Lastly, to be *Eternally proceeding from Both*, as the Holy Ghost is, must likewise import a *Way or Mode of Subsisting altogether as Relative* as the Two former. In which three ways of *Subsistence* consist the Personalities of the Three Persons respectively; and upon these *Self-Consciousness* can have no Constituting Influence at all; as being an Act quite of another Nature; to wit, *Absolute and Irrelative*, and resting wholly within the Person, whom it belongs to.

From all which, I conclude, That *Self-Consciousness* neither is, nor can be the *Formal Reason of Personality* in the Three *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity*. And this Argument I take to have the force and clearness of a *Demonstration*.

Argument III. The Third Argument is this. If *Self-Consciousness* be the *Formal Reason of Personality* in the Three *Divine Persons*, then there is no Repugnancy in the *Nature and Reason* of the Thing it self, but that there might be Three Thousand Persons in the *Deity* as well as Three. But this is Absurd, and therefore so must that be likewise from which it follows. The Consequence appears from this, That there is no Repugnancy but that there might be so many *Self-Consciousnesses*, or *Self-Conscious Minds* or *Spirits*, for the *Deity* to Communicate it self to: And therefore, if *Self-Consciousness* be the *Formal Reason of Personality*, there is no Repugnancy, but that there might be Three Thousand Persons in the God-head, as well as Three. The

The Proposition is proved thus. Because this Repugnancy (if there be any) must be either from the *Nature of Self-Consciousness*, in the several *Self-Conscious Minds* or *Spirits* it belongs to, or from the *Nature of the God-head*, which is to be Communicated to them. But it is from neither of them, For

First, there is nothing in the *Nature of Self-Consciousness* to hinder its Multiplication into never so great a Number of Particulars; but that there may be Three Thousand, or Three Millions of *Self-Conscious Minds* or *Spirits*, as well as Three. Nor, in the next place, is there any Repugnancy on the Part of the *God-head*, That Three Thousand *Self-Conscious Spirits* should subsist in it any more than that Three should: For the *Godhead* considered precisely and abstractedly in it self (and not as actually included in any Person) is as able to Communicate it self to the greatest Number as to the smallest.

If it be here said, That the Three *Persons* are not only Three *Self-Conscious Spirits*, but also Three distinct Infinite *Self-Conscious Spirits* (as our Authour says they are, and of which, more in the next Chapter.) I Answer, That there may be as well Three Thousand distinct *Infinite Spirits* as Three. For Infinity is as much inconsistent with the least Plurality of Infinites, as with the greatest; and therefore if it be no Repugnancy, that there should be Three distinct *Infinite Minds*, neither is there that there should be Three Thousand. So that if *Self-Consciousness* be the *Formal Reason* of *Personality*, there appears no Repugnancy either from the *Nature of Self-Consciousness*, or the Number of the *Spirits* endued with it, nor from the [supposed] *Infinity* of the said *Spirits*, no nor yet from the *Nature of the God-head* it self, but that there might be Three Thousand *Persons* in it as well as Three.

But

But how then comes there to be only Three? Why, upon these grounds no other Reason can be assigned for it, but only that it was God's free Determination that there should be Three and no more. And then the *Trinity of Persons* must be an Effect of God's Will, and not a Necessary Condition of the Divine Nature; and the further Consequence of this must be, that the three *Persons* are Three *Created Beings*, as proceeding from the free Results of God's Will, by virtue whereof they equally might, or might not have been.

But on the contrary our Author himself holds *Page 129. line 13.* That the Three *Persons* are Essential to the Divine Nature, and so Essential to it, that they necessarily belong to it in this number, *and can be neither more nor fewer than Three*. And if this be so, I am sure it is a Contradiction that it should be otherwise: for it is a Contradiction, that that should not be, which necessarily is, and cannot but be. But now I have proved, that there is no Repugnancy or Contradiction to the Nature of Things considered barely according to their Nature, that three thousand *Self-Conscious Minds* or *Spirits* should subsist in the *Godhead* any more than that three such *Spirits* should so subsist. And therefore if it be Absurd, and Impossible, (as undoubtedly it is) that so many *Persons* should belong to the *Divine Nature*, then must the Reason of this Absurdity be fetched from some other Thing, than either from *Self-Consciousness*, with reference to the *Divine Nature*, or from the *Divine Nature*, (considered in it self abstractedly from all Actual Personality:) for these, as we have shewn, afford no sufficient Proof of this Absurdity. And therefore, I say, some other Reason must be found out, and assigned against it. And accordingly, let this Author produce such an one (whatsoever it be) as shall solidly

solidly and conclusively prove, That there cannot be Three Thousand *Self-Conscious Persons* belonging to the Godhead, and that from the Nature of the Thing it self (as several such *Reasons* may be brought) and I will undertake to him to prove, by the very same *Reason* and *Argument* as Conclusively, That *Self-Consciousness* is not, cannot be the *Formal Reason* of *Personality* in the Three *Divine Persons* of the *Trinity*. In the mean time, by that kind of Arguing, which is called *Deductio ad Absurdum*, I have sufficiently disproved it, by shewing what an Intolerable Absurdity must follow the Asserting it.

Argument IV. The Fourth and Last *Argument* shall proceed thus. If Three distinct *Self-Consciousnesses* Formally Constitute Three distinct *Personalities*, then Three distinct *Self-Complacencies* will Constitute Three distinct *Personalities* too. But our Author, I suppose, will not allow of the latter, and therefore neither ought he to assert the former.

The Consequence is plain. Because there is no Reason allegable (according to our Author's Hypothesis) why *Self-Complacency* may not found a *Personality* as well as *Self-Consciousness*.

For they are both of them equally distinct *Internal Acts* in the Person whom they belong to; and as to the Formal Effect of each, an *Act* of *Self-Complacency* seems to have the Preeminence; since it is a greater Perfection to be United to an *Infinite Good*, that is, to the *Deity*, by way of *Love* and *Adhesion*, than barely by way of knowledge and Intellection. And *Self-Complacency* is the former, whereas *Self-Consciousness* rises no higher than the latter. And consequently since *Self-Complacency* is the more perfective *Act* of the two (knowledge of good being

being still in order to the Love of it) and since withall Personality is the most perfect way of *Subsisting*, which any Nature is capable of, it seems most rational to derive the perfectest way of *Subsistence*, belonging to an Intelligent Being, from the most Perfective Act of that Being ; if from any *Act* at all.

And now if this Author should Object, That *Self-Complacency* is in Order of Nature Subsequent to *Self-Consciousness*; and so, that there cannot be the same ground to make it the *Formal Reason* of Personality, that there is, to make *Self-Consciousness* so.

I Answer, That, according to my Principle, whereby I deny *Self-Consciousness* to be the *Reason* of Personality, because it is postnate to *Self-Subsistence*, it is, indeed, a good Reason; but according to our Author's Hypothesis, it is none at all. For if the Priority of *Self-Subsistence* to *Self-Consciousness* (according to him) hinders not but that *Self-Consciousness* may nevertheless be the *Principle* or *Reason* of Personality, why should the precedence of *Self-Consciousness* to *Self-Complacency*, hinder *Self-Complacency* from being as proper a Reason or Principle to found Personality upon, as the other.

All this I alledge only as *an Argument ad Hominem*; and desire this Author to consider, if any one should borrow some of that Boldness of him, by which he dissent from all Antiquity, and confidently averr, That *Self-Complacency* is the Proper formal Reason of Personality in each and every one of the Divine Persons, I would have him, I say, consider by what Reason or Argument, consistent with his New Opinion he could Confute this other New Assertion.

For my own part, since I think as much may be said for the one as for the other, I am ready to set up for *Self-Complacency* against his *Self-Consciousness*, when he

pleases ; and will undertake to give as good Reasons for my Notion, as he can for his, and perhaps better ; let him begin and enter into the Dispute, as soon as he will. And as I shall oppose my *Self-Complacency* to his *Self-Consciousness*, so I shall find out a *Mutual-Complacency* to Vye against his *Mutual-Consciousness* too. And if any one should here Object, That this and the like Disputes are of that Nature, that the World is not like to be much Edified by them ; I, perhaps, think so as much as he : But that is no great matter; since our Author is of so very Benign a Temper, That he does not always Write only for the Reader's *Edification*, but sometimes for his *Diver-
sion* too.

Having thus given my Reasons against this Author's New Notion of *Self-Consciousness*, both with reference to Persons Create and Uncreate, and proved, That it neither is, nor can be the *Formal Reason* of *Personality* in either of them : I shall now pass to his other New Notion of *Mutual-Consciousness*, whereby those Persons, who were distinguished from one another by their respective *Self-Consciousnesses*, are United and made one in Nature by virtue of this *Mutual-Consciousness*. Concerning which Notion also, I must profess my self in the number of those who are by no means satisfied with it, as of any such peculiar Efficacy to the use and purpose it is here brought for.

And there are sufficient Reasons against it. In giving of which, as I must acknowledge, That that one Consideration of the *Priority of Being* (whether *Essentially*, or *Personally* considered) together with the first Modes and Affections of it, to any *Act of Knowledge* Attributable to the said *Being*, is the Fundamental Principle upon which I impugn this Author's New Hypothesis ; so it does and must (as I have noted) run through all, or
Consci-

most of the parts of this Disputation, both about *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* too. And accordingly, in the first place I Argue against it thus.

Argument I. No *Act of Knowledge* can be the *Formal Reason* of an Unity of Nature in the *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity*: But an *Act of Mutual-Consciousness*, is an *Act of Knowledge*; And therefore no *Act of Mutual-Consciousness* can be the *Formal Reason* of an Unity of Nature in the Three *Divine Persons*. The Major I prove thus. Every *Act of Knowledge* supposes the *Unity* of a *Thing*, or *Being* from which that *Act* flows, as *Antecedent* to it, and therefore cannot be the *Formal Reason* of the said *Being*. For still I affirm, that *Being*, and consequently *Unity* of *Being* (which is the first *Affection* of it) must in *Order of Nature* precede *Knowledge*, and all other the like *Attributes* of *Being*. And if so, no *Attribute Subsequent* to a *Thing*, can be the *Formal Reason* of that *Thing*, which it is thus, in *Order of Nature*, *Subsequent* to. For neither can *Omniscience* it self (one of the greatest and most acknowledged *Attributes* of the *Divine Nature*) be said to be the *Reason* either of the *Being*, or of the *Unity* of the said *Nature*: And therefore neither can any *Act of Knowledge* whatsoever be so. This is my first *Argument*, which I think sufficient fairly to propose, without any farther Amplification.

Argument II. If *Unity of Nature* in the *Divine Persons* be the *Cause*, *Reason*, or *Principle* of *Mutual-Consciousness* in the said *Persons*, then their *Mutual-Consciousness* is not the *Cause* or *Reason* of the *Unity* of their *Nature*: But the former is true, and therefore the latter is so too.

As for the Consequence of the Major Proposition, it is as evident, as, that Nothing can be the Cause and Effect of the same Thing.

And for the Minor, *That Unity of Nature, or Essence in the Divine Persons is the Cause, Reason, or Principle of Mutual-Consciousness*, is proved from this, That we can no otherwise conceive of *Mutual-Consciousness*, than as of an Essential Property equally belonging to all the Three Persons: And all Properties, or Internal Attributes, are accounted to issue and result from the *Essence* or *Nature* of the Things which they belong to; and therefore can have no Antecedent Causal Influx upon the said *Nature*, so as to Constitute either the *Being*, or the *Unity* thereof. But the *Divine Nature* or *Essence* being one and the same in all the Three Persons, there is, upon this Account, one and the same *Knowledge* in them also. And they are not *one in Nature*, by virtue of their *Mutual-Consciousness*; but they are therefore *Mutually Conscious*, because the *perfect Unity and Identity of their Nature*, makes them so. And to Assert the contrary, is of the like import (still allowing for the Disproportion of an *Infinite* and a *Finite Nature*) as if we should make *Risibility* in a Man, the Principle of *his Individuation*, and affirm, That *Peter's* having this Property, is that which Constitutes him this particular Individual Man; which is egregiously absurd in all the Philosophy I ever yet met with, whatsoever it may be in this Author's.

Argument III. To affirm *Mutual-Consciousness* to be the Cause of the *Union* of the Three Divine Persons, in the same *Nature*, is to confound the *Union* and *Communion* of the said Persons together: But such a confusion ought by no means to be allowed of: and therefore neither ought that to be Asserted, from whence it follows.

Now

Now certain it is, That all *Acts* of several Persons upon one another (as all that are *Mutual* must needs be) are properly *Acts* of *Communion*, by which the said Persons have an *Intercourse* amongst themselves, as acting interchangeably one upon the other. But then, no doubt, both their *Essence* and *Personality* must still go before this *Mutual-Consciousness*, since the Three *Persons* must needs be really one in *Nature* before they can know themselves to be so. And therefore *Union* of *Knowledge* (as I think *Mutual-Consciousness* may properly be called) cannot give an *Union* of *Nature*. It may indeed suppose it, it may result from it, and upon the same Account may infer and prove it, but it can never give or cause it, nor be that Thing or *Act*, wherein an *Unity* of *Nature* does properly consist, whatsoever this Author Asserts to the contrary.

But the Truth is, all that he has said both of *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* (and he has no more than said it, as never offering at the Proof of any Thing) is founded in a manifest Perversion of that Natural Order, in which Humane Reason Conceives and Discourses of Things: Which Order (to give an Instance of it in our discoursing of any particular Person, or Complete Being) proceeds by these steps. First we conceive of this Person as possessed of a certain *Essence* or *Nature* Constituting or rendering him what he is. Then we conceive of this *Nature* as *one*, which is the first Affection resulting from *Being*. After this we consider this *Being*, as stepping forth, or exerting it self in some *Acts*, whether of *Intellection*, *Volition*, *Power*, or the like. In which whole process the Order of these Conceptions is such, That it cannot, with any Accord to *Reason*, be transposed, so as to have the second or third put into the place of the first.

But now let us see how contrary to this Order our Author's Hypothesis proceeds. For whereas *Nature* or *Being* should be *first*, *Unity* *next*, and the *Acts* *issuing* from thence obtain the *Third place*, and then those *Acts* stand in their due Order amongst themselves. This Author, on the contrary, makes *Mutual-Consciousness*, which is by two Degrees, or Removes posterior to *Unity* of *Nature* (in the Persons whom it belongs to) to be the Cause or *Formal Reason* of the *said Unity*. For first *Self-Consciousness* is posterior to this *Unity*, and then *Mutual-Consciousness* is posterior to *Self-Consciousness*, as being an *Act* supervening upon it. For *Mutual-Consciousness* is that *Act* by which each *Person* comprehends, or is *Conscious* of the *Self-Consciousness* of the other two ; and therefore must needs presuppose them, as the *Act* must needs do its *Object*. And therefore to make (as this Author does) *Mutual-Consciousness* the *Constituent Reason* of the *Unity* of the *Three Persons*, when this *Unity* is by two degrees, in *Order of Nature*, before it, runs so plainly counter to all the Methods of true Reasoning, that it would be but time lost to pursue it with any further Confutation.

Argument IV. Our 4th and last *Argument* proceeds equally against *Mutual-Consciousness* and *Self-Consciousness* too ; and is taken from that known Maxime in Philosophy, That *Entities, or Beings, are not to be multiplied without manifest Necessity* : That is, we are not to admit of New Things, nor to coin new Notions, where such as are known and long received are sufficient to give us a true and full Account of the Nature of the Things we discourse of, and to answer all the Ends and Purposes of Argumentation.

Accordingly

Accordingly I affirm, That the Notions of *Mutual-Consciousness* and *Self-Consciousness* in the Subject now before us ought to be rejected not only as New and Suspicious, but as wholly Needless. For what can be signified by those, which is not fully, clearly, and abundantly signified by that one plain Word, and known Attribute, the *Divine Omniscience*? And what are *Mutual-Consciousness* and *Self-Consciousness* else (if they are any thing) but one and the same *Omniscience* exerting it self several ways, and upon several *Objects*? As to apply it to the Matter before us ; does not every one of the *Divine Persons*, by virtue of the *Divine Nature*, and of this *Omniscience* therewith Communicated to him, Perfectly, Intimately, and Intirely know himself as a *Person*, and all the *Actions*, *Motions*, and every thing else belonging to him? No doubt he does ; for that otherwise he could not be *Omniscient*. And does not the same *Person* again, by the very same *Omniscience*, know all that is known by the other Two *Persons*, and the other Two *Persons* by the same Mutually know all that is known by him? No doubt they may and do : Forasmuch as *Omniscience* knows all things that are knowable, and consequently all that is or can be known of, or in any one or all of the *Divine Persons* joyntly or severally considered.

But to argue the Matter yet more particularly. Either *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* are one and the same with the *Divine Omniscience*, or they are distinct sorts of knowledge from it. If they are the same, then they are useless and superfluous Notions, as we affirm they are ; but if they import distinct sorts of knowledge, then these two Things will follow.

1. That in every one of the *Divine Persons* there are three distinct sorts of *Knowledge*, viz. A Knowledge of *Omniscience*, a Knowledge of *Self-Consciousness*, and a Knowledge of *Mutual-Consciousness* too ; which, I think, is very absurd and ridiculous.

2. And in the next place : If we affirm them to be distinct sorts of *Knowledge* from that of *Omniscience*, then they must also have *Objects* distinct from, and not included in the *Object* of *Omniscience* ; since all such difference, either of sorts or *Acts* of *Knowledge* is founded upon the difference of their *Objects*. But this is impossible ; since the *Object* of *Omniscience* comprehends in it all that is knowable ; and consequently if *Mutual-Consciousness* and *Self-Consciousness* have *Objects* distinct from, and not included in the *Object* of *Omniscience*, those *Objects* must be something that is not knowable ; for that *Omniscience* (as we have shewn) claims all that is knowable, or possible to be known, for its own *Object*. From all which it follows, That *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* considered as distinct from *Omniscience* are two empty Chimerical Words, without any distinct Sense, or Signification.

In a word, Every Person in the *Trinity*, by one and the same *Act* of *Omniscience*, knows all the Internal *Acts*, Motions, and Relations proper both to himself, and to the other Two Persons besides. And if so, what imployment or use can there be for *Self-Consciousness*, or *Mutual-Consciousness*, which *Omniscience* (that takes in the *Objects* of both) has not fully answered and discharged already ?

If it be here said, That *Omniscience* cannot give *Personality* ; forasmuch as the *Personality* of each *Person* distinguishes him from the other two ; which *Omniscience* (being common to them all) cannot do. This I grant, and

and own it impossible for any Thing Essentially involved in the *Divine Nature*, to give a Personal Distinction to any of the Three Persons ; but then I add also, That we have equally proved, that neither was *Self-Consciousness* the *Formal Reason* of this Personal Distinction, by several *Arguments* ; and more especially, because that *Self-Consciousness* being a Thing Absolute and Irrelative, could not be the *Formal Reason* of any thing in the Nature of it perfectly Relative, as the *Divine Persons* certainly are. For this is a received Maxime in the Schools, with reference to the *Divine Nature and Persons*, *Repugnat in Divinis dari Absolutum Incommunicabile*, Greg. de Valen.

¹ Tom. p. 874. And it is a sure Rule, whereby we may distinguish in every one of the *Divine Persons*, what is *Essential*, from what is *Personal*. For every Attribute that is Absolute, is Communicable, and consequently Essential, and every one that is purely Relative, is Incommunicable, and therefore purely Personal, and so *& converso*: Upon which Account *Self-Consciousness*, which is a Thing Absolute and Irrelative, cannot be Incommunicable, nor consequently the *Formal Reason* of Personality in any of the *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity* ; as we have already at large demonstrated.

So that still our Assertion stands good, That all that can be truly ascribed to *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* with reference to the *Divine Nature and Persons*, may be fully and fairly accounted for from that one known Attribute, the *Divine Omiscience*. And therefore, that there is no use at all either of the Term *Self-Consciousness* or *Mutual-Consciousness*, to contribute to the plainer or fuller Explication of the *Blessed Trinity* ; as this Author, with great flutter of Ostentation pretends, but has not yet by so much as one solid *Argument* proved.

But when I consider how wonderfully pleased the Man is with these two new-started Terms so high in sound, and so empty of sense, instead of one substantial word, which gives us all that can be pretended useful in them, with vast overplus and advantage, and even swallows them up, as Moses's Rod did those pitiful Tools of the *Magicians*; This (I say) brings to my Mind (whether I will or no) a certain Story of a Grave Person, who Riding in the Road with his Servant, and finding himself something uneasie in his Saddle, bespoke his Servant thus. John (says he) *a-light*; and first take off the Saddle that is upon my Horse, and then take off the Saddle that is upon your Horse; and when you have done this, put the Saddle that was upon my Horse, upon your Horse, and put the Saddle that was upon your Horse upon my Horse: Whereupon the Man, who had not studied the Philosophy of Saddles (whether *Ambling* or *Trotting*) so exactly, as his Master, replys something short upon him; *Lord! Master, What needs all these words? Could you not as well have said, Let us change Saddles?* Now I must confess, I think the Servant was much in the right; though the Master having *a Rational Head of his own*, and being withal willing to make the Notion of *changing* Saddles more plain, easie, and intelligible, and to give a clearer Explication of that word, (which his Fore-Fathers, how good Horse-men sever they might have been, yet were not equally happy in the explaining of) was pleased to set it forth by that more full and accurate Circumlocution.

And here it is not unlikely but that this Author, who, with a spight equally Malicious and Ridiculous, has reflected upon one of his Antagonists, and that for no Cause, or Provocation that appears (unless for having Baffled him) may tax me also, as one Drolling upon *Things*

Things sacred, for representing the vanity of his Hypothesis by the forementioned Example and Comparison. But I hope the World will give me leave to distinguish between *Things Sacred*, and his Absurd Phantaſtick way of treating of them ; which, I can, by no means look upon as *Sacred*, nor indeed any Thing else in his whole Book, but the bare *Subject* it treats of, and the *Scriptures* there quoted by him. For to speak my thoughts plainly, I believe this *Sacred Mystery* of the *Trinity*, was never so ridiculed and expos'd to the Contempt of the Profane Scoffers at it, as it has been by this New-fashioned Defence of it.

And so I dismiss his two so much *Admired Terms* (by himself I mean) as in no degree answering the Expectation he raised of them. For I cannot find, That they have either heightned or strength'ned Men's Intellectual Faculties, or cast a greater light and clearnes upon that Object which has so long exercised them ; but that *a Trinity in Unity* is as Mysterious as ever ; and the Mind of Man as unable to grasp and comprehend it, as it has been from the beginning of Christianity to this day. In a word, *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* have rendred nothing about the *Divine Nature* and *Persons*, plainer, easier, and more *Intelligible* ; nor indeed, after such a mighty stress so irrationally laid upon two slight empty words, have they made any thing (but the Author himself) better understood than it was before.

C H A P. V.

In which is proved against this Author, That the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, are not Three Distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

IT being certain both from *Philosophy* and *Religion*, that there is but one only *God*, or *God-head*, in which *Christian Religion* has taught us, That there are *Three Persons*; Many Eminent Professors of it have attempted to shew, how one and the same Nature might Subsist in *Three Persons*, and how the said *Three Persons* might meet in one, and make no more than one simple, undivided *Nature*. It had been to be wished, I confess, that Divines had rested in the bare Expressions delivered in Scripture concerning this Mystery, and ventured no further by any particular, and bold Explications of it: But since the Nature, or rather Humour of Man has been still too strong for his Duty, and his Curiosity (especially in things Sacred) been apt to carry him too far; those, however, have been all along the most pardonable, who have ventured least, and proceeded upon the surest grounds both of Scripture it self, and of Reason discoursing upon it. And such I affirm the Ancient Writers and Fathers of the Church, and after them the Schoolmen to have been; who with all their Faults (or rather Infelicities, caused by the Times and Circumstances they,

they lived in) are better Divines, and Soberer Reasoners than any of those Pert, Confident, Raw Men, who are much better at Despising and Carping at them, than at Reading and Understanding them: Though Wise Men Despise nothing, but they will know it first; and for that Cause very rationally despise them.

But among those, who leaving the Common Road of the Church have took a By-way to themselves, none (of late Years especially) have ventured so boldly and so far as this Author; who pretending to be *more happy* (forsooth) *in his Explication of this Mystery than all before him* (as who would not believe a Man in his own Commendation?) and to give a more satisfactory Account of this long received, and Revered Article by Terms perfectly New, and peculiarly his own, has advanced quite different Notions about this Mystery, from any that our Church was ever yet acquainted with; Affirming, (as he does) *That the Three Persons in the God-head, are Three Distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits,* as will appear from the several places of his Book, where he declares his Thoughts upon this great Subject. As, First in Page 50. he says, *The Three Divine Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three Infinite Minds really distinct from each other.* Again, in Page 66. *The Persons* (says he) are perfectly distinct; *for they are Three distinct and Infinite Minds, and therefore Three distinct Persons:* For a Person is an Intelligent Being; and to say, *they are Three Divine Persons, and not Three distinct Infinite Minds,* is both Heresie and Norsence. For which extraordinary Complement passed upon the whole Body of the Church of England, and perhaps all the Churches of Christendom besides, as I have paid him part of my thanks already, so I will not fail yet further to account with him before I put an end to this Chapter. In the mean time,

time, he goes on, in *Page 102.* *I plainly assert* (says he) *That as the Father is an Eternal and Infinite Mind, so the Son is an Eternal and Infinite Mind distinct from the Father, and the Holy Ghost is an Eternal and Infinite Mind distinct both from Father and Son:* Adding withall these words; *Which* (says he) *every Body can understand without any skill in Logick, or Metaphysicks.* And this, I confess, is most truly and seasonably remarked by him: For the want of this Qualification is so far from being any hindrance in the Case mentioned, that I dare undertake, that nothing but want of skill in *Logick and Metaphysicks*, can bring any Man living, who acknowledges the *Trinity*, to own this Assertion. I need repeat no more of his Expressions to this purpose; these being sufficient to declare his Opinion; save only that in *Page 119.* where (he says) *That Three Minds, or Spirits, which have no other difference, are yet distinguish'd by Self-Consciousness, and are Three distinct Spirits.* And that other in *Page 258.* where speaking of the *Three Persons*, *I grant* (says he) *that they are Three Holy Spirits.* By the same Token, that he there very Learnedly distinguishes between *Ghost* and *Spirit*, allowing the said *Three Persons* (as we have shewn) to be *Three Holy Spirits*, but at the same time denying them to be *Three Holy Ghosts*, and this with great scorn of those who should hold, or speak otherwise. To which at present I shall say no more but this, That he would do well to turn these two Propositions into *Greek*, or *Latin*; and that will presently shew him what difference and distinction there is between a *Ghost* and a *Spirit*, and why the very same things which are affirmed of the one (notwithstanding the difference of those words in *English*) may not, with the same Truth, be affirmed of the other also. But the Examination of this odd Assertion will fall in more naturally towards the latter end of this

this Chapter, where it shall be particularly considered.

I have now shewn this Author's Judgment in the Point, and in opposition to what he has so boldly Asserted, and laid down, I do here deny, *That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity, are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Three distinct Infinite Spirits.* And to overthrow his Assertion, and evince the Truth of mine, I shall trouble neither my Reader nor my self, with many Arguments. But of those, which I shall make use of, the first is this.

Argument I. Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits, are Three distinct Gods.

But the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, are not Three distinct Gods.

And therefore the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, are not Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

The Minor, I suppose, this Author will readily concur with me in; howbeit his Hypothesis (as shall be shewn) in the certain Consequences of it Contradicts it, and, if it should stand, would effectually overturn it. For by that he Asserts a perfect *Tritheisme*, though I have so much Charity for him, as to believe, that he does not know it.

The Major Proposition therefore is that which must be debated between us. This Author holds it in the Negative, and I in the Affirmative: and my Reason for what I affirm, *viz.* That *Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits, are Three distinct Gods*, is this, That God and *Infinite Mind, or Spirit*, are Terms Equipollent, and Convertible. God being truly and properly an *Infinite Mind, or Spirit*, and an *Infinite Mind or Spirit* being as truly

truly and properly God. And to shew this Convertibility and Commensuration between them yet further: Whatsoever may be affirmed or denied of the one, may with equal Truth and Propriety be affirmed or denied of the other. And to give an Instance of this with reference to the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity; As it is true, that one and the same God, or God-head is Common to, and Subsists in all and every one of the Three Persons; so is it true, *That one and the same Infinite Mind, or Spirit, is Common to, and Subsists in the said Three Persons:* And consequently, as it is false, *That one and the same God, or God-head, by being Common to, and Subsisting in the Three Persons, becomes Three Gods, or Three God-heads;* so is it equally false, *That one and the same Infinite Mind, or Spirit, by being Common to, and Subsisting in the said Three Persons, becomes Three Infinite Minds or Spirits.* This is clear Argumentation, and craves no Mercy at our Author's Hands.

If it be here Objected, That we allow of Three *distinct Persons* in the *God-head*, of which every one is *Infinite*, without admitting them to be Three *distinct Gods*; and therefore, why may we not as well allow of Three *distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits* in the same *God-head* without any necessity of inferring from thence, That they are Three *distinct Gods*?

I Answer, That the Case is very different, and the Reason of the difference is this, Because Three *Infinite Minds, or Spirits* are Three Absolute, Simple *Beings*, or *Essences*, and so stand distinguished from one another, by their whole *Beings* or *Natures*. But the *Divine Persons* are Three *Relatives*, (or one simple *Being*, or *Essence*, under three *distinct Relations*) and consequently differ from one another, not wholly, and by all that is in them,

them, but only by some certain *Mode*, or *respect* peculiar to each, and upon that Account causing their Distinction. And therefore to Argue from a *Person* to a *Spirit* here is manifestly Sophistical, and that which is called, *Fallacia Accidentis*, or (since several Fallacies may concur in the same Proposition) it may be also à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. For so it is to conclude, That Three *Persons* are Three *distinct Gods*; since the difference of Persons is only from a *diverse respect* between them; but Three *Gods* import Three absolutely *distinct Natures* or *Substances*. And whereas we say, That the Three *Persons* are all and every one of them *Infinite*, yet it is but from one and the same Numerical Nature Common to them all that they are so, the Ternary Number all the while not belonging to their *Infinity*, but only to their *Personalities*. The Case therefore between a *Mind*, or *Spirit*, and a *Person*, is by no means the same. Forasmuch as [*Person*] here imports only a Relation, or Mode of *Subsistence* in Conjunction with the Nature it belongs to: And therefore a Multiplication of *Persons* (of it self) imports only a Multiplication of such *Modes*, or *Relations*, without any necessary Multiplication of the Nature it self to which they adhere. Forasmuch as one and the same Nature may sustain several distinct Relations, or Modes of Subsistence. But now on the other side, a *Mind*, or *Spirit*, is not a Relation, or Mode of *Subsistence*, but it is an Absolute Being, Nature, or Substance; and consequently cannot be multiplied without a Multiplication of it into so many Numerical Absolute Beings, Natures, or Substances; there being nothing in it to be multiplied but it self. So that Three *Minds*, or *Spirits*, are Three Absolute Beings, Natures, or Substances, and Three *distinct Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits*, are accordingly Three *distinct Infinite*

Infinite Absolute Beings, Natures, or Substances. That is, in other words, *They are Three Gods*; which was the Thing to be proved; and let this Author ward off the Proof of it as he is able.

Argument II. My Second Argument against the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity being Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits, is this.

Three distinct Minds, or Spirits are Three distinct Substances.

But the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Substances.

And therefore they are not Three distinct Minds, or Spirits.

The Major Proposition is proved from the Definition of a *Mind*, or *Spirit*, That it is *Substantia Incorporea Intelligens*, an Intelligent, Incorporeal, [or Immortal] Substance; and therefore Three distinct Minds, or Spirits, must be Three such distinct Substances. And besides, if a *Mind*, or *Spirit*, were not a *Substance*, what could it be else? If it be any Thing, it must be either an *Accident*, or *Mode of Being*. But not an *Accident*, since no *Accident* can be in *God*; nor yet a *Mode of Being*, since a *Spirit* (not designed to concur as a part towards any Compound) is an Absolute, Entire, Complete Being of it self, and has its proper Mode of Subsistence belonging to it; and therefore cannot be a *Mode* it self. From whence it follows, That a *Spirit* is, and must be a *Substance*, and can be nothing else.

As for the Minor, viz. *That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Substances*; this is evident both from Authority, and from Reason.

And

And first for Authority, *Tertullian* against *Praxeas* affirms, *Semper in Deo una Substantia*. And St. *Jerom* in his Epistle to *Damasus*, *Quis ore sacrilego Tres substantias prædicabit?* And St. *Austin* in his 5th Book de Trinitate, Chap. 9. and in Book 7. Chap. 4. And *Ruffinus* in the 10th Book of his History, Chap. 29. All affirm One Substance in *God*, and deny Three, and yet the same Writers unanimously hold Three Persons, which shews, That they did not account these Three Persons, Three Substances. And *Anselmus* in his Book de Incarnatione, Chap. 3. says, That the Father and the Son may be said to be Two Beings, provided that by Beings we understand Relations not Substances. And *Bellarmino*, a Writer Orthodox enough in these points, and of unquestionable Learning otherwise, in his 2d Tome, page 348. about the end, says, That to assert, that the Father and the Son differ in Substance, is *Arianism*: And yet if they were Two distinct Substances, for them not to differ in Substance, would be impossible. And as for the Greek Writers, they never admit of Three *εἶδος* in the *Deity*, but where *εἶδος* is used to signify the same with *εἶδοντος*, as sometimes it was used: And by reason of this Ambiguity it was, that the Latine Church was so long fearful of using the word Hypostasis, and used only that of *Persona*, answering to the Greek *Περσωπή*, lest they should hereby be thought to admit of Three Substances, as well as Three Persons in the God-head.

Nor, in the next place, is the same less evident from Reason, than we have shewn it to be from Authority. For if the Three Persons be Three distinct Substances, then Two distinct Substances will concur in, and belong to each Person; to wit, *That Substance* which is the *Divine Essence*, and so is Communicable or Common to all the Persons, and *that Substance* which Constitutes each

Person, and thereby is so peculiar to him as to distinguish him from the other, and consequently to be incommunicable to any besides him to whom it belongs: Since for one and the same Substance to be Common to all Three Persons, and withal to belong incomunicably to each of the Three, and thereby to distinguish them from one another, is Contradictious and Impossible: And yet on the other side to assert Two distinct Substances in each Person, is altogether as Absurd; and that, as upon many other Accounts, so particularly upon this; That it must infer such a Composition in the *Divine Persons*, as is utterly Incompatible with the Absolute Simplicity, and Infinite Perfection of the *Divine Nature*. And therefore the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity, can by no means be said to be Three distinct Substances, but only one Infinite Substance, equally Common to, and Subsisting in them all, and diversified by their respective Relations. And moreover, since Three distinct Minds, or Spirits are Essentially Three distinct Substances, neither can the Three Persons of the Trinity be said to be Three distinct Minds, or Spirits; which was the Point to be made out.

Argument III. My Third Argument against the same shall proceed thus...

If it be truly said, That one and the same Infinite Mind, or Spirit is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, (I mean all Three taken together) and it cannot be truly said, That one and the same Infinite Mind, or Spirit is Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits; then it follows, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

But

But it may be truly said, That one and the same Infinite Mind, or Spirit is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ; and it cannot be truly said, That one and the same Infinite Mind, or Spirit is Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

Therefore the Three Persons in the Trinity, viz. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

This is the Argument. .

Now the Consequence of the Major appears from this, That the same Thing, or Things, at the same time, and in the same respect, cannot be truly affirmed and denied of the same Subject : And therefore since [Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, taken joynly together] are truly predicated of one and the same Infinite Mind ; and [Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits] cannot be truly affirmed or predicated, and consequently may be truly denied of the same ; it follows, That [Father, Son, and Holy Ghost] and [Three distinct Infinite Minds; or Spirits] neither are, nor can be accounted the same, nor be truly affirmable of one another.

As for the Minor, it consists of two parts, and accordingly must be proved severally in each of them.

And First, That it is, and may be truly said, *That one and the same Infinite Mind is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost* (viz. joynly taken) as I noted before. This, I say, may be proved from hence, That God is truly said to be Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (still so taken.) And it having been already evinced, That [one Infinite Mind, or Spirit] and [one God] are terms convertible and equipollent, it follows, That whatsoever is truly affirmed or denied of the one, may be as truly affirmed or denied of the other. And this is too evident to need any further proof.

And

And therefore in the next place, for the proof of the other part of the Minor, viz. *That one and the same Infinite Mind, or Spirit, cannot be truly said to be Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits;* This is no less evident than the former, because in such a Proposition both Subject and Predicate imply a Mutual Negation of, and Contradiction to one and another; and where it is so, it is impossible for one to be truly affirmed, or predicated of the other.

And now, after this plain proof given both of the Major and the Minor Proposition, and this also drawn into so little a compass, I hope this Author will not bear himself so much above all the Rules which other Mortals proceed by, as, after the Premises proved, to deny the Conclusion, viz. *That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.* The Affirmation of which, is that which I undertook to confute.

But before I dismiss this Argument, I cannot but take notice, That the same Terms, with a bare Transposition of them, viz. by shifting place between the Predicate and the Subject (which in Adequate and Commensurate Predications, may very well be done) will as effectually conclude to the same Purpose, as they did in the way in which we have already proposed them. And so the Argument will proceed thus.

If it be truly and properly said, That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity, are one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit; then they cannot be truly said to be Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

But they are truly and properly said to be one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit.

And therefore they neither are, nor can be truly said to be Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

The Consequence of the first Proposition is manifest, because (as we have shewn before) one and the same Infinite Mind cannot be Three distinct Infinite Minds without a Contradiction in the Terms.

And for the Minor, viz. That the Three Persons are truly said to be one Infinite Mind, or Spirit ; That also is proved by this, That all and every one of them, are truly and properly said to be God ; and God is truly and properly one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit : And therefore if the Three Persons are said to be the First, they must be said to be this Latter also ; and that (as I shew before) because of the Reciprocal Predication of those Terms. But as to the Matter before us, That God is truly and properly one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit, even this Author himself allows, who in Page 69. positively says, That we know nothing of the Divine Essence, but that God is an Infinite Mind. Very well ; and if he grant him to be an Infinite Mind, let him prove this Infinite Mind to be three distinct Infinite Minds, if he can. The Truth is [Infinite Mind or Spirit] is an Essential Attribute of the Divine Nature, and Convertible with it, and whatsoever is so, belongs equally to all the Three Persons, and consequently cannot be ascribed to them plurally any more than the Deity it self ; it being as incapable, as that, of being multiplied. Upon which Account, if the Three Persons are with equal Truth said to be [one Infinite Mind, or Spirit] and to be [one God] they can no more be said to be Three distinct Infinite Minds, than they can be said to be Three distinct Gods.

So that which way soever the Argument be proposed, either, *That one Infinite Mind is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*; or, *That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are one Infinite Mind*, it still overthrows this Author's Hypothesis, *That the said Three Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.*

Argument IV. My Fourth and Last Argument against the same, shall be this.

Whatsoever Attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in the Athanasian Form, so belongs to them all in Common, that it can belong to none of them under any Term of distinction from the rest.

But the Attribute [Infinite Mind, or Spirit] may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in and according to the Athanasian Form.

And therefore it can belong to none of them under any Term of distinction from the rest.

The Major is as evident; as that no Attribute can be Common to several Subjects, and yet peculiar and appropriate to each of them.

And the Minor is proved by Instance thus; The *Father* is an *Infinite Mind*, the *Son* is an *Infinite Mind*, and the *Holy Ghost* is an *Infinite Mind*; and yet they are not *Three Infinite Minds*, but one *Infinite Mind*.

And this I affirm to be as good Divinity as any part in the *Athanasian Creed*, and such as I shall abide by, both against this Author, and any other whatsoever.

But now let us see how his Assertion cast into the *Athanasian Model*, shews it self, as thus.

The Father is a distinct Infinite Mind, the Son is a distinct Infinite Mind, and the Holy Ghost is a distinct Infinite Mind; and yet they are not Three distinct Infinite Minds, but one distinct Infinite Mind.

And this is so far from being true, that it is indeed neither Truth nor Sence. For what Truth can there be in denying, That Three Persons, of which every one is said to be a *distinct Infinite Mind*, are *Three distinct Infinite Minds*? And what fence can there be in affirming, or saying, *That they are but One distinct Infinite Mind*? Whereas the Term [*distinct*] is never properly used or applied, but with respect had to several Particulars each discriminated from the other; but by no means where there is mention made only of *one Thing* and no more, as it is here in this Proposition.

But to make what allowances the Case will bear, and for that purpose to remit something of the strictness of the *Athanasian Form*, by leaving out the word [*distinct*] in the last and illative Clause, we shall then see that our Author's Hypothesis will proceed thus.

The Father is a distinct Infinite Mind, the Son is a distinct Infinite Mind, and the Holy Ghost is a distinct Infinite Mind; and yet they are not Three Infinite Minds, but one Infinite Mind.

Thus, I say, it must proceed in the *Athanasian* way with the word [*distinct*] left out of the Conclusion. Nevertheless even so, the Inference is still manifestly and grossly false in both the branches of it. For it is absolutely false [*That Three distinct Infinite Minds, are not Three Infinite Minds*] and altogether as false [*That Three Infinite Minds, are but One Infinite Mind.*]

The Author's Hypothesis put into the *Athanasian* Model, must needs fall in with that Fallacy sometimes

urged against us by the Socinians, viz. *The Father is a Person, the Son a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person, and yet they are not Three Persons, but one Person*; which is manifestly Sophistical, by arguing *ab imparibus tanquam paribus*, viz. Concluding that of an Attribute *Relative*, and *Multiplicable*, which can be concluded only of such as are not So.

For the *Athanasian* Inference holds only in Attributes *Essential* and *Common* to all the Three *Persons* joynly, or severally taken, and not in such as are *Proper*, *Personal*, and *Peculiar* to each. As also in such as are *Absolute* (as the Attribute of *Mind*, or *Spirit* without the word [*distinct*] is) and not in such as are *Relative*. For those Attributes, which agree to the *Divine Persons*, Personally, Peculiarly, and Relatively, can never Unite, or Coincide into *one* in the Inference, or Conclusion. In a word [*Infinite Mind, or Spirit*] is a Predicate perfectly *Essential*, and so in its Numerical Unity *Common* to all the Three *Divine Persons*, and for that cause not to be affirmed of, or ascribed to, either all or any of them with the Term [*distinct*] added to it, or joyned with it. For that would *multiply* an Attribute that cannot be *multiplyed*.

And now, what I have here discoursed upon, and drawn from the *Athanasian* Creed with respect to this particular Subject, I leave to our Author's strictest Examination. For my own part, I rely upon this *Creed*, as a sure Test, or Rule to discover the falsehood of his Hypothesis by. So that as long as it is true, that *God is one numerical Infinite Mind or Spirit*, and as long as the *Athanasian* Form duly applied is a firm and good way of Reasoning, this Author's Assertion, *That the Three Divine Persons, are Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*, is thereby irrefragably overthrown.

And

And therefore I shall not concern my self to produce any more Arguments against it. Only by way of Overplus to, and Illustration of those, which have already been alledged, I cannot but observe the Concurrent Opinion of the Philosophers, and most Learned Men amongst the Heathens about God's being One Infinite Mind, or Spirit, as a necessary deduction (no doubt) made by Natural Reason from the Principles thereof concerning the Divine Nature. For most of those Philosophers looked upon God as the Soul of the World, as One Infinite Mind, or Spirit, that animated and presided over the Universe. For so held Pythagoras, as Cicero in his first Book, *de Naturâ Deorum*, and Lactantius in his Book *de irâ Dei*, tells us, *Pythagoras quoque unum Deum confitetur dicens Incorpoream esse mentem quæ per omnem Naturam diffusa & intenta vitalē sensum tribuit.* In like manner the Great Hermes being asked, *What God was*, answered, ὁ πᾶς ὅλων δημόσιος οὐρανὸς καὶ αἰδής, The Maker of all Things, a most Wise and Eternal Mind. Thales called him, νῦν τὸ νόος Θεῖν, God, the Mind of the World. Diogenes, Cleanthes, and Oenipides, η τὸ νόος ψυχὴ, The Soul of the World. Plato in *Phædone*, says of God, That he is νῦν ὁ φύσεως πότερος τὸν καί τὸν πάνταν αἴτης, a Mind that is the Cause and orderer of all Things. And Plato the Son of Ariston says, οὗτος νῦν εἶπε τὸ νόος, God is the Mind of the World. And Lactantius gives this Testimony of Aristotle, That, *Quamvis secum ipse diffideat, ac repugnantia sibi & dicat, & sentiat,* (by which one would think our Author better acquainted with him than he is) *in summum tamen unam mentem mundo praesse testatur.* Lact. de falsâ Relig. Lib. i. Cap. 5. Agreeably to all which, Seneca in the Preface to his Natural Questions, putting the Question, *Quid est Deus?* What is God? Answers, *Mens Universi,* The Mind of the Universe. As the Learned

Emperour *Antoninus* after him, expresses God the same way, and by the same word in Greek, ὁ τὸς ὅλος νῆσος, Lib. 5. p. 148. Oxon. Edit. And that Passage in *Virgil's* 6. *Aeneid* is famous; where speaking of God, as the *Great Soul of the World*, running through all the Parts of that vast Body, he expresses it in those known Verses:

---- *Cælum, ac Terras, Camposq; liquentes,*
Lucentemq; Globum Lun.e, Titaniaq; Astra,
Spiritus intus alit, totamq; infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.

And the same was the Opinion of *Cato* before him, a great Man, though but a small Author, who tells us from the Ancient Poets (who were accounted the Philosophers of the first Ages) That *Deus est animus*, God is a Mind, or Spirit.

And the Truth is, I reckon that these Learned Men, all along, by an Infinite Mind, or Spirit, understood as truly and certainly One Infinite Mind, or Spirit, as if the Term of Unity had been added by them. For besides that the Particles *a*, or *the*, (which we use in translating any single word into our own Language) import so much, the very condition also of the Subject spoken of, as being *Infinite*, must needs infer the same. So that we see here how the Judgment of Natural Reason in these Eminent Philosophers amongst the Heathens falls in with what God himself revealed by the Mouth of our Saviour concerning his own Nature, in *John* 4. 24. viz. *That God is a Spirit.* For we have them expressing him by these words, *Animus*, *Mens*, & *Spiritus*. So that had they all lived after St. *John*, (as one of them did,) their Sentences might have passed for so many Paraphrases upon

upon the Text, all declaring God to be *One Infinite Son!, Mind, or Spirit.*

But perhaps our Author will here say, What is all this to the purpose, since we found our knowledge of the Three *Divine Persons*, wholly upon *Revelation?* And I grant, we do so : Yet nevertheless I shall, by his good favour, shew, That what I have alledged is very much to the purpose. And to this end, premising here what we have already proved, *viz.* That to be *One Infinite Mind, and to be Three distinct Infinite Minds,* involve in them a Mutual Negation of, and Contradiction to one another : (Forasmuch as to be *Unum*, is to be *Indivisum in se*; that is to say, Indivisible into more things, such as it self.) This, I say, premised,

First, I desire this Author to produce that Revelation, which declares the Three *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity*, to be Three *distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.* For I deny that there is any such.

Secondly, I affirm, That whatsoever is a Truth in Natural Reason, cannot be contradicted by any other Truth declared by Revelation ; since it is impossible for any one Truth to contradict another.

Upon which grounds, I here ask our Author, Is it a Contradiction for One God to be One Infinite Mind, or Spirit, and to be also Three Infinite Minds, or Spirits? If he grant this (as I have proved it, whether he does or no) then I ask him in the next place, Whether it be a Proposition true in Natural Reason, [That God is one Infinite Mind, or Spirit?] If he grants this also, then I infer, That it cannot be proved true from Revelation, [That God is Three Infinite Minds, or Spirits,] since the certain Truth of the first Proposition supposed and admitted must needs disprove the Truth of that *Revelation*, which pretends to establish the second.

But

But some again may perhaps ask, Suppose it were revealed in express Terms, [*That God is Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits,*] would you in this case throw aside this Revelation in submission to the former Proposition declared by Natural Reason? I Answer, No: But if the Revelation were express and undeniable, I would adhere to it; but at the same time, while I did so, I would quit the former Proposition, and conclude, That Natural Reason had not discoursed right when it concluded, *That God was one Infinite Mind, or Spirit*: But to hold both Propositions to be True, and to assent to them both as such, This the Mind of Man can never do.

So that, in a word, I conclude, That if it be certainly true from Reason, *That God is One Infinite Mind, or Spirit*. No Revelation can, or ought to be pleaded, *That he is Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*: And if Revelation cannot, or ought not to be pleaded for it, I am sure, we have no ground to believe it. And yet at the same time I own and assert a Revelation of the truth of this Proposition, [*That God is Three Persons,*] or, which is all one, [*That God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,*] since it does not at all contradict the forementioned Propositions founded upon Natural Reason, [viz. *That God is One Infinite Mind, or Spirit,*] nor could it yet ever be proved to do so, either by *Arrians*, or *Socinians*. But on the contrary, these two Propositions, viz. [*God is One Infinite Mind, or Spirit*] and that other, [*God is Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*] (which he must be, if the Three Divine Persons are *Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*) are Gross, Palpable, and Irreconcileable Contradictions. And because they are so, it is demonstratively certain, *That the said Three Persons are not Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*: As this Author against all,

all Principles of Philosophy and Divinity has most erroneously affirmed them to be.

I have said enough, I hope, upon this Subject. But before I quit it, it will not be amiss to observe what work this Man makes with the *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity*, (as indeed he seldom almost turns his Pen, but he gives some scurvy stroke at it or other,) particularly in *Page 89.* he affirms, That the Expression of [*the One true God, and the only true God*] cannot properly be attributed to the *Son*, nor to the *Holy Ghost*. From whence I infer, That then neither can the Expression of [*God, or the True God*] be properly attributed to the *Son*, or to the *Holy Ghost*. Forasmuch as the Terms [*One God*] and [*One True God, or one only True God*] are equivalent. The Term [*One God*] including in it every whit as much as the Term [*One True God, or One only True God*] and the Term [*One True God, or One only True God*] including in it no more than the Term [*One God*;] and consequently if he asserts, That these Terms cannot with equal Propriety be attributed to, and predicated of the *Son* and the *Holy Ghost*, we have him both *Arrian* and *Macedonian* together in this Assertion.

And I believe his Adversary the *Author of the Notes* could hardly have desired a greater Advantage against him, than his calling it (as he does) *a Corruption of the Athanaian Creed*, to joyn the Term [*One True God*] to every *Person* of the *Trinity*; adding withal, That upon the doing so, *it would sound pretty like a Contradiction to say in the close [That there was but One True God.]* These are our Author's words, but much fitter to have proceeded from a *Socinian*, than from one professing a belief, and (which is more) *a defence of the Trinity*. But in answer to them, I tell him, That the repeated Attribution of [*The One True God, or only True God*] to each of the

the Three Persons is no Corruption of that Creed at all. Forasmuch as these Terms [*The One True God, and the only True God*] import, an Attribute purely Essential, and so equally, and in Common belonging to all the Three Persons, and not an Attribute properly Personal, and so appropriate to some one or other of the said Persons. And if this Author would have duly distinguished between Essential and Personal Attributes, he could not have discoursed of these Matters at so odd a rate, as here he does. And therefore I deny it to be any Contradiction (let it be found in his Ears how it will) to conclude, That the said Three Persons (notwithstanding this Repetition) are not Three True Gods, but only One True God. But he says, That such a Repeated Application implies as if each Person considered as distinguished and separated from the other were the One True God. To which I Answer,

1. That to imply as if a thing were so, and to imply, that really it is so, makes a very great difference in the case; indeed so great, that this Author must not think from words implying only the former to conclude the latter; which yet must be done, or what he here alledges is nothing to his purpose. But

2. I Answer yet farther, That the forementioned words do indeed imply, and (which is more) plainly declare, That the Three Persons who are said to be [*the One, or only True God*] are, while they sustain that Attribute, really distinct from one another, but it does not imply, That this is said of them under that peculiar Formality, as they are distinct, and much less, as separated; which latter they neither are, nor can be. The truth is, what he has said against the repeated Application of this Term to every one of the Three Persons, may be equally objected

objected against all the repeated Predications in the *Athanasian Creed*; but to as little purpose, one as the other; since, albeit all these Predications do agree to *Persons really distinct*, yet they agree not to them under that formal and precise consideration *as distinct*: For nothing but their respective Personal Relations agree to them under that Capacity; and this effectually clears off this Objection.

But here I cannot but wonder, that this Man should jumble together these two Terms [*distinguished* and *separated*] as he does twice here in the compass of eight Lines; when the signification of them, as it is applyed to the Three *Divine Persons*, is so vastly different, that one of these Terms [viz. *distinguished*] necessarily belongs to them, and the other which is [*separated*] neither does nor can take place amongst them: Nay, and when this Author himself has so earnestly and frequently contended for the difference of them; as all along asserting the *distinction of Persons*, and as often denying their *separation*.

But he proceeds, and says, That this Expression of [*The One [or only] True God*] is never (*that he knows of*) attributed to *Son*, or *Holy Ghost*, either in *Scripture*, or any *Catholick Writer*. Which words, methinks, (as I cannot but observe again) do not look, as if a Man were writing against the *Socinians*. Nevertheless admitting the Truth of his Allegation, That this Term [*the One True God*] is not to be found expressly attributed to the *Son*, or the *Holy Ghost*, will he infer from hence, that therefore it neither can, nor ought to be so? For if that be attributed to them both in *Scripture* and *Catholick Writers*, which necessarily and essentially implies [*The one True God*] and does, and must signify the very same Thing, is it not all one, as if in *Terminis* it had been

ascribed to them? Doubtless there are several other Expressions in the *Athanasian Creed*, as hardly (as this) to be found elsewhere: However, the Thing being certain from other words equivalent, this exception is of no force at all; nor by any one, who understands these Matters, is, or ought to be accounted so; and much less can I see to what end it should be insisted upon by any one, while he is encountering the *Socinians*: And therefore, whereas he says, This Attribute, or Title, *viz.* [*The One True God*] cannot so properly be ascribed to any one Person, but only to the Father; (whom, he tells us, the Fathers call the *Fountain of the Deity*) what he here designs by the words *so properly* (which seem to import degrees of Propriety) I cannot well tell: But this I ask, in short, May it be properly attributed to the Son, and to the *Holy Ghost*, or may it not? If not; then they are not properly [*The One True God*] nor consequently are they properly [*The True God* :] For whatsoever any one properly is, that he may be properly said to be.

And as for [the Father's being *the Fountain of the Deity*,] I hope he looks upon this Expression only as Metaphorical, and such as ought not to be stretched to the utmost of its Native Sense, for fear the Consequences of it may engage him too far, to be able to make an handsome Retreat; which I assure him, if he does not take heed, they certainly will. But, in a word, I demand of him, Whether [*the Father's being the Fountain of the Deity*] does appropriate and restrain the Thing expressed by the [*One True God*] to the Father in contradistinction to the other Two Persons, or not? If it does, then the same Absurdity recurs, *viz.* [*That neither is the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, the One True God*] and consequently, neither simply, really and essentially [*God*.] But

But on the other side, if [*the Father's being the Fountain of the Deity*] does not appropriate the Thing signified by [*the One True God*] to the Father, then it leaves it common to the other Two Persons with Himself, and to each of them. And whatsoever is so, may with the same Propriety and Truth of Speech be ascribed to, and affirmed of them, as it is often ascribed to, and affirmed of the *Father* Himself. The Truth is, this Man's adventurous and unwary way of expressing himself in this sacred and arduous Subject, (to give it no worse word, whatsoever it may deserve) affords the *Arrians* and *Socinians* no small Advantages against this Doctrine; should it stand upon the strength of His Defence, as (thanks be to God) it does not.

But I must not here omit that Passage, which, in the former part of this Chapter, I promised more particularly to consider; a Passage, which indeed looks something strangely. It is that in P. 258. line 27. where he tells us, that he allows, *That in the Blessed Trinity there are Three Holy Spirits*, but denys, *That there are Three Holy Ghosts*; so natural is it for false Opinions to force Men to absurd Expressions. But my Answer to him is short and positive, That neither are there *Three Holy Spirits* nor *Three Holy Ghosts* in the *Blessed Trinity* in any sense properly belonging to these words. However, the Thing meant by him (so far as it is reducible to Truth and Reason) is, and must be this, viz. That when the Third Person of the *Trinity* is called the *Holy Ghost*, there the word *Holy Ghost* (which otherwise signifies the same with *Holy Spirit*) must be taken *Personally*, and consequently *Incommunicably*; but when the *Father*, or *Son*, is said to be a *Spirit*, or *Holy Spirit*, there *Spirit* must be understood *Essentially*, for that *Immaterial*, *Spiritual*, and *Divine Nature*, which is common to, and

Predicable of all the *Divine Persons*. All which is most true. But then, for this very Reason, I must tell our Author withal, That as *Holy Ghost* taken *Personally* is but *Numerically one*; so *Spirit*, or *Holy Spirit*, as it is understood *Essentially*, is but *Numerically one* too. And therefore, though the *Father* may be called a *Spirit*, or *Holy Spirit*, and the two other *Persons* may each of them be called so likewise, yet they are not therefore *Three distinct Spirits*, or *Holy Spirits*, nor can be truly so called (as this Author pretends they ought to be, and we have sufficiently disproved) but they are all one and the same *Holy Spirit Essentially* taken; and which so taken, is as much as *one and the same God*. And moreover, though *Spirit* understood *Personally* distinguishes the *Third Person* from the other two, yet taken *Essentially*, it speaks him *one and the same Spirit*, as well as *one and the same God* with them, and can by no means distinguish him from them, any more than the *Divine Essence*, or *Nature*, (which *Spirit*, in this fence, is only another word for) can discriminate the *Three Persons* from one another. So that upon the whole Matter, it is equally false and impossible, That in the *Blessed Trinity* there should be *Three Holy Spirits*, or *Holy Ghosts*, (Terms perfectly Synonymous) either upon a *Personal*, or an *Essential* account; and consequently that there should be so at all. For, as the word *Spirit* imports a peculiar Mode of *Subsistence*, by way of *Spiration* from the *Father* and the *Son*, so it is *Personal* and *Incommunicable*; but as it imports the *Immaterial Substance* of the *Deity*, so indeed (as being the same with the *Deity* it self) it is equally Common to all the *Three Persons*; but still, for all that, remains *Numerically one* and no more; as all must acknowledge the *Deity* to be. And this is the true state of the Case. But to state the difference between the *Holy Ghost*, and

and the other Two Persons, upon something signified by *Holy Ghost*, which is not signified by *Holy Spirit*, (as the words of this Author manifestly do; while he affirms *Three Holy Spirits*, but denies *Three Holy Ghosts*) this is not only *a playing with words* (which he pretends to scorn) but *a taking of words for things*; which, I am sure, is very ridiculous.

And now, before I conclude this Chapter, (having a Debt upon me declared at the beginning of it) I leave it to the Impartial and Discreet Reader to judge, what is to be thought or said of that Man, who in such an Insolent, Decretorious manner, shall in such a point as this before us, charge *Nonsense* and *Heresie*, (two very vile words) upon all that Subscribe not to this his New (and before unheard of) Opinion. I must profess, I never met with the like in any Sober Author, and hardly in the most Licentious Libeller: The Nature of the Subject, I have, according to my poor Abilities, discussed, and finding my self thereupon extremely to dissent from this Author, am yet by no means willing to pass for a Nonsensical Heretick for my pains. For must it be *Nonsense* not to own Contradictions? viz. *That One Infinite Spirit is Three distinct Infinite Spirits?* Or must it be *Heresie* not to Subscribe to *Tritheisme*, as the best and most Orthodox Explication of the Article of the *Trinity*? As for *Non-sence*, it must certainly imply the asserting of something for true concerning the Subject discoursed of, which yet in Truth is contradictory to it (since there can be no Non-sence but what contradicts some Truth.) And whereas this Author has elsewhere, viz. P. 4. declared it *unreasonable to charge a contradiction in any Thing, where the Nature of the Thing discoursed of is not thoroughly comprehended and understood*, I desire to know of him, whether he thoroughly understands and comprehends

hends the Article and Mystery of the *Trinity*? If he says, he does, I need no other Demonstration of his unfitness to write about it. But if he owns that he does not, let him only stick to his own Rule, and then he may keep the Charge of *Non-sence* to himself.

But what shall we say to the Charge of Heresie, (in which St. *Austin* would have no Person, who is so charged to be silent?) Why, in the first place we must search and enquire, whether it be so, or no? And here, if my Life lay upon it, I cannot find either in *Irenæus adversus Hereses*, or in *Tertullian's Prescriptions contra Hereticos*, Cap. 49. Nor in *Philastrius's Catalogue*, nor in *Epiphanius*, nor in St. *Austin*, nor in *Theodoret*, nor in *Johannes Damascenus's Book de Heresibus*; nor in the latter *Heresiologists*, such as *Alphonsus à Castro & Prateolus*, with several others: I cannot, I say, find in all, or in any one of these the Heresie of *not asserting the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity to be Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*; no, nor yet the Heresie of *denying them to be so*. But where then may we find it? Why, in this Author's Book. And therefore look no further; it is enough, that so great a *Master* has said it; whose Authority in saying a Thing, is as good as another Man's in proving it, at any time: And he says it (as we see) positively, and perhaps (if need be) will be ready to take his *Corporal Oath* upon it, That such as deny his Hypothesis are *Hereticks*.

Now in this case our Condition is, in good earnest, very sad; and I know nothing to comfort us, but that the Statute *de Heretico comburendo* is Repealed. And well is it for the Poor Clergy and Church of *England*, that it is so; for otherwise this Man would have kindled such a Fire for them, as would have torrified them with a vengeance. But as he has stocked the Church with such plenty

plenty of New *Hereticks* (and all of his own making) so could he, by a sway of Power, as *Arbitrary* as his *Divinity*, provide for them also such a *Furnace* as that of *Nebuchadnezzar* (whom in his Imperious Meen and Humour he so much resembles) yet he must not think, That the *Sound* and *Jingle* of *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* (how melodiously soever they may tinkle in his own Ears) will ever be able to Charm Men over to the Worship of his *Idol*; or make them Sacrifice their Reason and Religion either to *Him*, or to the *New Notions* which he *has set up*. And indeed I cannot but here further declare, that to me it seems one of the most preposterous and unreasonable things in Nature, for any one first to assert Three *Gods*, and when he has so well furnished the World with *Deities*, to expect that all Mankind should fall down and Worship *Him*.

C H A P. VI.

In which is Considered, what this Author pretends to from the Authority of the Fathers and School-men, in behalf of his Hypothesis; and shewn, in the first place, That neither do the Fathers own the Three Divine Persons to be Three Distinct Infinite Minds, nor Self-Consciousness to be the Formal Reason of their Distinction.

I Have in the foregoing Chapters debated the Point with this Author, upon the Reason and Nature of the Thing it self. But that is not all, which he pretends to defend his Cause by ; endeavouring to countenance it also with great Authorities ; and that in these positive and remarkable words.

This is no New Notion (says he) but the constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools, Page 101.

These are his very words ; and I desire the Reader carefully to consider, and carry them along with him in his Memory. For as they are as positive, as Confidence can make them : so if they are not made good to the utmost, they ought severely to recoil upon any one, who shall presume to express himself at such a Rate.

And now, that we may do him all the right that may be, The way to know, whether this Author's Hypothesis be the Constant Doctrine of the *Fathers* and *Schools*, is in the first place truly and fairly to set down, what this Author's Doctrine is, and wherein it does consist; as we shall declare, what the received Doctrine of the *Fathers* and *Schools* is, in our Eighth Chapter.

Now we shall find, That the whole Doctrine delivered by him concerning the *Blessed Trinity*, is comprehended under, and reducible to these four Heads.

First, That the Three Persons in the *Blessed Trinity*, are *Three distinct Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits*.

Secondly, That *Self-Consciousness* is the *Formal Reason* of *Personality*; and consequently that each of the *Divine Persons* is such by a *distinct Self-Consciousness* properly and peculiarly belonging to him.

Thirdly, That the Three *Divine Persons* being thus distinguished from one another by a *distinct Self-Consciousness* proper to each of them, are all United in one and the same Nature, by one *Mutual-Consciousness* Common to them all. And

Fourthly and Lastly, That a *Trinity in Unity*, and *an Unity in Trinity*, by this Explication and Account given of it, is a very *Plain, Ease and Intelligible Notion*.

These four Heads, or Particulars, I say, contain in them a full and fair representation of this Author's whole Hypothesis concerning the Oeconomy of the *Blessed Trinity*: And I am well assured, That the knowing and impartial Reader, neither will, nor can deny, that they do so.

In the next place therefore, that we may see how far our Author makes good all the said Particulars by the Authority of the *Fathers*, as he has peremptorily promised and undertook to do, I think it requisite to consider, how the *Fathers* expressed themselves upon this Subject, and how this Author brings the said Expressions to his purpose. For surely the natural way of knowing any Writer's Mind is by the Words and Expressions, which he pretends to deliver his Mind by. But concerning these we have our Author declaring,

First, That he has not troubled his Reader with the signification of *Essence*, *Hypostasis*, *Substance*, *Subsistence*, *Person*, *Existence*, *Nature*, &c. Pag. 101. and some of his Readers could give him a very good Reason why, though I fear too true for him to be pleased with. But the Reasons which he himself alledges for his not troubling his Readers either with these Terms, or the Exposition of them, are,

First, *That they were very differently used by the Fathers themselves*, Page 101. And be it so; yet still for all that, *used by them* they were; and that not so very differently neither; the chief difference having been about the words *εστια* and *εστωτος*, which yet was fairly accorded, and well nigh setled between the *Greeks* and the *Latines*, before the end of the 6th Century, as shall be further made to appear in our Eighth Chapter. And his next Reason for *his not troubling his Reader* (forsooth) with these Terms is, Because they have (as he tells us) *very much obscured the Doctrine of the Trinity, instead of explaining it*, Page 101. which being one of the Chief Things, which, he might conclude, would assuredly be disputed with Him; for Him thus to presume it, before he had proved it, is manifestly to beg the Question. In the mean time, certain it is, That these, and these only were.

were the Terms which the *Fathers* used in their Disputes about the *Trinity*, and by which they managed them ; and consequently, were they never so *Ambiguous, Faulty, or Improper* (as they are much the contrary) yet, who-foever will pretend to give the Sence of the *Fathers*, must have recourse to them, and do it by them ; and to do otherwise would be to dispute at Rovers, or (as the word is) *to speak without Book* ; which may much better become our Author in the Pulpit, than in the man-agement of such a Controversie.

And now let the Reader (whom he is so *fearful of troubling* with any Thing that is to the Purpose) judge, Whether this Man has not took a most extraordinary *way of proving his Doctrine the very same with the Fathers*. For neither in the first place does he set down, what the Doctrine of the *Fathers* concerning the *Trinity* was ; which yet, one would have thought, was absolutely ne-cessary for the shewing how his own Doctrine agreed with it, which he professed to be his design : Nor, in the next place, does he either *use, or regard*, or offer to explain those Terms, which the *Fathers* all along deli-vered that their Doctrine in ; but is so far from it, *That he reproaches, explodes, and utterly rejects them, as serving only to obscure this Doctrine, instead of explaining it* : Which, in my poor Judgment, is such a way of pro-ving the *Fathers* on his side, as perhaps the World never heard of before, and will be amazed at now. But it is *his way*, and it will not be long before we find him be-stowing a like cast of his kindness upon the *School-men* too.

But since, notwithstanding all this, He allows the *Fathers* (good Men) to have *meant well*, and taught right ; albeit, by reason of a certain Infelicity and Awk-wardness they had in representing *what they meant, by*

what they wrote, their meaning ought, by no means, to be gathered from their own words (as, possibly also for the introducing a new and laudable Custom amongst the Fathers and Sons of the Church, that the Sons must teach the Fathers to speak) our Author has, for these and the like Reasons, in great Charity and Compassion to their InfirmitieS, provided two other and better words of his own Invention, viz. *Self-Consciousness*, and *Mutual-Consciousness*, by which alone the True Sense and Doctrine of the Fathers, in all their Writings about this Article of the *Trinity*, may, or can be understood.

Nevertheless how kind soever this design of his may be, yet to me it seems very unreasonable. For, in the first place, it is, (upon the most allowed grounds of Reason) a just, and a sufficient Presumption, that the Fathers were wholly Strangers to what our Author intends by these two words, for that they never so much as mention, or make use of the words themselves: Whereas, *to be Self-Conscious, and Mutually-Conscious*, were things (no doubt) easie enough, not only for the Fathers, but for any Man else of Common Sense to find out and understand; and they might also, without much difficulty, have been applyed to the *Divine Nature*, as well as other *Acts of Knowledge*; and therefore since the Fathers never used them in this case, it is but too plain, that they never thought them fit, or proper for this purpose. For the *Arrian Controversie* was then, *viz.* in the 4th and 5th Centuries (in which also the most Eminent of the Fathers wrote against it) at the Highest. Among which Writers, *Gregory Nyssen* (whom this Author so often quotes) has a Passage, which, in this case, is to me very remarkable, and a Rational ground to conclude, that he knew nothing of *Mutual-Consciousness*, as it is here applyed by this Author. For that, speak-

speaking of the Unity of the *Divine Persons*, in respect of one *Common* (though *Single*) Nature, he expresses it by *ηγιώτων καὶ τὸ σῶμα*, instead of which, certainly he could not have chosen a more apposite and proper place to have expressed the same by a *ηγιώτων καὶ τὸ Κυρίδηνον*, had that *Father* had the same Notion of it, which this Author so much contends for. But it seems, he was either less *Happy*, or more judicious in this Particular. And besides all this, it is most worthy to be Noted, That the very Terms in which the Orthodox Writers expressed themselves about the *Trinity*, and whatsoever related to it, were severely canvased and examined, and some of them settled by Councils; which is a fair Proof, that the said Terms were fixed and authentick, and exclusive of all others, and consequently of those of this Author, as well as of the Notion signified by, and couched under them, which he would here with such Confidence obtrude upon the World, by and from the Credit of the *Fathers*, tho' their Writings demonstrate, that they were wholly unconcerned, both as to his Doctrines, and his Expressions.

Nor can any Want, or Penury of words be here pleaded for their silence in this Matter, since the *Greek* being so happy, above all other Languages, in joyning and compounding words together; in all probability had the *Fortunes of Greece* (as the word is) been concerned in the case, we might have heard of some such words, as, *ω̄ πονηρός*, and *ηγιώσυνείδης*. Or since most such words, as in *English* terminate in -ness, usually in the *Greek* terminate in -μος, possibly we might have met with some such made-words, as, *ω̄ πονηρόμος*, and *ηγιώσυνείδημος*, since these do more properly import *Consciousness* than the former; which rather signify *Self-Conscience*

— ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡ οὐκ
κατέπιστε οὐδὲτον ἡ
γνωστικῶν εἰπεῖσθαι.
Greg. Nyfse. de differen-
tiā εἰδῶν καὶ γνωστῶν.
Tom. 2. P. 455. Edit. Pa-
ris. 1615.

Conscience and *Mutual-Conscience*, and so in, strictness of Speech, differ something from the other. But he who seeks in the *Greek Fathers* for these words, or any thing like them (as applyed to the *Trinity*) may seek longer than his Eyes can see.

Nor will his Inquest succeed at all better amongst the *Latines*. For although that Language be extremely less copious than the other, and so affords no one *Latine* word either for *Self-Consciousness*, or *Mutual-Consciousness*, but what we must first *make*, and being *made* would found very barbarously ; yet, no doubt, there were ways and words enough to have otherwise expressed the same thing, had they found it the fittest and best Notion to have expressed this great Article by. But no such thing or word occurs in any of their Writings.

But why do I speak of the *Greek* and *Latine Fathers* ? When the very *School-men*, the boldest Framers and Inventors of Words and Terms, of all others, where they think them necessary to express their Conceptions by, notwithstanding all their *Quiddities*, *Hacceities*, and *Perseities*, and the like, have yet no word for *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* : which is a sufficient Demonstration, that either the thing it self never came into their Heads ; or (which is most likely) that they never thought it of any use for the explication of this Mystery, which yet they venture further at, than any other Writers whatsoever.

But after all ; though this Author is very much concerned to ward off the charge of Novelty and Singularity from his Notions, (for which I cannot blame him ; this being a charge sufficient to confound and crush any such Notion applyed to so Sacred and received an Article as the *Trinity*) and for this cause is not a little desirous to shelter it with the Authority of the *Fathers* ; yet I assure

sure the Reader, That he is no less careful and concerned to keep the Glory of the Invention wholly to himself, and would take it very ill either of *Fathers*, *School-men*, or any one else, should they offer to claim the least share in it. For he roundly tells us, That the *Fathers were not so happy as to hit upon his way of explaining this Mystery*, Page 126. Line 5. nay, and that, how right a Judgment soever they might have of it, yet in down-right Terms, *That they knew not how to explain it*, Page 126. Line 18. which, I confess, is no small Complement passed upon himself (a thing which he is seldom or never failing in) but, in good earnest, a very course one upon the *Fathers*. In short, he would appropriate the *Credit* of the *New Invention* entirely to himself, but with admirable, and more than Metaphysical Abstraction, at the same time clear himself of the *Novelty of it*; and so, in a word, prove it of at least 12 or 13 hundred years standing in the World; when yet the Author of it was Born since *Conventicles* began in *England*, as is well known. But I frankly yield him the Invention, as perfectly his own; and such an one too, as he is more like to be known by, than ever admired for; and so, much happiness attend him with it.

But as little success as we have had in seeking for his Darling and peculiar Notion of *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness*, in the Ancient Writers of the Church, we are like to find no more in seeking for his other equally espoused Notion and Opinion there, *viz.* That the Three Persons of the *Blessed Trinity are Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*: We find indeed the Terms *αγωνιτης*, *κοσμιος*, *ιδιοτης*, *γρωειουσα*, &c. but not one Tittle of *reia πνευμα*, or *τρεις εοιαι*, except where *εοια* (as I hinted before) is sometimes used in the same sense and signification with *κοσμιος*. And in this case

case (I am sure) no difficulty of framing Words, or Terms (as might possibly in some measure be pretended in the Case of *Self-Consciousness*) can with any colour of Reason be alledged for our not finding this Notion in the *Fathers*, had the thing it self been at all there. For can there be any words more Obvious, and Familiar than *τρεις μέμπτα*, or *τρεῖς Νόοις*, in the Greek, or than *Tres Spiritus*, or *tres Mentes*, in the *Latine*? But neither one nor the other are to be met with any where amongst them, as applyed to the Subject now before us.

But in Answer to this, I expect that our Author will reply, That they are not the words [*Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*] or those other [*of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness*] but the Things meant and signified by them, which he affirms to be found in the *Fathers*. But this is the very Thing which I insist upon against him, *viz.* That the Non-usage of these words, (nor any other equivalent to them) in the Works of those Ancient Writers, (while they were so particularly, and nicely disputing this Matter) is a solid Argument, That neither are the things themselves there. For that all those Great and Acute Men should mean the very same thing with this Author, and not one of them ever light upon the same words, is not rationally to be imagined. For, What Reason can be given of this? Was either the Thing it self (as I noted before) of such deep, or sublime Speculation, as not to be reached by them? Or the Language, they wrote in, too scanty to express their Speculations by? Or can we think that the *Fathers* wrote *Things* without *Words*, as some do but too often write *Words* without *Things*? So that to me it is evident to a Demonstration, That the *Fathers* never judged, nor held in this Matter, as this Author pretends they did: And besides all this, there is yet one Consideration more, and that

that of greater weight with me, than all that has been, or can be objected against this Man's pretensions, viz. That it seems to me, and I question not but to all Sober Persons else, (and that upon good reason) wholly unsuitable to the wise and good Method of *Goa's Providence*, That a clear Discovery of such a Principal Mystery of the *Christian Religion*, as the *Trinity* is, should now at length be owing to the Invention, or lucky Hit of any one Man's single Mind, or Fancy; which so many Pious, Humble, as well as Excellently Learned Persons, with long and tedious search, and the hardest study, (and these, no doubt, joyned with frequent and fervent Prayers to *God*, to enlighten and direct them in that search) have been continually breathing after, but could never attain to for above Sixteen Hundred Years together. This, I freely own and declare, That I judge it morally impossible for any serious, thinking Person, ever to bring himself to the belief of; and much less for any one, not Intoxicated with intolerable Pride, to arrogate to Himself. To which sort of Persons *God* never reveals any thing extraordinary for the good of the World, or of themselves either.

But, since I am now upon *Disputation*, which has its proper Laws, and that this Author may have no ground of Exception, I will proceed to examine his Quotations out of the *Fathers*, and try whether his *Hypothesis* may be found there, where, it is certain, that we can find none of his Terms.

And here, he first begins with the Distinction of the *Divine Persons*, where I must remind him, That it is not the bare proving a *Distinction of Persons* (which none, who acknowledges a *Trinity*, either doubts of, or much less, denies) which will here serve his turn; but He must prove also, That they stand distinguished as

Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits, and that this Distinction is owing to Three distinct Self-Consciousnesses belonging to them; otherwise all his Proofs will fall beside his Hypothesis.

This premised, I will consider what he alledges. And in the first place he positively tells us, *Page 101. That no Man who acknowledges a Trinity of Persons, ever denied, That the Son and Holy Spirit were Intelligent Minds, or Beings.* To which I Answer,

First, That it is not sufficient for him, who advances a Controverted Proposition, that none can be produced, who before denied it; but it lies upon him the Advancer of it, to produce some who have affirmed it. Forasmuch as a bare non-denial of a Thing, never before affirmed, can of it self neither prove nor disprove any Thing. But

Secondly, I Answer further, That if none of the Ancient Writers did ever, in express Terms, deny this, it was because none had before in express Terms asserted it. But then I add also, That the *Ancients* have expressly asserted that, which irrefragably infers a Negation of the said Proposition: For they have affirmed, *That the Son and Holy Spirit are one single Intelligent Mind*, and consequently that being so, they cannot possibly be more. And this is a full Answer to this sorry shift; for an Argument, I am sure, it deserves not to be called.

But he proceeds from Negatives to Positives, and tells us, *Page 101. That it is the Constant Language of the Fathers* (for it seems, he has read them all) *That the Son is the Substantial Word and Wisdom of the Father, and that this can be nothing else, but to say, That he is an Intelligent Being, or Infinite Mind.* And he is so, I confess. But does this infer, *That He is therefore a distinct Intelligent Mind, or Being from the Father?* This we deny, and

and it is the very Thing, which he ought to prove. And it is not come to that pass yet, that we should take his bare affirmation for a Proof of what he affirms.

He comes now to Particulars, and tells us, That *Gregory Nyssen* (though since he neither mentions Book nor Page, this ought not to pass for a Quotation) calls the Son *νοεῖν πι χρῆμα*, which this Author renders *Mind, or Intellect*: And I will not deny, but that it may, by consequence, import so much; but I am sure it does not by direct Signification. *Νοεῖν πι χρῆμα*, signifies properly, *Res quedam Intellectualis, or Intellectu prædita*: And since nothing is so, but a *Mind, or Spirit*, it may (as I have said) imply a *Mind*, but it does not directly signific it. But admitting that it does both; does this expression prove, That the Son is a *νοεῖν πι χρῆμα, distinct* from the *Father*? By no means: For not only the *Son*, but the *Father* may be called, *Νοεῖν πι χρῆμα*, and the *Holy Ghost*, *Νοεῖν πι χρῆμα*, and yet they are not Three *Νοεῖ χρῆματα*, but *ἐν νοεῖν χρῆμα*. And the Reason of this is, because *Νοεῖν χρῆμα*, is an *Essential Attribute* following the *Divine Nature*, and therefore common to all the Three *Persons*, and not a *Personal Attribute* peculiar to any one of them. So that granting the *Son* to be as truly and properly *νοεῖν πι χρῆμα*, as this Author would have him, yet we absolutely deny, That he is a *distinct νοεῖν χρῆμα*, from the *Father*. And this Expression, I am sure, is far enough from proving him to be so.

From *Nyssen*, he passes to St. *Athanasius*, who (he tells us) observes out of these words of our Saviour, *John 10. 30. ἐγώ εἰπα ταῦτα ἐν ἑσπέδῃ*, that our Saviour does not say, *ἐγώ καὶ ταῦτα ἐν εἰμι*, but *ἐν ἑσπέδῃ*, and that, by so speaking, he gave us a perfect *Duality of Persons* in the word *ἴσθι*, and an *Unity of Nature* in the word *ἐν*.

All which is very true, and that this distinction of *Persons* overthrows the *Heresie of Sabellius*; and the Unity of their Nature, the *Heresie of Arius*. But then this is also as true, that all this is nothing at all to our Author's Purpose. For how does this prove, either that the Three *Divine Persons* are *Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*? Or, that *Self-Consciousness* is the proper ground, or Reason of their distinction? Why, yes, (says He) *If the Father be an Eternal Mind and Wisdom, then the Son is also an Eternal, but begotten Mind and Wisdom*. Very true; but still I deny, that it follows hence, *That the Eternal Mind, or Wisdom, Begetting, and the Eternal Mind, or Wisdom Begotten, are Two distinct Minds, or Wisdoms, but only one and the same Mind, or Wisdom, under these Two distinct Modifications of Begetting and being Begot.*

But he pretends to explain and confirm his Notion of a *distinct Mind, or Wisdom*, out of those words of the *Nicene Creed*, in which the *Son is said to be God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God*.

By which words, I cannot imagine, how this Author thinks to serve his turn; Unless that by *Light* must be meant *Infinite Wisdom, or Infinitely Wise Mind*, and that this must also infer the *Father and Son to be Two distinct Infinitely wise Minds, or Wisdoms, one issuing from the other*.

But if so; then the same words will, and must infer them also to be *Two distinct Gods, and very Gods*. For all these words stand upon the same level in the same Sentence; and then, if we do but joyn the Term [*Distinct*] equally with every one of them, we shall see what Monstrous Blasphemous Stuff will be drawn out of this *Creed*.

In the mean time let this Author know once for all, *That Light of Light imports not here Two distinct Lights; but one Infinite Light under Two different ways of Subsisting*, viz. either *of* and *from it self*, as it does in the *Father*, or of and from another, as it does in the *Son*. All which is plainly and fully imported in and by the Particle [of] signifying properly *Derivation*, or *Communication* in the thing which it is applyed to. And this is the clear undoubted sense of the Word, as it is used here. In the mean time, I hope the *Arrians* and *Socinians* will joyn in a Letter of Thanks to this Author, for making such an Inference from the *Nicene Creed*.

In the next place, he comes to St. *Austin*; where, though I am equally at a loss to find how he proves his Point by him, any more than by those whom he has already produced; yet I will transcribe the whole Quotation into the Margin, that so both the Reader may have it under his Eye, and the Author have no cause to complain, that he is not fairly dealt with.

*Quæ ratione
cinatio ad
id cogit, ut
dicamus
Deum Pa-
trem non
esse sapien-*

tem nisi habendo sapientiam quam genuit non existendo per se pater sapientia. Deinde si ita est, Filius quoque ipse, sicut dicitur, Deus de Deo, Lumen de Lumine, videndum est utrum possit Sapientia de Sapientia dici, si non est Deus pater ipsa sapientia, sed tantum Generator sapientiae. Quod si tenemus, cur non & magnitudinis sua, & bonitatis, & aeternitatis, & omnipotentiae sua Generator sit? ut non ipse sit sua magnitudo, & sua bonitas, & sua aeternitas, & sua Omnipotentia, sed ea magnitudine magnus sit, quam genuit, & ea bonitate bo-

nus, &c. Aug. Tom. 3. Lib. 6. de Trinitate.

Now that which he would infer from thence, seems to be this, *That God the Father is Infinitely Wise*, by a Wisdom of his own distinct from that Wisdom by which the *Son* is called *The Wisdom of the Father*; and consequently, that they are *Two distinct Infinite Wisdoms*, or *Infinitely Wise Minds*. This, I say, is that, which he would infer, and argue from St. *Austin*, or I know not what else it can be.

But

'But this is by no means deducible from his words: for the *Father* is wise by one and the same *Infinite Wisdom* equally belonging both to the *Father* and the *Son*, but not by it under that peculiar Formality, *as it belongs to the Son*. For it belongs to the *Son*, as *Communicated to Him*; whereas it belongs to the *Father*, as *Originally in and from Himself*.

And whereas it is objected, *That if the Father should be Wise by the Wisdom which he Begot, then he could not be said to be Wise by a Wisdom of his own, but only by a Begotten Wisdom proper to the Son*. I Answer, That neither does this follow; since it is but one and the same *Essential Wisdom* in both, *viz.* in him who Begets, and in him who is Begotten: Though [*as*] *it is in him* who is Begotten, it is not *after the same way* in Him who Begets: So that it is this determining Particle [*as*, or *Quatenus*] which by importing a distinction of the manner, causes a quite different application of the Term, while the Thing is still the same. For the *Father* himself is not denominated *Wise*, even by that very *Wisdom* that is *Essential to Him*, considered as *Personally determined to the Son*; for so it must be considered as *Derived and Communicated*, and no *Divine Perfection* can agree to the *Father* under the Formal Consideration of [*Derived and Communicated*] albeit the Thing it self, *which is Derived and Communicated*, absolutely considered, may and does. In a word, the *Father* is Wise by one and the same *Wisdom*, which is both in himself and in his *Son*, but not by it, *as it is in the Son*.

But, by the way, it is worth observing, That this Man who here in the 102 and 103 Pages denies the *Father* to be *Wise by this Begotten Wisdom*, which the *Son* is here called (and which, in the Sense we have now given of it, is very true) and alledges St. *Austin* and *Lombard* to abett

abett him in it. This very Man, I say, *Page 131. Line 24.* affirms, That the Son is that *Wisdom* and *Knowledge*, *wherewith his Father knows himself*. Where, *If for the Father to be Wise and to know himself be formally the same Act*, and as much the same as his *Wisdom* and *Knowledge* can be, as it is manifest, they are ; then, I leave it to this Author to tell us, which of these two Assertions is false ; for both of them, I am sure, cannot be true. But he who makes nothing to contradict himself within the compass of two or three Pages (and sometimes as many Lines) may do it *cum Privilegio* at the distance of near Thirty.

And whereas it is urged again from the same place in *St. Austin*, *That if we say the Father begets his own Wisdom, we may as well say, That he Begets his own Goodness, Greatness, Eternity, &c.*

I Answer, No doubt but we may say one as well as the other, but that in Truth and Propriety of Speech, we can say neither. For God cannot properly be said to beget *Wisdom*, and much less *his own Wisdom*, nor indeed any of his other Attributes, or Perfections *Essentially* taken and considered ; he may indeed be said to *Communicate them*, and by such *Communication* to *Beget a Son*. But still, though these are thus said to be *Communicated*, it is the *Person only*, who is, or can be properly said to be *Begotten*.

But our Author tells us, *Page 103.* out of the next Chapter of *St. Austin* (the words of which he should have done well to have quoted) that he there calls *God the Father, Sapientia Ingenita*, and the *Son, Sapientia Genita*, and are not these *Two distinct Infinite Wisdoms* ?

I Answer, No : For that the *Wisdom* here spoken of, is not taken *Absolutely and Essentially*, but *only Personally* : That is, for *Wisdom* under two several Modifications ; which

which Modifications, though they *diversifie* and *distinguisb* the Thing they belong to, yet do not *multiply* it. For still it is one and the same *Wisdom*, which is both *Genita*, and *Ingenita*, though *as it is one*, it is not the other. *Sapientia*, or *Wisdom*, considered *Absolutely* and *Essentially* in it self, belongs in Common to all the *Three Persons*; but with the Term *Genita*, or *Ingenita* joyned with it, it imports a peculiar *Mode of Subsistence*, which determines it to a particular *Personality*: So that *Sapientia quatenus Genita* properly and only denotes the *Person* of the *Son*. In like manner when the *Third Person* of the *Trinity* is called the *Spirit*, The Term *Spirit* is not there taken *Essentially* for that *Infinite Immaterial Incorporeal Nature*, *Absolutely* considered (for so it is common to all the *Three Persons*) but for that *Infinite Incorporeal Nature*, *Quatenus procedens aut spirata*, and under that peculiar *Mode of Subsistence*, it belongs not to the other Two *Persons*, but stands appropriate only to the *Third*. Nevertheless this makes them not *Three distinct Infinite Spirits* (as we have already shewn) but only one *Infinite Spirit* under *Three distinct Modalities*. Accordingly, when the *Son* is here called the *Wisdom of the Father*, that very Term [of the *Father*] imports a Modification of it peculiar to the *Son*, but yet this Modification does not make it *another Wisdom*, from that which is in the *Father*; since one and the same *Wisdom* may sustain several determining *Modes*.

Our Author's next Quotation is out of *Peter Lombard*, *Page 103.* whom (for the Credit of what he Quotes from him) he styles the *Oracle of the Schools* (though he, who shall read *Lambertus Daneus* upon the first Book of his Sentences, will quickly find what a Doughty Oracle he is.) The Passage quoted, proceeds upon the same Notion which we find in the foregoing Citation out of *St. Austin*,

St. Austin, whom he also alledges for it. Nevertheless, I shall Transcribe this also, as I did the other, both for the Choice Stuff contained in it, as also that the Reader may have it before him, and thereby see, what — Sed
use our Author is able to make of it for his purpose.

abſit ut ita
ſit; [viz.
That the

Father should be wise only by the Wisdom he Begets] quia si hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, non per illam sapientiam quam genuit sapiens dicitur Pater, alioquin non ipsa ab illo sed ille ab ipsa est. Si enim sapientia quam genuit causa est illi ut sapiens sit, etiam ut sit ipsa illi causa est; quod fieri non potest nisi gignendo eum, aut faciendo: Sed nec genitricem nec conditricem Patris ullo modo quisquam dixerit Sapientiam. Quid enim insanius? &c. Lib. 1. Dist. 32. Cap. 3.

First of all then, he tells us, *That in God to be, and to be Wise, is the same thing.* And I grant it, with respect to the Absolute Simplicity of the *Divine Nature*: but, for all that, I must tell him, *That to Be, and to be Wise,* fall under two formally distinct Conceptions, of which the former does not include the latter; and that for this Reason, such as treat Scholastically of these Matters, do always allow a *formal difference* between them, and never treat of them, but as so considered. And let me tell him also, that this Consideration looks yet something further; as inferring, That Things *formally* distinct, must have *formally* distinct Effects; so that the *formal effect* of one cannot be ascribed to the other. And moreover, that it is a very gross Absurdity to confound the *Formal Cause with the Efficient*, and so, to argue from one, as you would do from the other.

Which Observations being thus laid down, let us see how this Man and his Oracle argue in the Case. And it is thus.

If the Wisdom which He [viz. God the Father] Begets, be the cause of his being wise, then it is the cause also of his very Being.

In Answer to which, I deny the Consequence. For that, Wisdom is the cause of one's being Wise only by a formal Causality, viz. by Existing in Him, and affecting him in such a particular way ; and this it does without being the Cause also of his Existence, that being a Thing formally distinct from his Being Wise : And therefore, though Wisdom, I grant, must presuppose the Existence of the Subject, where it has this effect : Yet it does not formally cause it ; or rather indeed, for this very reason, cannot possibly do so.

But he proceeds and argues further, viz. *That supposing the Wisdom Begotten by the Father were the Cause both of his Being, and of his being Wise, then it must be so either by Begetting, or Creating him* (for so I Interpret *Conditricem*) *but for one to say, That Wisdom is any way the Begetter, or Maker of the Father, would be the height of Madness.*

It would be so indeed. And so on the other side to attempt to prove the Father and the Son to be Two distinct Infinite Minds by such strange, odd, uncouth Notions as these, which St. Austin himself (particularly treating of them in his 7 and 15 Books *de Trinitate*) confesses to be *Quæstiones inextricabiles*, this, I say, (whatever may be the height of Madness) is certainly not the height of Discretion. Nevertheless, as to the Argument it self, I deny the Consequence. And that because the Begetting, or any otherwise Producing a Thing imports a Cause operating by a proper Efficiency, or Causality ; whereas Wisdom, being only the formal Cause of one's being Wise, (as it would be no other, could it be the Cause of one's very Being also) operates only by an Internal, Improper Causality, viz. in a word, *Wisdom makes one Wise*, as Whiteness makes a Thing White, not by producing any Thing in him, but by Existing in him,

him, and affecting him by it self, after such a certain manner, and thereby giving him such a certain Denomination.

Now from hence let any one judge how forcibly and Philosophically this Man Disputes ; the Truth is, were the whole Argument Conclusive, it were nothing to his purpose. But I was willing to shew, That his way of arguing is as defective, as the Thing he Argues for is Absurd.

Nevertheles let us see, what the main Conclusion is, which he would draw from the Premisses. Why, it is this, *That the Father is Eternal Wisdom, or Mind, and the Son Eternal Wisdom and Mind.* I give you his very Terms. And who denies this? Or what does it conclude for him? For still I ask, Does he who says, *That the Father is Eternal Wisdom, or Mind, and the Son Eternal Wisdom and Mind,* by saying so, affirm, *That the Father and the Son are Two distinct Eternal Wisdoms, or Minds?* Any more than he who says, *That the Father is God, and the Son God,* affirms them to be *Two distinct Gods?* Let him say it if he can; and he shall not fail of a through Confutation as soon as it can be Printed off.

But to give the Reader an Account of the whole matter in short. This Author has espoused a very Heterodox and dangerous Notion, viz. *That the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, are Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits;* and, in order to the proof of this, would persuade us, *That there are Two distinct Wisdoms, one in the Father, and the other in the Son;* and that, for this Reason: Because the Father, who is *Essentially Wise,* cannot be said to be *Wise* by *that begotten Wisdom, which is in the Son*(albeit the Son be yet said to be the *Wisdom of the Father*) but that the Father must have one *distinct*

Wisdom of his own, and the *Son* another *distinct Wisdom* of his own. This, I am sure, is the full Account of his Argument from top to bottom. In Answer to which, I have plainly and undeniably shewn, That the *Father* is Wise by one and the same *Essential Wisdom*, common to *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, though not under that particular Modification, as it Subsists in the other Two *Persons*, but by that peculiar Modification, by which it is appropriated to, and Subsists in his own. And that those different Modifications do not, for all that, make it any more than one single Numerical Wisdom, but only one and the same under so many *distinct Modes* of *Subsistence*, determining it to so many *distinct Personalities*.

This is the Sum both of his Opinion and of mine, and I refer it to the Judicious Reader to arbitrate the Case between us, with this profession and promise, that if in all, or any one of the Quotations alledged by him he can shew, That it is either expressly affirmed, or necessarily implied, *That the Father and the Son are Two distinct Infinite Minds*, I will, without further proof of any sort, forthwith yield him the Cause, and withal renounce all my poor share in Common Sense and Reason; nay, and all belief of my own Eyes for the future.

But there is one Clause more, which he brings in as one part of his main Conclusion, *Page 103. Line 33. viz.* *That if we confess this of the Father and the Son*, to wit, *That they are each of them Eternal Mind, or Wisdom, there can be no dispute about the Holy Ghost who is Eternal Mind, and Wisdom, distinct both from Father and Son.*

Now this is perfectly *gratis dictum*, without either proof, or pretence of proof; and that whether we respect the Orthodox, or the Heterodox and Heretical. And,

First, For the Orthodox, they utterly deny the *Holy Ghost* to be an *Eternal Mind*, or *Wisdom* distinct both from the *Father* and the *Son*; and I challenge this Author to produce me but one reputed *Orthodox Writer*, who affirms it. In the mean time, it argues no small Confidence (to give it the mildest Term) in this Man to Assert that *as certain, and without Dispute*, which is neither granted on one side, nor so much as pretended to be proved on the other. But

Secondly, If we respect the Heterodox and Heretical, who (no doubt) *can dispute* as much as others, will this Man say, That these also grant this his Assertion about the *Holy Ghost without any dispute*? No, it is certain, that they neither do, nor will. For this Author may be pleased to observe, That as some in the *Primitive Times*, allowed the *Son* to be only *like the Father*; so they made the *Holy Ghost* a downright *Creature*, and an inferiour Agent to Both. Such were the *Πνευμολόγοι* under their Head and Leader *Macedonius*; as we see in *St. Austin de Heresibus*, Cap. 52. hereby placing him as much below the *Son*, as they had placed the *Son* below the *Father*; or rather more. Whereupon, I appeal even to this Author Himself, whether those, who did so, would *without all dispute* have allowed the *Holy Ghost* to be an *Eternal Infinite Mind*, or *Wisdom*, distinct both from the *Father* and the *Son*; and, upon that Account, Essentially and Necessarily equal to them Both? Let this Author rub his Fore-head, and affirm this if he can; and for the future take notice, That it becomes a True and Solid Reasoner, where a Thing is disputed, fairly to prove it, and not boldly and barely to presume it.

In the last place he alledges the Judgment of *all the Fathers* indefinitely in the Case. And truly where he cannot cite so much as one of them to the purpose, I think

think he does extremely well to make short work of it, and with one bold Impertinent stroke to alledge them all together.

His Allegation is this, *That it is usual with the Fathers to represent the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity as distinct as Peter, James, and John.* Well; and what then? Why; *That then the said Three Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.* I deny the Consequence, and to give a particular Answer to his general Allegation, I tell him, *That it is a Fallacy of the Homonymy of the Word, and that the Term [as distinct] is Ambiguous.* For it may either signifie,

1. *As Real.* Or,
2. *As Great a Distinction.*

As for the first, I grant, *That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity differ as really as Peter, James, and John;* Forasmuch as they differ by something in the Thing it self, or, *ex parte rei*, antecedent to, and independent upon any Apprehension, or Operation of the Mind about it; which is a *Real difference*, and whatsoever is so, is altogether *as Real* as the Difference between one Man and another can be. But,

Secondly, If by *Real distinction* be meant *as great a distinction*, so we utterly deny that the *Three Divine Persons* differ as much as *Peter, and James, and John* do, or that the *Fathers* ever thought they did so. For this would infer a greater difference, or distinction between them, than even our Author himself will allow of; even such a difference, as reaches to a *Division*, or *Separation* of the *Persons* so differing. And since it is impossible for the *Persons* of the *Trinity* to differ so, it is hard to imagine upon what bottom of Reason our Author should measure the *Distinction*, or *Difference* of the *Three Divine Persons*, by the *Distinction*, or *Difference*, that is between

between Peter, James, and John. For though the *Three Divine Persons* differ as really, yet it is certain, that they do not differ as much. But what the *Fathers* alledged only as an Illustration of the Case, this Man is pleased to make a direct proof of his Point ; which, by his favour, is to stretch it a little too far : For, if he would make the foregoing Example a Parallel Instance to the Thing which he applies it to, it would prove a great deal too much, (as has been shewn) and therefore as to the Thing, which it is brought for, does indeed prove nothing at all. Now the Thing it is brought to prove, is, *That the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits* ; but since we have shewn, *That a Real Difference, or Distinction, may be much short of such an one as is between two or more Minds, or Spirits,* (which we own to be as great, as between two or more Men) it follows, *That the Real Difference, which is between the Three Divine Persons, cannot prove them to be so many distinct Minds, or Spirits.* In short, our Author's whole Argument amounts to no more but this (which, though it may found something jocularly, is really and strictly true) viz. *That because Peter, James, and John are so many Men, therefore Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are so many Minds.* A pleasant way of Arguing certainly.

I have now examined all, that this Author has alledged about the *distinction of the Three Divine Persons*, and I have done it particularly and exactly, not omitting any one of his Quotations. But how comes it to pass all this while, that we have not so much as one Syllable out of the *Fathers*, or *School-men*, in behalf of *Self-Consciousness*? Which being, according to this Author, the *Constituent Reason of the Personality and Personal Distinction of the Three Divine Persons*, will he pretend to prove the Distinction it self from the *Fathers*, and at the same

same time not speak one Tittle of the Principle, or Reason of this Distinction? Or will he profess to prove his whole Hypothesis by the Authority of the *Fathers*, and yet be silent of *Self-Consciousness*, which he himself makes one grand and principal part of the said Hypothesis? Certainly, one would think, that the very shame of the World, and that Common Awe and regard of Truth, which Nature has imprinted upon the Minds of Men, should keep any one from offering to impose upon Men in so gross and shameless a manner, as to venture to call a Notion or Opinion, the *Constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools*; nay, and to profess to make it out and shew it to be so, and while he is so doing, not to produce *one Father*, or *School-man*, I say again, not so much *as one of either* in behalf of that, which he so confidently and expressly avows to be the joyn't Sentiment of Both. This surely is a way of *proving*, or rather of *imposing* peculiar to Himself. But we have seen how extremely fond he is of this new Invented Term and Notion: And therefore since he will needs have the Reputation of being the sole *Father* and *Begetter* of the *Hopeful Issue*, there is no Reason in the World that Antiquity should find other *Fathers* to maintain it.

C H A P. VII.

In which is shewn, That the Passages alledged by this Author out of the Fathers do not prove Mutual-Consciousness to be that, wherein the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity does consist: But that the Fathers place it in something else.

OUR Author having undertook to make good his Doctrine about the *Blessed Trinity*, from the *Fathers*; and that both as to the Distinction of the *Divine Persons*, and also as to their Unity in the same Nature; And having said what he could from those Ancient Writers, for that new sort of Distinction which he ascribes to the said *Persons*, in the former part of his 4th Section, which I have confuted in the preceding Chapter; he proceeds now, in the following, and much longer part of the same Section, to prove the Unity of the *Three Persons* in one and the same Nature, according to his own Hypothesis.

And the Proofs of this we shall reduce under these Two following Heads, as containing all that is alledged by him upon this point of his Discourse, *viz.*

First, That it is one and the same *Numerical Divine Nature*, which belongs to all the *Three Divine Persons*. And,

Secondly, That the Thing, wherein this *Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature* does consist, is that *Mutual-Consciousness*, by which all the *Three Persons* are intimately *Conscious* to one another of all that is known by, or belongs to each of them in particular.

And here the Authority of the *Fathers* is pleaded by him for both of these, and I readily grant it for the *first*, but however shall examine what this Author produces for the *one*, as well as for the other.

But before I do this, I must observe to him, That if that Distinction Asserted by him between the *Divine Persons*, whereby they stand distinguished as *Three Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits*, holds good, all his proofs of the Unity of their Nature will come much too late. For he has thereby already destroyed the very Subject of his Discourse; and it is in vain to seek, wherein the *Numerical Unity* of the *Divine Nature* (as it belongs to the *Three Persons*) does Consist, after he has affirmed that, which makes such an *Unity* utterly impossible. And it has been sufficiently proved against him in our 5th Chapter, That *Three Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits*, can never be one *Numerical Infinite Mind*, or *Spirit*, nor consequently one *God*. *Three distinct Spirits* can never be otherwise *One*, than by being United into one Compound, or *Collective Being*, which, (could such a Thing be admitted here) might be called indeed *an Union*, but *an Unity* properly it could not. And hereupon I cannot but observe also, That this Author very often uses these Terms promiscuously, as if *Union* and

and Unity, being United into One, and being One, signified the very same Thing ; whereas, in strictness and propriety of Speech, whatsoever Things are United into One, cannot be Originally One ; and è *Converso*, whatsoever is Originally One, cannot be so, by being United into One : For as Suidas explains the word, ἔνωσις ἐπίπτυ^η άγε^{τη} θε^{ος} εἰς τὸ ζυγόθεα^ν τὸ περιγυγά, that is to say, Union is so called from the pressing [or thrusting] together several Things into one. But our Author, who with great profoundness, tells us of the same Nature in Three distinct Persons being United into One Numerical Essence, or God-head, Page 118. Lines 9, 10. has certainly a different Notion of Union from all the World besides. For how one and the same Nature (though in never so many distinct Persons ; since it is still supposed the same in all) can be said to be United into any one Thing, I believe surpasses all Humane Apprehension to conceive ; Union in the very Nature of it, being of several Things, not of one and the same. I desire the Reader to consult the place, and to extract the best sense out of it that he can.

And thus having presented our Author with this Preliminary Observation, I shall now proceed to consider how he acquits himself in the first Thing undertook by him, viz. The proving a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Three Divine Persons, out of the Fathers ; which tho' I do as readily grant, and as firmly believe, as this Author does, or can ; yet I think it worth while to shew, with what Skill, Decency, and Respect he Treats the Fathers upon this Subject.

And here in the first place he tells his Reader, That this being a Mystery so great, and above all Example in Nature, it is no wonder if the Fathers found it necessary to use several Examples, and to allude to several kinds of Union

to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the God-head. And withal, That they take several steps towards the Explication of this great Mystery, viz. of an Unity of Nature in a Trinity of Persons, Page 106. In our Examination of which Passages (reserving his former words to be considered elsewhere) we will first consider the steps which (he says) the Fathers made towards the Explication of this Mystery.

And these, he tells us, are Two.

First, The ὁμογένεια, or ὁμοστοίχη, (i. e.) the Coessentiality of the Divine Persons, whereby all the Three Persons of the God-head have the same Nature, Page 106.

Secondly, The other is a Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence, or Nature, Page 121. Line 6. which (to answer one Greek word with another) we may call the τὸ εἷς, or the ἐνός τὸ εἷς, or φύσης, St. Cyril Authorizing the Expression, whom we find speaking of an ἐνός φύσιν οὐ σωμάδης ἐν τῷ πατρὶ οὐ φύσης τῷ μητρὶ, as Ammonius Cites him in his Catena upon John 17. 11, 21.

Now as this ὁμογένεια, or Sameness of Nature, and this Numerical Unity of Nature, lying fifteen whole Pages, in this Author's Book, distant from one another, must be confessed to make a very large stride; so, for all that, they will be found to make but an insignificant step; as setting a Man not one jot further than he was before. For as touching those Words and Terms, which the Fathers used to express the Unity of the Divine Nature by, I do here, without any demur, affirm to this Author, That Coessentiality, Sameness of Nature, and Sameness of Essence, all signified by the ὁμογένεια, or ὁμοστοίχη, as also, Unity of Nature, and Unity of Essence, expressed by the τὸ εἷς, or ἐνός τὸ εἷς, or φύσης, do all of them, in the

the sense of the *Fathers*, denote but one and the same Thing, viz. *A Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature*, only, I confess, with some Circumstantial Difference, as to the way, or manner of their signification. For,

1. The $\delta\circ\mu\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\tau\circ\tau\circ\tau$, signifies *Unity of Nature*, with a Connotation of some Things, or Persons to whom it belongs. Upon which Account it is, that St. *Ambrose* (whom this Author cites) speaking of this word in his 3d Book, Chap. 7. tells us, That $\circ\mu\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\tau\circ\tau\circ\tau$ aliud alii, non ipsum est sibi : Nor indeed is any Thing said to be the same, but with respect to some Thing, or Circumstance besides it self. And therefore no wonder if the $\mu\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\tau\circ\tau\circ\tau$ was anciently rejected, since the $\delta\circ\mu\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\tau\circ\tau\circ\tau$, relating to the Person, whom the $\circ\sigma\alpha$ belongs to, must import an *Unity in Personality*, as well as in *Essence*, which would be contrary to the *Catholick Faith*. But,

2. The $\delta\circ\pi\circ\tau$, or the $\circ\pi\circ\tau\circ\tau\circ\tau$, or $\circ\pi\circ\tau\circ\tau\circ\tau$, signifies *Unity of Nature*, or *Essence*, without Connotation of any to whom it belongs : Not but that it does really and indeed belong to the *Three Divine Persons*, but that according to the strict and proper signification and force of the word, it does not connote, or imply them, but abstracts, or prescinds from them.

And this is a true Account of these words, by which the *Fathers* (without making more steps than one) intended and meant the same Thing, viz. a *Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature* belonging to all the *Three Persons*, only with this difference, That the $\circ\mu\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\tau\circ\tau\circ\tau$ signifies the *Unity of the Divine Nature*, with a Connotation of the *Persons* in whom it is ; which also gives it the Denomination of *Sameness* ; and that the $\delta\circ\pi\circ\tau$, or the $\circ\pi\circ\tau\circ\tau\circ\tau$, signifies the *Unity of the same Nature* absolutely and abstractedly, without implying, or co-signifying any respect to those in whom it is, and to whom it belongs.

So that these words (as much *Two* as they are) yet in the sense and meaning of the *Fathers*, import but one and the same *Unity*.

But our Author tells us, That though indeed the *Fathers* own an *Unity of Nature* in the *Divine Persons*, yet, since there is a *Specifick*, as well as a *Numerical Unity*, the Dispute is here, which of these two *Unities* we shall assign to the *Divine Nature*, with reference to the *Divine Persons*.

And for this ; He tells us, That *Petavius* and Dr. *Cudworth* have abundantly proved, That the *Nicene Fathers* did not understand the word *cooperation* of a Numerical, but of a Specifical Sameness of *Nature*, or the agreement of *Things Numerically different from one another in the same Common Nature*, Page 106. about the end.

In Answerto which, I must confess my self very unfit to take such Great and Truly Learned Persons to task, and that upon comparing this Author and *Petavius* together (if there can be any comparison between them) I find much more Reason to believe that he mistook the meaning of *Petavius*, than that *Petavius* could mistake the meaning of the *Fathers*.

But however, I shall lay down this as a Conclusion, which I take to be undoubtedly true, viz. That the *Ancient Fathers*, as well the *Nicene*, as those after them, held only a *Numerical Unity* of the *Divine Nature* in the *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity* : That is, in other words, They held and acknowledged one *Numerical God*, and no more. This Conclusion I hold, and have good reason to believe, That neither *Petavius*, nor Dr. *Cudworth* shall be able to wrest it from me. For the chief Reason of some Men's charging the *Fathers* with holding a *Specifick Unity of Nature* amongst the *Divine Persons*, is drawn from this, That some of them, and particularly

Maximus

Maximus and *Nyssen* (cited by this Author) seem to argue from that *Specifick Unity of Nature* which is found in several Individual Men, to an *Unity of the Divine Nature* in the Persons of the *Blessed Trinity*.

To which I Answer, That the *Fathers* never used the Example of Three or more Individual Men, agreeing in the same *Nature* as a Parallel Instance of the same sort, or degree of *Unity* with that which is in the *Three Divine Persons*; but always alledged it, *one*, or (perhaps sometimes) *both* of these two ways.

First, By way of Allusion, or Illustration (as I have already noted in the foregoing Chapter) and as it is the nearest Resemblance of, and Approach to this *Divine Unity* of any that could be found in *Created Beings*. For still their Argument proceeds only by the *ἓν* and the *ἕτερος* on the one side, and the *ἕτερος* on the other, (as appears from that place quoted out of *Maximus*, P. 107.) which Terms surely do not of necessity import an *Identity* of the Case, but only some *Similitude* in the parts of the Comparison.

Secondly, The *Fathers* used the forementioned Example as an Argument *à minore ad majus*, viz. That if several Individual Men could not properly be said to have more than one *Nature* (upon which *Nyssen's* whole Argument turns) much less could this be said of the *Three Divine Persons*. Forasmuch as it is not only certain, but evident, That Persons merely distinguished from one another and no more, must have a greater *Unity of Nature*, than such as are not only *distinguished*, but also *divided* from one another by a separate Existence. And let any one stretch this Argument of the *Fathers* further if he can.

I do not in the least deny, but several Expressions may have dropped from the *Fathers*, which, if we look'd no further, might be drawn to a very inconvenient sense. But then also it is as little to be denied, That the same *Fathers* professedly and designedly treating of the same Points, have declared themselves in such Terms, as are very hardly, if at all reconcileable to those Occasional and Accidental Expressions. And therefore since their meaning cannot be taken from Both, it ought much rather to be taken from what was Asserted by them designedly, than what was Asserted only occasionally.

To which I shall add this further Remark, That a due consideration of the Circumstances, under which those *Fathers* wrote, may very well Apologize for the Defects of some of their Arguments. For the Grand Controversie which exercised the *Orthodox Writers* of the fourth and part of the fifth Century, was that with the *Arrians*. So that we have the less cause to wonder if some of their Reasonings about the *Trinity* seem to look no further than the Proof of a *Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons*, while they had to deal with Adversaries who would not allow so much as this between the *Father* and the *Son*, but instead of an ὁμοεστιον, or *Sameness*, held only an ὁμοιεστιον, or *Likeness of Nature* between them; which, together with the foregoing Considerations, may serve as a Key to let us into the true Explication of several Passages of the *Fathers*; about the meaning of which we might otherwise possibly be something at a loss. And the same likewise may serve to give a fair Account of what has been alledged by *Petavius*, and mistook by this Author upon the present Subject. For to traverse and examine all *Petavius's* Allegations particularly would require a full and distinct Work by it self.

But still our Author seems extremely set upon making good his first step of a *Specifick Unity* of the *Divine Nature* from the *Fathers*; and to that purpose he tells us, *Page 107. Line 23.* *That one Thing wherein the Fathers place the Unity of the God-head is, that all the Three Persons have the same Nature*, by which he means (as shall be shewn presently) *Specifically the same Nature*; and a few Lines after, he tells us again, *That some of the Fathers went further than this, and plac'd the Essential Unity of the Divine Nature in the Sameness of Essence*, *Lines 30, 31, 32.* of the same Page.

Now here I would desire this Author to inform me of Two Things.

First, By what rule of speaking, or upon what Principle of Divinity, Logick, or Philosophy, *Sameness of Nature* ought to signify one Thing, and *Sameness of Essence* to signify another; and withal to be so contra-distinguished to each other, that in the degrees of *Unity*, this latter must be a step beyond the former? For the *Fathers*, I am sure, make no such Distinction, but use the words *Sameness of Nature*, and *Sameness of Essence*, as well as the words *ἓν οὐσία* and *ἓν οὐσιάς* themselves promiscuously; so that neither by their Native signification, nor yet by their use, do they import any more than one sort of *Unity*.

Secondly, Whereas in *Page 106. Lines 23, 24.* he makes the *first step* towards this *Unity* to consist in the *ομοιούσιον*, or *Coessentiality*, (which also in the next Page, *Line 23. &c.* he explains by *Sameness of Nature*); And whereas, in *Page 121.* he makes a *Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence*, the *next step* (introducing it with the word *Secondly*) and telling us, *That the Fathers added it to the ομοιούσιον*, which he had before made the

first step; And whereas, notwithstanding this, having in Page 107. told us, That Sameness of Nature was one Thing wherein the Fathers placed the Unity of the Divine Nature, within seven Lines after, he tells us, That some of the Fathers went further, and placed it in the Sameness of Essence, (which, yet it is manifest all along, that he reckons not the same thing with Numerical Unity of Essence,) I desire to know of him, whether there be Two second steps in this Unity? or, whether there be one between the first and the second? For he makes οὐγεστίονας, or Sameness of Nature one step, Page 106, 107. And Sameness of Essence a further step, Page 107. Line 30. &c. And then Numerical Unity of Nature another step, calling it also the Second, Page 121. Line 5. These Things, I must confess, I am utterly unable to give any Consistent Account of, and I shrewdly suspect, that our Author himself is not able to give a much better. But it is still his way to forget in one place what he has said in another; and how kind soever he may be to himself, I should think it very hard for another Man to forget himself so often, and to forgive himself too.

Nevertheless our Author, without mincing the Matter, roundly Asserts a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons, telling us, Line 23. &c. of the fore-cited Page 107. That this is absolutely necessary to make the Thrice Persons one God, and that it is impossible that they should be so without it; where it is evident, that he means a Specifick Unity, both from this, that it was the Subject, which he had been there treating of, as also from this, that immediately after he mentions another sort, or degree of Unity, as a step further than this; which, since nothing can be but a Numerical Unity, it follows, That that which was one step short of a Numerical, must needs be a Specifical. And now is it not strange, that in Page 109. which

which is but the next save one after this, this Man should positively say, (as he does) *That the Fathers never so much as Dream'd of a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons,* having here in Page 107. affirmed it to be no less than absolutely necessary to make the Three Persons one God? And that certainly is a necessity with a witness. But he, who exacts of this Author a consistency with himself for five Pages together, deals very severely with him.

And accordingly, the more I consider of this Matter, I cannot but think, That what he says of the *Nicene Fathers holding a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons,* Page 106. And his affirming that *Gregory Nyssen, St. Cyrill, Maximus and Damascen never so much as Dream'd of any such Unity,* Page 109. Line 22. will by no means consist together.

For First, If by the *Nicene Fathers* be meant not only those who were present at that Council, but those Fathers also, who about those Times held the same Faith which was Established in that Council, then his two fore-cited Passages contain a gross, manifest, fulsome Contradiction; even as gross as the *positive asserting of a thing*, and the *never so much as dreaming of it*, can import. But if by the *Nicene Fathers* he means only those who sat and acted in that Council, he will hardly however perswade any understanding Man, That *Gregory Nyssen*, who Wrote and flourished between fifty and Sixty Years after the Council, and *Maximus* about Sixty, and *St. Cyrill* about Ninety, could be so grossly ignorant of, and Strangers to the Sentiments of those Fathers, as not so much as to *Dream of that wherein they had placed the Unity of the God-head*. This to me seems Incredibile and morally Impossible: since it is not to be imagined, that *Nyssen, Cyrill, and Maximus* could so soon forget, or knowingly dare to relinquish the Doctrine of the

fore-mentioned *Fathers*, whose Authority was so great and Sacred all the *Christian World* over. And therefore since this Author allows these *Fathers* not to have *Dreamt* of a *Specifick Unity* of the *Divine Nature*; I conclude, That neither did the *Nicene Fathers Dream* of it any more than they, howsoever they might express themselves upon some occasions.

And thus having (as well as he could) made his *first step*, by Asserting a *Specifick Unity*, or *Sameness of Nature* in the *Three Divine Persons* from the *Fathers*, that is to say, partly from what *Petavius* and *Dr. Cudworth* had told him of the *Nicene Fathers* holding such a *Specifick Unity* between them, and partly from the other *Fathers* never so much as *dreaming of it*, he proceeds now to his other *step*, or rather *Counter-step*; which is to shew, That the *Unity* between the *Divine Persons*, held by the *Fathers*, was no other than a *Numerical Unity* of *Nature*, or *Essence* belonging to them: For since to be one only *Specifically*, and to be one only *Numerically*, are by no means consistent with one another, in respect of the same *Persons*, what can this be so truly and properly called as a *Counter-step*, to that which he had made before? His Method being plainly this. First he tells us, That the *Nicene Fathers* by the ὁμοστοῖς understood only a *Specifick Unity*, or *Sameness of Nature* in the *Divine Persons*, Page 106. And then, that the *Fathers* [mentioning them indefinitely] held this *Sameness of Nature* absolutely necessary to make the said *Three Persons* one *God*, Page 107. And now at length he tells us, Page 121. Lines 27, 28, 29. That though several of the *Fathers* attempted several ways of explaining that *Unity of Nature* that is in the *Divine Persons*, yet they all agree in the Thing, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, *Three distinct Divine Persons* are united in one *Numerical Nature and Essence*. So that the Sum of all must

must be this (as appears also from his own words in the latter end of *Page 120.* and the four first Lines of the *121.*) that, according to him, the *Fathers* held a *Specifick Unity of Nature* necessary to make the *Three Divine Persons* one *God*, but not sufficient without the Completion of it by a *Numerical Unity* superadded to it.

This, I say, is the Sum of what he delivers ; and in direct opposition to which, I do here deny, That there is any such Thing as a *Specifick Unity of Nature* belonging to the *Divine Persons*, or that the *Fathers* ever held, that there was.

And to prove this, I shall premise this Assertion both as certain in it self, and withall affirmed by this Author in those fore-cited words, *viz.* *That all the Fathers held, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three distinct Persons are United in (or rather are One, by) One Numerical Nature and Essence.*

Which being so premised, I have these *Considerations* to oppose to the Admission of any *Specifick Unity* in the *Divine Nature* as it belongs to the *Divine Persons.*

As,

First, If a *Numerical Unity* in the same *Divine Nature* be sufficient to make the *Three Divine Persons* to whom it belongs, *One God*, then a *Specifick Unity* of the same is not necessary ; but a *Numerical Unity* in the same *Divine Nature* is sufficient to make the said *Three Persons One God*, and therefore a *Specifick Unity* is not necessary. The Consequence is evident, because nothing can be *necessary* to any Thing, or Effect, beyond, or beside what is *sufficient* for the same ; since this would imply a manifest Contradiction, by making the same Thing, in the same respect, both *sufficient* and *not sufficient*. And as for the Minor, That an Agreement in one and the same *Nume-*
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rical Divine Nature is sufficient to make the *Persons* so agreeing *One God*. I suppose this carries with it so much Self-Evidence, that no Man of Reason will pretend to doubt of, and much less to deny it.

Secondly, A greater degree of *Unity*, and a less degree of *Unity* are not to be admitted in the *Divine Nature*. But a *Numerical Unity* and a *Specifical Unity*, are a greater and a less degree of *Unity*, and therefore they are not both to be admitted in the *Divine Nature*. The Major is proved thus, Because two such *Unities* would overthrow the simplicity of the *Divine Nature*; forasmuch as they must be either two degrees of the same kind of *Unity*, or they must be two different kinds of *Unity*: Either of which would infer a Composition by no means to be endured in the *Divine Nature*. As for the Minor, it is evident in it self, and needs no Proof.

Thirdly, Such a degree, or sort of *Unity of Nature*, as may agree to Ten Thousand Individuals, neither can nor ought to be admitted in the *Divine Nature*, with reference to the *Divine Persons*. But a *Specifick Unity of Nature* may agree to Ten Thousand Individuals, as well as to Two or Three; since (upon a *Specifick Account*) it has no Stint or Limitation, but may be every whit as well and properly in the former Number, as in the latter; and therefore it neither can nor ought to be admitted in the *Divine Nature*.

Fourthly, Such an *Unity* as is principally, if not absolutely *Notional* and depends upon the Operation of the Intellect drawing one common Notion from the agreement, which it observes in several Individuals, is by no means necessary to make the *Three Divine Persons One God*, nor can any way properly belong to them. But a *Specifick Unity* is such an one. And therefore it neither is,
nor

nor can be necessary to the making the *Three Divine Persons* *One God*; as this Author most absurdly Asserts, *P. 107. Line 23, 24.* The Major is evident. For that, if such an *Unity* could be necessary upon that Account, then there would be some sort or degree of *Unity* in the *Divine Nature* so depending upon the Operation of some *Intellect*, or other (forming one common Notion out of several Particulars,) that, had not such an Operation passed upon the said Particulars, such an *Unity* could not have been; nor consequently could the *Three Divine Persons* have been one *God* without it; which to affirm, would certainly be both a Monstrous and Blasphemous Assertion.

Fifthly and Lastly, If a *Specifick Unity of Nature* consists with, and indeed implies a *Multiplication* of the said *Nature*, in every one of the Particulars, to which it belongs; then such a *Specifick Unity* can by no means be admitted in the *Divine Nature*. But a *Specifick Unity of Nature* imports a *Multiplication* of the said *Nature* in every one of the Particulars to which it belongs; And therefore such an *Unity* cannot be admitted in the *Divine Nature*. The Reason of the Consequence is evident; because the *Divine Nature* is uncapable of any *Multiplication*: And herein consists the difference of the *Divine Nature's* belonging to the *Divine Persons*, and of any other *Nature's* belonging to its proper Individuals; That this latter is by a *Multiplication of it self in them*, and the other by a bare *Communication of it self to them*, so as that the same *Numerical Nature exists in*, and becomes thereby common to all the *Three Persons*. As for the Minor Proposition, That a *Specifick Unity of Nature* consists with and implies a *Multiplication* of the said *Nature* in the several Individuals which it belongs to;

I refer him to all the *Logicians* and *Metaphysicians* who have wrote of *Species*, and *Specifick Unity*, of *Idem*, & *Diversum*, whether they do not give this Account of it.

But I fancy this Author has a reach of Cunning (tho' but a short one) in the case. For that having made the *Three Divine Persons Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*, which can never be *One* by a *Numerical Unity*; he is willing to provide them a *Specifical Unity*, and to see whether that will serve the turn; but as the *Nature of the Thing* unhappily falls out to be, that will not do it neither.

These are the *Considerations* which I thought fit to advance against the Admission of a *Specifick Unity* in the *Divine Nature*, with reference to the *Divine Persons*. And the Conclusion, which I draw from them all, is this, That since the *Fathers* (and that even by this Author's own Confession) held a *Numerical Unity of Nature in the Three Divine Persons*, we can by no means grant that the said *Fathers* admitted also a *Specifick Unity* in the same, without making them guilty of a gross Absurdity and Contradiction. Forasmuch as these Two sorts, or degrees of *Unity* are utterly incompatible in the *Divine Nature*.

I hope by this time the Judicious Reader sees how fit this Man is to be trusted with the *Fathers*, whose Judgment about so weighty an Article he dares misrepresent in such a manner. For to sum up briefly what he has said upon this Point.

First, he tells us, *That the Fathers agree very well in the Account they give of a Trinity in Unity*, Page 106. and the four first lines. Next he tells us, *That the Nicene Fathers asserted a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature in*

the Persons of the Blessed Trinity, and understood the word ὁμοιοτον only of such an Unity, and not of a Numerical, Page 106. and the five last Lines. And Thirdly, That this Specifick Unity, or Sameness of Nature, was absolutely Necessary to make the Three Divine Persons One God, and that it was impossible they should be so without it, Page 107. Lines 23, 24. And Fourthly, That the other Fathers (of which he there names four) never so much as Dream'd of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature, Page 109. Lines 22, 23. And Lastly, That the Fathers do not stop in this Specifick Unity and Identity of Nature, but proceed to shew how the ὁμοιοτον proves a true Numerical and Essential Unity of the God-head in the Three Divine Persons, Page 114. Lines 30, 31, 32, 33.

From all which Assertions, which lie plain and open in the forecited Pages, I desire this Author to resolve me these following Queries.

1. Whether those Fathers who Assert a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature, and those who never Dreamt of such an Unity; And those again, who by the ὁμοιοτον understood only a Specifick, and not a Numerical Unity of Nature; and those who by the same ὁμοιοτον proceed to prove a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons, can be said to agree so very well in the Account they give of a Trinity in Unity?

2. Whether those could give a true and right Account of a Trinity in Unity, who never so much as Dreamt of that, which was so absolutely necessary to make the Three Divine Persons One God, that they could not possibly be so without it?

3. Whether a Specifick Unity, or Sameness of Nature in several Persons, is or can be a direct and proper proof of a Numerical Unity and Identity of Nature in the said Persons?

These Questions, I say, being the Natural and Immediate Results of this Author's Positions, I hope he will graciously vouchsafe, sometime or other, to give the World a Satisfactory Resolution of.

In the mean time I will tell him what it was, that imposed upon him so, as to make him talk thus Absurdly and Unphilosophically of a *Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature*, and traduce the *Fathers* also, as if they held the same. And that in one word is, That in the Subject before us, he takes *Specifick Nature* and *Common Nature* to signify one and the same Thing; whereas, though every *Specifick Nature* be a *Common Nature*, yet every *Common Nature* is not a *Specifick Nature* (nor nor a *Generical* neither.) And that this was his mistake appears from those words of his in Page 106. where he says, That Petavius and Dr. Cudworth have abundantly proved, That the Nicene Fathers did not understand the word ὁμοιότης of a Numerical, but of a Specifical Sameness of Nature, or the agreement of Things Numerically differing from one another, in the same Common Nature.] In which words it is evident, That he makes *Specifick Sameness of Nature*, and the *Agreement of Things numerically different*, in one and the same Common Nature, to signify Convertibly the same Thing; and when he has done so, he opposes them Both to a *Numerical Sameness of Nature*; as appears from the Adverbative Particle [But] placed between them. In which, let me tell him he is guilty of a very great mistake, both by making those Things the same, which are not the same, and by making an Opposition where there is a real Coincidence. For, by his favour, one and the same Numerical Divine Nature is a *Common Nature* too; forasmuch as without any Division, or Multiplication of it self, it belongs in *Common* to the Three Divine Persons. The Term [Deus] indeed is neither a *Genus*, nor a *Species*.

ties. Nevertheless all *Divines* and *School-men* allow it to be a *Terminus Communis*, as properly predicable of, and Common to *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*; and in this very Thing consists the Mystery of the *Trinity*, That one and the same *Numerical Nature* should be *Common* to, and Exist in *Three Numerically distinct Persons*. And therefore for one (who pretends to teach the whole *World Divinity*) while he is Discoursing of the *Divine Nature* and *Persons*, to oppose *Common Nature*, to *Nature Numerically One*, and from the *Commonness of it*, to make the *Fathers Argue* against its *Numericalness* (whereas the same *Divine Nature* may be, and really is both) it is a shrewd sign of the want of some thing or other in that Man, that must needs render him extremely unfit to prescribe, and dictate in these Matters.

In fine, the sole Point driven at all along by the *Fathers*, as to the Question about the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature* (for their Arguments to prove the Coequality of the *Three Divine Persons* against the *Arrians* are not now before us) is an Assertion of a Real Numerical Existing *Unity* of the said *Nature* in the said *Persons*. I say, a *Numerical Unity*, without making any more steps, or degrees in it than *One*, or owning any distinction between *Sameness of Nature*, and *Sameness of Essence*. And much less by making (as this Author does) a *Specifick Sameness of Nature*, one thing wherein they place the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature*, and then making *Sameness of Essence* another and further degree in the *Unity* of the said *Nature*; and when they have done so, by a return back explaining this *Sameness of Essence*, by the *Sameness of Nature* newly mentioned; as, he says, they do, in these words, immediately following (by way of Exegesis of the former) viz. *That there is but one God, because all the Three Divine Persons have the same Nature*, Page 107. and

the two last Lines. All which is a Ridiculous Circle, and a Contradiction to boot, making *Sameness of Nature* one step, and *Sameness of Essence* another, and then making this *Sameness of Essence* no more than a *Sameness of Nature*, again; so that according to him the *Fathers* must be said to go further, by resting in the very same step which they first made: Which way of Reasoning, I confess, may serve well enough for one, who can forget in one Page, what he had said in the other just before; But (by his favour) the *Fathers* were a little more Consistent, and understood themselves better than to run Divisions in such a senseless manner upon a Thing that admitted none.

And thus having shewn how he has dealt with the *Fathers* in the Account given by him of their Opinion about the *Unity of the Divine Nature in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity*, (which was the first Head, under which I reduced his Allegations from them,) I come now in the

2d Place, to the other and Principal Head; under which he undertakes to prove the chief and more peculiar part of his Hypothesis from the said *Fathers*, viz. That the *Unity and Identity of Nature belonging to the Three Divine Persons, consists in the Mutual-Consciousness which is between them*, That is in Truth, That they are therefore *One God*, because they are *Conscious* to themselves, that they are so.

And here I shall begin with shewing how this Author overthrows the Point undertook by him before he produces any Arguments from the *Fathers* for it. And to this Purpose I shall resume those words of his before cited by me out of Page 106. In which he reminds his Reader, *That Trinity in Unity being so great a Mystery, and of which we have no Example in Nature, it is no wonder*

der if it cannot be explained by any one kind of Natural Union, and that therefore it was necessary to use several Examples, and to allude to several kinds of Union, to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the God-head. Now here, since our Author's Notion, and the Fathers too (as he says) of this Unity is nothing else but Mutual-Consciousness, I desire to Learn of him, what necessity there was, or is of using several Examples, and alluding to several kinds of Union to explain, or form an adequate notion of that? And I wonder what kind of Thing he would make of his Mutual-Consciousness, should he come to explain and describe it by several Examples, and several Kinds of Union? But this is not all, for he tells us likewise (as we also observed before) that there are several steps to be taken towards the Explication of this Mystery. Whereupon I would again learn of him how many steps are necessary to explain Mutual-Consciousness; for one would imagine one single step sufficient to represent and declare a Thing which every Body understands. This Author indeed confidently enough Asserts, That the Fathers give no other Account of a Trinity in Unity, than the same which he gives of it, Page 101. Line 2. But certainly if the Fathers thought several Examples, Steps and Kinds of Union absolutely necessary to explain the Notion they had of this Unity, and if these cannot be necessary to explain the Notion of Mutual-Consciousness, then it must follow, That the Fathers neither did, nor possibly could by that Unity mean Mutual-Consciousness. And if this Author doubts of the force of this Reasoning, let him try his skill, and see what Learned stuff he is like to make of it when he comes to explain his Notion of Mutual-Consciousness by several Examples, Steps, and Sorts of Union, and out of them all to form one adequate Notion of this so much admired Thing. Wherefore

I conclude, and, I think, unanswerably, That the *Fathers* by this *Unity* between the *Divine Persons*, mean one Thing, and this Man quite another ; and consequently that they have given a very different Account of it, from what he gives, contrary to his equally bold and false Assertion, affirming it to be *the very same*. °

And now I am ready to see what he has to offer us from the *Fathers* in behalf of his *Mutual-Consciousness*; but because I am extremely desirous, that the Reader should keep him close to the Point, and not suffer him to wander from it (which, in dispute, he is as apt to do as any Man living) I shall presume to hint this to him, That the Point to be proved by this Author, is not that the *Three Divine Persons* have one and the same *Numerical Nature*, or *Essence*, nor that they are *Mutually Conscious* to one another of whatsoever each of them *is*, or *knows*; no, nor yet that this *Mutual-Consciousness* infers an *Unity of Nature* in them, as a Thing inseparable from it. But he is to prove, That this *Unity of Nature*, and this *Mutual-Consciousness* are Convertibly one and the same Thing, or that this latter is to the former what the *Essence*, or *Form* of any Thing is to that Thing : That is to say, That the *Unity of the Divine Nature* formally *Consists in*, and is, what it *is*, by that *Mutual-Consciousness* which belongs to the *Three Divine Persons*. This, I say, is the Thing to be proved by Him.

And so I proceed to his Arguments (which I assure the Reader, he shall find very strange ones) nevertheless to give him as easie and distinct a view of them, as I can, I will set down the several Heads of them before I particularly discuss them.

1. The First of them is from the *μία κρέψεια* ascribed, by the *Fathers*, to all the *Three Divine Persons* joynly.

2. The

2. The Second from the *μία νύνες & διανοής τῆς αὐτῆς βελτίωσης*.

3. The Third from the *επιχώριος*, or Circumincision attributed likewise by the Fathers to them.

4. The Fourth from the Representation, which St. Austin makes of the *Trinity*, by the *Mind*, and its *Three distinct Faculties of Understanding, Memory, and Will*. And,

5. The Fifth and last from the *Unity of the Original Principle*, or *Fountain of the Deity*, or rather (say I) of the second and third *Persons* of the *Trinity*.

All which I shall examine distinctly, and in their order. But before I do so, I think fit to give the Reader an Account in one word of this Author's whole design in all the Particulars above specified. And that is, to prove, That the *Unity of the Divine Nature* consists in *Unity of Operation*, and then to suppose (for he does not so much as go about to prove it) that this *Unity of Operation is Mutual-Consciousness*. This is the Sum Total of the Business; but I now come to Particulars. And

First, For the *μία ἀνέγενα*, quoted by him out of *Greg. Nyssen*. Where, before we see how far it may be formed into an Argument, I think it requisite to give some Account how this Author Discourses of it. I must confess, I have sometimes wondred, what design he could have in so zealously exploding those commonly received Terms of *Substance, Essence and Nature* from any application of them to God: which here he does again afresh, telling us in *Page 115. lines 24, 25, 26, 27.* That it confounds our minds when we talk of the Numerical Unity of the God-head to have the least Conception or Thought about the Distinction and Union of Natures and Essences. And that therefore we are to speak of God only in words importing Energy or Operation: And accordingly for this reason

Gr.

Gr. *Nyssen* expresses God by Θεός and ἐφορά, words not signifying *Nature* or *Essence*, but only *Sight* and *Inspection*; Nay and this Author has gone a step much beyond this, plainly telling us, *That the Father and the Son are Energy or Operation*, Page 132. Line 13. And that *Nature and Energy are the same in God*, P. 133. L. 20. and consequently, That we are to entertain no other Conception of God, but as of a pure simple *Operation*. And thus, when we have degraded the *Divine Nature* from *Substance* to *Operation*, it is but one step more to degrade it to bare *Notion*. This conceit of this Author, I say, at first I could not but wonder at, but am since pretty well aware of what he drives at by it. And that is in short, That he thinks it a much easier Matter to make *Action*, or *Operation*, than *Substance*, *Essence*, or *Nature* passes for *Mutual-Consciousness*: And this upon good Reason, I am satisfied, is the Thing he designs: But I believe he will fall short of fetching his *Mutual-Consciousness* out of either of them. And therefore first to Correct that Crude Notion of his, *That we must not speak of God in Terms importing Nature, but Operation*; I desire this Bold Man (as I urged before in Chap. 2.) to tell me whether the Names of *Jah* and *Jehovah*, and *I am that I am*, by which God revealed himself to his People, were not Names of *Nature* and *Essence*? and whether God revealed them for any other purpose than that he might be known and understood by them? But for all this he will have us to know from Gr. *Nyssen*, That the *Divine Nature* is *quid ἀκατωνόμαχον καὶ ἀφεκτον*, a Thing above Name or Expression. And it is so, I confess, as to an adequate complete Conception or Description of it. But then, I ask him, are not the *Divine Operations* so too? Are we able to comprehend them perfectly, and to the utmost of *what*, and *how* they are? When the Psalmist tells us, that *God has put darkness under*

der his feet, Psal. 18. 9. and that his foot steps are not known, Psal. 77. 19. And the Apostle in Rom. 11. 33. That his judgments are unsearchable, and his ways past finding out. And are not these passages an Account of his Dealings and Operations in the Government of the World? And yet surely, notwithstanding all this, we may have some true, though imperfect Conceptions both of his Nature and of his Operations also: And I desire this Assuming Man to inform me, What should hinder, but that so much as we Conceive of God, we may likewise express, and (what is more) prove too? For though *Gregory Nyssen* has told us, That the *Divine Nature* is *unexpressible*, yet, I hope, a Thing may be proved, though the *Nature* of it cannot always be throughly expressed. But the Truth is, he makes this *Father Argue* at a very odd rate. For he tells us, *Page 115.* That one way, by which *Gregory Nyssen* undertakes to prove, That the *οὐρανός*, or *Specifick Sameness of Nature*, (as this Man understands it) proves a *Numerical Unity of Nature* in the *Divine Persons*, is, because the *Name* [God] does not so properly signifie the *Divine Nature* as something relating to it: Which is a rare Proof indeed; it being as much as to say, That the *οὐρανός*, or *Sameness of Nature*, proves one *God*, because [God] does not signifie *Nature*. But St. *Gregory* is far from arguing so (which, besides the Absurdity of it, is only *denying instead of proving*) but he proves *Sameness and Unity of Nature*, by *Sameness*, or *Unity of Operation*, and that surely he might very well do, without making *Unity of Nature* only an *Unity of Operation*. And no less absurd is it, to represent St. *Gregory* making *Unity of Operation* one way, whereby the *οὐρανός*, or *Specifick Sameness of Nature*, proves a *Numerical Unity of Nature*: For though *Unity of Operation* it self

self proves this, yet surely it is not a Medium, whereby a Specifick Unity of the said Nature, does, or can prove it.

But to proceed, That Assertion of this Author, [That God is properly, Energy, or Operation] contains in it more Absurdities than one. For first he takes Energy and Operation for the same Thing; whereas ἔργον is properly *vis activa*, and Operation is only the ἔργων, or actual Exercise of that *vis*, or Power. But whether it signifies one or both, it is certain, that God is properly neither of them. For (as I have shewn before) we must speak of God as we are able to conceive of him; and we conceive of God, not as of an *Action*, but as of an *Agent*; that is, as of a *Substance acting*, or exerting it self; and upon this Account I do here tell this Author, that it is impossible for Humane Reason to conceive of *Action*, or *Operation*, but as founded in *Substance*; and that nothing would more confound and overturn all the Methods, Ways, and Notions of Men's Minds, than to endeavour to conceive of it otherwise. And therefore if God is sometimes called ἔργον, or Action, it is by a Metonymy of the Adjunct for the Subject, or the Effect for the Cause; for truly and properly he is not so. And now, if this Author shall think to take Sanctuary in that known Expression of God, That he is a pure simple *Act*, he may please to take notice, that the Term *Act* is Ambiguous; and sometimes signifies an *Actus Entitativus*, which is no more than the *Entity*, or *Being* of a Thing, and sometimes an *Actus Physicus*, which is the *Operation*, or *Exertion* of some *Active Power*. And it is in the former sense only in which God is said to be a *pure simple Act*, and not in the latter. And, by this Author's Favour, every *Substance*, *Essence*, or *Nature* is such an *Act*, which quite

quite spoils all his fine Notion about expressing God only by Terms of *Energy* and *Operation*, in exclusion of those of *Nature*, *Essence* and *Substance*. This I thought fit to premise, as throwing up the very foundation of all his Arguments, and indeed of his whole Hypothesis.

And so I come to his Argument, the Sum of which, is this.

That the *Divine Nature* is *Divine Energy*, or *Operation*; And therefore, That the *Unity* of *Divine Operation*, is *Unity* of *Divine Nature*; And Lastly, That this *Unity* of *Divine Nature* is *Mutual-Consciousness*.

Now it is certain, That there is not one of all these Three Propositions true; but that is no fault of mine: since if they were cast into a Syllogism, that would not mend the Matter; for the Syllogism must proceed thus.

Unity of Divine Energy, or Operation is Mutual-Consciousness.

Unity of Divine Nature is Unity of Divine Energy, or Operation.

And therefore, *Unity of Divine Nature is Mutual-Consciousness.*

Every one of which *Propositions* is still false. And yet I shall refer it to this Author himself, or to any one, who has Read and Considered his Book, to form a better Argument from what he has said of a *μία ἐπέγεια*, with reference to the present Subject, if he can.

Nevertheless whether it be an Argument, or no Argument, my Answer to his Allegation of the *μία ἐπέγεια*, with relation to the *Unity of the Divine Nature*, and to *Mutual-Consciousness*, is thus.

First, That it is one Thing to be a *Proof* of a Thing, and another to be that wherein the *Nature of the Thing* proved, does consist. Thus actual Ratiocination is a

certain Proof of a Principle of Reason, yet nevertheless it is not that wherein a Principle of Reason does consist; since that may be and continue when actual Ratiocination ceases. In like manner I will allow the *μία ἐπέγεια*; to be a Proof of the *μία σοια*. But I absolutely deny, That the *ἐνότης* of the Energy, is that wherein the *ἐνότης* of the Nature is, or ought to be placed; or that the Fathers ever accounted it so, how truly and strongly soever it might, in their judgment, infer it.

What the Fathers designed to prove by *Unity of Operation in the Three Divine Persons*, is evident from the following Passages; (to which Twenty times as ma-

²Ων ἦ οὐρανος μία καὶ οὐ φύση πάντων οὐ
απὸ τέτον θεόν. Greg. Nyssen in Orat. Dom.
Nas. 3.

² Ων αὶ κατὰς ἐνέγκαμε τόπων καὶ ἡ ἔστια μία
ἐνέργεια ἢ πατέρος καὶ γυναικός τὸ ποιῶντα μήδε
θρωπον. καὶ τάλιν, αὐτὸν ὁ πατέρε πατέρη καὶ ἕγεις
ὅμοιως ποιῶν ἀρέθη τοια μία πατέρης καὶ ἕγεις. Ba-
sil. lib 4. contra Eunomium. εἰκατὴν ἡ ἐνέργειας
ταυτότης δην πατέρος καὶ γυναικός τοια μήδε
θείκνουσι σαρώς τὸ τὸ ἔστιας ἀπεργάλλακτον. Basil
Epist. ad Eustathium. Non potest operatio esse
diversa ubi non solum aequalis, verum etiam in-
dulcra Natura. August. Serm. de Verbo Dom.
63. Cap. 3.

ny might be added.) Gregory Nyssen tells us, That those whose Energy is the same, have their Nature altogether the same. And St. Basil, That those who have the same Operations, have also the same Essence [or Substance.] But the Operation [or Energy] of the Father and the Son is one, as appears in that Expression, Let us make Man. And again, Whatsoever

the Father does, that likewise does the Son, and therefore there is but one Essence of the Father and the Son. And again, The Sameness of Operation in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, evidently shows, That there is no difference in their Essence, or Substance. And accordingly St. Austin, The Operation cannot be diverse, where the Nature is not only equal, but also undivided. From all which, it is most clear, That the Fathers alledge this Unity of Operation only as a Proof or Argument of this Unity of Nature, or Essence : And therefore, since nothing can be a Proof of

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it self, That they did not take *Unity of Operation*, and *Unity of Nature* for one and the same Thing. But,

Secondly, Supposing (but not granting) that it were so, *viz.* That *Unity of Operation*, did not only prove, but really was it self this *Unity of Nature*, or *Essence*; yet how will this Author prove, that *Unity of Nature*, or *Unity of Operation* is properly *Mutual-Consciousness*? Is there so much as one Tittle in the *Fathers* expressing, or necessarily implying, that it is so? And as to the Reason of the Thing it self; Will any one say, That there is no other ἐρέψεια belonging to the *Divine Nature*, but *Mutual-Consciousness*? Or that this ἐρέψεια in the whole Latitude and Compafs of it extends no further? Nay, on the contrary, does it not Exert it self in Infinite other A&ts? And, what is yet more, does it not more properly belong to any other of the *Divine A&ts*, than to an *Act of Knowledge*? (bare *Knowledge*, as such being of it self unoperative) and *Mutual-Consciousness* is but an *Act of Knowledge*. I protest I am ashamed to dispute seriously against such Stuff.

2. His next Argument to prove, *That Mutual-Consciousness is formally that Unity of Nature which is in the Three Divine Persons*, is taken from another Expression of the said *Gregory Nyssen*; viz. That there is amongst the *Divine Persons*, μία κίνησις καὶ διακόσμησις τῆς αὐγαδῆς βελήματος. Concerning which, this Author has the boldness to appeal to any one to judge, whether this μία κίνησις βελήματος, this single Motion of the Will, which at the same instant, is in *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, can signifie any thing but *Mutual-Consciousness*, which makes them *Numerically One*, Page 117. Lines 8, 9, 10. &c. And he adds, That it is impossible they should have such a single Motion of Will passing through them all, without this *Mutual-Consciousness*, Page 124. Lines

30, 31. And this is the Sum of his Argument from the
 $\mu\alpha\ \kappa\iota\nu\sigma\iota\ \beta\delta\lambda\mu\alpha\tau\text{G}.$

In Answer to which, before I address my self to his Argument, I will give some Account of the Quotation. In which, by his Favour, we are to take the sense of the *Father's* words from the *Father* himself, and not from the Inferences which he who Quotes them, thinks fit to draw from them (how good soever he may be at that Work.) Now, what St. *Gregory* means by them, appears plainly by his manner of Reasoning. The Question before him was, *Whether the Three Divine Persons were Three Gods?* Which St. *Gregory* denies, and amongst other Proofs, says, That God is the Name of Energy, and from the Unity of Energy, proves the Unity of the Deity, and that Three Persons are but one God because the Operation is the same in all. To this he raises an Objection from the Sameness of Faculty, Office, or Operation amongst Men, as Geometrians, Husbandmen, Orators, whose Office, Business and Operations, (in their respective way) are the same; which yet does not hinder, but that they are still Three or more several Men. To which he Answers, That these act separately and by themselves; but that it is not so in the Divine Nature; no Person, in the Holy Trinity, doing any Thing by himself only, or acting separately from the other Two, but that there is one and the same Motion and Disposition of Will passing from the Father, through the Son, to the Holy Ghost. This is the force of St. *Gregory's* Reasoning, and the plain meaning of it is no more but this, That Three Men acting the same Thing, are still Three Men, because they act separately and by themselves: but that the Three Persons in the Trinity, are but One God, because they do not act separately, but that there is the same Motion and Disposition of Will in all the Three Persons; as, on the contrary, Three Men's not having one

one and the same Motion of Will, equally proves, That they are not One, but Three several Men ; and accordingly makes a manifest difference between Three Men acting the same Thing, and the Operation of the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity ; which is the Sum of St. Gregory's Answer to the forementioned Objection. And now, what does all this prove ? Why truly neither of those Two Things, which this Author must prove, or he proves nothing, viz. *That this Unity of Motion, and Disposition of Will, is properly and formally Unity of Divine Nature* : And next, *That this Unity of Divine Nature is properly Mutual-Consciousness*. These Two Things, I say, it is incumbent upon him to prove : But how it can be done from the fore-mentioned Words, or Argument of *Gregory Nyssen*, I believe will pose the Learnedst Man alive to shew.

The proper Answer therefore to this Argument will be much the same with that just before given to the Argument drawn from the *μία ἐργεία*, (of which this *μία κίνησις βελήματα* is but a Branch) and it proceeds thus.

First, I deny the *μία κίνησις βελήματα*, to be any more than a proof of the *Unity of the Divine Nature* ; just as either the *Effect*, or the *Causality* is a sure proof of the *Cause* ; but for all that, is not the Cause : or as a *Consequent* proves its *Antecedent* without being the *Antecedent*, or that wherein the *Nature* of the *Antecedent* does consist.

Secondly, In the next place I deny that *μία κίνησις βελήματα*, is formally and properly the same with *Mutual-Consciousness*, any more than an *Act*, or *Motion* of the *Will*, is formally the same with an *Act* of the *Understanding* : And before this Author takes it for granted, (which is his constant way of proving things) I expect, that

that he make it appear, That *βέλημα*, or *βέλνοις*, and *εἴδησις*, or *γνῶσις*, signify formally one and the same Thing: And it was boldly done of him (to say the least) to appeal to his Reader about a Thing, in which, if he understood the difference between an *Act of Volition*, and an *Act of Intellection*, he must certainly judge against him.

But it may be replied, That this *μία βέλνοις* does at least infer a *μία γνῶσις*, *εἴδησις*, or *αὐτεΐδησις*. I grant it may: But affirm, that this is nothing to his Purpose; unless it could follow from hence, that that which infers, or proves a Thing, is the very Thing which it infers and proves; which it neither is, nor, for that Reason, can be.

As for what he adds, That this *μία κίνησις βελήμα* cannot be in the *Three Divine Persons*, without such a *Mutual-Consciousness*: I do readily grant this also. But in the mean time, is not this *Dictator* yet old enough to distinguish between the *Causa sine quâ non*, or rather the *Condition* of a Thing, and the *Ratio formalis*, or *Nature* of that Thing? Between That, without which a Thing cannot be, and that, which that Thing *properly is*? There can be no such Thing *as Sight*, without a due Circulation of the Blood and Spirits: But is such a Circulation, therefore, properly an *Act of Sight*? Or an *Act of Sight* such a Circulation? To dispute this further, would be but to abuse the Reader's Patience.

And last of all, if this Author should take advantage of those words from *Gregory Nyssen*, *That God is the Name of Energy*. Besides, that it is not the bare *Notation*, but *use of the Word*, that must govern its signification: I would have this Author know, That *God* may have many Names, by which his *Nature* is not signified; as well as several others by which it is, and may be. But

But I must confess, it is a very pleasant Thing (as was in some measure hinted before) to prove the *Divine Nature to be Energy*, because the Name [God] does not signify *Nature*, but *Energy*, or *Operation*; whereas in Truth (if it proves any thing) it proves that *Nature* and *Energy* (applyed to God) do by no means signify the same Thing.

And so I have done with his Argument from the *μία κίνησις βελτίου αὐτοῦ*, and effectually demonstrated, That there is not so much as the least shew, or semblance of any proof from this, *That Mutual-Consciousness is properly that wherein the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity does consist.*

3. His Third Argument is from the Word *περιχώρησις*, commonly Translated *Circumincection*, and signifying a *Mutual-Inexistence*, or *In-dwelling* of each *Person* in the other Two. The Word was first used in this sense (so far as I can find) by *Damascen*, a *Father* of the 8th Century. But the Thing meant by it, is contained in those words of our Saviour in *John 14. 11. 21*. *Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me*, which, I confess, are a solid and sufficient proof of the *Unity* and *Identity* of the *Divine Nature*, both in the *Father* and the *Son*; and withal a very happy and significant Expression of the same.

But what is this to our Author's Purpose? And how does he prove this *περιχώρησις* to be *Mutual-Consciousness*? Why truly, by no Argument, or Reason produced, or so much as offered at by him, but only by a confident, Over-bearing Affirmation, *That there is no other Account to be given of that Mutual-In-being of the Divine Persons in each other, (which the Fathers call περιχώρησις) but by Mutual-Consciousness*, Page 125. Lines 6, 7, 8.

But, by his leave, I must debate the case a little with him, before he carries it off so. And in order to this, I must tell him in the first place, That the Question is not whether *Mutual-Consciousness best explains this περιχώρησις*, but whether it be the *περιχώρησις* it self, and that *περιχώρησις* be the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons? And in the next place, I demand of him, Whether our Saviour's Words do not plainly and expressly signify the *Mutual-In-being*, or *In-existence* of the Persons in one another, without any signification of their *Mutual-Consciousness at all?* And if so; let me hear a Reason, Why we should not take our Saviour's meaning from the Native signification of his own Words, rather than from those of this Author. For will he venture to affirm, That the *Father* cannot be in the *Son*, and the *Son* in the *Father* by a *Mutual-Inexistence* in one another, but only by a *Mutual-Knowledge* of one another? Let him take heed what he says, and how he ventures beyond his Depth. Or will he say, That our Saviour meant the same Thing with himself, but was *not so happy in expressing it?* For no other Reason, but one of these Two can be assigned, That when our Saviour expresses himself in Terms importing *Mutual-In-existence*, this Man shall dare to say, That he means nothing by them but *Mutual-Consciousness*. I refer it to the Serious and Impartial Reader to judge of the Horrible Boldness of this Man: and withal, to observe how extremely he varies from himself about this *περιχώρησις* and *Mutual-Consciousness*. For

First, He sometimes says, That *Mutual-Consciousness is the only Thing wherein both the Unity of the Divine Nature, and this Mutual-In-dwelling of the Three Divine Persons does Consist*, Page 124. Lines 4, 5. And

Secondly,

Secondly, He says, *That Mutual-Consciousness is the only thing that can explain, or give an Account of this Mutual-In-dwelling, or περιχώρησις,* Page 125. Lines 6, 7.

To which I Answer, That when he speaks of giving an Account of this *περιχώρησις*, if he means only an Account that there is such a Thing belonging to the Divine Persons, Our Saviour's Words have given a sufficient Account of that already. But,

Secondly, If he means such an Account of it, as explains and makes clear to us the *Nature* of it, by shewing what it is, and how it is. I deny that any such Account can be given (or perhaps understood) by Humane Reason; and much less, that his *Mutual-Consciousness* does or can give it.

Concerning which, I shall ask him this one Question, viz. Whether the *Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity* are not *Mutually-Conscious* to one another of their *Mutual-In-existence* in one another? I suppose he will not (because he dares not) deny it. And if he grants it, then it manifestly follows, That their *Mutual-In-existence* in one another, is in Order of *Nature* before their *Mutual-Consciousness*; and consequently cannot be the same with it, nor Consist in it. For certainly those *Divine Persons* must Exist *Mutually* in one another, before they can know, or be *Conscious* to themselves that they do so.

So that we see here, that nothing is, or can be concluded from this *περιχώρησις* for his *Mutual-Consciousness*, whether we consider the Use of the Word, or the Nature of the Thing. But let us see, how he makes good his Point from the Authority of the *Fathers*, which was the grand Thing undertook by him in this his 4th Section. And here as for the *Fathers*, he both Despises and Reproaches them, and that very grossly too. For first he

tells us, *That such an Union amongst the Divine Persons* (as is expressed by the word περιχώροις) *they all agree in, but how to explain it they knew not*, Page 125. Lines 17, 18. And why then, in the Name of God, does he refer to the *Fathers* to justifie his Explanation of that, which in the very same Breath he says, *They knew not how to Explain?* And the Truth is, the *Fathers* never owned themselves able to explain it; and that for a very good Reason; viz. because they held it unexplicable and unconceivable; and not for that Scandalous Reason given by him, viz. *That they had gross Material Conceptions of the Deity*, by conceiving of it as of a Substance, Page 125. Lines 27, 28. For, says he, within Two Lines after, *Had they Contemplated God as a pure Mind, it had been easie to explain this περιχώροις, or Indwelling of the Divine Persons in each other. Good God!* That any Professor of Divinity should call that easie to explain, which the Reason of all Mankind has hitherto bent under, as a Thing too great, and mysterious for it to comprehend, or to grapple with! So that if ever we have cause to cry out ὡ βαστό, it is here: Or that he should tax all those, who own themselves at a los about it, *for not Contemplating God as a pure Mind!* But to him, I confess, who can *Conceive of such a Pure Mind, as is no Substance*; that is to say, in other words, *No Being*. (For I am sure he will not so much as pretend it to be an Accident) to Him, I say, I cannot wonder, if nothing seem difficult, or mysterious. In the mean time, it is shameless and insufferable in this Man to say, as he does Page 100, 101. *That his Explication of the Trinity is not new, but the same with that of the Fathers*, and afterwards in pursuance of this Assertion, to say, *That the Fathers knew not how to explain it*, and to give this as a Reason of their not knowing how to do so, viz. *That they had such gross-*

gross Notions of God, that they could not conceive rightly of this Mystery. For this he has roundly affirmed ; and therefore ought in all Reason, either to prove this Charge upon the *Fathers*, or to give the World, and the Church of *England* in particular , satisfaction for speaking so falsely and scandalously of such glorious Lights and principal Pillars of the *Christian Church* ; and such as, I dare say, never Preached nor Prayed in any Conventicle.

But what the Doctrine of the *Fathers* is concerning this *περιχώρησις*, and how they understood those words of our Saviour (expressed by this Term) is manifest from the Testimony of two or three of them, which I shall set down, as (in so known a case) abundantly sufficient. St. Cyril of *Alexandria*, says expressly, *Christ's saying*, that he is in the Father, and the Father in him, shews the Identity of the Deity, and the Unity of the Substance, or Essence. And so likewise Athanasius : Accordingly therefore (says he) Christ having said before, I and my Father are one : He adds , I am in the Father, and the Father in me, that he might shew both the Identity of the Divinity, and the Unity of Essence. And so again St. Hilary : The Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, by the Unity of an inseparable [Undivided] Nature. By which Passages, I suppose any Man of sense will perceive, That the Thing which the Fathers meant and gathered from those words

"Ινα διὰ μὴ τὸ, τέτον ἐγ̄ ἔκείνω κάκείνων
ἐν τέτρῳ φαίνεται τὸ ταυτότητα τὸ Θεότητος καὶ
τὸ οὐσίας ἑρότητα, σεῖς, Cyril. *Thesauc. lib. 12.*
p. 109.

Διὰ τέτον γδ, καὶ σικότως εἰγνάς τετέστη,
Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατής ἐν ἑσμῷ, ἐπηγάπετο. Εγὼ ἐν
τῷ πατεὶ καὶ ὁ Πατής ἐγ, Εμοὶ ίνα τὸ μὴ
ταυτότητα τὸ Θεότητος, καὶ τὸ ἑρότητα τὸ οὐσίας
σεῖς, *Athanasius Oratione quarta contra Arianos.*

Pater in filio est & filius in Patre per inseparabilis Naturae Unitatem, *Hilarius de Trinitate, lib. 8.*

of

of our Saviour (since expressed by this $\pi\epsilon\rho\xi\chi\omega\rho\nu\tau\sigma$) was no Unity of Mutual-Consciousness (which they never mention) but an Unity of Essence, or Nature (which they expressly and constantly do.) Nor does this very Author deny it, as appears from his own words, though he quite perverts the sense of the Fathers, by a very fenceless Remark upon them, *Page 125. Lines 20, 21.* This Sameness [or Unity] of Nature (says he) might be the Cause of this Union [in the Divine Persons] viz. by a $\pi\epsilon\rho\xi\chi\omega\rho\nu\tau\sigma$, but not explain what this Intimate Union is. Now this Author has been already told, That the Question here is not, what explains this Union, but what this Union is? But besides this his mistake of the Question, I desire him to declare, what he means by the Cause of this Union? (as he here expresses himself.) For will he make an Union (as he calls an Unity) in the Divine Persons by Sameness of Nature a Cause of their Intimate Union by a $\pi\epsilon\rho\xi\chi\omega\rho\nu\tau\sigma$, or Mutual-In-being of them in each other, and affirm also this $\pi\epsilon\rho\xi\chi\omega\rho\nu\tau\sigma$ to be the same Thing with Mutual-Consciousness? If he does so, he makes the same Thing the Cause of it self. For the Sameness of Nature in the Three Persons, and their Mutual-In-being, or In-dwelling, are the very same Thing, and the same Unity, though differently expressed. But however, if we take him at his own word, it will effectually overthrow his Hypothesis. For if the Sameness of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons, be (as he says) the cause of this $\pi\epsilon\rho\xi\chi\omega\rho\nu\tau\sigma$, and this $\pi\epsilon\rho\xi\chi\omega\rho\nu\tau\sigma$ be the same with Mutual-Consciousness; it will and must follow, That this Sameness, or Unity of Nature can no more consist in Mutual-Consciousness, than the Cause can consist in its Effect, or the Antecedent in its Consequent. And this Inference stands firm and unanswerable against him.

But as to the Truth of the Thing it self, though we allow and grant the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons, and the Mutual In-being, or In-dwelling of the said Persons in each other, to be the same Thing, yet we deny, That this their Mutual In-being is the same with their Mutual-Consciousness. But that their Mutual-Consciousness follows and results from it, and for that cause cannot be formally the same with it. And so I have done with his 3d Argument, which he has drawn from the περιχώρησις, and is indeed nothing else, but a bold downright Perversion of Scripture, and a gross Abuse of the Fathers.

4. His fourth Argument is from an Allegation out of St. Austin, who, though he does not (as our Author confesses) Name this Mutual-Consciousness, yet he explains a Trinity in Unity (as he would persuade us) by Examples of Mutual-Consciousness; particularly by the Unity of the Three Faculties of Understanding, Memory and Will in the same Soul, all of them Mutually Conscious to one another of the several Acts belonging to each of them. And his 9th Book is spent upon this Argument; In which he makes the Mind, considered with its knowledge of it self, and its love of it self (all three of them (as he says) but one and the same Thing) a faint Resemblance of the Trinity in Unity. And this is, what he Argues from St. Austin.

To which I Answer.

First, That Faint Resemblances are far from being solid Proofs of any Thing; and that, although similitudes may serve to illustrate a Thing otherwise proved, yet they prove and conclude nothing. The Fathers indeed are full of them both upon this and several other Subjects, but still they use them for Illustration only, and nothing else. And it is a scurvy sign that Proofs and Arguments

run very low with this Author, when he passes over those Principal Places in which the *Fathers* have plainly, openly and professedly declared their Judgment upon this great Article, and endeavours to gather their sense of it only from Similitudes and Allusions ; which looks like a design of putting his Reader off with *something like an Argument, and not an Argument, and of which the Tail stands where the Head should* : For according to the True Method of proving Things, the *Reason* should always go first, and the *Similitude* come after ; but by no means ought the *Similitude* ever to be put instead of the *Reason*. But

Secondly, To make it yet clearer, how unconclusive this Author's Allegation from St. *Austin* is, I shall demonstrate, That this *Father* does not here make use of *an Example of Mutual-Consciousness*, by shewing the great disparity between the Thing alledged, and the Thing which it is applyed to, and that, as to the very *Cafe*, which it is alledged for. For we must observe, That the *Mutual-Consciousness* of the *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity* is such, as is fully and entirely in each *Person*, so that by vertue thereof every one of them is truly and properly *Conscious* of all that belongs to the other Two. But it is by no means so in those three Faculties of the Soul, *Understanding, Memory, and Will*. For though the *Understanding* indeed be *Conscious* to all that passes in the *Will*, yet I deny the *Will* to be *Conscious* to any Thing, or A&t that passes either in the *Understanding*, or the *Memory*, and it is impossible it should be so, without exerting an A&t of Knowledge, or Intellection ; which to ascribe to the Faculty of the *Will*, would be infinitely absurd. It is true indeed, That one and the same Soul is *Conscious* to it self of the A&ts of all these Three Faculties : But still it is by vertue of its Intellectual Faculty alone,

alone, that it is so. And the like is to be said of its *Knowledge* and of its *Love* of it self: For though it be the same Soul which both Knows and Loves it self, yet it neither Knows it self by an *Act* of *Love*, nor Loves it self by an *Act* of *Knowledge* any more, than it can *Will* by an *Act* of the *Memory*, or *Remember* by an *Act* of the *Will*; which is impossible: and amongst other proofs that it is so, it seems to me a very considerable one, that, if a Man could *remember* by his *Will*, this Author in all likelihood, would not *forget* himself so often as he does. It is clear therefore on the one side, That the *Acts* of *Understanding*, *Memory*, and *Will*, neither are nor can be *Acts* of *Mutual-Consciousness*; and on the other; that *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost* do every one of them Exert *Acts* of *Mutual-Consciousness* upon one another, and consequently, that, as to this thing, there is a total entire difference between both sides of the Comparison. For which cause it is to be hoped, that this Author himself will henceforth Consult the Credit of his own Reason so far, as to give over proving, *That the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Blessed Persons consists wholly and solely in the Mutual-Consciousness of the said Persons*, by Examples taken from such Created Things as are by no means *Mutually-Conscious* to one another.

But to manifest yet further the Vanity of this his Allegation out of St. Austin, I shall plainly shew, wherein this *Father* placed the *Unity* of the *Three Divine Persons*. And that, in short, is *in the Unity of their Nature, Essence, and Substance*. This is the Catholick Faith (says he) that we believe *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be of one and the same Substance*.

Patrem Filium & Spiritum Sanctum, unus
eiusdemque Substantie, Lib. 1. de Trinitate,
Cap. 4.

E e

And

Credamus ergo in Patrem & Filium & Spiritum Sanctum: Hæc æterna sunt & incommutabilia, id est, Unus Deus, Unius Substantiæ, Trinitas æterna. Ibid.

And again, *Let us believe in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. These are Eternal and Unchangeable, that is, One God, of One Substance, the*

Eternal Trinity. And moreover, speaking of such as would have *Three Gods* to be Worshipped, he adds,

That they know not what is the meaning of One and the same Substance, and are deceived by their own Fancies; and, be-

cause they see Three Bodies separate in Three Places, they think the Substance of God is so to be understood.

I think it very needless to add the like Testimonies from other *Fathers* (how numerous and full soever they may be) for our Author having here quoted only St. *Austin*, I shall confine my Answer to his Quotation, and think it enough for me to over-rule an Inference from a *Similitude* taken out of St. *Austin* by a *Plain, Literal, Unexceptionable Declaration* of St. *Austin's Opinion*.

The Sum of the whole Matter is this, That the Thing to be proved by this Author, is, *That the Three Divine Persons are One, only by an Unity of Mutual-Consciousness:* And to prove this, he produces only a *Similitude* out of St. *Austin*, and that also, a *Similitude* taken from Things, in which no such Thing as *Mutual-Consciousness* is to be found.. By which it appears, That his Argument is manifestly Lame of both Legs, and, as such, I leave it to *shift for it self.*

5. In the fifth and last place, He tells us, *That the Fathers also resolved the Unity of the God-head in the Three Divine Persons into the Unity of Principle; meaning thereby, That though there be Three Divine Persons in the God-head,*

head, Father, Son and Holy Ghost ; yet the Father is the Original and Fountain of the Deity, who begets the Son of his own Substance ; and from whom, and the Son, the Holy Ghost eternally proceeds of the same Substance with the Father and Son ; so that there is but one Principle and Fountain of the Deity, and therefore but one God, Page 128. Line 6.

Now all this is very true ; but how will our Author bring it to his purpose ? Why, thus, or not at all, viz. That the Numerical Unity of Nature in the Three Divine Persons, by being founded in, and resolved into this Unity of Principle, does therefore properly consist in Mutual-Consciousness. This, I say, must be his Inference, and it is a large step, I confess, and larger than any of the Fathers ever made : Nevertheless without making it, this Author must sit down short of his Point. And yet if he really thinks, that his Point may be concluded from hence ; why, in the Name of Sence and Reason might he not as well have argued from Gen. i. 1. That God Created the Heavens and the Earth, and that therefore the Three Divine Persons are and must be one, only by an Unity of Mutual-Consciousness ? For it would have followed every whit as well from this as from the other. But, since the Creation of both, I believe, never Man disputed as this Man does, while he pretends to prove his Mutual-Consciousness from the Unity of Principle in the Oeconomy of the Divine Persons : And yet, if he does not design to prove it from thence, to what purpose is this Unity of Principle here alledged, where the only Point to be proved is, That the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons is only an Unity of Mutual-Consciousness ?

But to come a little closer to him. If this Author can make it out, That the Father Communicates his Sub-

stance to the *Son*, and the *Father* and the *Son* together Communicate the same to the *Holy Ghost* by one *Eternal Act of Mutual-Consciousness*, Common to all *Three Persons*, then his Argument from *Unity of Principle* to an *Unity of Nature, consisting in Mutual-Consciousness*, may signify and conclude something ; but this he attempts not, nor if he should, would he or any Man living be ever able to prove it.

But he is for coming over this Argument again, and tells us, *That (as Petavius well observes) it does not of it self prove the Unity (that is to say, the Numerical Unity) of the God-head, but only the ὁμοιότης, or Sameness of Nature, i. e. as he elsewhere explains himself [the Specifick Sameness of Nature.] And that therefore the Fathers thought fit to add, That God begets a Son, not without, but within Himself, Page 128. Line 17, &c.*

In Answer to which Observation, though it affects the Point of *Mutual-Consciousness* (the only Thing now in hand) no more than what he had alledged before ; yet in vindication both of the *Fathers* and of *Petavius* himself, I must needs tell this Author, That it is equally an Abuse to both. For as to the *Fathers* ; it has been sufficiently proved to him, That neither is there any such Thing as a *Specifick Unity, or Sameness of Nature* in the *Divine Persons*, nor that the *Fathers* ever owned any such, but still by the ὁμοιότης held only a *Numerical Unity of Nature*, and no other ; so that their saying, *That God begot a Son within himself*, was rather a further Explication of the ὁμοιότης, than any *Addition* at all to it. And as for *Petavius*, whereas this Man says, That he has observed, *That this Argumentation of the Fathers, does not of it self prove the Numerical Unity of the God-head in the Three Persons* ; I averr, That *Petavius* observes no such Thing. He says indeed ; *If this Reasoning (viz. from*

from Unity of Principle) were considered *Absolutely and Universally*, it would prove rather a *Specifick* than a *Numerical Unity of Nature*, and gives a Reason for it from *Hume Generation*: But then he does by no means say, That the *Fathers Arguments* in this Case ought to be so considered, but plainly limits them to the *Divine Generation*, as of a peculiar kind, differing from all others. And thereupon no less plainly Asserts, *That when the Father begets the Son, he Communicates to him the same Numerical Substance and Nature*, and says expressly, *That the force and strength of the Fathers Argumentation is taken from the proper Condition and Nature of the Divinity, and the Divine Generation, from whence they collect, not any kind of Unity of Essence, but only a Singular and Numerical Unity in the Three Divine Persons*: Which he makes good by Instances from St. Athanasius and St. Hilary. And this is the true state of the Case, and shews, That *Petavious* understood the *Fathers*; whether he, who takes upon him to be his Corrector and Confuter, does or no. In the mean time it is shameless to insinuate in this manner, that *Petavious* represented these Arguments of the *Fathers*, as proving only the *[Specifick] Sameness of Nature*, and not the *Numerical Unity of the God-head*, when he plainly shews, That they designed thereby to prove a *Numerical Unity of Essence* in the *Divine Persons*, and nothing else.

But this Author seems to assume to himself a peculiar Priviledge of saying *what he will, and of whom he will*. In which nevertheless I cannot but commend his Conduct, as little as I like his Arguing. For that, as he makes so bold with so Learned and Renowned a Person as *Petavious*:

Ex propriis Divinitatis divinæque Generationis Conditione ac natura Vis & robur Argumentationis istius petitur, quatenus non qualemcumque Essentia Unitatem sed Singularem & Numeralem inesse Tribus Personis colligit. Petav. Dog. de Trinitate. Lib. 4. Cap. 15.

vius; So he wisely does it now that he is laid fast in his Grave. For had *Petavius* been living, and this Man wrote his Book in the same Language in which *Petavius* wrote his (which, for a certain Reason, I am pretty well satisfied he never would) there is no doubt but *Petavius* would have tossed him and his *New Notion* of *Three distinct Infinite Spirits*, long since, in a Blanket, and effectually taught him the difference of Insulting over a Great Man when his Head is low, and when he is able to defend himself.

We have seen how little our Author has been able to serve himself of the fore-mentioned *Resolution of the Unity of the Divine Nature, into an Unity of Principle*, by way of Argument in behalf of his *Mutual-Consciousness*. Nevertheless, though it fails him, as an Argument, yet, that he may not wholly lose it, he seems desirous to cultivate it as a *Notion*; and upon that score tells us, That it needs something further both to *Complete* and *Explain* it, (which, with reference to his own Apprehensions of it, I easily believe) but however, I shall take some Account of what he says, both as to the *Completion*, and *Explication of it*. And

First, For the *Completion*. He tells us, *That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Essential to One God*, and that upon this Account there must be necessarily *Three Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, and can be no more*. As to which last Clause he must give me leave to tell him, That it is not the *bare Essentiality* of the *Three Persons* to the *God-head*, which proves that there can be no more than *Three* belonging to it: but it is the *Peculiar Condition* of the *Persons*, which proves this; without which the *Essentiality* of the *Three*, would no more hinder the *Essentiality* of a *Fourth or Fifth*, than the *Essentiality* of *Two* could take away the *Essentiality* of a *Third*. And therefore though the

the Proposition laid down by him be true, yet his Reason for it will not hold.

But one choice Passage quoted by him out of a great Father, I must by no means omit, viz. That upon Account of this Unity of Principle, St. Austin calls the Trinity, *Unam quandam summam Rem*, Page 123. Line 8. Concerning which, I desire any Man living (except this Author) to declare freely, whether he thinks that St. Austin, or any one else of Sence and Learning would call *Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits* (which are neither Numerically, nor Specifically, nor so much as Collectively One) *Unam quandam summam Rem*. But in the

Second Place: As for his *Explication* of the said Notion, he tells us, *That he shall proceed by several steps*, and those (as he would perswade us) *very plain, and Universally acknowledged by all*, Page 126. Lines 16, 17, &c.

Nevertheless, by his good leave, I shall and must demur to Two of them, as by no means fit to be acknowledged by any, and much less such as are acknowledged by all. And they are the *Third and Fourth*. In which he tells us, That, in the first place, *Original Mind and Wisdom*, and in the second, *That Knowledge of it self*, and lastly, *Love of it self*, are all of them *distinct Acts*, and *so distinct, that they can never be one Simple Individual Act*. And withal, that these *Acts* being thus *distinct*, must be *Three Substantial Acts in God*, That is to say, *Three Subsisting Persons*: By which *Three Substantial Acts* he must of necessity mean *Three such Acts, as are Three Substances*. Forasmuch as he adds in the very next words, *That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God*, Page 130. Lines 7, 8, 9. to the middle of the Page.

Now against these strange Positions, I Argue thus.

First,

First, If the Three fore-mentioned *Act*s are so distinct in God, that they can never be *One Simple Individual Act*, then I infer, That the said *Three Act*s cannot possibly be *One God*. Forasmuch as to be *One God*, is to be *One Pure Simple Indivisible Act*. And thus we see how at *one step*, or stroke, he has Ungodded the *Three Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity*. For these *Three Act*s (he tells us) are the *Three Persons in the Godhead*. Though I believe no *Divine* before him, ever affirmed a *Person to be an Act, or an Act a Person*; with how great Confidence soever (and something else) this Man affirms it here.

Secondly, If those *Three Act*s in the *God-head* are *Three distinct Infinite Substances* (as he plainly says they are, by telling us, Page 130. Line 19. *That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God*) then in the *God-head* there are and must be *Three distinct Gods, or Godheads*. Forasmuch as an *Infinite Substance* being properly *God*, every *distinct infinite Substance*, is and must be a *distinct God*.

These I affirm to be the direct unavoidable Consequences of those two short Paragraphs in *Page 130.* which he makes his *Third and Fourth Explanatory Steps*.

But because he may here probably bear himself upon that Maxim, *That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God*, (which yet by the way might better become any one to plead than himself) let me tell him, That that *Proposition* is not absolutely, and in all Sences true. If indeed he means by it, *That there is no Being, whether Substance, or Accident in God*, besides his own most *Pure, Simple, Indivisible Substance, or Essence*, (which is the commonly received sence of it) it is most true. But if he therefore affirms, *That neither are there any Modes,*

Modes, or Relations in God, this will not be granted him. For in God, besides *Essence, or Substance*, we assert, That there is that, which we call *Mode, Habitudo, and Relation*: And by one or other of these in Conjunction with *Essence, or Substance*, we give account of all the *Acts, Attributes, and Personalities* belonging to the *Divine Nature, or Godhead*. This is the constant, unanimously received Doctrine of *Divines, School-men, and Metaphysicians*, in their Discourses upon *God*, and without which, it is impossible to Discourse intelligibly of the *Divine Acts, Attributes, or Persons*. And as it stands upon a firm bottom, so it may well be defended: And if this Author has ought to except against it, I shall be ready to undertake the defence of it against him at any time.

But still, that he may keep up that Glorious, standing Character of *Self-Contradiction*, (which, one would think to be the very *Ratio formalis*; or, at least, the *Personal Property* of the Man.) Having here, in *Page 130.* made a very bold step, by Asserting the *Three Divine Persons, to be Three distinct Acts, and so distinct, that they can never be one Simple, Individual Act.* In the very next *Page but one, viz. 132.* Line 13. he roundly affirms, *That the Father and the Son are one single Energy and Operation.* Now, how safe and happy is this Man, that no Absurdities, or Contradictions can ever hurt him! Or at least, that he never feels them, let them pinch never so close and hard.

What remains, is chiefly a Discourse about the different way of the *Son's issuing from the Father, and the Holy Ghost's issuing from both*: As that the former is called *Generation*, because the *Son issues from the Father by a Reflex Act*, and the latter termed *Procession*, because the *Holy Ghost issues from both by a direct Act*. But

why a *Reflex Act* must needs be termed properly a *Generation*, and a *direct Act* not be capable of being properly so accounted, this our Acute Author very discreetly says nothing at all to ; though (under favour) all that he says besides, leaves us as much in the Dark as we were before. And for my own part, I cannot think my self concerned to clear up a Point wholly foreign to that, which alone I have undertook the Discussion of.

And thus I have finished my Dispute with Him, concerning the Authorities of the *Fathers* alledged in behalf of his *Notion of Mutual-Consciousness*, as that, wherein he places the *Unity of the Divine Nature* belonging to the *Three Blessed Persons*. The Sum of which whole Dispute is resolved into this single Question, viz. *In what the Fathers placed the Unity in Trinity?* And if they placed it in the *Sameness*, or *Unity of Nature, Substance, or Essence*, (words applyed by them to this Subject at least a Thousand Times, and still used to signify one and the same Thing) then it is plain that they did not place it in an *Unity of Mutual-Consciousness*. For, I suppose, no Man (this Author himself not excepted) will say, That *Essence*, or *Substance*, and *Mutual-Consciousness* are Terms *Synonymous*, and of the same signification. And as the whole Dispute turns upon this single Question ; so in the management of it, on my part, I have with great particularity gone over all the Proofs by which this Author pretends to have evinced his Doctrine from the *Fathers*. The utmost of which Proofs amounts to this, That the *Fathers* proved an *Unity of Nature* in the *Divine Persons*, from the *μία ἐνέργεια*, the *μία κίνησις βελήματος*, and the *περιχώροντος* Common to them all : And moreover, sometimes illustrated the said *Unity* by the *Three Faculties* of the *Understanding, Memory, and Will* being one with the Soul which they belonged to. And Lastly, That

That they resolved the Unity of the Trinity into an Unity of Principle; the Father being upon that account styled, *Principium & fons Deitatis*, as Communicating the Divine Substance to the Son and together with the Son to the Holy Ghost. And what of all this, I pray? Do all, or any of the fore-mentioned Terms signify Mutual-Consciousness? Why, No: But this Author with a *non obstante* both to the proper signification and common use of them all, by absolute Prerogative declares them to mean Mutual-Consciousness: And so his Point is proved, viz. That Mutual-Consciousness is not only an Argument inferring the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Blessed Persons, (which yet was all, that the Fathers used the fore-mentioned Terms for) but, (which is more) That it is that very Thing wherein this Unity does Consist. This, I say, is a True, though a short Account of all his Arguments upon this Subject; and (according to my custom) I refer it to the Judicious Reader, to judge impartially, whether it be not so, and withal to improve and carry on the aforesaid Arguments in his behalf to all further advantage that they may be Capable of.

But in the issue, methinks the Author himself seems to review them with much less Confidence of their Puis-
fance, than when at first he produced them. For if we look back upon the Triumphant Flag hung out by him at his Entrance upon this part of his Work (the only proper time for him to Triumph in) and when he declared, *That his Explication of the Trinity was the Constant Doctrine of the Fathers and the Schools*, Page 101. Lines 24, 25. who could have imagined but that he then fore-
saw, that he should prove his Point with all the strength and evidence which his own Heart could desire? And yet alas! Such, for the most part, is the vast distance between Promises and Performances, that we have him

bringing up the Rear of all with this sneaking Conclusion, Page 138. Line 22, &c. It must be confessed, (says he) That the Ancient Fathers did not express their sense in the same Terms that I have done. But I leave it to any Indifferent and Impartial Reader, whether they do not seem to have intended the same Explication which I have given of this Venerable Mystery. These are his words; and I do very particularly recommend them to the Reader, as deserving his peculiar Notice. For is this now the Upshot and Result of so daring a Boast, and so confident an Undertaking, to prove his Opinion the Constant Doctrine of the Fathers? viz. That though the Fathers speak not one word of it; nay, though they knew not how to express themselves about it, Page 125. Line 18. Yet that to an Indifferent Reader (and a very indifferent one indeed he must needs be in the worst sense) they may seem to intend the same Explication he had given of it? So that the Sum of his whole Proof and Argument amounts to this and no more, viz. That to some Persons *videtur quod sic*, and to others, *videtur quod non*. For see, how low he sinks in the issue. First of all from the Fathers positive saying, or holding what he does, it is brought down to their Intending it; and from their Intending it, it falls at last to their seeming to Intend it; and that is all. And now, is not this a worthy Proof of so high a Point? And may it not justly subject this Author to the same Sarcastical Irony which he passed upon his Socinian Adversary? Page 92. Line 17, &c. Right, very Right, Sir, a plain Demonstration!

But still there is one half of his Promise to be yet accounted for, viz. The proving his Opinion to have been the constant Doctrine of the Schools. And how does he acquit himself as to this? Why, in a very extraordinary manner too. For, first, instead of alledging the Authority of

of the *School-men*, he tells us, Page 138. That they are of no Authority at all, but as they fall in with the Fathers. And withal, That instead of doing so, They use to mistake, and clog the sence of the Fathers with some peculiar Niceties and Distinctions of their own. And that, the Truth is, the vain Endeavours of reducing this Mystery to Terms of Art, such as *Nature*, *Essence*, *Substance*, *Subsistence*, *Hypostasis*, *Person*, and the like, (which (he says) some of the Fathers used in a very different sence from each other) have wholly confounded this Mystery.

And here I cannot but desire the Reader to judge, whether this be not a new and wonderful way of procuring Credit to an Hypothesis, upon the score of its being the constant Doctrine of the Schools, by telling the World (as this Man here does) that the *School-men* are a Company of *Impertinent Fellows*, of little or no Authority in themselves, and who have by their useless absurd Niceties, confounded this whole Mystery? For if they are of no Authority but what they derive from the *Fathers*, (as he avers) why does he quote them upon the same level with the *Fathers*, and plead them both as *two distinct Authorities*? And if they do nothing but pervert and confound this Mystery, why, instead of alledging them, does he not earnestly caution his Reader against them, and dissuade him from having any Thing to do with their dangerous and absurd Writings? This certainly is a way of proving a Point by *Testimony* and *Authority*, so beyond all Example ridiculous, that unless the Reader will vouchsafe to read these Passages in the Author himself, and so take his Conviction from his own Eyes, I can hardly blame him, if he refuses to believe my bare Affirmation in a Thing so Incredible.

As for the Terms *Essence*, *Substance*, *Subsistence*, *Person*, and the like, which he so explodes, I hope I have given

given my Reader a satisfactory Account both of their Usefulness, and of the uselessness of such as this Author would Substitute in their room, in *Chap. 2.* at large, to which I refer him. And whereas he says, Page 139. Line 25. &c. *That the Deity is above Nature, and above Terms of Art; and that there is nothing like this Mysterious Distinction and Unity; and therefore, no wonder, if we want proper words to express it by; at least, that such Names as signify the Distinction and Unity of Creatures, should not reach it.* If by all this he means, That there are no Terms of Art Comprehensive, and fully expressive of the Divine Nature, and the Mysterious Distinction and Unity of the Persons belonging to it, none that I know of thinks otherwise. But if he means that no Terms of Art can be of any use to aid us in our inadequate imperfect Conceptions of those great Things, so as thereby we may conceive of them in some better degree, and clearer manner, than we could without such Terms, pray then, of what use are his *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* in this Matter? For I suppose he will allow these to be Terms of Art too; and such (I am sure) as he has promised the World no small Wonders from. But if he will allow any Usefulness in those two Terms of Art (of his own Inventing) towards our better Apprehension of the Divine Nature and Persons, the same and greater has the constant use of all Church-Writers proved to be in the Terms *Essence*, *Substance*, *Hypostasis*, *Person*, &c. as the properest and most significant, the fittest and most accommodate to help and methodize Men's Thoughts in discoursing of God, and *Immaterial Beings*, of all or any other Terms of Art, which the Wit of Man ever yet invented, or pitched upon for that purpose. And I hope, the known avowed use and experience of such great Men, and those in so great a number, is

is an abundant overpoise to the contrary Affirmation of this, or any other *Novel Author* whatsoever.

But all this (it seems) he endeavours to overthrow and dash with *Three Terrible Confounding Questions*, *Page 139.* Lines 22, 23, &c. Which yet I can by no means think so very formidable, but that they may be very safely Encountered, and fairly Answered too. As,

Qu. 1. What (says our Author) is the Substance, or Nature of God?

I Answer. It is a *Being* existing of, and by it self, Incorporeal, Infinite, Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent, &c.

Qu. 2. How can Three distinct Persons have but One Numerical Substance?

I Answer. Every whit as well as they can be said to have but one *Numerical Godhead*, or *Divine Nature*; or as they can have one *Numerical Mutual-Consciousness* common to them all.

Qu. 3. What is the Distinction between Essence, and Personality, and Subsistence?

I Answer. The same, that is between a *Thing*, or *Being*, and the *Modes* of it. And he, who neither knows, nor admits of a difference between these, is much fitter to go to School himself, than to sit and pass judgment upon the *School-men*. And as for the Terms *Subsistence* and *Personality*, they import the last and utmost Completion of the Existence of Things, by virtue whereof, they exist by themselves so, as neither to be *Supported* by, nor *Communicable* to any Subject. Of which Two Modes, *Personality* belongs only to *Intelligent Beings*, but *Subsistence* to all others, to whom the aforesaid Definition does agree. And this is the True, Proper Difference and Distinction between these Two. And this

this Author may take Notice of it, if he pleases.

However, having thus answered his Questions (tho' to what purpose he proposed them, I cannot imagine) yet that he may see how ambitious I am to follow his great Example, I shall, in requital of his Three Questions, propose these Four to him: As

First, Since in *Page 139.* he affirms *the Deity to be above Nature, and all Terms of Art; so that we want proper Words and Names to express the Distinction and Unity of the Divine Persons by, and that such, as signify the Distinction and Unity of Creatures, cannot reach it.* I desire to know of him upon what ground of Reason it is, That speaking of this same *Mysterious Unity and Distinction* in *Page 106.* Lines 11, 12, &c. He says, *That the Fathers used several Examples, and alluded to several kinds of Union, thereby to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the Godhead?* For if the Deity be so far above Nature and all *Terms of Art*, that there is an utter want of words, or *Names to express the Unity of it by, How could any Examples, or Allusions drawn from Nature* (though never so many) *form in us an Adequate Notion thereof?* Hitherto both *Divines* and *Philosophers* have judged the *Divine Nature* absolutely Incomprehensible by any *Adequate, or Complete Conception* of it. And for my own part, I account *the Unity of it in Trinity*, much less capable of having an *Adequate Notion* formed of it, than the *Deity* considered barely in it self is, and consequently that it is as much as Humane Reason can reach to, to have a *true and certain Notion* of it, though very *Imperfect and Inadequate*. But as for an *Adequate Notion of the Unity of the Godhead in Three Divine Persons*, if this Author can form to himself such an one, let him enjoy it as a *Priviledge peculiar to himself, and not obtainable by any other Mortal*

Mortal Man whatsoever. And this is not the first Instance of his misrepresenting the *Fathers*.

Secondly, Whereas this Author in the latter end of *Page 138*, and the beginning of *Page 139*. explodes the Terms *Essence*, *Substance*, *Subsistence*, *Hypostasis*, *Person*, &c. as *useless Niceties*, and serving only to confound the *Mystery of the Trinity*; and yet nevertheless in *Line 12*, &c. of *Page 139*. acknowledges, That *these very Terms were found out and made use of to encounter the Heresie of Sabellius*, who had turned this Sacred Mystery into a *Trinity of Names*, or, at most, of *Offices*; I desire to know of him, what greater Proof he could have given of the exceeding Usefulness and Importance of these Terms, than by thus deriving the Invention and Use of them from such an Occasion? And especially when, notwithstanding *all the Curious Examination since passed upon them*, whereby (he says) *they were found in some respect or other defective*(as what Terms are not when applyed to God?) experience yet shews, that they have maintained their Use and Credit from that Age all along to this very Day. Certainly it is a great Unhappiness, when a Man can neither forbear Writing, nor yet know when he *Writes for a Thing*, and when against it.

Thirdly, I desire to know of this Author, whether in the very same place, *viz. Page 130*. in which he professes to *explain an Unity in Trinity by an Unity of Principle*, he does well to tell us in *Line 19*. of the said *Page*, *That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God*, having so often, and so positively declared, *That these Terms serve only to obscure and confound Men's Notions of God?* And whether he accounts such Terms, as serve only thus to confound Men's *Thoughts and Notions about the Godhead*, and the *Unity thereof*, the fittest to *explain the Unity of*

the said Godhead, with reference to the Divine Persons ? Which is the Thing there promised and undertaken by Him.

Fourthly and Lastly, Since this Author has condemned all the forementioned Terms both as useless, and fit only to obscure and confound, instead of explaining, the Doctrine of the Trinity, I desire to know of him, why he tells us at the close of *Page 139*. That he does not think it impossible (which is only a Figure called, a μένων, signifying, that it is very possible and easie) to give a Tolerable Account of the said School-Terms and Distinctions ? For since by a Tolerable he must mean (if he means any Thing to the Purpose) such an Account of them, as shews them to have a Rational sense and meaning under them, I desire him to tell me whether every Rational Sense is not (as such) also a True one ? And if True, whether one Truth can any more obscure, perplex, and confound, than it can Contradict another Truth ? Which being invincibly evident, as to the Negative, I desire this Author in the last place to tell me, whether it does, or can become a Man Consistent with himself, to pass so Reproachful a Character upon the Terms of the Schools, in the beginning of *Page 139*, and afterwards to give so contrary and commendatory an Account of the said Terms in the latter end of the very same Page ?

I hope the Reader will be pleased to take this Notable Instance also of this Author's Consistency with himself (so far as *Self-Contradiction* may be so called) into his Consideration.

And so these are the *Four Questions*, or *Queries*, which I would have him resolve me, or rather the World, in ; for I am sure it concerns Him and his Credit, so to do.

Having thus followed this Author both in his Reasonings and Quotations, and found him equally Impertinent in both, I must again desire my Reader to joyn with me in admiring the strange Confidence of the Man. I have already noted, with what a daring Assurance he vouches his New Opinion for the constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools, Page 101. Line 24. &c. After which Peremptory Assertion, who could have expected, but that he would have appeared in the Head of Thirty, or Twenty Fathers at least (Greek and Latin together) to have rescued his beloved Hypothesis from the Imputation and Charge and Novelty, which he seems so desirous to Ward off? P. 100. L. 22. And that besides Gr. Nyffen, Athanasius, Maximus, Nazianzen, Damascen (and these for the most part quoted upon an Account not at all relating to his Hypothesis) and St. Cyril, (who is not so much as Quoted, but only Named) we should have had Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Origen, Clemens Alexandrinus, St. Basil, Theodoret, Epiphanius, with several more, all alledged in his behalf? And amongst the Latins that we should besides St. Austin, whom alone he quotes, and St. Ambrose, whom he only mentions about the ὁμοίων, Page 107. Line 10. have heard also of Tertullian, Laetantius, St. Cyprian, St. Jerome, and St. Hilary, with a great many others? And then lastly for the Schoolmen, who could have expected fewer of them also, than Ten, or Twenty? And that we should have seen Alexander Alensis (the first who Commented upon the Oracle) with Durandus, Aquinas, Scotus, Major. Biel, Soto, Vazquez, Cajetan, Gr. de Valentia, Estius, and many more of the Scholastick Tribe, all drawn forth in Rank and File, to have fought his Battels? But when after all, none but poor Peter Lombard comes forth like a Doughty Captain, with none to follow him, this methinks looks

more like the Despair of a Cause, than the Defence of it. For though our Author calls Peter Lombard *the Oracle of the Schools*, and all know his Sentences to be the Text which the *School-men* undertake to Explain and Comment upon: Yet Experience has told us, That the *Responses of this Oracle* (as well as of those heretofore) are often found very *Dubious and Ambiguous*. Witnes *Thomas* and his Followers expounding them one way, and *Scotus* and his Disciples understanding them another; and several, (amongst whom *Durandus* and *Greg. Ariminensis*) going a different way from both. So that sometimes there is but too much need of a good Interpreter to fix the fence of this *Oracle*, (as great a Veneration as the *Schools* may have for him.) And therefore since his Text is not always so very plain and easie as to make an Explication of it superfluous, this Author having quoted *Peter Lombard* in such, or such a fence, ought in all Reason to have produced the Major and more eminent part of the *School-men* and *Writers* upon him, and shewn their Unanimous Concurrence in the same Sence and Notion, which he took him in, and quoted him for. And this indeed would have been to his Purpose, and look'd like proving his Opinion to have been *the Doctrine of the Schools*. Otherwise I cannot see how the *Master of the Sentences* can be called, or pass for all the *School-men*, any more than the *Master of the Temple* can pass for all the *Divines* of the *Church of England*. Unless we should imagine, that this *Peter Lombard* had by a kind of *Mental-Consciousness* gathered all his Numerous Brood into Himself, and so United them all into one Author. So that the Sum of all is this, That this Author, having declared his Opinion, *the constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools*, to make his words good, has produced for it Three or Four *Greek Fathers*, and Two *Latin*

Latin (though even these no more to his purpose than if he had quoted *Dod* and *Cleaver*, or τὸν δὲ αὐτὸν οὐαβέροντα, out of *Homer*) and lastly, One Sentence ~~out of one Schoolman.~~ Which if it be allowed to pass for a good, just, and sufficient Proof of any Controverted Conclusion, let it for the future, by all means, for this our Author's sake, be an Established Rule in Logick from a Particular, to infer an Universal.

And now that I am bringing my Reader towards a close of this long Chapter, I must desire him to look a little back towards the beginning of the foregoing Chapter, wherein, upon this Man's Confident Affirmation, That *his Opinion was the Constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools*, I thought it necessary to state what his Opinion was, and accordingly I shew'd, that it consisted of Four Heads.

1st. That the *Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity were Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*; which how far he was from being able to prove from the Authority of any of the *Fathers* cited by him, was sufficiently shewn by us in the preceding Chapter. The

2d. Was, *That Self-Consciousness was the formal Reason of Personality in the said Three Persons, and consequently That, whereby they were distinguished from each other*; which (in the same Chapter) I shew'd he was so far from proving from the Authority of those *Ancient Writers*, that he did not alledge one Tittle out of any of them for it, nor indeed so much as mention it in any of the Quotations there made by him. And as for the

3d. Member of his said *Hypothesis*, viz. *That the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Blessed Persons, Consisted in the Mutual-Consciousness belonging to them*, This we have Examined at large, and Confuted in this Chapter. But still there remains the

4th. And

4th. And last to be spoken to, as compleating his whole Hypothesis, and resulting, by direct Consequence, from the other Three, viz. *That a Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity, explained by the Three fore-mentioned Terms, or Principles, is a very plain, easie, and Intelligible Notion*; which having been in a most Confident, Peremptory manner, affirmed by him all along, (as I shew in Chap. 1.) and upon that Score, making so great a part of his *Hypothesis*, ought in all reason to be proved to have been the Sence and Doctrine of the *Fathers* concerning this Article. But not one word does he produce upon this Head neither. Nor, for my own part, do I expect ever to find the least Sentence or Syllable in any *Ancient Writer* tending this way. And I challenge this Author to produce so much as one to this purpose.

In the mean time, how, and with what kind of words I find these *Ancient Writers* expressing themselves about this Venerable Mystery, I shall here set down. Only I shall premise a Sentence or two out of this Author himself; and which I have had occasion to quote more than once before, from *Page 106. Line 7.* viz. *That the Unity in Trinity being (as he confesses) so great a Mystery, that we have no Example of it in Nature, it is no wonder if it cannot be explained by any one kind of Natural Union; and that therefore it was necessary to use several Examples, and to allude to several Kinds of Union, to form an Adequate Notion of the Godhead;* and moreover, *Page 139. Line 26. &c. That there is nothing like this Mysterious Distinction and Unity, and that we want proper words to express it by.*

All which Passages lying clear, open, and express in the fore-cited places of this Author, I must needs ask him, Whether all these are used by Him to prove *the Unity*

Unity in Trinity a plain easie and Intelligible Notion, as he has frequently elsewhere asserted it to be? As, to go over each of the Particulars;

First, Whether we must account it *Plain*, because he says, *It is a Great Mystery, of which we have no Example in Nature?* And

Secondly, Whether we must reckon it *easie*, because he says, *That it cannot be Explained by any one kind of Natural Union, but that several Examples must be used, and several sorts of Union alluded to for this purpose?* And

Lastly, Whether it must pass for *Intelligible*, because he tells us, *That we want proper words to express it by, that is, in other Terms, to make it Intelligible?* since to express a Thing, and to make it *Intelligible*, I take to be Terms equivalent.

In fine, I here appeal to the Reader, Whether we ought from the forementioned Passages of this Author, to take the *Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity* for a plain, easie, Intelligible Notion, according to the same Author's affirmation so frequently inculcated in so many Parts of his Book?

But I shall now proceed to shew, (as I promised) how the Fathers speak and declare themselves upon this great Point. And here we will begin first with Justin Martyr. A Singularity, or Unity (says he) is understood by us, and a Trinity in Unity is acknowledged. But how it is thus, I am neither willing to ask others, nor can I persuade my self, with my Muddy Tongue and Polluted Flesh, to attempt a Declaration of such

Moras ἐν τειάδι νοῖται, Εἰ τοι
αἱ ἐν μητρὶ γνωσίζεται. Καὶ τοῦ
τῶν ὃ διεγέλαν ἐτὸντος ἐβαλό-
μεν, ἐτὸντος ἐγεγένετο δικαίου
πειστον τὸν τοῦτον δοκόρητον λό-
γος γλώσση πλινθὸν καὶ σαρπίων
πυτῷκεντρούμενον Justin. Mar-
tyr. Exposit. Fidei de rectâ Con-
fessione. Pag. 379. Edit. Colon.
1686.

Ineffable

Dionysius ἡ θεας Τεράς
αὶ πντ. ἡ ὁ λόγος. Justin.
Mor. ibid. p. 381.

Ineffable Matters. And again, speaking of the *Oeconomy* of the Blessed Trinity, The Nature and Manner (says he) of this *Oeconomy*

is unutterable. And yet again, speaking of this Mysterious *Oeconomy* of the Deity and the Trinity, as one of the greatest *Mysteries* of the Christian Faith: I cry out (says he) O wonderful! For that the Principles and Articles of our Religion surpass, and transcend the Understanding, Reason, and Comprehension of a Created Nature.

Ἀναπτίκω τὸ σύμφα, ὅπι
τῷ πν., τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ νο-
τιδιόδῳ τὸ οὐσίος φύσεως τὰ ἡμέ-
ραι. Justin. Mor. ibid. p. 387,
388.

Τελεῖ ταρπεν. & ταρπεν. Dionysius Areopagita in *Mysticā Thēologiā*, cap. 1. pag. 271. Paris. Edit. 1615.

"Ἄρρητος τις γε ἀναπτίληπτός
ἐν τερις καπαλημβάνεται & οὐ
νοιωνία & οὐ Θείεσσι, &c.
Greg. Nyssen. Pag. 465. Tom. 2.
Edit. Parisiens. 1615.

on, &c. St. Basil also, derogate from the Equality

"Η γέ σιωπῆ πιθαῶ τὰ ἄρρητα,
ἢ εὐσεβῶς αεριζεῖσθαι τὰ ἄγια.
Basilus libro de Spiritu Sancto ad Amphiliocium, cap. 18. p. 332.
Tom. 2. Edit. Paris. 1637.

Writing against such as would speak of the Trinity thus, Either let these Inexpressible Things be silently Reverenced, or Religiously and Becomingly Represented. And again, in a Discourse against such as used Contumelious Words of the Trinity, speaking

there of the *Holy Ghost* as Essentially one with the Father

ther and the Son, he says, *The Intimate Conjunction between him and them is hereby declared viz. by the Scripture there quoted by him, and applied to them) but the Ineffable Manner of his Subsistence hereby Inviolably preserved.* So that still (we see) with this Father the Economy of the Three Divine Persons in the Blessed Trinity, is a Thing Ineffable, and above all Description, or Expression. Nazianzen also speaks of the Trinity under these Epithetes, styling it *the Adorable Trinity, Above, and before the World, before all Time, of the same Majesty, of the same Glory, Increase, and Invisible, above our Reach, and Incomprehensible.* And the same Epithetes are given it by Nicephorus Patriarch of Constantinople, in the *Acts of the Council of Ephesus,* declaring the Trinity to be of One and the same Essence, Transcendent in its Substance, Invisible, and Inconceivable. And Lastly, Eulogius, Archbishop of Alexandria, sets it forth thus. *We divide not (says he) what is but One, we part not the Singularity, nor distract the Unity; but so Assert this*

Tns ἡ οἰκείωται δηλαδήνς
εντούτοις, τοῦτο τεράντιον ἡ ὑπάρχει-
ως αρρέντος φυλακτήριος. ibid.
pag. 333.

Teras περικυντόν, καθηγή-
μόν, ὁρθερόν, ὄμοδονόν,
τρόχερόν, ἀκτόν, αὐτοῖς,
διαφέν, ανθεινόν. Greg. Na-
zianzen. Oratione 12. P. 204.
Edition. Parisiens. Anno Dom.
1630.

Nicephorus Patriarch of
Constantinopolitanus in Actis Sy-
nodi Ephesinae, Pag. 307. Edi-
tionis Commeliana 1591.

Teras ἐμέτον, ταῦτανόν, αὐ-
τοῖς, αὐτοῖς. Nicephorus
Constantinopolitanus in Actis Sy-
nodi Ephesinae, Pag. 307. Edi-
tionis Commeliana 1591.

Ἐν δὲ δύσημῳ, καὶ μηδὲν
μετέστρεψη, καὶ τὸ ἔραδα διέτελεμον,
ἀλλὰ τὴν αἰδίων μεγάλην θεολογίην τε-
τωντα, τὸ τετέλειον αὐτὸν Κυριολο-
γῆμον ἔτετοσεν, εἰ διδεύμενοις

λογισμοῖς τὰ ταῦτα τὸν τελεαλλοτες, τὸν τελεοντες γε τὸν ερδουραῖς τὰ ταῦτα
εὑρίσκειντος. Eulogius Archiepiscopus Alexandrinus in Biblio-
theca Photii. Cod. 230. Pag. 865. Rothomagi Anno Dom. 1653.

Unity, in an Eternal Singularity, as to ascribe the same to Three distinct Hypostases; by no means subjecting things above our Understanding, to Human Reasonings, nor by an Over-curious Search undervaluing Things so much above all Search, or Discovery.

Having given this Specimen of what the Greek Fathers and Writers thought and spoke of the Trinity, let us

now pass to the Latines. And amongst these, we have in the first place, St. Hilary expressing himself thus. *The Mystery of the Trinity is Immense and Incomprehensible, not to be express'd by Words, nor reach'd by Sence, Imperceivable, it blinds our Sight, it exceeds the Capacity of our Understanding. I understand it not. Nevertheless, I will comfort myself in this, That neither do the Angels know it, nor Ages apprehend it, nor have the Apostles enquired of it, nor the Son himself declared it. Let us therefore leave off complaining, &c.*

Trinitatis Mysterium est immensum, & Incomprehensibile, extra significantiam sermonis, extra sensus intentionem, Imperspicabile, Lumen occæcat, Intelligentiae Capacitatem excedit. Ego nescio; sed confolabor me tamen: Angeli neisciunt, sacula non tenent, Apostolus non interrogavit, Filius ipse non edidit. Cesset ergo dolor querelarum, &c. Sanctus Hilarius Libro secundo de Trinitate.

Absque ullo Principio aut fine credenda est Sanctæ Trinitatis Divinitas. Licet humana sit menti ipsa comprehensione difficultis. Unde non incongrue dicitur quod hoc solum ex ea comprehendimus, quia prorsus comprehendi non potest. *Ambrosius Tract. in Symbolum Apostolicum. Tom. 4. p. 43. col. 1. Edit. Colon. 1616.*

After him, let us hear St. Ambrose, *The Divinity of the Holy Trinity (says he) is to be believed by us to be without beginning or end; albeit, hardly possible to be comprehended by the Mind of Man.*

Upon

Upon which Account it may be not improperly said concerning it, That we comprehend this only of it, That in truth it cannot be comprehended.

To St. Ambrose succeeds St. Austin. In this Trinity (says this Learned Father) is but One God, which is indeed wonderfully unspeakable, and unspeakably wonderful.

To the same purpose Fulgentius. So far as I can judge, only the Eternal and Unchangeable Trinity ought to be looked upon by us, as worthy to be esteemed Incomprehensibly Miraculous; and as much exceeding all that we can think or imagine of it, as it surmounts all that we are.

After him we shall produce Hormisda Bishop of Rome, in a Letter to Justinian the Emperour, about the beginning of the Sixth

Century, speaking thus. The Holy Trinity (says he) is but One, It is not multiplied by Number, nor grows by any Addition, or Encrease: Nor can it either be comprehended by our Understanding, nor in respect of its Divinity be at all Divided. And a little after. Let us Worship Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, distinct in

Concil. Tom. 1. Pag. 1034, 1035.

In illâ Trinitate, Trinitas est unus Deus, quod sanè est mirabiliter ineffabile, vel ineffabili-
ter mirabile, Aug. de Trinitate Lib. 15.

Sola (quantum arbitror) immutabilis illa sempiternitas Trinitatis reperiatur Incomprehensibilitatis digna miraculo, quæ sic excedit omne quod cogitare vel sapere possumus, sicut superat omne quod sumus. Fulgentius ad Thrasymundum Regem, lib. 2. cap. 1.

Unum est Sancta Trinitas, non multiplicatur Numero, nec crescit Augmento; nec potest aut Intelligentia comprehendendi, aut hoc quod Deus est discrecio- ne se Jungi. Ac paulò post. Adoramus Patrem & Filium & Spiritum Sanctum Indistinctum diligenter. stincte Incomprehensibilem & inenarrabilem substantiam Trinitatis. Atque iterum, Mag-

num est sanctæ & incomprehensibile Mysterium Trinitatis, Crabb.

themselves, but with one indistinct Worship, That is to say, *The Incomprehensible and Unutterable Substance of the Trinity.* And presently again, *Great and Incomprehensible is the Mystery of the Holy Trinity.*

In the last place St. Bernard

Fidenter dixerim æternam be-
atamquè Trinitatem, quam non intelligo, credo, & fide teneo, quod non capio mente, *Bernar-*
aus Sermone 76. super Cantic. delivers himself upon the same Subject thus. *I confidently affirm* (says he) *that the Eternal and* Blessed Trinity, which I do not understand, I do yet believe, and embrace with my Faith, what I can-

not comprehend with my Mind.

I have here, as I said, given a Specimen of what the Ancient Writers of the Church, both Greek and Latin, thought and said of the Blessed Trinity, and it is, I confess, but a Specimen; since I think that enough for an Universally acknowledged, and never before contradicted Proposition: Whereas I had it but in the least seemed a Novelty, (as this Author's Hypothesis not only seems, but unquestionably is) I should have thought my self obliged to have brought as many Quotations for it from Antiquity, as would have filled a much larger Book than I intend this shall be.

But as for those which I have here produced, I do solemnly appeal to any Man living, Christian, or not Christian (who does but understand these Languages) whether the Fathers now Quoted by me (and all the rest upon the same Subject speak agreeably to them) looked upon Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity, as a Plain, Easie, and Intelligible Notion? So that if the Judgment of the Fathers, and of this Author, be in this point one and the same, it must unavoidably follow, That either the Fathers have not yet declared their Judgment and Doctrine, or that this Author has not yet declared his: Since

Since so much as has been declared on the one side, is a direct and gross *Contradiction* to what has been Asserted on the other.

And moreover the fore-alledged Testimonies of the *Fathers* are such, that we are not put to draw what we contend for, by remote, far fetched Consequences from them, but it lies plain, open, and manifest in them ; in words too clear and full to be denied, and too convincing to be evaded. So that we are sure both of their Words and Expressions, and of the common sense of all Mankind to expound and understand them by. And will this bold over-bearing Man, after all this, *Claim their meaning to be the same with his?* What *his meaning* is, he has told us forty times over, *viz.* That *Unity in Trinity*, &c. is so far from being an *Unintelligible Notion*, that it is not so much as *difficult*, how much soever the dull mistaken World has for near 1700 Years thought otherwise.

And now if this be the True Account and state of this Matter, that when the *Fathers* say of the *τριάντα*, or *Trinity*, that it is ἅππνης, ἀναγλυπτης, ἀναγλύφης, ἀνειληπτης, ὑπέρειας, ὑπέρτειας, ὑπὲν τῷ ὑπὲρ λόγῳ, ὑπὲρ αἰλεγονίας λογισμοῦς & ὑπὲρ εὐρητῶν : That is to say, *Ineffable, Inconceivable, Unintelligible, Incomprehensible, and (if possible) transcending the very Notion of the Deity it self, above all Humane Understanding and Reason, Discourse and Scrutiny*, I say, if by all this, he can prove that the *Fathers* meant, *That it was a very Plain, Easy, and Intelligible Notion* (as, by affirming that those (who used all these Expressions) *meant the same with himself*, he does and must affirm ; or say, *That they knew not their own meaning*, or at least were not able to express it, but in words quite contrary to it;) I must needs own the *Fathers* to have been not only less happy in expressing themselves

selves about this Mystery, than this Author (as with great Modesty and Deference to them, he often tells us they were) but, which is yet much worse, that they were the most wretchedly unhappy in wording their own *Notions* of all Men, who ever yet set Pen to Paper. And as for this Author, if *Unutterable, Unconceivable and Unintelligible* can pass with him for *Plain, Ease, and Intelligible*, it is high Time for me to leave off disputing with him, and either to have no more to do with him, or, without any further demurr, to profess my self as ready to believe and grant *Contradictions*, as he is, or can be, to Write them.

C H A P. VIII.

In which is set down the Ancient, and generally received Doctrine of the Church, concerning the Article of the Blessed Trinity, as it is Delivered and Explained by Councils, Fathers, School-men, and other later Divines; together with a Vindication of the said Doctrine so Explained from this Author's Exceptions.

Though I cannot think that the Nature and Design of the Work undertook by me (which was only to Animadvert upon, and Confute this Author's Novel, *Heterodox Notions* about the *Trinity*) does, or can directly engage me to proceed any further; or lay any Necessity upon me to give a positive Account of the *Doctrine* and *Sence* of the *Church* about this great *Article*; yet since this Author in asserting his own Opinion, could not be content to do it without reproaching and reflecting upon those *Ancient Terms*, which the *Church* has been so long in possession of, and has still thought fit to use in declaring it self upon this Subject, (as if instead of *Explaining*, they served only to perplex, obscure, and confound it) and since the Reasonableness, or Unreasonableness of either *Hypothesis*, is most likely to appear by fairly setting down one, as well as the other, and shewing

ing what this *Opiniator* is gone off from, as well as what he is gone over to, I judge it neither improper, nor unuseful to represent what the Church has hitherto held and taught concerning this *Important Article of the Trinity*, as I find it in *Councils, Confessions, Fathers, Schoolmen*, and other *Church-Writers*, Ancient and Modern. And in this also I must be again content to entertain my Reader only with a *Tast*, or *Specimen* out of so vast a store; which yet I do, with very good Reason, judge both satisfactory and sufficient, in a Point of *Divinity* Universally owned, received, and embraced; and (unless by such as reject and deny the *Trinity* it self) never Impugned, or Contradicted before.

Now the commonly received *Doctrine* of the *Church and Schools*, concerning the *Blessed Trinity* (so far as I can judge, but still with the humblest Submission to the Judgment of the *Church of England* in the Case) is this, That the *Christian Faith* having laid this *sure Foundation*, That there is but *One God*; and that there is nothing (i.e. no *Positive, Real Being*, strictly and properly so called) in *God*, but what is *God*, and lastly, That there can be no *Composition* in the *Deity* with any such *Positive Real Being* distinct from the *Deity* it self; and yet the *Church* finding in *Scripture* mention of *Three*, to whom distinctly the *Godhead* does belong, it has by warrant of the same *Scripture*, *Heb. 1.3.* expressed these *Three* by the *Name of Persons*; and stated their *Personalities* upon *Three distinct Modes of Subsistence* allotted to *One* and the same *Godhead*, and these also distinguished from one another by *Three distinct Relations*. Concerning which, we must observe, That albeit, according to the Reality of the *Thing*, the *Subsistence* and *Relation* of each *Person* make but *One Single Indivisible Mode of Being*, yet according to the Natural Order of *Conceiving Things*, we must *Conceive* of the *Subsistence* as

as precedent to the *Relation*: Forasmuch as Humane Reason considers Things simply as *Subsisting*, before it can consider them as *Relating* to one another.

But for the further Explication of the Point before us, it will here be necessary to premise what is properly a *Mode of Being*. And this the *School-Divines* do not allow to be either a *Substance*, or an *Accident* (which yet makes the adequate Division of *Real Beings*; since there is no such *Being* but what is contained under one of them) but a *Mode* is properly a certain *Habitude* of some *Being*, *Essence*, or *Thing*, whereby the said *Essence*, or *Being* is determined to some particular State, or Condition, which, barely of it self, it would not be determined to. And according to this account of it, a *Mode* in Things Spiritual and Immaterial seems to have much the like reference to such kind of *Beings*, that a Posture has to a Body, to which it gives some difference, or distinction, without superadding any new *Entity*, or *Being* to it. In a word, a *Mode* is not properly a *Being*, either *Substance*, or *Accident*, but a certain affection cleaving to it, and determining it from its *common general Nature* and *indifference* to something more particular, as we have just now explained. As for Instance, in *Created Beings*, *Dependence* is a *Mode* determining the *general Nature* of *Being* to that particular State, or Condition, by virtue whereof it proceeds from, and is supported by another; and the like may be said of *Mutability*, *Presence*, *Absence*, *Inherence*, *Adherence*, and such like, *viz.* That they are not *Beings*, but *Modes*, or *Affections of Being*, and inseparable from it so far, that they can have no Existence of their own, after a separation, or division from the Things, or *Beings* to which they do belong.

And thus having explained, in General, what a *Mode* is, we are to know, That the *Personalities*, by which

the *Deity* stands diversified into *Three distinct Persons*, are by the Generality of *Divines*, both *Ancient* and *Modern*, called and accounted *Modes*, or at least something Analogous to them (since no one Thing can agree both to *God* and the *Creature*, by a perfect *Univocation*.) And moreover, as every *Mode* *Essentially* includes in it the *Thing*, or *Being* of which it is the *Mode*, so every *Person* of the *Blessed Trinity*, by virtue of its proper *Mode* of *Subsistence*, includes in it the *Godhead* it self, and is properly *the Godhead as subsisting with and under such a certain Mode, or Relation*. And this I affirm to be the Current Doctrine both of the *Fathers* and the *Schools*, concerning the *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity*, and the constantly received Account given by them of a *Divine Person*, so far as they pretend to Explain what such a *Person* is.

And accordingly, as these *Relations* are *Three*, and but *Three*, so the *Persons* of the *Godhead*, to whom they belong, are so too, viz. *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*. But then, we must observe also, That the *Relations* which the *Godhead* may sustain, are of Two sorts.

1st. *Extrinsic*, and founded upon some *External Act* issuing from *God*; of which sort are the *Relations* of *Creator*, *Preserver*, *Governor*, and the like, to the *Things Created*, *Preserved*, and *Governed* by him. Which, though they leave a real effect upon the *Things themselves*, yet derive only an *External Habitude*, and denomination consequent from it upon the *Deity* it self. The

2d. Sort of *Relation*, is *Intrinsic*, and founded upon those *Internal Acts*, by which one *Person* produces another, or proceeds from another: For to produce and to proceed (whether by *Generation*, or *Spiration*) is that which makes, or Constitutes a Plurality of *Persons* in the *Godhead*.

From all which it follows, That the *Relation*, by which God as a *Creator*, or *Preserver*, respects his *Creatures*, is extremely different from that by which God as a *Father* respects his *Son*. The former adding only to the *Deity* an *Extrinsic* *denomination*, but the latter leaving upon it an *Internal Incommunicable Character*, *Essentially Inseparable* from the *Deity*. So that although it may well enough be said, That God might never have been a *Creator*, yet it cannot be said of Him, That he might never have been a *Father*; the former being only an effect of his Will, but this latter the Necessary Result of his *Nature*.

Now these *Internal Acts*, upon which the *Divine Relations* are founded, and from which they flow, are,

First, That *Eternal Act*, by which the *Father* *Communicates* his *Divine Nature* to the *Son*, which accordingly is called *Generation*.

And that by which the *Son* receives his *Divine Nature* from the *Father*, which is called *Filiation*. And

Thirdly, The *Act of Spiration*, by which the *Father* and the *Son* together, eternally breath forth the *Holy Spirit*. And,

Lastly, The *Act of Procession*, by which the *Holy Ghost* *proceeds*, and receives his *Divine Nature*, joynly from them both. These, I say, are those *Internal, Incommunicable* and *distinguishing Acts*, from which the *Personal Relations* belonging to the *Three Divine Persons* are derived.

But you will say: Does not this infer *Four Persons in the Godhead*? viz. That as *Generation* and *Filiation* make two, so *Spiration* and *Procession* should make two more?

I Answer, No: Because the same *Person* may sustain several *Personal Relations*, and Exert, and receive several *Personal Acts*, where those *Acts*, or *Relations* are not opposite to, or inconsistent with one another in the same Subject. As for instance, The *Person* of the *Father* may Exert both an *Act* of *Generation* and of *Spiration*, and so sustain the *Relations* resulting from both without any Multiplication of his *Person*; and the *Son* likewise may receive and sustain the *Act* of *Filiation*, and withal Exert an *Act* of *Spiration*, without any Multiplication of Personality. And this, because neither are the *Acts* of *Generation* and *Spiration* inconsistent in the *Father*, nor the *Acts* of *Filiation* and *Spiration*, incompatible in the *Son*. Though indeed the *Acts* of *Generation* and *Filiation*, and the *Relations* springing therefrom, would be utterly inconsistent (because opposite) in any one *Person*, as likewise upon the same Account would the *Acts* of *Spiration* and *Procession*.

From whence by plain and undeniable Consequence it follows, That *Generation* and *Filiation*, *Spiration* and *Procession* Constitute only Three Persons in the Eternal Godhead and no more. For *Relations* merely *disparate*, do not Constitute several distinct *Persons*, unless they be opposite too. That Maxime of the Schools being most true, That *Sola Oppositio multiplicat in Divinis*. So that albeit, *Filiation* and *Spiration* are Terms opposite to their respective Correlates, yet being only *disparate* with reference to one another, and as both of them meet and are lodged in one and the same Subject, (*viz.* the *Person* of the *Son*) they neither cause, nor infer in him any more than one *Single Personality*.

But now if any one should ask me, What this *Generation* and *Filiation*, this *Spiration* and *Procession* are?

I Answer,

I Answer, That herein consists the Mystery ; and since such Mysteries exceed the Comprehension of Human Reason, I am not in the least ashamed, most readily to own my ignorance thereof, in that known Anthem used in the Church.

*Quid sit Gigni, quid Processus,
Me nescire sum professus.*

For though the Author whom I have been Disputing with, by the help and vertue of Two Wonder-working Words (able to make one, *who is no Conjurer*, do strange things) undertakes to make this greatest of Mysteries *Plain, Ease, and Intelligible*; and when he has done this, (as he says he has) owns it nevertheless for a *Mystery* still : yet in the Judgment of other Mortals, to acknowledge a Thing *Inexplicable*, and in the same Breath to offer *an Explication* of it too, will be thought a little too much for one of an ordinary pitch of Sence and Reason to pretend to ; and therefore, for my own part, I dare not look so high.

Upon the whole matter, in discoursing of the *Trinity*, Two Things are absolutely necessary to be held and insisted upon. One, That each, and every *Person* of the *Blessed Trinity*, entirely contains and includes in himself the whole *Divine Nature*. The other, That each *Person* is *Incommunicably different* and *distinct* from the other.

And here if it should be asked. *How they differ, and whether it be by any real Distinction between the Persons?*

I Answer, Yes : But for the better explaining of my Answer, we must distinguish of Two sorts of *Real Distinctions*.

1. The first greater, *viz.* When Two Things, or real *Beings*, differ from one another.

2. The other lesser; as when the difference is between a Thing, or real *Being* on the one side, and the *Mode* of it on the other: Or between Two or more *Modes* of the same *Being*. And this Distinction, or Difference is called *Real* in opposition to that which is wholly founded upon the Apprehension, or Operation of the Intellect, and has of it self no Existence without it. But a *Being*, and the *Mode* adhering to it differ, whether the Mind ever apprehends and thinks of them, or no. And thus we affirm, That the *Divine Persons* really differ, and are distinguished from one another, *viz.* by a *Modal*, or *lesser* sort of *Real Difference*; according to which, the *Divine Nature Subsisting* under, and being determined by such a certain *Mode*, personally differs from it self, as *Subsisting* under, and determined by another. Forasmuch as the *Divine Nature*, or *Godhead* so *Subsisting* and determined is properly a *Person*. Nor ought this smallness of difference between the *Divine Persons* to be any presumption against the Truth of what we have delivered concerning the *Oeconomy* of the *Blessed Trinity*, as shall be more particularly shewn in Answer to one of this Author's Objections against it, before we come to a conclusion of this Chapter.

In the mean time to sum up the foregoing Particulars, the Reader may please to take what I aver to be the *Doctrine* of the *Catholick Churc*h about this great Article, in this following Account of it, *viz.* That there is one, and but one *Self-Existing, Infinite, Eternal, &c. Being, Nature, or Substance*, which we call *God*. And that this *Infinite, Eternal, Self-existing Being, or Nature, Exists in, and is common to Three distinct Persons, Father, Son and Holy Ghost*. Of which the *Son* eternally issues from the *Father*

Father by way of *Generation*, and the *Holy Ghost* joynly from both, by way of *Spiration*; which *Three Divine Persons* superadd to this *Divine Nature*, or *Deity*, *Three different Modes of Subsistence*, founding so many *different Relations*; each of them belonging to each *Person* in a peculiar *Uncommunicable manner*; so that by virtue thereof, each *Person* respectively differs and stands distinguished from the other Two: And yet by reason of one and the same *Numerical Divine Nature*, or *Godhead* equally Existing in, and common to all the *Three Persons*, they are all but *One and the same God, who is Blessed for Ever*.

This I reckon to be a True and Just Representation of the *Doctrine* of the *Catholick Church*, so far as it has thought fit to declare it self upon this Great and Sacred Mystery. Not that I think this sets the Point clear from all Difficulties and Objections. For the Nature and Condition of the Thing will not have it so, nor have the *Ablest Divines* ever thought it so, (for where then were the *Mystery*?) But that it gives us the fairest and most consistent Account of this Article, both with reference to Scripture and Reason, and liable to the fewest Exceptions against it, of any other *Hypothesis*, or *Explication* of it whatsoever.

And the same will appear yet further from those Terms which the *Writers of the Church* have all along used in expressing themselves upon this Subject. And that both with respect

First, To the *Unity* and *Agreement* of the *Three Divine Persons* in one and the same *Nature*. And

Secondly, To their *Personal distinction* from one another.

And first, For their *Unity* and *Agreement* in one and the same *Nature*. The Greeks expressed this by the Terms ὁμοίωτης, or ὁμοίων, ταῦλότης, and ἐρότης. And the

the Latines by *Consubstantialitas* and *Coessentialitas*. By all which I affirm, That they understood an *Agreement* in one and the same *Numerical Nature*, or *Essence*. For, though this Author has affirmed, That the *Nicene Fathers* understood no more by the ὁμοστοῖλς, than a *Specifick Unity of Nature*, this Matter has been sufficiently accounted for, and his Assertion effectually confuted in the foregoing Chapter.

In the next place. As for the Terms expressing the Distinction and Difference of the *Divine Persons* from one another, the Greeks make use of these, *Τριάς Trinity*, *πεντωπα Persons*, *ὑποστάσεις Subsistences*, or *Persons*, *τρόποι ὑπάρξεως Modes of Subsistence*, *ἰδιότητεis Properties*, *χαρακτῆρεis Marks of Distinction*, *χαρακτηρικὰ ἰδιώματα Distinguishing Properties*, *γνωσιομάτα Notes of Signification*. And agreeably to them, the Latines also make use of the following Terms, *Trinitas*, *Personae*, *Subsistenteis*, *Modi Subsistendi*, *Proprietates*, *Relationes*, and *Notiones seu Notionalia*. By which last the Schoolmen mean such Terms and Expressions, as serve to notice and declare to us the proper and peculiar distinction of the *Divine Persons*. And they reckon four of them, viz. the above-mentioned *Paternitas*, *Filiatio*, *Spiratio* & *Processio*; all of them importing Relation. To which some add a fifth, which the Greeks call *ἀγέννοια*, or *τὸ ἀγέννον*; and the Latines, *Innascibilitas*; a Term not importing in it any *Positive Relation*, but only a meer Negation of all *Producibility*, by any *Superiour Principle*, and upon that account peculiar to the *Father*, who alone, of all the *Persons of the Blessed Trinity*, is without Production. Touching all which Terms, I cannot think it necessary to enlarge any further, in a particular and more distinct Explication of them; since, how differing soever they may be in their respective Significations, they all

all concur in the same use and design; which is to express something proper and peculiar to the *Divine Persons*, whereby they are rendered distinct from, and Incommunicable to one another.

But these few general Remarks I think fit to lay down concerning them. As,

1. That albeit most of these Terms, as to the Form of the Word, run *Abstractively*, yet they are for the most part to be understood *Concretively*, and not as simple Forms, but as Forms in Conjunction with the Subject, which they belong to. In the former abstracted sense they are properly *Personalities*, or *Personal Properties*, viz. Those *Modes*, or *Forms* by which the *Persons*, whom they appertain to, are formally constituted and denominated what they are; but in the Latter and *Concrete Sence*, they signify the *Persons* themselves.

2. The Second Thing, which I would observe, is, That there has been in the first Ages of the Church some Ambiguity in the use of the words *ὑστια* and *ὑπότασσις*, *Περσωπη*, or *Persona*. For neither would the *Latines* at first admit of *Three Hypostases* in God, as taking *ὑστια* and *ὑπότασσις* for the same Thing; for that they had no other *Latin Word*, to Translate *ὑπότασσις* by, but *Substantia*, by which also they Translated *ὑστια*; (the Word *Subsistensia* being then looked upon by them as Barbarous, and not in use) so that they refused the Term *τρεις ὑποτάσσεις*, for fear of admitting of *Three distinct Substances*, or *Essences* in the *Trinity*, which they knew would lead them into the Error of *Arius*. Nor on the other side would the *Greeks* acquiesce in a *μία ὑπότασσις*, nor admit of the *περσωπη*, for fear of falling thereby into the contrary Error of *Sabellius*; for that they thought the Word *περσωπη* imported no real *Internal difference*, but only a difference of *Name*, or *Attribute*, or at most

of Office ; and for them to allow no more than such an one amongst the *Divine Persons*, they knew was *Sabellianisme*. And this Controversie of Words exercised the Church for a considerable time ; to appease and compose which (amongst other Matters) a Council was called and held at *Alexandria* about the Year of *Christ*, 362. in which amongst many other Bishops Convened from *Italy*, *Arabia*, *Egypt* and *Lybia*, was present also *Athanasius* himself. And in this Council both sides having been fully heard, and found to agree in fence, though they differ'd in words, it was ordained, That they should thenceforth Mutually acknowledge one another for *Orthodox*, and for the future cease contending about these words to the disturbance of the Church. By which means, and especially by the Explication given of these words by *Athanasius*, (whereby (as *Gregory Nazianzen* tells us in his Panegyrick upon him) he satisfied and reconciled both *Greeks* and *Latines* to the indifferent use of them, and indeed that Oration made by *Nazianzen* himself in the Council of *Constantinople* (*viz.* the second General) before 150 Bishops, not a little contributing to the same;) the fence of these Terms from that time forward came generally to be fixed, and the Ambiguity of them removed, and so the Controversie by degrees ceased between the *Greeks* and *Latines*, and the Words περσωπα, or *Personae*, and υποτάσεις, or *Substantiae* grew at length to be promiscuously used without any Jealousie or Suspicion, and to be accepted on all hands (though not presently) in the same signification.

3. The Third Thing which I would observe, is, That some of the forementioned Terms signify *Causally*, and some only *Declaratively*, that is to say, some import the *Ground and Reason* of the Distinction of the *Divine Persons*,

Persons, and some import only Marks, Notes, and Signs of such a Distinction. Of the first sort amongst the Greeks, are ὑποστάσεις, τρέψοις ὑπάρχεις, and ιδιότητες; and amongst the Latines, Subsistentia, Modi Subsistendi, Proprietates & Relationes. Of the Latter sort amongst the Greeks are χαρακτῆρες and γνωστικά: and amongst the Latines, Notiones. But for the fuller and further illustration and improvement of this Note, I cannot but add the Observation of the solid and exactly Learned Forbesius, viz. That of these Modes, called by the Greeks, τρέψοις ὑπάρχεις, there is a four-fold Use, or Effect, as they sustain four several Considerations. viz. That

First, As Modes of Subsistence, they Constitute the Persons. And

Secondly, That by the Relations, which they imply and include, they cause the said Persons to be referred to one another. And

Thirdly, That as they are Properties they distinguish the Persons from each other. And

Lastly, That, as Notions, they are Means, and (as it were) Instruments whereby we are enabled in some measure to apprehend and conceive of the Divine Persons. *Forbesius Instruct. Hist. Theolog. Lib. 1. Cap. 35. Sect. 16.*

By all which it appears, That the several forementioned Terms do really import but one and the same Thing, differently considered, according to the several Uses and Effects ascribed to it, in respect of the Oeconomy of the Three Divine Persons amongst themselves.

4. In the Fourth and Last place, we may observe, That the words most commonly and frequently used by Writers in treating of the Divine Persons, are the forementioned ὑποστάσεις, τρέψοις ὑπάρχεις, and ιδιότητες amongst

mongst the Greeks. And the Terms *Personæ*, *Relatio-*
nes, *Proprietates*, and (in the latter Ages especially)
Subſiſtentia, and *Modi Subſiſtendi* amongst the *La-*
tines.

These Observations I thought fit to lay down for our clearer and readier Apprehension of the Expressions used by the *Fathers*, and other *Church-Writers* in their Discourses about this great Article of the *Christian Faith*.

And so I proceed now to my Authorities, shewing both from the Ancient and Modern use of the Terms aforesaid, and more especially of the ὑποτάσεις, and τρέπων ὑπάρχεων, the *Subſiſtentia* & *Modi Subſiſtendi*, that the Church has all along placed the respective *Personalities of the Three Divine Persons in Three distinct Modes of Subſiſtence*, according to the Doctrine Asserted by us. And here I shall begin with the *Greek Writers*, setting them down according to the Order and Age in which they Lived.

Justin
Martyr.

And first with *Justin Martyr*, who in his ἐκδεος τὸ πί-
 τεως, or Exposition of Faith, speaks thus. Οὐ ταῦλὸν τῷ
 πατεῖ ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἄγιον, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ἀγέννητον καὶ
 γεννητὸν καὶ ἐπορευτὸν εἰν αἱτιας ὀνόματα αἱλλα τρέπων τὸ
 ὑπάρχεων. The Son (says he) and the Holy Ghost, are not the same with the Father; for the Terms Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding, are not the Names of Essence, but Modes of Subſiſtence, *Justin. Exposition. fidei.* p. 373. Colon. Edition. 1686. Again, speaking of the same Terms, he tells us, That they are not αἱτιας δηλωτικὰ, but σημαντικὰ τῷ ὑποτάσεων, that is to say, not denoting the Essence, but signifying the Hypostases, or Subſiſtences; adding withal, οὐαρὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν διακείνειν τὰ τρέ-
 πων, καὶ τὸ πατεῖ καὶ θεός, καὶ ἄγιος πνεῦματος. ιδιαζόντως
 διεκρίνειν ὑποτάσειν, That they are sufficient for us to di-
 stinguish

stingish the Persons, and to shew the proper and peculiar Subsistence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost by. Pag. 374. And again, Ἐνα τεοὶν πεστηεν ὁμολογεῖν εὐ πατεῖ ἐ^τιψ, καὶ πνεύματι ἄγιω γνωειζόμενον, οὐ μὲν πατήρ εἰς, καὶ πνεύμα ἄγιον τὸ μιᾶς Θεότητος τὰς ὑποτάσεις γνωειζοῖται, οὐ δέ θεοὶς τὸ πατ' εστιαν κοινὸν τῷδε ὑποτάσεων τοῦτοιται. That is, we ought to own, or Confess One God, expressed to us in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, hereby acknowledging, as they are Father, Son and Holy Ghost, Three Subsistences of one and the same Godhead; but as they are God, understanding thereby one Essence, or Substance common to all the Subsistences, p. 379. ibid. By all which Expressions we see Personality stated upon Subsistence.

Our next Testimony shall be from Athanasius, who ^{Athanasius.} in his Treatise de Sanctissimā Virgine Deiparā, gives this Account of his Faith. Πιτεύομεν εἰς Πατέρα, καὶ εἰς, καὶ ἄγιον πνεύμα, τελέσθα ὑποτάσεων αἵματων εἰχόντων τὸ διαιρετικόν, καὶ τὴν ἔνωσιν αὐτούχοτον. That is, We believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, a Trinity of Hypostases, or Persons, having amongst them such a Distinction, as admits of no Division, and such an Union, or Unity, as is without all Confusion. Athan. Tom. 1. p. 1029. Colon. Edit. 1686.

The Author called Dionysius the Areopagite (though ^{Dionysius} Areopagi^o) - by a false Title, for the Areopagite lived in the first Century, but this Writer in the fourth) in his Book de Divinis Nominibus cap. 1. sets forth the Trinity thus. Τετράς τὸ διὰ τὴν περιστούσιον τὸ ὑπερβοτίς γονιμότητος ἐκφαντιστησι. The Trinity (so called) because of its manifestation of a Divine, or Superlative Fecundity shewn in Three Subsistences, or Persons.

Epiphanius also in the 62d. Heresie, and 3d. Paragraph, ^{Epiphanius.} gives the like account of the same, Τετράς αἱρεθμεύειν Πατήρ, καὶ εἰς, καὶ πνεύμα ἄγιον, τὸ χως ἐν τι τετράν τὸνόμασιν

κανδημένον, ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τέλεια τὰ ὄντα, τέλειαι ὑπόστασις. The Trinity is numbered by Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, not as one Thing called only by Three Names, but as being in Truth Three perfect Subsistences, [or Persons] as well as Three perfect Names.

Gregory Nazianzen. In like manner *Gregory Nazianzen* speaks much the same Thing in his 29th Oration. Χρῆμα τὸν θεὸν τηρεῖν γὰρ τὰς τρεῖς ὑπόστασεis ὄμολογεῖν, εἰτὲ δὲ τείχα πεφύωσα, κατέκατην μετὰ τὸν ιδιότητα. We ought (says he) to hold one God, and to confess Three Subsistences, or Three Persons, each with his respective Property according to his Subsistence, *Greg. Nazianz. Tom. 1. P. 490. Edit. Paris. 1630.*

Gregory Nyssen. Upon those words in the first of *Genesis*, Let us make Man, expresses himself thus. Ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς ἀνθρώπον ἵνα ἐνώσῃ τὸν θεότητα, ἐνώσῃ δὲ τὰς ὑπόστασεis, οὐδὲν γάρ ὑπόστασις Πατερός, οὐδὲν γάρ πνεύματος οὐδὲν. God (says he) made Man (laying the stress upon the Word *ἐποίησεν* of the Singular Number) that you may reckon, or account the Godhead to be but One: But not so the Subsistences; for there is a proper Subsistence of the Father, a proper Subsistence of the Son, and a proper Subsistence of the Holy Ghost. *Greg. Nyssen Tom. 1. p. 141. Edit. Paris. 1615.*

St. Basil. St. *Basil* in his Book de *Spiritu Sancto*, Chap. 18. speaks thus of the Second Person of the Trinity. Δεύτερον δὲ Θεὸν γεδέω καὶ τήμερον αὐτοκόσμον. Θεὸν γένος δὲν Θεοῦ περικυρνάτες καὶ τὸ ιδιάλογον τῶν ὑπόστασεων ὄμολογόμην καὶ μέρομην ἔχοντες μοναρχίας. We (says he) never to this Day heard of a Second God; but Worshipping the Son as God of God, we both acknowledge the Property of the Hypostases [or Persons] and insist upon one Supreme Governor, or Lord of all Things. *Bas. Tom. 2. p. 332. Edit. Paris. 1637.*

Likewise

CHAPTER VIII.

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Likewise St. Cyril of Alexandria declares himself St. Cyril!!
much the same way in his third Dialogue de Trinitate. ^{of Alexandria.}
"Ἐνεργοῦσσιν τὸν μικρὸν θεότητερωλόγον καθ' ὑπέρσυνον. We may observe (says he) in one Deity, a Ternary, or Triplicity according to [or in respect of] Subsistence.

The same we find also in *Isidorus Pelusiota*, Lib. I. *Isidorus Pe-*
Epist. 247. Μία γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεότης, τρεῖς δὲ αἱ ὑποστάσεις. *Isid. 247.*
τρεῖς τρέπει, τρεῖς ἴχε. There is (says he) One Godhead,
but Three Hypostases, or Subsistences. This keep, this
hold, &c.

Theodoret also speaks very fully upon the same Subject, *Theodoret.* in his first Dialogue *contr. Anom.eos.* Τὰ μὲν τὸ στοιχεῖον τὸν ὁμοίως εἰσὶ κοινὰ τῷ πατέρᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀγίῳ πνεύματι. τὸ δὲ Πατήρ τὸ κοινόν. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ στοιχεῖον τὸν πατήρ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποστάσεως, εἰ δὲ ἄλλο τὸ ὑποστάσεως τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ ἀλλα τὸ στοιχεῖον τὸν ὁμοίωματα, τὸ ταυτόν ἐστι σημαινόμενον στοιχεῖον τὸ ὑποστάσεις. That is to say, Such Things as belong properly to the [Divine] Essence, or Substance, are in like manner common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. But the Term [Father] is not common to them; and therefore [Father] is no Property of the Essence, but of the Subsistence, or Person: But now, if one Thing be proper to the Hypostasis, or Subsistence, and there be other Properties of the Essence, it follows, That Essence and Hypostasis do not signify one and the same thing. And again, a little after: Ήδη στοιχεῖον τῷ ἀγίῳ πνεύματι κοινόν· ὁμοίως δὲ αὐτῷ, ὁμοίως ἀφθαρτῷ, ὁμοίως ἀγίῳ καὶ ὁμοίως ἀγαθῷ. καὶ διὰ τοῦ λέγομέν μιαν στοιχεῖον, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις. That is, the Essence, or Substance of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost is common, being equally and alike Immortal, Incorruptible, Holy and Good. And for this Reason we affirm One Essence, and Three Hypostases, *Auct. aritum* five Tom. 5. Theodoret. p. 286. Edit. Paris. 1684. Certainly

tainly nothing could, with greater Evidence, state the Personalities of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost* upon Three several *Subsistences*, than the Words here quoted out of this *Father*. And I quote them out of him, though I know the same Dialogues are inserted into *Athanasius's* Works; but I am convinced by the reasons given by *Garnerius* the Learned Editor of this *Auctarium*, that the said Dialogues cannot belong to *Athanasius*.

Basilii Seleuciens. p. 5. cœcilius. Next to him let us hear *Basilii Seleuciens.* speaking the same Thing in his first Oration, upon the first Verse of the first Chapter of *Genesis*, where, upon these words, *Let us make Man after our own Image and Likeness*, he discourses thus. Μία μὲν εἰκὼν ἡ πλατύομένη, ωχέρος ὃ περισσώπει μηδίμην, ἀλλὰ τειῶν ὑποστάσεων· κοινὸν γὰρ τὸ Θεότητί. δημιύργυμα τὸ πλατύομένην, τειχίδα μὲν ἐμφαίνει τὴν πλάτην, μίαν ὃ εἰκόνια τὴν τειχίδαν. ὑπάρχεσσαν, εἰ δὲ μία τὴν τειχίδαν. ἡ εἰκὼν μία τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἡ φύσις. Τὸ γὰρ ταῦτα τὸ σοῖς ἡ τοιότητος απρύττει. That is to say, *The Image here formed is but One*, but the mention here made is not of One Hypostasis, or Person only, but of Three. For the Thing formed being the common Work of the whole Deity, shews the Trinity to have been the Former thereof, and so gives us one Image, or Resemblance of the Trinity: But if the Image of the Trinity be but One, the Nature of the Hypostases [or Persons] must be One too. For the Unity of the Image, proclaims the Unity of the Substance, or Essence. *Basil. Seluciens. Orat. 1. p. 5.* Printed at Paris with *Gregorius Thaumaturgus*, &c. *Anno Dom. 1622.*

Zacharias Sirnamed *Scholaisticus*, and sometime Metropolitan of Mitylene (of the Sixth Century) in his Disputation against the Philosophers who held the Eternity of the World, to a certain Philosopher, asking him, How the Christians could acknowledge the same both a

Trinity

Trinity and an Unity too? Makes this Answer. Τεράσα φαμὲν ἐτὸν τὸν μονάδι καὶ μονιδα τὸν τελείδι, τῷ τὰς μὲν υπερ-
γάστερι τροῖς ἐτὸν, καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον μόνῳ. That is, We affirm a Trinity in Unity, and an Unity in Trinity; hereby affirming the Subsistences [or Persons] to be Three, and the Essence, or Substance to be only One.

Johannes Damascenus, a Writer of the Eighth Century, in his third Book de Orthodoxia fide, Chap. II. about the end of it speaks thus. Θεότης μὲν γὰρ φύσιν δι-
λοῖ, τὸ δὲ πατήρ τὸν υπόστασιν, ὥστερ ἀνθρωπωτην τὴν φύσιν,
Πέτερος δὲ τὸν υπόστασιν. Θεὸς δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως σημαίνει, καὶ εὐφ' ἑκάτην τῶν υπόστάσεων τάττεται παρωνύμως. That is, The Godhead declares the Nature, but the Term [Father] the Subsistence; as Humanity does the Humane Nature, but Peter the Subsistence, or Person. For the Term [God] denotes the Divine Nature in Common, and equally denominates, or is ascribed to each of the Hypostases, or Subsistences. *Damascen.* Page 207. Edit. Basil. 1575.

I shall close up these particular Testimonies with some *Athanasiian* Passages in the Creed, commonly called the *Athanasian Creed*, which I place so low, because it is manifest, that Athanasius was not the Author of it, it being not so much as mentioned in any *Ancient Writer* (as the very Learned Dr Cave affirms) till it occurs in *Theodulphus Aurelianensis*, *Histor. 14.* *vers. 1.* who lived about the latter end of the Eighth Century. Now the Passages are these, Μητὲ συγχέοιτε τὰς υπό-
στάσεις (in some Copies περιστώσαι) μητὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον διαιρεί-
τες, ἀλλοι γάρ εἰναι τοὺς πατερούς υπόστασις, ἀλλοι τὸν οὐρανόν, καὶ ἀλλοι
τοὺς πνεύματα τοὺς ἀγίους, ἀλλοι Γατερούς καὶ οὐρανούς καὶ πνεύματα
ἀγία μια Θεότης, &c. That is, Neither confounding the Hypostases [or Persons] nor dividing the Substance. For there is one Hypostasis of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost, but the Godhead of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is One, &c. And again,

ὅλαι αἱ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις συνδιαιωνίζοσαι ἐαυταῖς εἰσὶ καὶ ισαῖ.
That is, The whole Three Hypostases [or Persons] are Co-equal together, and Coequal. These Passages are full and plain, and the *Creed* it self may well claim the Antiquity at least of the Eighth Century.

My next Authorities shall be those of the *Councils*. But before I pass to them, I cannot but observe and own to the Reader concerning some of the first of my Quotations, viz. those out of *Justin Martyr*, and that out of St. *Athanasius*; that it has been very much questioned by some Learned Men, Whether those Books, from whence they are taken, do really belong to the Authors to whom they are ascribed, and among whose Works they are inserted, or no. This, I say, I was not ignorant of, nevertheless I thought fit to quote them by the Names under which I found them placed; since many very Learned Persons, and much more acquainted with the *Writings of the Ancients* than I pretend to be, have upon several Occasions done so before me. And the said Tracts are certainly of a very early date, and though the Authors of them should fall a Century or two lower, yet they still retain Antiquity enough to make good the Point for which I alledged them. Nevertheless I must and do confess it very probable, That the more distinct and exact use of the Terms ὑποστάσεις, and τρέψεις, as applyed to the *Divine Persons*, did not generally and commonly take place, but as by degrees the Discussion of the *Arian* and other the like Controversies, through frequent Disputes, grew to still a greater and greater Maturity. And that the use of these Terms did obtain then, and upon that Account, I think a very considerable Argument to authorize, and recommend them to all Sober and Judicious Minds.

And so I pass to the Testimonies of Councils concerning the same. Amongst which, we have here, in the first place, the Council of Chalcedon, making a Confession, or Declaration of their Faith, concerning the Person of our Saviour, and that, both as to the Absolute undivided Unity of his Person, and as to the Difference and Distinction of his Two Natures, part of which Confession runs thus. Ὡμολογηθῆνται καὶ ταῦτα Ἰνστιτούτον Χειρίζεται, καὶ εἰσιν, διὸ μονογενῆς, ἐν ᾧ νοῦ φύσεσιν αὐτοῦ χάριτων, αὐτοῖς πέπλωσι, καὶ εἰσιν αἱρέτων, καὶ ἀκολεύεται γνωστοῖς ψήμενον· εὐθαυτῆς τοῦ φύσεων διαφορᾶς αἱρημένης διὰ τοῦ ἑνώσιου, Σωζομένης ἡ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἴδιοτητός. ἐκατέρας φύσεως, καὶ εἰς ἓν περισσωποῦ καὶ μικρὸν ὑστερώσιν συντρεχόσιν. That is, We confess One and the same Lord Jesus Christ, the only Begotten Son of God in Two Natures, without Confusion, &c. the difference of the said Natures, being by no means destroyed by their Union, but rather the Property of each Nature being thereby preserved, and both concurring to [or meeting in] One Person, or Hypostasis. This Account of the Chalcedon-Confession we have in the 2d Book of *Eusebius*, towards the latter end of the 4th Chapter; and a lively Instance it is of the Council's expressing the Personality of Christ by, and stating it upon, *Subsistence*.

In the next place, upon Justinian's calling the second Council of Constantinople (being the Fifth General one, in the Year 553, for Condemning of the *Tria Capitula*, we have a large and Noble Confession of Faith made by that Emperor, and owned and applauded by all the Council, and inserted amongst the *Acts* of it: And in this we have the *Three Divine Persons* several times expressed by so many *ἴωστάσεις*, as a Term equivalent to *περιστών*, and indeed importing withall the Personality, or *Formal Reason* of the same; and that so fully and plainly, that nothing could, or can be more so. Ὡμο-

λογίζειν τοινύ πιστεύειν εἰς Πατέρα, καὶ Υἱὸν, καὶ ἄγιον Πνεῦμα, Τελάδα ὁμοστοι, μιαν Θεότητα, ἵτοι φύσιν καὶ ψιλαν, καὶ δύναμιν, καὶ ἐξουσιαν ἐν τελεσιν ὑποστάσεσιν, ἵτοι περσώπωις, δοξάζοτες, &c. That is, We profess to Believe One Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Glorifying thereby a Consubstantial Trinity, One Deity, or Nature, or Essence, and Power and Authority in Three Subsistences, or Persons. And again to the same purpose, Μονάδα ἐν τελείδι καὶ τελάδα ἐν μονάδι περσκυνθέμεν, παρέδοξον ἔχεται τὸ διαιρέσιν καὶ τὸ ἐνωσιν, μονάδα μὲν κατὰ τὸ ὅσιαν ἡγεμόνην Θεότηταν λόγον, τελάδα δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἴδιοτητας ἡγεμόνην ὑποστάσεις ἵτοι περσώπα. We Worship (says he) an Unity in Trinity, and a Trinity in Unity, having both a strange and wonderful Distinction and Union, that is to say, an Union, or Singularity in respect of the Substance or Godhead, and a Trinity in respect of Properties, Subsistences, or Persons; with several more such Passages to the same Purpose and Signification.

Fifth General Council. And then, as for the Council it self, the first Canon of it speaks thus; "Εἰ τις ὀχι ἐμολογεῖ Πατέρα, οὐδὲ, καὶ ἄγιον πνεῦμαν. μιαν φύσιν, ἵτοι ψιλαν, καὶ μιαν δύναμιν, καὶ ἐξουσιαν, τελάδα ὁμοστοι, μιαν Θεότηταν ἐν τελεσιν ὑποστάσιν, ἵτοι περσώπωις περσκυνθήτην, τοιετόν. Ανάθεμα ἐξω. That is, If any one Confess not One Nature, or Substance, One Power and Authority of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, a Coessential Trinity, and One Deity to be Worshipped in Three Subsistences, or Persons, Let such an one be Accursed.

The Sixth General Council. In the next place, we have the Sixth General Council, and the Third of Constantinople, called by Constantinus Pogonatus against the Monothelites in the Year 681. In the Acts of which Council, Article 6. we have the Council owning the same Thing, and in the same words, which a little before we quoted out of the Council of Chalcedon: And moreover in the Tenth Article, the Council declares it self thus.. Τὸν κύρεον ἡμῶν Ἰησὸν Χε-

χον τὸν ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν πιστεύοντες φαμεν δύο αὐτῷ τὰς φύσεις
ἐν τῇ μιᾷ αὐτῷ διαλαμπόσας ὑποτάσει, &c. That is,
We believing our Lord Jesus Christ to be the True God, do
affirm in him Two Distinct Natures, shining forth in One
Subsistence, or Person.

Agreeably to this, the Council immediately following called by the Greeks, Σύρος ο πεντέτην, and by the Latines, Concilium Quini-Sextum, Consisting chiefly of the same Persons with the former, and called by the same Constantine about Ten Years after, for the making of Canons about Discipline, by way of Supplement to the Fifth and Sixth Councils, which had made none. This Council, I say, in the first of its Canons, which is as a kind of Preface, owns and applauds the Nicene Fathers, for that, with an Unanimous Agreement and consent of Faith, they had declared and cleared up one Consubstantiality in the Three Hypostases, or Subsistences of the Divine Nature. Οἱ τῇ ὁμολημοσύῃ τῷ πιστεῖ τὸ ὁμούσιον ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τελών τῷ Θεαρχικῆς φύσεως ὑποτάσεων ἀπεκάλυψάντες καὶ διετελώσανταν, &c.

And Lastly in the Florentine Council, held in the Fifteenth Century, in which the Greeks, with their Emperor Johannes Palaeologus met the Latines in order to an Accord between them, touching that so much controverted Article about the Procession of the Holy Ghost. In this Council, I say, we have the Greeks also expressing the Personality of the Holy Ghost, by the τὸ ὑποτάτικόν. For whereas the Latines affirmed, that the Holy Ghost the τὸ ἄγιον πνεῦμα did ἀναβλύζειν ἐν τῷ νεί. That is to say, stream, or flow from the Son, the Greeks desired them to explain what they meant by that Expression, ἀναβλύζειν ἐν τῷ νεί, and whether they understood, that he derived both his Essence and Personality from him, and that in these words very significant to our Purpose, Εἰ γὰρ στια-

στιαν καὶ τὸ ὄποτατικὸν οὐχι τε καὶ λαμβάνει εἰς αὐτῷ τῷ νῷ.
By which we see that even with these Modern Greeks also
the στια, and the τὸ ὄποτατικόν, which is all one with the
ὄποτατος, signify *Essence* and *Person*, as applyed to the
Persons of the *Blessed Trinity*, *Hist. Concil. Florent.* in
the last Chapter, and *Question 7. of Section 8. Pag. 246.*
set forth by Dr. Creyghton, 1660.

I cannot think it requisite to quote any Thing more from the *Greeks* upon this Subject, it being as clear as the Day, that both *Fathers* and *Councils* stated the *Personalities* of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, upon *Three distinct Hypostases*, or *Subsistences* of one and the same *Godhead*, *Essence*, or *Substance*, distinguished thereby into *Three Persons*.

And so I pass from the *Greeks* to the *Latines*, whom we shall find giving an Account of the same, partly by *Subsistences* and *Modes of Subsistence*, and partly by *Relations*. But not equally by both in all Ages of the *Church*.
The *Latin Church.* For we have before shewn, That there was a long and sharp Contest between the *Greeks* and the *Latines* about the Word *Hypostasis*, and that the *Latines* dreaded the use of it, as knowing no other *Latin* Word to render it by, but *Substantia*, which they could by no means ascribe plurally to *God*; and as for the Word *Subsistentialia*, that was not then accounted properly *Latin*; and it was but upon this occasion, and to fence against the Ambiguity of the Word *ὑπότασσας*, that it came at length into use amongst the *Latines*. And even after all, it must be yet further confessed, That notwithstanding that fair foundation of Accord between the *Greeks* and *Latines* laid by the forementioned Council of *Alexandria*, and the hearty Endeavours both of *Athanasius* and of *Gregory Nazianzen* after him, to accommodate the busines between them, the *Latines* were not so ready to come over to the *Greeks*,

Greeks, in the free use of the Word *Hypostasis*, as the Greeks were to comply with the *Latins* in the use of the Word *περσωπα*, answering to their *Persona*. And therefore in vain would any one seek for an Explication of the *Divine Persons* in the *Trinity*, by the Terms *Subsistētiæ*, or *Modi Subsistendi*, in the earlier *Latin Writers*, such as *Tertullian* about the latter end of the second Century, and *St. Cyprian* about the middle of the Third, and *Lactantius* about the latter end of the same, and the beginning of the Fourth. Nevertheless find it we do, in the Writers of the following Ages; And how, and in what sence it was used by them, shall be now considered.

And here we will begin with *St. Ambrose*, who is full and clear in the case, in his Book *in Symbolum Apostolicum* Cap. 2. Tom. 2. in these Words. *Ita ergo rectum, & Catholicum est, ut & unum Deum secundum Unitatem Substantię fateamur, & Patrem, & Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum in suā quemque Subsistentiā sentiamus.* A Passage so very plain, that nothing certainly could more effectually declare, That this *Father* reckoned the *Personalities* of the *Three Divine Persons* to consist in their severall and respective *Subsistences*.

The next whom we shall alledge, is *St. Hilary*, who s. *Hilary* flourished in the Fourth Century, and wrote Twelve Books of the *Trinity*, and some other Tracts upon the same Subject against the *Arians*. He, I confess, frequently, and particularly in Book 4. *de Trinitate*. p. 36. *Basil. Edit. 1570.* calls the *Three Divine Persons*, *Tres Substantias*; but it is evident, that he took *Substantia*, in the same sence with *Subsistētia*, or *Hypostasis*; forasmuch as he elsewhere often affirms that, which must of necessity infer this to be his meaning. As for instance, in his Book *de Synodis contra Arianos*, Page 223. he tells us, That

That *Nullam diversitatem aut dissimilitudinem admittit Geniti & Gignentis Essentia*. And again, That there is *Indifferens in Patre & Filio divinitatis substantia*, p. 224. And *nulla differentis Essentiae discreta Natura*, ibid. And *nulla Originalis substantiae diversitas*, ibid. And that there is between them *nulla diversitas Essentiae*, p. 225. None of all which Propositions could possibly be true, if the *Divine Persons* were *Three distinct Substances* according to the proper sense and signification of the Word *Substance*. And therefore the Learned *Forbesius* in his *Historico-Theological Instructions*, Book 1. Chap. 2. quoting the afore-said Passage, after the Words *Tres substantias*, subjoyns these of his own, *Eo [nempe] sensu quo Græci dicebant τρες υπόταξεις*. And accordingly St. *Hilary* explaining himself further, in his fore-cited Book *de Synodis contra Arianos*, p. 226. says, That though between the *Father* and the *Son* there was *nulla diversitas Essentiae*, yet they did *respuere Personalium Nominum Unionem, ne Unus Subsistens sit, qui & Pater dicatur & Filius*: Which Words manifestly infer, That the *Father is said to be a Father, and the Son to be a Son*, by a *distinct Subsistence* proper to each of them. And again, speaking of those *Fathers* who opposed the Heresie of *Sabellius*, says of them: *Idecirco Tres Substantias esse dixerunt, Subsistentium Personas per Substantias edocentes, non substantiam Patris, & Filii, & Spiritis Sancti, diversitate dissimulis essentiae separantes*, p. 228. By which Words, he speaks all that the *Greeks* meant by *υπόταξις*, or the *Latines* of the following Times, by *Subsistentia*. For which reason it is, that the Learned *Collator* and *Editor* of this *Father's Works*, uses, now and then, to such Passages as these to add an *Explicatory Marginal Note* to this purpose; as in Page 36. Book 4. *de Trinitate*, he puts in the Margin, *Tres Substantiae, id est, υπόταξεις*, and in this Book *de Synodis*,

nodis, &c. p. 227. he remarks in the side, *Trina in Divinis ὑπόστασις;* which manifestly shews, what the Judgment of Learned Men was concerning St. Hilary's sense in the use of the words *Tres Substantiae* with reference to the *Divine Persons.*

From St. Hilary we pass to St. Jerome; who indeed ^{St. Jerome.} scrupled the use of the Word *Hypostasis*, (as applyed to the *Divine Persons*) in Epistle 57. to Pope Damasus. But that he did only scruple it, and not absolutely refuse, or reject it, is evident from several other Passages in that Epistle; which shewed his Judgment to be, that there was nothing of it self ill and hurtful in the use of it. For, had he judged otherwise, surely he would not have told *Damasus*, that he was ready to own the Expression of *Tres Personas Subsistentes*: And moreover, That if *Damasus* would command the use of the Term *Hypostasis*, he would use it. But his Exception against it (for it was not the Word *Person*, as a great Man mistakes it, but the Word *Hypostasis*, which St. Jerome demurred to the See the Four Sermons on
use of) was built upon these Two grounds, both expressed in the same Epistle.

First, That *Hereticks* abused, or made an ill use of ^{Printed} this Term, to deceive and impose upon the Minds of ^{1692.} Weak, and Unwary Persons. And, in good earnest, that must be a very extraordinary Word indeed, which is uncapable of being one way or other abused by some, and misunderstood by others.

Secondly, The other ground (which, as there is great reason to believe, was the main and principal cause of St. Jerome's dislike of this Term) was its being imposed by an Incompetent Authority, *viz.* That some of the Greek Church would needs command him (and him a very warm Man too) who was of the *Latin Communion*, to the use of that, which the *Latin Church* had not obliged

ged him to. And *Calvin*, in *Lib. i. Chap. 13.* of his *Institutions, Sect. 5.* shrewdly intimates the peculiar Pique, which St. *Jerome* bore to the Eastern Bishops, to have been the chief, if not the sole cause of his Exception against this Word ; adding withal, that it was not fairly done of him (which *Calvin* was a very Competent Judge of) to Assert (as in that Epistle he does) that in *omnibus Scholis, & sic* was *nihil aliud quam Hypostasis* ; which *Calvin* there says, *Communi tritōque usu passim refellitur*. But after all, it seems, St. *Jerome* could relent from his stiffness, and reconcile himself to this so much scrupled Expression. For in his Epistle, or Discourse *ad Paulam & Eustochium de assumptione Beatæ Mariæ*, speaking of our Saviour's exercising Two distinct kinds of *Operation*, according to his Two *Natures* combining in one *Person*, has these Words, *Per hoc, quod audierant, quod viderant, quod tractabant* (viz. *Apostoli*) *verbum vita erat, & nihil aliud ex duabus Naturis, quam Unum juxta Subsistentiam vel Personam. Hieronym. Tom. 9. p. 113. Edit. Paris. apud Nivellum, 1579.* So that I am in good hopes, that for the future St. *Jerome*'s Authority will not be alledged against expressing the *Divine Persons* by *Hypostases* ; till it be proved, that there cannot be a *Greek* and a *Latin* Word for one and the same Thing : For, what *ὑπόστασις* signifies in the *Greek*, That, it is certain, *Subsistentia* signifies and declares to us in the *Latin*.

St. Austin. As for St. *Austin*, though he looks upon the Word *Hypostasis*, or *Subsistentia*, as new and strange to the *Latines*, in the fence, in which it was used by the *Greeks*, yet he is so far from abridging the *Greeks* in their way of speaking, that he very amicably allows even of those *Latines* also, who chose to follow the *Greek* Expression, as to this Particular, in his 5th Book *de Trin. Chap. 8, 9.* where he tells us, *Qui hæc tractant Græco eloquio dicunt*
μίαν

μιαροστιαρ, τρεῖς υπότασσις. Latinè ista tractantes cum aliis modum aptiorem non inventarent, quo enuntiarent verbis, dicunt Unam Essentiam vel Substantiam, Tres autem Personas, *ibid.* By which this *Father* manifestly shews, That the *Latines* indeed understood the very same Thing by *Persona*, which the *Greeks* did by *ὑπότασσις*; and that they really rendred one by the other, though they were not generally so ready to use the Term. And here I suppose the Reader will easily perceive, that my Intent is not to establish the use of the *Words* hitherto pleaded for, upon the Authority of St. *Austin*, (for the *Cafe* needs it not) but only to shew, That albeit this *Father* does both particularly consider, and expressly speak of the said Terms, yet he does not in the least reject, or disallow of them. But however, in the same Book he proceeds to another Topick very much to our present purpose, *viz.* his stating the *Divine Personalities* upon *Relation*, in these Words, *In Deo nihil secundum Accidens dicitur, quia in eo nihil est mutabile.* Nec tamen omne quod dicitur, secundum Substantiam dicitur, sed secundum Relativum: *Quod tamen Relativum non est Accidens, quia non est mutabile; ut filius dicitur Relative ad Patrem, &c.* Whereby (as we have said) founding *Personality* in, and upon something *Relative*, he sufficiently proves, That the same neither is, nor can be placed in *Self-Consciousness*; this being a Term, in the import of it, perfectly *Absolute*, and containing nothing *Relative* in it at all.

Next to St. *Austin*, we will produce *Rufinus* a Writer *Rufinus*. of the 4th Century, and flourishing about the latter end of it; who, in the short Account he gives us of what was done in the forementioned *Synod* of *Alexandria*, for the Peace of the *Church*, and the closing up the Division between the *Greeks* and the *Latines* about the *Words*

στια and *ὑπόστασις*, in Chap. 29. of the first Book of his History, tells us, That although some thought that both these Words were Synonymous, and consequently that as *Three Substances* were by no means to be admitted in the *Trinity*, so neither ought we to acknowledge *Three Subsistences* therein, yet that others, and those much the greater, and more prevailing part, judged quite otherwise; in these Words. *Alii vero quibus longè aliud Substantia quam Subsistentia significare videbatur, dicebant quod Substantia rei alicujus Naturam rationemque, quā constat, designet; Subsistentia autem uniuscujusque Personae hoc ipsum quod extat & subsistit, ostendat; ideoque propter Sabellii Hæresin tres esse Subsistencias confitendas, quod quasi Tres Subsistentes Personas significare viderentur, ne suspicionem daremus tanquam istius fidei sectatores essemus, qua Trinitatem in Nominibus tantum, ac non in Rebus, ac Subsistentiis confitetur.* So that we see here a full, and clear Account both of the Sence of this Word, and of the Reason, Why the *Church* thought fit to establish the use of it with reference to the *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity*.

Boetius.

Another Testimony shall be from *Boetius* who flourished about the beginning of the 6th Century. He in Chap. 2. of his Book *de duabus Naturis in unā Personā Christi*, first gives us this Definition of a Person, that it is *Rationabilis Naturae individua Subsistentia*, (according to which, our Author's War-Horse is like to fall from his Personal Dignity.) And afterwards, having discoursed about the difference of *στια*, *ὑπόστασις*, and *ὑπόστασις*, he concludes the said Chapter thus. *Hec omnia idcirco sunt dicta, ut differentiam Naturae atque Personae, id est στιας atque ὑπόστασεως monstraremus: Quo verò nomine unumquodque oporteat appellari, Ecclesiastice sit locutionis Arbitrium; ut tamen hoc interim constet, quod inter Naturam Personamque differre prædiximus.*

diximus. By all which he gives us a very Plain, Rational, and Scholastick Account of this Matter.

The next, whom I shall produce to Vouch the same *Ruficus Diaconus*, who lived and flourished about the middle of the Sixth Century. . He in Chap. 6. of his Book *contra Acephalos*; tells the *Nestorian Heretick*, (whom he is there by way of Dialogue disputing with) That *Subsistentia interdum Personam significat, non nunquam vero Substantiam.* And accordingly, that the Council of *Ephesus* distinguished in our *Saviour, aliud & aliud*, viz. in respect of his *Two Natures*, but not *alium & alium* in respect of his *Person*, which was but *One*: And this quite contrary to what we observe in the *Trinity*, *Illic enim aliis & aliis, ne Subsistencias confundamus; non vero aliud & aliud. Unum enim Tria & idem Deitate.* To which Words of the *Synod*, this Author subjoyns these of his own. *Ecce manifestissime Synodi Universalis Authoritas Subsistencias pro Personis suscepit atque laudavit.* This also, I think, is very full and satisfactory.

I shall close these particular Testimonies with Two *Liberatus Diaconus* Passages in the Appendix to the Breviary of *Liberatus Diaconus*. the Deacon, who also lived about the middle of the Sixth Century, as I find it in *Crabb's Collection of the Councils*, Tom. 2. P. 126. Col. 2. and which the very Learned Dr. *Cave* observes, is the only Edition of the *Councils*, where it is to be found. The first Passage is this. *Idem Natura & Substantia, quod commune, non proprium significat, & idem Persona & Subsistentia, quod proprium, & non commune declarat.* And the other follows about Ten Lines after in the same Column. *Sancte ergo Trinitatis una quidem est Natura atque Substantia. Communis est enim Trium Substantia, non autem una Subsistentia, seu Persona Trium, viz. Patris, & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti, sed Tres Subsistentiae sunt.* In which certainly we have

have so very clear and pregnant a Declaration of the Thing Contended for by us, that a clearer cannot possibly be given, nor reasonably desired.

The *Late-*
rn Council
under
Martin the First.

And therefore to add no more Private, or Single Authorities, I shall conclude all with that of a *Council*; not a General one indeed, but that *Lateran* held under Pope *Martin the First* of 105 Bishops about the Year 649,

or 650, and by way of Preparation for the Sixth General one, and of *Constantinople* the third; called (as we have already shewn) by *Constantinus Pogonatus*, and held the following Year against the *Monothelites*. The first Decree of which said *Lateran Synod*, is this : *Siquis secundum Sanctos Patres non confitetur propriè & veraciter Patrem, Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum, Trinitatem in Unitate & Unitatem in Trinitate, hoc est, unum Deum in Tribus Subsistentiis consubstantialibus, æqualis gloriae, unam, eandemque Trium Deitatem, Naturam, Substantiam, & Virtutem, &c. sit condemnatus.* Now this does as manifestly place the *Three Divine Persons* in *Three distinct Subsistences*, as it is possible for Words to express. For it is evident, that by *Subsistentiis* cannot be here meant *Substantiis*; forasmuch as [*Substantiis consubstantialibus*] would neither be Truth, nor Sence.

And now, all that I pretend to from the foregoing Testimonies and Quotations, is not to prove, that the *Latin Church* has alway made use of the Terms *Hypostases*, *Subsistente, & Modi Subsistendi*, about the Explication of the *Trinity*, (for I own it to have been otherwise,) but that from the Fourth Century downward, those of that Communion were not Strangers to, and unacquainted with these Words; many great and Eminent Writers having from time to time more or less applyed them to this Purpose. But the main Proof of the Point driven at I state upon the Latter Ages of the *Catholick Church*.

Concerning

Concerning which I dare and do affirm, That for the Five or Six last Centuries, the said Terms have been Universally received and used by *Divines* in their Writings and Discourses about the *Trinity*; all stating the *Personalities* and *distinction* of the *Divine Persons* upon so many *distinct Subsistences*, or *Modes of Subsistence*; therein following the *Greek Fathers*, who were much more versed in this Controversie, and managed it much better and more exactly than the Ancient *Latines* did.

Accordingly, I shall proceed now to the *School-men*; *Lombard.* amongst whom I shall begin with the Father of them, *viz.* Peter *Lombard*, who in *Book 1.* of his *Sentences*, *Distinct.* 25. and *Point*, or *Seck.* 9. speaks thus. *Cum dicatur alia est Persona Patris, alia Filiī, alia Spiritū Sancti, utique id sane intelligi potest, ut sit sensus talis; Alia est Subsistētia, vel Hypostasis Patris, alia Subsistētia Filii, alia Subsistētia Spiritū Sancti; & alia Subsistētia Pater, alia Filius, alia Spiritus Sanctus.* By which surely it is plain, That he states the *Divine Persons* and their *Personalities* upon *Subsistence*, if any thing can be so.

Next to *Lombard*, I shall produce *Aleensis*, who in *Vol. 1.* *Alexander Aleensis.* and *Book 1.* *de Divinis nominibus in speciali*, has these Passages. *In Divinis non dicatur una subsistētia, sicut una substantia.* Quæst. 57. Memb. 3. And *Tres sunt Hypostases unius Essentiae*, Quæst. 58. Memb. 3. And *Persona est Hypostasis proprietate sua distincta*. Quæst. 58. Memb. 4. By all which he manifestly Asserts the thing here contended for.

After him, let us see what *Durandus* says, who undertaking to give the signification of *Substantia*, *Subsistētia*, *Essentia* and *Persona*, with reference to *God*, in order to the Explication of the Term *Subsistētia*, first tells us, What it is to *Subsist*, in these Words. *Subsistere dicit determinatum essendi modum, prout scilicet aliquid est Ens*

Ens per se, & non in alio. A little after which, he tells us, That *Nomen Personæ dicit suppositum Intellectualis Naturæ, cui omnia Prædicta convenient, scil. Essentia, Substantia & Subsistentia.* By which he gives us a most exact Account and Definition of a *Person*; which (in Intelligent Beings) is nothing else but an *Essence*, or *Substance* (Terms Synonymous in God) under a *Subsistence* peculiarly belonging to it. And in the end of this Question, he further explains the *Personalities* of the *Divine Persons* by so many *distinct Relations*, in these Words. *Persona, quæ multiplicatur in Divinis, includit in eo, de quo dicitur, aliquid, quod non est omnino idem secundum rem vel ex naturâ rei cum Essentiâ vel Substantiâ, scilicet Relationem; ratione cujus plurificatur Persona in Divinis, & non essentia.* Durandus Lib. i. Distinct. 23. Quæst. 2.

Aquinas.

Thomas Aquinas also we shall find giving his Judgment to the same purpose, and that very fully and clearly. *Dicendum* (says he) *quòd quamvis hoc Nomen [Substantia] in Latino respondere videatur huic Nomini [Hypostasis] in Græco, non tamen omnino idem significat secundum usum utriusque linguae.* Nam hoc nomen [Hypostasis] apud Græcos significat tantum Substantiam particularē quæ est substantia prima; sed Latini utuntur Nominē Substantiæ tam pro primi quam pro secundi. *Substantia autem particularis nihil aliud videtur, quam quid distinctum Subsistens.* Cū ergo in Divinis invenitur aliquid distinctum subsistens, recte ibi Nomen [Hypostasis] dici potest, secundum quod Divina verbis humanis significari continet. And again, *Dicendum quòd hoc Nomen [Persona] non differt ab hoc nomine [Hypostasis] nisi quòd addit determinatam Naturam; quod patet ex hoc, quòd Hypostasis est Individualia substantia. Persona verò Individualia substantia Rationalis Naturæ.* Hypostasis ergo in Rationali Naturâ accepta nihil aliud est, quam Persona, sicut Animal cum Rationali Actu

Actu nihil aliud est quam Homo. Unde cum Divina Naturae sit Rationalis, (largo modo accipiendo Rationale pro quolibet Intellectuali) oportet quod Hypostasis Divina sit idem quod Persona Divina. And presently after, as to the Relative Nature of this Hypostasis, he adds this at the end of the Article. *Sicut ergo hoc Nomen [Persona] in Divinis significat Relationem per modum rei Subsistens, sic & hoc Nomen [Hypostasis.]* Thomas in Scripto 2. in Sentent. Lib. 1. Distinct. 26. Quæst. 1. Artic. 1, 2. And again in his Comment upon the Epistle to the Romans, Cap. 1. *Nihil aliud est Persona quam Hypostasis aut suppositum Rationalis Naturæ.*

Next to Thomas, let us hear Cajetan, one of the most ^{Cajetan.} Eminent Commentators upon him, who defending Bonaventure against Scotus, speaks thus as to this particular. *Substantia dupliciter sumitur, & pro Essentiâ & pro Hypostasi (i. e.) Subsistentiâ.* Atque hoc secundo modo Substantia, id est, Hypostasis dicitur formaliter de Personâ Divinâ, & quod simul ac semel Persona Divina est Hypostasis & tamen Relatio. Adding these Words immediately hereupon. *Hæc omnia communia sunt omnibus Theologis.* Cajetan in 1^m Thomæ, Quæst. 40. Artic. 2.

From Cajetan I shall pass to Greg. de Valentia, who ^{Greg. de Valentia.} discourses of the Divine Persons and Personalities thus. *Ex hoc consequenter apparet, debere concedi in Divinis Tres Subsistencias respectivas, non solum ut Subsistentia accipitur pro Totâ Personâ, ut definitio Ecclesiæ declarat; sed etiam ut accipitur pro gradu illo ultimo Substantiali constitutive Personam & redditne illam incommunicabilem, quem Theologi appellare solent Subsistentiam, & est ipsa Personalitas.* G. de Valentia Tom. 1. Disputat. generali 2. Quæst. 3. Artic. 2.

p. 741.

To Gregory de Valentia, we will subjoin Estius, who ^{Estius.} speaking of the Words *Persona* and *Hypostasis* as they

were used by the Greeks and Latines, and of the fence of the Fathers about them, speaks thus. *Horum Authoritatem posteriores Greco ita sunt secuti, ut Hypostasim in Divinis non aliud intelligent, quam quod Latini Personam vocant, maximè cum in promptu non esset aliud Vocabulum, quo Subsistentiam illam personalem, quâ inter se distinguuntur Pater, & Filius, & Spiritus Sanctus, commode atque inoffensè exprimerent.* Estius in sentent. lib. 1. Distinct. 23. Articulo 3. By which Words it appears, That according to this Author, it is this *Personalis Subsistentia*, by which the *Three Divine Persons* are distinguished, and consequently in which the proper *Personality* of each of them does consist.

Suarez.

After *Estius* let us cast our Eye upon *Suarez*, speaking much the same Thing with those before mentioned. *Advertendum est* (says he) *hoc nomen [Subsistentia] apud Antiquos Patres frequentius accipi in Vi concreti ad significandam Hypostasim seu Personam.* *In quo sensu nulla est Questio inter Catholicos, nam de fide est, dari in Trinitate Tres Subsistencias realiter distinctas, id est Tres Hypostases.* *Suarez in 1^m Thomæ de Trinitatis Mysterio lib. 3. cap. 4.* And then again for the *Relative Nature* of the said *Subsistences*, he gives this Account of the *Divine Persons* and their *Personalities*. *Ex his que hactenus diximus, &c. concluditur Relationem Personalem esse etiam proprietatem constituentem Personam [seu quâ constituitur Persona.]* *De Trinit. lib. 7. cap. 7.* in the beginning.

Ripalda.

To all which I shall add, *Martinez Ripalda*, a short, but Judicious Writer upon the Sentences, speaking of the Term [*Hypostasis*] in these Words. *Heretici* (says he) *referente Hieronymo, eâ voce abutebantur ad decipiens dum fideles; jam eâ significantes Essentiam, jam Personalitatem & incommunicabilem Subsistentiam.* By which last Expression this Author manifestly shews, That he takes *Personality*

Personality and Incommunicable Subsistence for Words synonymous ; and consequently that such a *Subsistence* is and must be that, by which a *Divine Person* is constituted formally, what he is.

I cannot think it necessary to quote any more of this sort of Writers, nor am I sollicitous to alledge many of them, because I am well assured (according to the forecited Saying of *Cajetan*) that *these are the Terms, and this the Language of them all upon this Subject*. Only I think fit to remark this : That, whereas I have alledged some of the *School-men* (and particularly *Durandus*, *Thomas*, and *Suarez*) expressing the *Divine Personalities* by *Relations*, as well as by *Hypostases*, or *Subsistences*, as they do in both these mean but one and the same Thing, *viz.* a *Relative Subsistence*, or a *Subsisting Relation*; so by both of them they equally overthrow this Author's *Hypothesis*, deriving the *Divine Personalities* from *Self-Consciousness*. Forasmuch as *Subsistence* is in *Nature* before it, and *Relation* is opposite to it ; it having been demonstrated by me in Chap. 4. That *Self-Consciousness* is a Thing wholly *Absolute* and *Irrelative*, and therefore cannot possibly be the *Formal Reason* of that which is *Essentially Relative*. In a word, *Self-Consciousness* is neither an *Hypostasis*, nor a *Relation*; and therefore can have nothing to do here, whatsoever other Employment this Author may have for it.

And now I shall at last descend to the Testimony of several *Modern Divines*, and all of them Men of Note in the Times in which they lived. And amongst these, let us first hear *Philip Melancthon* in his common places speaking thus upon this Head. *Satis constat* (says he) *veteres Scriptores Ecclesiae solitos h.e.c duo vocabula discernere στιαν & υπόστασιν, & dicere unam esse στιαν, id est, E-*

sentiam eternam Patris, & Fili, & Spiritus Sancti, sed tres ὑποτάσσεις.

Cheznitius From him we will pass to *Cheznitius* who Wrote upon *Melancthon's Common Places*: He in the first Chapter of his Book *de duabus in Christo Naturis*, gives his Opinion thus. *Hypostases seu Personae Trinitatis omnes unum sunt propter Identitatem Essentiae sua, atque ad eum non differunt Essentialiter, nec separatim una extra aliam & sine aliâ subsistit.* And presently after this, *Relatione autem seu τεχνώ υπάρχεις, modo scilicet Subsistendi realiter differunt.*

Calvin. After *Cheznitius* let us consider what *Calvin* says; in Book 1. of his *Institutions*, Chap. 13. Sect. 2. *Filiū Dei Apostolus characterem Hypostaseos Patris nominans, haud dubiè aliquam Patri Subsistentiam assignat in quā differat à Filio. Nam pro Essentiâ accipere (sicuti fecerunt quidam Interpretes, &c.) non durum modò sed absurdum quoquè esset.* And again in Sect. 6. of the same Chapter. *Personam voco Subsistentiam in Dei essentiâ, quæ ad alios relata proprietate incommunicabili distinguitur. Subsistentia nomine aliud quiddam intelligi volumus quam Essentiam.*

Peter Martyr. In the next place *Peter Martyr* gives us the same Account of the same Subject. *Multò rectius* (says he) *& verius intelligemus ex isto loco* (nempe 2 Samuelis Cap. 7. Commate 23.) *Tres Personas in Unâ Naturâ Divinâ, Patrem, inquam, Filium & Spiritum Sanctum, quæ cum sint Tres Hypostases, tamen concluduntur in Unam Essentiam.* *Petrus Martyr Loc. Com. p. 50. col. 2. Loco de Dei Attributis & Sacro-Sanctâ Trinitate.*

Wolfgang. Musculus. Likewise *Wolfgangus Musculus* in his Common Places under the particular Head or common Place *de Deo*, declares the Matter thus. *Est itaque Deus Essentiâ unus quemadmodum & Naturâ & Divinitate, Hypostasi vero Tri-nus.* And a little after, *Hec sunt manifestâ fide tenenda, Deum,*

Deum, viz. *Esse Unum Essentia, Naturam, Divinitatem, sentientiam, motionem, & Operationem, Trinum vero Tribus Personis, quorum singulis sua est Hypostasis & Proprietas.* Musc. Loc. Comm. cap. 6. p. 7. And a little before speaking of the difference of *sotia* and *ιωστασις*, and in what sense the *Ancients* understood these Words. *Voce Essentiae* (says he) *id expresserunt (nempe Veteres) quod commune est in Sacra Triade: per Hypostasim vero quod Unicuique Personae proprium in illa est, significarunt.* p. 6. ibid.

Piscator also in his *Theological Theses*, speaks after the *Piscator.* same manner. *Quum igitur λόγος semper fuerit filius Dei, quis non videt λόγον de quo loquitur Johannes, semper fuisse Personam seu Hypostasim, rem scilicet per se Subsistentem,* Loc. 2. de Deo. p. 57, 58.

Agreeably to this, *Tilenus* an Eminent Divine expresses himself in his Body of Divinity, *ιωστασις* (says he) *sive Personae sunt illa ipsa sotia que in singulis Personis est Tota; ipsae vero Relationibus sive Proprietatibus χαρακτηριకais sunt distinctae.* And again, *Simplicer dicimus Proprietates istas διακριτicas esse diversos τρόπους ὑπάρξεως hoc est, modos Subsistendi.* *Tilenus.* Syntag. par. I. cap. 20. p. 129.

The Learned *Ursinus* in his *Theological Treatises* under *Ursinus.* the Head *De tribus Personis in Una Deitate* declares the same. *Tenendum est, nequaquam eandem esse Patris, Filii & Spiritus Sancti Personam; sed Tres esse Personas seu Hypostases Divinitatis reipsa distinctas, nec plures nec pauciores.* *Ursini Oper. Theol. Quæst. 4. Thesi 2.* By which we see that this great Divine reckons *Subsistence* to be so much the Ground and Reason of Personality, that he uses *Persona* and *Hypostasis* as Terms perfectly equivalent.

But there would be no end of Particulars should I *Ursinus.* quote all that might be quoted, and therefore I shall conclude.

conclude all these single Testimonies with that of *Turretinus*, late Professor of Divinity at Geneva, who gives us this full and Judicious Account, in his common Places, of the Point here before us. *Fides Orthodoxa haec est, in Unitate Simplicissimâ Dei Essentia Tres esse distinctas Personas, one Proprietatis Incommunicabilibus size Modis Subsistentes ita inter se distinguuntur, ut una non sit alia, sicut per ineffabilem περιχώρην manent semper & existant in se invicem.* Turretinus part. i. Loco 3. Quæst. 28.

*The Aug
ustan
Confessi
on*

In the last place to confirm the Testimonies of particular Persons, with the joyned Suffrage and Concurrence of whole Churches in their Publick Confessions, I shall mention some of them. And amongst these, the *Augustan*, or *Ansb erg Confession*, gives this Account of the Trinity. *Ecclesia Scilicet Reformatæ magnus consensu accepit Decretum Synodus Nicene credendum esse, viz. Quid sit Una Essentia Divina, & tamen sint Tres Personæ eiusdem Essentie, &c. Et Utuntur nomine Personæ ex significatione quæ sit suæ Scriptores Ecclesiastici, ut significet non partem, aut qualitatem, sed quid propriæ Subsistit.* Confessio Augustana in Articulo fidei 1.

*The Wirt
emberg Conf
ession*

Next to this we have the *Wirtemberg Confession* declaring the same in the very beginning of it. *Credimus & confitemur Unum solum Deum, &c. Et in hic uni & Aeternâ Deitate Tres esse per se Subsistentes proprietates seu Personas, Patrem, Filium & Spiritum Sanctum.* This Confession was made and given forth in the Year 1552.

*The Gal
lican Conf
ession*

Likewise the *Gallican Reformed Churches* in their Confession made in the Reign of *Charles the IX.* and in the Year 1561. declare themselves much the same way upon this Article. *Sancta Scriptura nos docet in illi singulari & simplice Essentia Divina Subsistere Tres Personas, Patrem, Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum.*

Add to these the Belgick Confession also, recognized, approved, and ratifyed in the Synod of Dore; which in its eighth Article speaks of the *Divine Persons* in the *Blessed Trinity* thus. *Hec distinctio [viz. Personarum] non efficit ut Deus in Tres sit divisus, quandoquidem Scriptura nos docet Patrem, Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum singulos distinctam habere suis Proprietatibus Hypostasis,* which Words are extremely expressive and full.

But as touching these Confessions, the Reader ought not in Reason to be disatisfied that I produce no more of them to the present purpose, (out of those many which are extant) since it has been still the Custom of most Churches to draw up their Confessions in Terms as general and short as they well could. So that we are the less to wonder if we seldom meet with such Words in them as are Explicatory and Particular.

And now after all these Authorities thus alledged by me, I would desire this Confident Man (whom I am here disputing with) to look back upon the fore-mentioned *Greek and Latin Fathers, Councils, School-men, and all those Eminent Modern Divines,* together with the *Clergy of whole Countreys and Nations,* Solemnly and Unanimously declaring themselves in their Publick Avowed *Confessions of Faith,* upon this great Article and Mystery; I say, I desire him to look all these in the Face, and to tell them, That they have hitherto abused the whole World with false Notions of the *Trinity*, by expressing the *Divine Persons* and *Personali ties* by *Hypostases, Subsistences, and Modes of Subsistence,* Words (as he says) importing little better than *Sabellianism,* and serving for nothing else but to obscure, perplex, and confound the Minds and Thoughts of Men in conceiving, or discoursing of this Weighty and Sacred Point of our *Christian Faith.* This, I require him, in defence of what

what he has so expressly, peremptorily, and Magisterially affirmed all along in his Book, to do ; if his *Heart* and *Forehead* will serve him for it.

In the mean time I have here delivered in all the Testimonies both *Greek* and *Latin*, *Ancient* and *Modern*, which I think fit to offer in behalf of the Point pleaded for : Though, should I have represented all that occurs in the fore-cited Authors (besides many others not mentioned) to the same purpose, I should not so much have *quoted*, as (upon the Matter) *Transcribed* them.

And now, if any one should ask me, Whether I look upon these Testimonies as sufficiently representing the Doctrine of the *Catholick Church* upon this Head of *Divinity* ?

I Answer, That barely by way of *Induction* they do not ; since an *Induction* ought to consist of a greater Collection of Particulars. Nevertheless I avouch this number of Testimonies to be a full and sufficient Representation of the fence of the Church herein, if we consider them as joyned with, and supported by these Three following Considerations. As

First, That it is morally impossible, that the *Persons* above quoted, being of such Eminent Note in the Church, both for Orthodoxy and Learning, and Living (most of them) at such great distance both of Time and Place, (rendring all Communication between them impracticable) should, or could presume to express themselves upon so Sacred an Article, and so Tender a Point, but in such Terms as were generally received, used, and approved of by the Church.

Secondly, That these Terms were never yet Condemned, nor the Users of them Censured by any *Church*, or *Council*, accounted Orthodox ; which in so great, and so revered an Article they would infallibly have been, had

had they been judged *unfit* for, or *unapplicable* to, the Things to which they were actually applyed, as this bold Author with great Confidence affirms them to be.

Thirdly and Lastly, That hardly any Church-Writer of considerable Remark and Name can be produced, who ever treated of this great Subject in any other Terms than those expressed by us, or particularly made use of the Terms *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* to explain it by. All being wholly silent of them in all those Writings in which they do most particularly and exactly design a Discussion of these Matters.

These Three Considerations, I say, added to the fore-alledged Quotations irrefragably prove them to be a true, just, and sufficient Representation of the Sence and Doctrine of the *Catholick Church* in this Matter; and that it is utterly inconsistent with the Common Reason, Principles and Practice of Mankind, that it should be otherwise. And as for what concerns this Author, whom I am disputing with, I dare affirm yet further, that any one or two of the Passages quoted by me, are more full and clear to the purpose I quote them for, than all that he has produced from the several *Fathers* alledged by him for his *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* put together; and much more than his forlorn *νοεῖσθαι τι χρῆμα* cited out of Gr. Nyssen to prove the *Son an Infinite Mind distinct from the Father*, Page 102. That is to say, than Three vagrant Words applyed by him, *to be knowns not what*, and *to be found* (for ought appears) *he knows not where*.

All which being manifestly so, I desire any Sober Person to shew me something but like a Reason to prove, That the *Fathers* and other *Church-Writers* (from whom all these Quotations were drawn) placed the *Personal*

Distinction of the Divine Persons in Self-Consciousness, and their Unity only in Mutual-Consciousness. On the contrary, as these Words were never so much as mentioned by them, so I affirm, That, whensoever, in speaking of the Trinity they proceed beyond the bare Word and Name of Person, so as to give any Account of the Thing signified thereby, and the Reason thereof, they do it constantly by *Subsistences*, *Modes of Subsistence*, and *Relations*. This I am positive in ; and withal, that, as they never mention the Terms *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* upon this Subject, so I averr moreover, That when they use the Words *Subsistences*, *Modes of Subsistence* and *Relations* on the one side, and of *Unity*, or *Identity of Nature*, *Essence*, or *Substance* on the other, (which they always do) they neither do, nor can mean *Self-Consciousness* by the former, nor *Mutual-Consciousness* by the latter, nor yet the Things signified by either of these Terms. And that for these Reasons.

First, Because all *Modes of Being* importing *Existence*, are in Order of *Nature* antecedent to the other Attributes of *Being*; such as are *Knowledge*, *Wisdom*, *Power*, and the like. And *Self-Consciousness* is no more; as being but a branch, or sort of *Knowledge*, and nothing else. And

Secondly, Because nothing *Absolute* can give *Distinction* and *Incommunicability* to the *Divine Persons*, the Rule of the Schools being undeniably true, *Non dari in Divinis Absolutum Incommunicabile*, Gr. Valent. Tom. I. Pag. 874. But such a Thing I affirm *Self-Consciousness* to be, and in *Chap. 4.* have abundantly proved it so. So that it is evident, That all the *Fathers* and *Ancient Writers* in all the Terms which they used to express the *Trinity* and *Divine Persons* by, had no regard to *Self-Consciousness*, either *Name* or *Thing*, and consequently,

ly that it is a Term wholly foreign and unapplicable to this purpose. And what is said of their silence about *Self-Consciousness* extends to *Mutual-Consciousness* too.

And the Truth is, the other forementioned Terms asserted by us against this Innovator, are to be looked upon by all Sober Intelligent Men as a set of stated Words, or Forms of Expression first pitched upon by the Ablest *Divines* and *Writers* of the *Church*, then countenanced and owned by *Councils*, and lastly established by a kind of Prescription founded upon a long continued use of the same throughout the several Ages of the *Church*, as the best and fittest helps to guide Men in their Conceptions of, and Discourses about this great Mystery ; and such as the *Church*, in treating of so arduous a Point, never yet would, nor durst go beyond. So that the Question now is, Whether they ought to be abandoned and made to give place to a New, Mushroom, unheard of Notion, set up by one Confident Man preferring himself before all Antiquity ? A Notion, (no doubt) long before he was Born, throughly considered, canvased and laid aside, as not only insufficient, but Impertinent to give any tolerable Account of the *Trinity* by.

Well ; but having declared this for the *Catholick*, *Orthodox*, and *Received Doctrine* about the *Blessed Trinity*, viz. *That it is one and the same Divine Nature, Essence, or Substance diversified into Three distinct Persons by Three distinct Modes of Subsistence, or Relations, so that by virtue thereof God is truly and properly said to be Three Persons, and Three Persons to be One God*. Having, I say, vouch'd this for the *Doctrine* of the *Church*, let us in the last place see what this Author has to object against it. And here his

First Reason (to put it into Form for him for once) may run thus : Whatsoever constitutes and distinguishes

the *Divine Persons*, is really and truly in God, but *Modes of Subsistence* are not really and truly in God, and therefore *Modes of Subsistence* do not constitute, or distinguish the *Divine Persons*. The Major is evident, and shall be readily granted him. And the Minor he positively asserts, by denying any *Modes* to be in God, as particularly in Page 47. in these Words. *All Men grant* (says he) *that there are no Accidents, Qualities, or Modes in God*. And again, Pag. 84. *There are no Modes, no more than there are Qualities and Accidents in the Deity*. So that we see here what this Author holds concerning all *Modes* with reference to God.

In Answer to which Argument, as I have formed it (and I challenge him to shew that I have at all wronged him in it, if he can) I deny the Minor, viz. *That Modes of Subsistence are not in God*: And as for his Two forecited general Assertions: *That Modes are no more to be allowed in God than Qualities and Accidents* (which by the way are so put together, as if *Qualities* were not *Accidents*) I have these Two Things to remark upon those Two Assertions so positively laid down by him.

First, That it is a gross Absurdity, and no small proof of Ignorance, to reckon things so vastly different as *Modes* and *Accidents* are, upon the same Range, or Level, and then to argue and affirm the same thing of both. And therefore I do here with the same Positiveness tell him, That *Modes* and *Accidents* do extremely differ; and that none of any skill either in *Logick*, or *Metaphysicks* ever accounted them the same. For an *Accident* affects the Subject, it belongs to, so, that it is also a *distinct Being* it self. But a *Mode* affects it so, that it is not a *distinct Being* it self. I will not deny but *Accidents* may sometimes in a large and loose sense be called *Modes*: But I deny, That *Modes* are either *Accidents*, or ever so called, where

where they are particularly and distinctly treated of by themselves. *School-men* and *Metaphysicians* may speak very differently of *Modes* when they mention them *occasionally*, and when they discourse of them *professedly*, and under a certain and peculiar Head. And whensoever they do so, if this Author can bring me any one *Logician*, *Metaphysician*, or *School-man* who takes *Accidents* and *Modes* promiscuously for the same Things, I dare undertake to forfeit to him a greater Sum, than ever yet he received for Copy-money in his Life.

Secondly, My next Remark upon his foregoing Assertion is this : 'That as it is grossly absurd to confound *Modes of Being* with *Accidents*; so it is equally absurd to deny *Modes of Being* to belong to *God*. And this I shall prove both from the manifest Reason of the Thing, and from Unquestionable Authority. And

First, For the Reason of the Thing. If *Modes of Being* should not be allowed in *God*, then I affirm it to be impossible for any Distinction, and consequently for any *Persons* to be in *God*. Which I prove thus. If there be any distinction in *God*, or the *Deity*, it must be either from some distinct *Substance*, or some *Accident*, or some *Mode of Being*, (for I desie him or any Mortal breathing to assign a fourth Thing besides these.) But it cannot be from any distinct *Substance*, for that would make a manifest Composition in the *Divine Nature*; nor yet from any *Accident*, for that would make a worse Composition: And therefore it follows, That this *Distinction* must unavoidably proceed from one or more distinct *Modes of Being*. This I affirm, and (according to my promise made to this Author in the foregoing Chapter) I shall be ready to defend the Truth of this Assertion against him, whensoever he shall think fit to engage in the Dispute.

Secondly,

Secondly, In the next place, for the proof of this from Authority, I affirm, that all *Metaphysicians, School-men* and *Divines* (at least, all that I have yet met with) do unanimously concur in these Two Things.

1. That they utterly deny any *Accidents* in *God*.
And

2. That they do as universally affirm *Modes of Being* to be in *God*, and to belong to him. Nay, and (which is more) That they do in these very *Modes* state the Ground and Reason of the *Personalities*, and the distinction thereof respectively belonging to the *Three Persons* of the *Godhead*.

And for a further proof of what I have here affirmed, and withal to shew how unable this Man's *Memory* is to keep pace with his *Confidence*, whereas in the fore-mentioned page 47. he affirms, *That all Men* (mark this Word) *deny Accidents, Qualities and Modes to be in God*. He himself afterwards, in page 48. owns, *That the School-men hold these different Modos Subsistendi in the Godhead*, and accordingly there sets himself (as well as he is able) to confute them for it. Now how shall we reconcile these blind Assertions, that so cruelly butt and run their Heads against one another? For will he say, *That the School-men do not grant such Modes to be in God*, after he himself has done his poor utmost to confute them for holding it? Or having said, *That all Men deny these Modes to be in God, and yet that the School-men grant and hold it*, will he say, *That the School-men are not Men*, and so come not under that Universal Appellative? What the *School-men* hold and assert in this Matter, has been sufficiently shewn already. But I must needs tell this Author upon this occasion, *That he seems to have something a bad Memory, and withal to have more than ordinary need of a very good one.*

There

There is one Thing more which I think fit to observe, and it is something pleasant, *viz.* That our Author having exploded all *Modos Subsistendi* in God, and Chastised the School-men for holding them, even to a forfeiture of their very *Humanity*; he yet vouchsafes afterwards, by a kind of Correctory Explication, to allow them in this fence, *viz.* *That the same Numerical Essence is whole and entire in each Divine Person, but in a different Manner,* P. 84. Lines 12, 13, 14. By which Words it appearing that he grants that of the *Manner*, which he had before denied of the *Modus*, it is a shrewd Temptation to me to think, That certainly this Acute Author takes *Modus* for one Thing, and *Manner* for another.

In fine, I appeal to the Judicious and Impartial Reader. Whether a Man could well give a more convincing Argument of his utter Unacquaintance with the True Principles of Philosophy and Theology, than by a Confident Assertion of these Two Positions.

1. That *Accidents* and *Modes of Being* are the same Things. And

2. That such *Modes* are not at all to be allowed of, or admitted in *God*.

Secondly, His Second Objection against our stating the distinction of the Divine Persons upon Three different Modes of Subsistence, is, That these Modes are little better than Three Names of One God. Which was the Heresie of *Sabellius*. P. 83.

To which, I Answer Two Things.

First, In direct and absolute Contradiction to what he asserts, I affirm, That the difference between Three Modes of Subsistence in the Godhead, and only Three distinct Names applyed to it, is very great. For Names and Words depend only upon the Will and Pleasure of the Imposer, and not upon the Nature of the Thing it self,

self, upon which they are imposed, and for that cause neither do nor can *Internally* affect it. But on the contrary, all *Modes of Subsistence* spring from the *Nature* of the *Thing*, or *Being*, which they affect, both antecedently to, and (by consequence) independently upon the Apprehension, or Will of any one. So that altho' neither Man nor Angel had ever considered, or thought of, or so much as known that there were such or such things; yet the *Modes of Subsistence* proper to them, would have belonged to them, as really and as much as they do now. And if this Author cannot by this see a vast difference between these, and so many bare *Names*, (thanks be to God) others can both see, and defend it too. But

Secondly, Whereas he says, *That these Three Modes are but little better than Three Names.* I Answer, That his very saying so is a Concession that they are something at least *more and better*. To which, I add further, That *this something* (as small a Difference as it makes) is yet sufficient to discriminate things, which are only *Distinguishable*, and no more. For *separable*, or *divisible* from one another, I am sure they are not. Nay, this is so far from being a just and rational Exception against placing the difference of the *Divine Persons* in so many different *Modes of Subsistence*, that, in the Judgment of very Great and Learned Men, it is no

small Argument for it: For

‘Ομούσιον τοῖνυν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πάτερ τὸν ὑὸν ὄμολογόντες ὑπάρχειν ἐν ἴδιᾳ τε ὑποτάσσει συναρφῶς τε ἀμα καὶ διωχσόμενως ἐνάθαι φαμεν· τοῦ, τὸ παυτότητος λόγοις αναγκαιοτάτως εὑ μάλα συγάπλουτες τῷ περσώπων ἦτοι

St. Cyril says, *That the difference between the Divine Persons (by reason of the perfect Unity of their Nature (as it were) blotting out, or taking away all Diversity between them) is so very small as but just to distinguish them,*

them, and no more; and to cause that One of them cannot be called the other; the Father not the Son, nor the Son, upon any Account, the Father, &c. I thought fit to Transcribe the whole Passage, tho' the latter part, viz. from the Words *īva μὴ ταύτης*, &c. is most immediately and directly to the Purpose, which I here alledge the whole for.

And *Thomas Aquinas* tells us, That the Divine Persons ought to be distinguished by that, which makes the least distinction.

In like manner *Durandus* affirms, That the first Instance of Plurality [or remove from Unity] ought to be the least. And therefore that the distinction of the Divine Persons, since it is the first, ought to be by distinct Relations compatible in the same Essence: Which for that cause, is a less distinction than any that can be made by Things Absolute.

And Lastly, *Bellarmino* averrs positively, That the distinction of the Divine Persons ought to be the least that is possible. Supposing all along, that it must still be Real, and not barely Nominal, or Imaginary. This was the Judgment of these

πῶν σιομάτων διατολών καὶ τῶν ὑποτάσσεων ἐτερότητα, τὸν δὲ Πατέρι καὶ νιώτην κατὰ αὐτὸν δὴ τελικὴν μόνον ἵνα μὴ ταύτης ὁ σιαστής πᾶν ὅτινον ἐμφερεῖ, καὶ τὸ καλλίτελον διαφορεῖν καὶ ὕσταυτῷς ἔχον απαρελάκιως ἐν τε τῷ Πατέρι καὶ τῷ νιώτην, καταλειποῦν τερόπον τινὰ τὸ διαφορεῖν καὶ δυσδιακρίσιον κομιδῆν τὸ ξιραμένος ὕδιον ἐκάλεται κατεργυσταῖς πῶς. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὗτοι Πατέρι καὶ νιώτης ὁ δὲ αὖτις καὶ εἴτε περὶ Πατέρον. &c. Cyril. Dial. 1. de Trinit. p. 4c9. Edit. Lutet. 1638.

Distinctio Personarum non debet esse nisi per id, quod minimum distinguit, hoc est, per Relationem. *Aquin. primā parte. Quæst. 40. Articulo 2. prope finem.*

Prima pluralitas debet esse minima; & ideo *distinctio Personarum*, quæ est prima, debet esse per Relationes compoſſibiles in eadem Essentiâ: Et ob hoc, est minor aliâ quacunque distinctione, quæ fit per Absoluta. *Durandus Lib. 1. Distinct. 16. Quæst. 1. in fine.*

Distinctio inter Divinas Personas debet esse minima. *Bellarminus Tom. 1. P. 337. Lutetiae Parisi.*

Learned Men ; who as they were far from being *Sabelians*, so they very well knew both what to assert and how to express themselves without giving any ground for their being thought so.

From all which it follows, That for this very cause, that *Modes of Subsistence* import the least *Real difference* that can be, they are therefore the fittest to state the *Distinction* of the *Divine Persons* upon. So that our Author here relapses into a fault which he has been guilty of more than once, viz. in alledging that as an Argument against a Thing, which is indeed a most *Effectual Reason for it*. And so I come to his

Third and Last Objection against our making these *Modes of Subsistence* the ground, or *Formal Reason* of the *Distinction* between the *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity*, which is, That it makes the Three *Divine Persons* only Three *Modes of the Deity*, or only Modally distinguished ; whereas (according to his Doctrine) there are no *Modes in the Deity*, and much less can a Mode be God. And that, As all must grant, that the Father is not a Mode of the Deity, but Essentially God ; so no Man can think that the Father begot only a *Modus*, and called it his Son ; whereas a Son signifies a Real Person of the same Nature, but distinct from the Father. Thus he discourses, pag. 83, 84. And is not this close and profound reasoning ? But as profound as it is, if it be at all to his Purpose, his Argument must lie in this, That all the forementioned Absurdities unavoidably follow from deriving the *Distinction* of the Three *Divine Persons* from Three distinct Modes of *Subsistence* belonging to one and the same *Divine Nature*. But this consequence I utterly deny, and to make out the Reason of this denial, I shall consider what he has said particularly.

And here, first of all, I would fain know, Whether this Man will never leave confounding things perfectly different, and taking them for the very same? For to affirm the *Three Divine Persons* to be only *Three Modes* of the *Deity* is one Thing; and to affirm them to be only *Modally distinguished*, is quite another. The former we absolutely deny, and as positively hold the latter. And yet this wretched Fallacy would he impose upon his Reader all along, *viz.* That the Assertors of these *Modes of Subsistence* in the *Trinity*, make a *Person* to be only a *Modus Subsistendi*. But that is his own Blunder. For we do not say, That a *Person* is *only a Modus*, but that it is the *Divine Nature*, or *Godhead* Subsisting under such a *Modus*; so that the *Godhead* is still included in it, joyned to it, and distinguished by it. This is what we affirm and abide by, and what sufficiently overthrows his pitiful Objection.

And as for his Absurd Denial of all *Modes* in *God*, that has been thoroughly confuted already; so that we have nothing more to do, but to admire that Invincible and Glorious Ratiocination of his in these Words, p. 84. *No Man* (says he) *can think that the Father begot only a Modus, and called it his Son.* No, good Sir, No; none that I know of is in any danger of thinking, or saying so; no more, than that *Socrates* begot only the Shape and Figure of a Man, and then called it his *Son*; or (to turn your own blunt Weapon upon your self) no more than *God the Father* begot another *Self-Consciousness* besides his own, and called that his *Son*. Nevertheless I hope it will be granted me, That *Socrates* might beget *one* of such a Shape and Figure, and (by this Author's and *Xantippe's* good leave) call that his *Son*; and that *God the Father* might beget a *Person* endued with such a *Self-Consciousness* (amongst other Attributes) and call

that his *Son* too. But I perceive this Author and the *Fallacy of the Accident* are such fast Friends, that it is in vain to think of parting them.

In the mean time, as I told him what we do not hold concerning the *Father's Generation* of the *Son*, so for his better Information I shall tell him, what the Assertors of these *Modes of Subsistence* do hold concerning it, *viz.* We do hold and affirm, That the *Father* Communicates his Nature under a different *Mode of Subsisting*, from what it has in himself, to another, and that such a Communication of it, in such a peculiar way, is properly called his begetting of a *Son*. In which we do not say, *That the Father begets a Modus*, no nor yet an *Essence, or Nature*, but that he Communicates his own *Essence, or Nature* under such a *distinct Modus* to another, and by so doing begets a *Person*, which *Person* is properly his *Son*. This, Sir, is the true Account of what the Assertors of the *Personal Modes of Subsistence* hold concerning the *Eternal Generation*. And if you have any thing to except against it, produce your Exceptions, and they shall not fail of an Answer.

I am now come to a close of this Chapter, and indeed of the whole Argument undertook by me against this Author. In which I have Asserted the commonly received Doctrine about this great Article of the *Trinity*, both from the *Ancient Writers* of the *Church*, and against this Author's particular Objections; and in both fully shewn, That the *Three Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity* are one and the same *undivided Essence, Nature, or Godhead*, diversified only by *Three distinct Modes of Subsistence*, which are sometimes called *Properties*, and sometimes *Relations*. So that a *Divine Person* is formally and properly the *Divine Nature, Essence, or Godhead with, and under such a distinct Mode, Property, or Relation*. And this I averr to be the common, current, generally received Doctrine

Doctrine of the *Church* concerning the *Trinity*. For *Councils* and *Fathers* hold it, the *School-men* teach it, the *Confessions of Churches* (where they are any thing particular upon this Subject) declare it; and all *Divines* both *Papist* and *Protestant*, in the several Bodies of *Divinity* wrote by them, do *Affirm* it; only this Author, who yet (forsooth) owns himself a *Protestant* of the *Church of England*, denies and explodes it. To whom therefore (if he were not too great in his own Eyes to be *Counseled* and *Advised*) I would give this Charitable piece of *Counsel* for once, *viz.* *That for the future he would not presume at such a rate to contradict the whole World, till he has learn'd not to contradict himself.*

C H A P. IX.

In which this Author's Paradoxes, both Philosophical and Theological, as they occur in this his Discourse, are drawn together, Examined, and Confuted.

I Am sensible, that I am now engaged in a Subject that would threaten the Reader with a very long Chapter, should I follow it, as far as it would carry me : For I am entered into a large Field, *viz.* this Author's *Paradoxical Assertions* : In the traversing of which, I shall observe no other Method, but just to take them in that order in which they offer themselves throughout his Book ; save only, that I shall give my Reader this premonition, That such of them as I have particularly examined, and laid open in the foregoing Animadversions, I shall now set down without any further Descant, or Enlargement upon them, or at least with very little.

But as for those, which I there passed over without any Notice, or Remark, (as I did it all along with full purpose to treat of them by themselves, so) I shall particularly insist upon them now. And the Reader may please to take them as they follow.

P A R A D O X.

It is a vain and arrogant presumption (says this Author) to say, What is, or what is not a Contradiction, when we confess

confess we do not understand, or comprehend the thing we speak of, p. 4. And again, *I know nothing in the World that we do perfectly understand,* p. 7. line 19.

Answer. According to these Two Assertions taken together, I affirm, That though a Man discourses never so falsly and inconsistently of God, or indeed of any thing in the World besides, yet he cannot justly be charged as guilty of a Contradiction. And moreover, since this Author affirms, page 97, That for any one to say, *That Three Divine Persons who are divided and separated from each other, are each of them God, and yet that they are not Three Gods, but one God, is a direct Contradiction;* I desire to know of him, *Whether he comprehends what the Godhead, and what the Divine Persons are?* And if not, *Whether (according to his own Rule) it is not a vain and arrogant Presumption in him to say what is a Contradiction, when he professes himself not to comprehend the thing he is speaking of, and about which the Contradiction is said to be?*

P A R A D O X.

This Author having declared the *Intimate and Essential Unity* between the *Father* and the *Son* from those Words of our *Saviour*, John 14th. Chap. 10th. Ver.. *I am in the Father, and the Father in me:* Subjoyns, *That this Oneness between them is such an Union, as there is nothing in Nature like it; and we cannot long doubt what kind of Union this is, if we consider that there is but one possible way to be thus United, and that is by this Mutual-Consciousness,* p. 57.

Answer. These Words I charge with Contradiction, and consequently with Absurdity upon two Accounts.

First, because they Contradict our Saviour's Words. And

Secondly, Because they Contradict the Author's own Words.

1. And first concerning those of our Saviour. Whereas this Author says, *That this Oneness between the Father and the Son, is such an Union, as there is nothing in Nature like it.* Our Saviour in John Ch. 17. (where this whole Passage is repeated twice) affirms something to be like it; viz. in ver. 11. where he prays to his Father, *That they (viz. Believers) may be One, as We (viz. his Father and Himself) are One:* And again, ver. 21. *That they may be One, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee.* So that our Saviour expressly asserts a *Likeness* of something to this Union on the one side; and this Author as expressly denies it on the other. In which (according to his blundering, undistinguishing way) he confounds [*Likeness*] and [*Sameness of kind*] as all One; as shall presently be further shewn.

In the next place, our Saviour (as plainly as Words can express a Thing) says, *That he and his Father are One, by a Mutual In-being, or In-existence in one another.* And this Man as expressly says, *That there is no possible way for them to be one but by Mutual-Consciousness.* But I on the contrary deny, That *Mutual-Consciousness* is *Mutual-Inexistence*, or *Mutual-Inexistence Mutual-Consciousness*, any more, than that *Being*, or *Existence* is properly *Consciousness*, or *Knowledge*; and therefore if they cannot possibly be one, but by *Mutual-Consciousness*, it is certain that they are not so by *Mutual-Inexistence*; which yet our Saviour, in Words properly and naturally signifying *Inexistence*, affirms that they are.

And the more intolerable is this Assertion in this Author, for that in Pag. 56. he affirms, that these Words of our Saviour *ought to be understood properly*; and if so, I hope they do not only exclude *Metaphors*, but all other *Tropes* and *Figures* also; for [*Proper*] is not, adequately opposed to *Metaphorical*, but to *Figurative*, whatsoever

ver the *Figure* be. And I do here affirm, That if our Saviour's Words be understood of *Mutual-Consciousness*, they do not signify *Properly*, but *Figuratively*; and the *Figure* is a *Metonymy* of the *Subject* for the *Adjunct*; forasmuch as in *God*, *Being*, or *Inexistence* are to be look'd upon as the *Subject*; and *Knowledge*, and the like Attributes as the *Adjuncts*. And therefore I do here tell this bold Man again, that for him to say, as he does, that the forementioned Words of our Saviour ought to be understood *properly*, and yet to interpret them to a fence not *Proper*, but *Figurative* (which, by interpreting them of *Mutual-Consciousness*, he evidently does) is both an *Absurdity* and a *Presumption*, equally insufferable. But in the

2d. Place I charge the forecited Passage of this Author with the same *Absurdity*, for being as *Contradictory* to his own words, as it was to those of our Saviour. For whereas he here says,

First, *That this Oneness between the Father and the Son, expressed in those Words, I am in the Father, and the Father in me, can be no other kind of Union, than an Union by Mutual-Consciousness.* And

Secondly, *That it is such an one, that there is nothing in Nature like it.*

I desire him to turn to *Page 106.* of his Book, where he tells us, *That the Fathers use several Examples, and allude to several sorts of Union, thereby to form a Notion of the Unity of the Godhead in the Three Divine Persons.* Let him, I say, read this, and tell me, Whether those *Examples and Allusions* could be of any use to *form a Notion of that Unity* to which they bore no *Resemblance* at all? For I, for my part, ever thought, that there can be no *Allusion* of one thing to another without some *Similitude* between them, and that a *Similitude* is always on both

sides ; it being not possible for *Peter* to be like *John*, but *John* must be like *Peter* too. And if this Man does not yet blush at such Contradictory Assertions, let him turn a little further to *Page 126, 127.* where he tells us particularly, that *St. Austin* explains this *Unity* by Examples of *Mutual-Consciousness*, and by several *Similitudes* (mark the words) of which the *Unity of Understanding, Memory, and Will* with the Soul of Man is alledged by him for *One* ; and that a notable one too, for that *these Faculties* (as he there says) are *Mutually in one another* ; and the Example of *Love and Knowledge* in the same Mind, is alledged by him as another such a Simile, affirming them in like manner to be *Mutually in one another*. Now, I say, after all this, ought not the Reader to stand amazed, when he reads the Man first affirming that the *Unity* between the *Father* and the *Son* *Mutually existing* in one another by virtue of the *Mutual-Consciousness* between them has nothing like it in *Nature*, nor has any *Example, Metaphor, or Similitude*, besides it self to allude to ; and yet afterwards producing several *Similitudes, Allusions, and Metaphors* out of the *Fathers*, to explain both this *In-being*, and this *Mutual-Consciousness* by ? God give him a better Memory ; for as these things represent him, no Man living (would he but impart his skill) could be so fit to teach the *Art of Forgetfulness* as himself.

But after all, I must not omit to give the Reader notice of another of his Absurdities, though of a lower rate, *viz.* That all along *Page 57.* he takes a *Pattern, or Example, and a Similitude, or Metaphor* for Terms equivalent ; whereas a *Pattern, or Example* imports a perfect entire Resemblance between it self and the thing of which it is the *Pattern*, and indeed approaches next to a *Parallel Instance* ; while, on the other side, an Agree-

greement in any one respect, or degree, is sufficient to found a *Metaphor*, or *Similitude* upon. And therefore tho it may easily be granted this Author, That there is no *Pattern*, or *Example* of such an *Union* as is between the *Father* and the *Son*; yet that does not infer, that there is nothing in Nature that bears any similitude to it; since this may very well be without the other, as that place in *John* 17. 11. and 21. has already proved.

And now I should here have finished my Remarks upon this particular Head, but that there is a certain Passage in order to his proving that there is nothing in Nature like the *Unity between the Father and the Son*, and it is this, *That in Substantial Unions, that which comprehends, is greater than that which is comprehended*: So that if Two Substances should be United by a *Mutual-Comprehension* of one another, the same would be both greater and lesser than the other, *viz.* greater as it comprehended it, and less, as it was comprehended by it, P.57. Now this Proposition I will neither note as Paradoxical, nor absolutely affirm to be *false*. But so much I will affirm, *viz.* That it is nothing at all to his Purpose; and that he can never prove it to be *True*. For besides, that he still confounds an *Example*, or *Parallel Case* with a *Similitude*, I would have him take notice,

First, That this Maxime, *Omnis continens est maius contento*, upon which he founds a majority of the thing comprehending to the Thing comprehended, is wholly drawn from, and founded upon the Observations made by the Mind of Man about *Corporeal Substances*, endued with Quantity and Dimensions; in which the *Substance Comprehending* is, and must be of a greater Dimension than the *Substance Comprehended*. But what is this to *Spiritual Substances*? Concerning which, I demand of this Author a solid Reason, Why Two such *Substances* may not be

intimately United by a *Mutual-Permeation*, or *Penetration* of one another? For all that can hinder such a *Penetration*, or *Permeation* (as far as we know) is *Quantity*; which in *Spiritual Substances* has no place; and then, if such a *Mutual-Penetration* be admitted, these *Substances* will be *Mutually* in one another, and *United to one another*, not indeed by a *Comprehension* of one another, (of which there is no need, if such a thing could be) but by a *Mutual-Adequation*, or *exact Coequation* of one to the other; so that nothing of one *Substance* shall *exist*, or *reach beyond*, or without the other, but the whole of both by such a *Permeation*, *Mutually Exist* in each other. This, I say, I neither do, nor will affirm to be actually so, but I challenge this Author to prove that it *cannot be so*; and, till he can, it may become him to be less confident.

In the *next place*, I have one thing more to suggest to him about *Substantial Unions*, which he talks so much of, *viz.* That the Term is Ambiguous, and may signify either;

First, The *Union* of Two or more *Substances* together, and so the *Father* and the *Son*, who are not *Two Substances*, but only *Two Persons* (as has been shewn in the foregoing Chapter) can never be *Substantially United*. Or,

Secondly, It may signify the *Union* of Two, or more *Persons* in one and the same *Substance*; which is truly and properly the *Union* of the *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity*.

And thus, though there is no Instance in *Nature* of *Persons* so *United*, yet by way of Allusion and Similitude, the *Union* of the three fore-mentioned Faculties of *Understanding*, *Memory* and *Will*, in one and the same *Soul*, (alleged by St. *Austin*) may pass for a small, or (as this Author himself calls it) *Page 126. Line 28. A faint*

faint Resemblance of the Union of the said *Three Divine Persons in the same Nature, or Substance*; which, according to his Excellent Talent of *Self-Contradiction*, he positively denies here in *Page 57.* and as positively affirms in that other now pointed at. In fine, this Assertion, *That the Father and the Son cannot possibly be One, or in One another* (which is here the same) *but by Mutual-Consciousness*, *Page 57.* Line 23, 24, 25. unavoidably infers, and implies, *That they are not One by Unity of Substance, Unity of Essence, or Unity of Nature.* For I am sure neither *Substance, Essence, or Nature*, are *Mutual-Consciousness.* And if the *Church* will endure a Man asserting this, I can but deplore its Condition.

PARADOX.

If we seek for any other Essence, or Substance in God, (says this Author) *but Infinite Wisdom, Power and Goodness, the Essence of God, though considered but as one Numerical Person, is as perfectly unintelligible to us, as one Numerical Essence, or Substance of Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity,* *Page 69, 70.*

Answer. This *Proposition* is false and Absurd, and to prove it so, I shall lay down these following *Affirmations.*

First, That it is certainly much easier for Humane Reason to conceive one and the same *Divine Nature, or Deity*, as *Subsisting in one Single Person*, than in *Three distinct Persons.*

Secondly, That *Essence, Substance, Wisdom, Power and Goodness* are in the *Divine Nature* (which is a pure simple *Act*) all but one and the same Thing, or Being.

Thirdly, That notwithstanding this, *Essence, or Substance, and Wisdom, Power and Goodness* are formally distinct from one another. That is to say, The *Concupis Objectivus*, or proper *Essential Conception* of one does not imply.

imply, or involve in it the proper Conception of the other : Upon which Account one of them cannot properly be said to be the other.

Now these Three Things thus laid down, it is readily granted to this Man, *That Essence, or Substance, Wisdom, Power and Goodness are really one and the same Being*, and that therefore it is vain and foolish to seek for any *Essence, or Substance in God, which is not also Wisdom, Power and Goodness*. But this, by his favour, is not the point. For if he will nevertheless say, *That the Divine Nature expressed by one Infinite Essence, or Substance Subsisting in One Person, is as unintelligible, as the same Subsisting in Three distinct Persons*; Nay, that One and the same Numerical *Wisdom, Power and Goodness* considered, as *Subsisting* only in one *Person*, is not more Intelligible than the same, as *Subsisting* under Three; This is manifestly false, and contrary to common Experience, and without any further arguing the case, I appeal to the Reason of all Mankind, Whether it be not so?

P A R A D O X.

What is Intellectual Love (says this Author) *but the True Knowledge, or Estimation of Things? What is Justice and Goodness but an equal Distribution of, or a true and wise Proportion of Rewards and Punishments? What is perfect Power, but perfect Truth and Wisdom which can do whatsoever it knows?* Pag. 71, 72.

Answer. We have here a whole Knot, or Cluster of Paradoxes, but I shall take them asunder, and consider them severally: And because they run all in the way of *Interrogations*, I shall take them out of their *Interrogative Form*, and cast them into so many *Categorical Assertions*. The first of which is,

That Intellectual Love is nothing else but the true Knowledge and Estimation of Things.

This

This is false and Absurd. For *Love* is one Thing, and *Knowledge* another ; each of them distinguished by *Essentially different Acts* and *Objects*, *Knowledge* importing no more than a bare Speculation, or Apprehension of the *Object* ; whereas *Love* is properly an Adhesion to it : *Love Essentially* presupposes the *Knowledge* of the Thing *Loved* ; but *Knowledge* cannot presuppose it self. *Knowledge* is the first *Act* of an *Intelligent Mind*, *Love* the second. And I would fain know, Whether this Man of *Paradox*, will affirm, That *God Loves* every Thing which he has *a true Knowledge and Estimation of*? But to give him one Argument for all, are not the Eternal Distinguishing Characters of *Two Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity* founded in the distinction of *Love* and *Knowledge* in *God*, the *Son* issuing from the *Father* by way of *Knowledge*, and the *Spirit* issuing from both by way of *Love*?

In the next place he affirms *Justice and Goodness* to be *the same Thing*, and to consist both of them in a true and wise Proportion of Rewards and Punishments.

But this also is false. These Two being as properly and formally distinguished by their *Acts* and *Objects*, as the Two former. And I do here tell this Author, That *God's Goodness* is the proper Qualification of his own Actions, without referring necessarily to any other besides ; but that his *Justice* bears an *Essential Relation* to the Actions of others, viz. as *Rewardable*, or *Punishable*. And consequently *God* might have exerted innumerable *Acts* of his *Goodness*, though there had never been any *Object* for him to have exerted so much as one *Act* of his *Justice* upon. And to give him one Instance that may Convince any Man of sense of the vast difference of these two Attributes ; was that *Act of Creation*, by which *God* first Created the World, an *Act* of his *Justice*? Or did that *Act* consist in a *Wise proportion of Rewards*

wards and Punishments, before there was any *Act* of the Creature to be Rewarded, or Punished? But I am sure it was an *Act* of the *Divine Goodness*, whereby God communicated much of the Perfection of *Being* to something without himself. Again, is Pardon of Sin an *Essential Act* of *God's Justice*? But I am sure it is an *Act* of his *Goodness*. Certainly this Man neither knows, nor cares what he says.

His Third Assertion is, *That perfect Power is nothing else, but perfect Truth and Wisdom.*

But this also is a gross Paradox, and as false, as that *Omnipotence* and *Omniscience* are not Two *distinct Attributes* of God. God's *Power* acts by and under the direction of God's *Wisdom*, and therefore neither is, nor can be formally the same with it. And besides this, all *Acts* of *Wisdom* and *Truth* proceed from God by a Necessity of *Nature*, but the *Acts* and Exercise of his *Power*, by a free determination of his *Will*. For in speaking of God, no Man says, That *God is Wise, Knowing, or True, or Acts according to these Perfections, because he will do so*; for he can neither be, nor *Act* otherwise; but we truly and properly say, That *God does this or that, because he will do it*; for if he had pleased, he might have chose, whether he would do it, or no. From all which, I conclude, That nothing could be more improperly and absurdly affirmed than, *That the Divine Power is nothing else but the Divine Truth and Wisdom.*

P A R A D O X.

In Men (says he) it is only Knowledge that is Power; Humane Power, and Humane Knowledge, as that signifies a Knowledge how to do any Thing, are Commensurate; so that every Man can do what he knows how to do: Nay, Knowledge, is not only the Director of Power, but it is that very Power which we call force, Page 72.

Answer.

Answ. This is so gross a *Paradox*, that, I think, it can need no other Confutation than to oppose the sense of all Mankind to it, nevertheless I shall offer this one Consideration towards the disproving the Identity of *Knowledge* and *Power*, viz. That a Man's Knowledge and Skill about the doing any Work of Art, may increase, as his power of Execution for the Actual doing the said Works may decrease, nay, wholly cease, and therefore they cannot be the same. For suppose a Carpenter disabled by Age, or Accident, that he cannot strike a stroke towards the building an House; does he therefore cease to know how to build it, while another shall build it wholly by the direction of his Skill and Knowledge? This Man may as well prove his Head and his Hands to be one and the same Thing, as *Knowledge* and *Power* to be so. But I shall go no further than this very Author, to confute this Author's Assertion, who has told us in *P. q. l. 3,4.* *That we understand nothing of the Secrets and Mysteries of Nature; nor are concerned to understand them, any more than it is our Business to understand how to make either a Body, or a Spirit, which we have no power to do,* (mark that) *if we did understand it, and therefore it would be an useless piece of Knowledge.* Now I beseech the Reader to set these Two Assertions together, viz. that in *Page 72.* *That to know how to do a Thing is to be able to do it,* and that other in the *Page 9.* viz. *That though we understood how to make a Body, or a Spirit, yet we have no Power to do it.* I say let these Two Propositions be compared; and then I hope that for the future, *Knowledge how to do a thing, and Power to do it,* ought not, even according to this very Author, to pass for the same thing. In the mean time we see how one of his Assertions contains a gross Absurdity, and the other completes it with as gross a Contradiction.

P A R A D O X.

This Word Infinite (says he) *confounds our Notions of God*, p. 77.

Answer. This is false. The Thing indeed signified by the Word *Infinite*, exceeds and transcends our *Notions*, but the Word *Infinite* does not confound them. And I would have this Man take notice, that for an Object to surpass and be above our *Thoughts*, and to disorder and confound them, are very different Things. And moreover, that it is the height of Impudence and Ignorance too, to say, That that *Word confounds our Thoughts, Notions and Conceptions of God*; which all *Divines* and *Philosophers* in all Places and Ages have constantly expressed the *Nature of God* by: And which, after the Notion of his bare Existence, does, next in order, offer it self to the Mind of Man, in its Speculations of this Great Object.

P A R A D O X.

We know not (says he) *how far Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, and Power reaches; but then we certainly know, that they have their Bounds, and that the Divine Nature is the utmost Bounds of them*, p. 79.

To which I *Answer*, That for an *Infinite Wisdom* to have *Bounds*, and the *Bounds* of it to be the *Divine Nature* (which it self has no *Bounds*) is *in ipsis Terminis* an express, downright, and shameless Contradiction. See this further laid open in my 2d Chapter.

P A R A D O X.

This Creed (says he, speaking of the *Athanasian*) *does not speak of the Three Divine Persons as distinguished from one another*, P. 88. Line 21.

In reply to which, I am amazed to read an Assertion so manifestly false, and yet so positively uttered. For will this Author put out the Eyes of his Reader? He tells

tells us here that *Athanasius* (or whosoever else might be the Author of this Creed) does not herein speak of the Three Divine Persons as distinguished from one another. But I demand of him, does *Athanasius* here speak of them as of Three Persons, or no? If the first; then he does and must speak of them as distinguished from one another, for that without such a distinction they are not so much as Three. But if he does not speak of them as of Three, and as of Three thus distinguished. What then mean those Words of the Creed? There is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost? Do these Words speak of these Persons as distinguished, or do they not? If they do; then what this Man has here said of the Creed, is shamelessly false; and if they do not express the said Persons as distinct, I defie all the Wit of Man to find out any Words that can.

P A R A D O X.

He tells us, That the Title of the one Only true God cannot be so properly attributed to any one Person, but only to the Father, p. 89.

Answer. This I have already shewn in Chap. 5. p. 137. to be both false and dangerous; as by direct consequence either making several sorts of Gods, or excluding both the Son and the Holy Ghost from the one true Godhead. At present I shall only say thus much, That [the One only true God] and [the true God] are Terms perfectly equivalent, and not only Commensurate but Identical in their signification; and withal, That this very Author himself affirms Page 186. Line the last, That the Son must be included in the Character of the only True God; which how he can be, without having this Character properly affirmed and predicated of him, and his su-

staining thereby the Denomination of the *only True God*, let this Confident, Self-contradicting Man declare if he can. In the mean time let me tell him further, That these Terms [*the True God*] and [*the only True God*] do both of them import an Attribute, or Denomination purely *Essential*, and by no means *Personal*, or *Oeconomical*: And moreover that every such Attribute does and must agree to all the *Three Persons* equally, and whatsoever equally agrees to them all, may with equal Propriety be affirmed of all and each of them, and consequently that the Title of [*the One only True God*] may every whit as truly and properly be attributed to the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, as to the *Father* himself. See more of this in my forementioned Chapter.

P A R A D O X.

I affirm (says he) *that the Glory and Majesty and all the other perfections of the Three Divine Persons are as distinct as their Persons are.* And again, *These perfections are as distinct as the Persons, and yet as Numerically one and the same as the Godhead is*, p. 91.

Answer. The first part of these Assertions is utterly inconsistent with, and wholly overthrows the last. And it is indeed very horrid, as by inevitable consequence inferring a Tritheisme. For if the *Essential Perfections of God* (which in Truth are only the *Divine Essence* under several Conceptions and Denominations) are as *distinct as the Persons*, whom the Church acknowledges to be *really distinct*, then it will and must follow, That in the *Trinity* there are *Three really distinct Essences, or Godheads*, as well as *Three really distinct Persons*: And if they are thus *distinct*, it is impossible that the *Three Persons* should by virtue thereof, either be, or be truly said to be, *really one*; so that this Author, we see, has herein asserted

asserted a *Trinity* with a Witness ; but as for any *Unity* in it, you may go look.

But I perceive he was driven to this false and absurd Assertion by that Argument of his *Socinian* Adversary urging him, That if the *Essential Glory* and *Majesty* in *Father, Son* and *Holy Ghost* be but One, then it cannot be said that their Glory is equal, their Majesty co-ternal; forasmuch as *Unity* is not capable of *Equality*; which must of necessity be between two or more. This, I say, no doubt drove him to this Inconvenience.

In Answer to which Objection, (though I owe not this Author so much Service) as I shall readily grant, That where there is an *Equality*, there must be also a *Plurality*, of some sort or other, whatsoever it be: So I shall observe, That the *Divine Essence, Glory, or Majesty*, (which I still affirm to be but different Names of the same thing falling under divers Conceptions) and every other *Essential perfection* of the *Godhead*, may be considered two ways.

First, Absolutely and Abstractedly in it self, and as prescinding from all *Personal Determinations*, in which fence the *Divine Nature, Essence* (and every *Essential Attribute* included in it) is, and always must be taken, whensoever, in Discourse, it is spoken of, either as *compared with*, or *contra-distinguished to* all, or any of the *Persons*. And accordingly, in this fence being *absolutely One*, it is incapable of any *Relation of Equality*. Forasmuch as *one Thing* considered but as *One*, cannot be said to be equal to it self. Or,

Secondly, This *Glory, Majesty, or any other Essential perfection of the Godhead*, may be considered as sustaining *Three several Modes of Subsistence in Three distinct Persons*; which said *Modes*, as they found a *Plurality in this Essential Glory, or Majesty*, (though by no means of it)

it) so this *Plurality* founds a Capacity of *Equality*; by virtue whereof, the same Glory according to its peculiar way of *Subsisting* in the *Father*, may be said to be equal to it self as *Subsisting* after another way in the *Son*, and after a third in the *Holy Ghost*; so that immediately and strictly this *Equality* is between the Three several *Modes of Subsistence*, which this *Essential Glory*, or *Majesty* sustains, or (if you will) belongs to the said *Glory*, for and by reason of them. And this is the true Answer to this *Socinian Objection*, which by a manifest fallacy proceeds à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, viz. That because *Equality* cannot belong to the *Essential Glory*, or *Majesty* of the Godhead considered abstractedly from the *Divine Persons*, therefore neither can it agree to the same *Glory*, or *Majesty*, upon any other Account whatsoever, which is utterly false; forasmuch as considered according to the *Three different ways* of its *Subsistence* in the *Three Persons*, it may, as *Subsisting* under any one of them be said to be equal to it self, as *Subsisting* under the other Two.

P A R A D O X.

This Author represents Gregory Nyffen as first asserting a Specifick Sameness, or Unity of Nature, in the Divine Persons (which also he makes all along to be signified by the ὁμοοίωτην) and then asserting that this Specifick Sameness, or Unity of Nature, makes the said Three Persons Numerically One, Page 118. the latter end.

Answer. This is too great an Absurdity for so Learned a *Father* to be guilty of, and therefore ought to lie at this Author's own Door; for that a *Specifick Sameness*, or *Unity of Nature*, should make any *Thing*, or *Person*, *Numerically One*, (any more than a *Generical Unity* can make

Things

Things Specifically One) is beyond measure fenceless and illogical.

PARADOX.

Though the Fathers (says he) assert the singularity of the Godhead, or the Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence; yet they do not assert such a Numerical Unity, as where there is but one Person as well as one Essence, but such a Numerical Unity as there is between Three, who are *expositio*n, of the very same Nature, but are not merely united by a specifick Unity, but by an essential Union; and therefore are Three and One, Pag.

121. Line 15.

Answer. In these Words there are several Absurdities, which he falsely charges upon the Fathers, but ought in all Reason to take to himself. As,

1. He supposes a Specifick Unity, and an Essential Unity to be *distinct* *Unities*: whereas every Specifick Unity, or *Union*, (call it, at present, which you will) is also an Essential Unity, or *Union*. For a Specifick Unity is one sort of an Essential Unity (which in its whole compass contains the Generical, the Specical, and the Numerical) and therefore thus to *contra-distinguish* a Species to its *Genus*, is fit for none but such a Logician as this Author; it being all one, as if one should say of Peter, That he is not only a Man, but also a Living Creature.

2. The second Absurdity is, That he owns a Specifick Unity of *Nature* in the *Divine Persons* (which sort of *Unity* I have abundantly proved in Chap. 7. the *Divine Nature* not to be capable of) for he says here of the *Divine Persons*, *That they are not meerly United by a Specifick Unity*: which Words must imply, that however, so *United* they are.

3. He makes Two sorts of Numerical Unity, contrary to all Rules of *Logick*, viz. One, where there are several.

ral Persons of One Nature, as here in the Trinity; and the other, where there is but One Person, as well as One Nature. But let me here tell him, That the Divine Nature is every whit as Numerically One in the Three Persons, as if there were but one Person in the Godhead, and no more. And in this very Thing (as has been shewn) does the Mysteriousness of an Unity in Trinity consist. I say, The Divine Nature is as Numerically One in the Three Persons, as the Humane Nature was Numerically One in Adam, while there was no other Person in the World but himself; nay, much more so, since it is not multiplicable, as that was. And to affirm, That the Numerical Unity of the Godhead is not so perfect, or is not the very same, Subsisting in Three distinct Persons, as if we could imagine it to Subsist but in One, Subverts and Overthrows such an Unity in Trinity, as the Church in all Ages hitherto has maintained.

P A R A D O X.

Having told us, That the Fathers universally acknowledged, the Operation of the whole Trinity ad Extra to be but One, and from thence concluded the Unity of the Divine Nature and Essence; for that every Nature has a Virtue and Energy of its own; (Nature being a Principle of Action,) and if the Energy and Operation be but One, there can be but One Nature. He adds within four Lines after, That this is certainly True, but gives no Account, how Three distinct Persons come to have but One Will, One Energy, Power and Operation; nor that any Account (that he knows of) can be given of it but by Mutual-Consciousness, Page 124. Line 7, &c.

Answer. Were I not acquainted with this Man's way of Writing, I should be amazed to see him in so small a compass so flatly contradict himself. For will he, in the first place, assert, in the Three Divine Persons a Numerical

merical Unity of Nature? And in the next, assert also, that this Unity of Nature is proved by Unity of Energy and Operation? And after this tell us, That this gives no Account at all, how Three distinct Persons come to have but one Will and Energy, Power and Operation? For does not Unity of Nature in these Three distinct Persons prove this? While the said Unity of Nature proves Unity of Operation, as the Cause proves its Effect, and Unity of Operation again proves Unity of Nature, as the effect proves its cause? This, any one of sense would think, is a fair, full, and sufficient Account how Three distinct Persons, having all but One Nature, come thereby all to have but One Will, Energy and Operation. And should any one else argue otherwise, I should think him beside himself; but this Author in this discourses like himself.

PARADOX.

Knowledge, Self-reflection, and Love are distinct Powers and Faculties in Men, and so distinct, that they can never be the same; Knowledge is not Self-Reflection, nor Love either Knowledge, or Self-Reflection; though they are inseparably United, they are distinct, Pag. 130. Line 11, 12, &c.

Answer. Here also is another knot of Absurdities. For, First, *Knowledge, Self-Reflection, and Love* are not in Men *distinct Powers and Faculties* (as this unsledged Philosopher calls them) but only *distinct Acts*.

Secondly, Admitting that *Knowledge* were a *Faculty* (as it is not) yet I deny that *Knowledge* and *Self-Reflection* would make Two *distinct Faculties*, forasmuch as it is one and the same *Intellectual Faculty*, which both exerts an *Act of Knowledge*, and an *Act of Reflection* upon that *Act of Knowledge*, or upon it self as producing the said *Act*. For which Cause it is (as has been observed before) that Philosophers hold that the *Understanding* is *Facultas supra se Reflexiva*; all of them allowing both

the direct and the Reflex *Acts* of *Knowledge* to issue from the same Faculty.

Thirdly, He says, That albeit the forementioned *Acts* are distinct, yet they are inseparably United. But this also is false; for (whether an *Act* of *Knowledge* may be without an *Act* of *Self-Reflexion*, as some, not without Reason, think it may) I am sure in Men (of whom alone we now speak) both an *Act* of *Knowledge* and of *Self-Reflexion* too may be without an *Act* of *Love* consequent thereupon: And if the former may be without the latter, then they are not inseparably United, as this Author here says they are.

P A R A D O X.

He says, *That Love is a distinct Act, and therefore in God must be a Person*, P. 133.

Answer. If this be a true and good consequence, then the Ground and Reason of it must be This, *That every distinct Act in God, is, and must be a distinct Person*. And if so, then every Decree in God, whether it be his Decree of *Election*, or of *Reprobation* (if there be such an one) or of creating the World, and sending *Christ* into it, and at last of destroying it, and the like, are each of them so many *Persons*. For every Divine Decree is an *Act of God*, and an *Immanent Act* too, as resting within him, and (as such) not passing forth to any Thing without Him; that Maxime of the *Schools* being most true, that *Decreta nihil ponunt in esse*. Nor is this all, but most of the *Divine Acts* are free also; so that there was nothing in the Nature of them to hinder, but that they equally might, or might not have been; which applyed to the *Divine Persons*, would make strange work in Divinity. In the mean time if this Author will maintain this Doctrine, viz. That *Acts* and *Persons*, are the same in *God*, (as, I think, he ought in all Reason to maintain the immedi-

immediate consequences of his own Assertion) I dare undertake that here he will stand Alone again ; and that he is the only Divine who ever owned, or defended such wretched Stuff.

PARADOX.

These Three Powers of Understanding, Self-Reflexion, and Self-Love are One Mind, viz. in Created Spirits; of which alone he here speaks, adding in the very next words, What are meer Faculties and Powers in Created Spirits, are Persons in the Godhead, &c. Page 135. at the latter end.

Answer. This is a very gross Absurdity, and to make it appear so, I do here tell him, That the Three fore-mentioned Powers are no more *One Mind*, than *Three Qualities* are *One Substance*; and that very Term [Powers] might have taught him as much; *Potentia* and *Impotentia* making one Species of *Quality*; under which all *Powers* and *Faculties* are placed. So that *his Three Powers of Understanding, Self-Reflexion, and Self-Love are One only Unitate Subjecti*, as being Subjected in One and the same Mind; but not *Unitate Essentiae*, as *Essentially differing both from one another, and from the Mind it self too, in which they are*. Certainly if this Man did not look upon himself as above all Rules of *Logick* and *Philosophy*, he would never venture upon such Absurd Assertions.

PARADOX.

He tells us, That the Son and Holy Ghost Will and Act with the Father; not the Father with the Son and the Holy Ghost, Pag. 169. Line 13, 14, &c.

Answer. This is a direct Contradiction: For if the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* Will and Act with the *Father*, the *Father* must Will and Act with the *Son* and the *Holy Ghost*. And he who can find a distinct fence in these Two Propositions,

ons, and much more, affirm the first; and deny the latter, has a better Faculty at distinguishing than any Mortal Man, using his Sence and Reason, will pretend to. It being all one, as if I should say, *I saw Thomas, William and John together; of whom William and John were in the Company of Thomas, but Thomas was not in the Company of William and John.* And I challenge any sensible thinking Man to make better fence of this Author's fore-mentioned Assertion if he can. But this must not go alone without a further cast of his Nature, by heightning it with another Contradiction too, which you shall find by comparing it with *Page 188. Line 4.* where he affirms, *That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost Act together,* having before expressly told us here, *That the Father does not Will and Act with the Son and Holy Ghost;* which very Assertion also, (to shew him the further fatal Consequences of it) absolutely blows up and destroys his whole Hypothesis of Mutual Consciousness, by destroying that upon which he had built it. *For if the Father may and does Will and Act without the Son and Holy Ghost,* then farewell to the *μία ἐνόπεια,* and the *μία κίνησις βολήματος,* for they must never be alledged in this Cause more.

P A R A D O X.

Nothing can make God visible but a Personal Union to a Visible Nature, Page 234. Line 22, 23.

Answer. This is a most false Assertion, and directly contrary to Scripture. And to prove it so, I shall lay down these Four Conclusions.

First, That the *Godhead*, or *Divine Nature*, neither is nor can be visible to a Corporeal Eye, by an Immediate sight, or Intuition of the *Godhead* it self.

Secondly, That *God* is visible to such an Eye only by the special Signs, or Symbols of his Presence.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, That God is visible by a Body Personally United to him, only as the said Body is such a Sign, or Symbol of his peculiar Presence. And

Fourthly and Lastly, That a Body actually assumed by God for a Time, is during that Time as true, and visible a Symbol of his Presence, as a *Body*, or *Nature personally United to him* can be.

And thus it was, that God appeared visibly to the *Patriarchs* in Old Time, and particularly to *Abraham*, to *Gideon*, and to the Father and Mother of *Sampson*, who thereupon thought *that they should Die for having seen God Face to Face*. For generally all Interpreters hold the Person who thus appeared, to have been the *Second Person of the Blessed Trinity*, the *Eternal Son of the Father*; though sometimes called simply the *Angel*, and sometimes the *Angel of the Covenant*, from the Office he was then actually employed in by his Father, as the Extraordinary Messenger and Reporter of his Mind to Holy Men upon some great Occasions.

This supposed, I desire this bold Author to tell me, Whether the *Second Person of the Trinity* (God equal with the *Father*) was personally *United* to the *Body*, which he then appeared in, or not? If not; then the fore-mentioned Assertion, *That nothing can make God visible, but a Personal Union to a Visible Nature*, falls shamefully to the Ground, as utterly false. But if he was *Personally United to it*, then these *Paradoxes* must follow,

1. That he either laid down that *Assumed Body* afterwards, or he did not: if he did, then an *Hypostatical Union* with God may be dissolved; and not only so, but there may be also a Thousand *Personal Unions* one after another, (if God shall think fit to Assume a Body, and appear in it so often;) which would be contrary to the Sence
of.

of all Divines, and to all Principles of sound Divinity, which own but one *Hypostatical Union* and no more. Or,

2. He still retains an *Union* to that *Assumed Body*, and then there is a double *Hypostatical Union*, viz. One to the *Visible Body Assumed* by him, in which he appeared of Old, and the other to that *Body* which he was Born with in the World. All which *Positions* are horrid and monstrous, but unavoidably consequent from the foregoing Assertion. But for the further illustration of the case I do here affirm to this Author, That *God* is as *Visible* in an *Assumed Body*, whether of Air, or *Aether*, or whatsoever other Materials it might be formed of, as in a *Body* of *Flesh and Blood Personally United* to him: I say, as *Visible*. For notwithstanding the great difference of these *Bodies*, and the difference of their *Union* and *Relation to God*, One being by a *Temporary Assumption*, and the other by a *Personal Incarnation*; yet no *Corporeal Eye* could discern this Difference, during the Appearance, but that one was, for the time, as *Visible* as the other; and therefore since both of them were truly *Symbols of God's peculiar Presence* (the only way by which the *Divine Nature* becomes visible to a *Mortal Eye*) it demonstratively overthrows that positive, false Assertion of this Author, *That nothing can make God Visible, but a Personal Union to a Visible Nature.*

P A R A D O X.

All the Circumstances of our Saviour's Birth, and Life, and Death, were so punctually foretold by the Prophets, and so peremptorily decreed by God, that after he was come into the World, there was no place for his Choice and Election. And he could not shew either his Love, or his Humility by choosing Poverty, Death, &c. Page 242. Line 5.

Answer. This is False, Absurd, and Dangerous, and indeed next to Blasphemous; as overthrowing the whole *Oeconomy*

Oeconomy of Man's Redemption by the Merits of Christ. For that which leaves no place for *Choice*, leaves no possibility for *Merit*. For all Merit is founded in *freedom of Action*, and that in *Choice*. And if *Christ*, after his *Incarnation*, had not this, he could not *Merit*. And whereas the Author says, *That Christ chose all this as the Second Person of the Trinity antecedently to his Incarnation.* I Answer, That this is indeed true, but reaches not the present Case. For what he did before he was Incarnate, was the *Act* of him purely as *God*; but a *Meritorious Action* must still be an *Humane Action*; which could not proceed from the *Second Person* before his Assumption of an *Humane Nature*. I readily grant and hold, That the Actions of *Christ's Humane Nature* received a peculiar Worth and Value from its Union with his *Divine Person*, yet still I affirm, that this Worth and Value was Subjected and Inherent in his *Humane Actions*, as such; and thereby qualified them with so high a degree of *Merit*. So that, whencesoever this *Merit* might flow, they were only his *Humane Actions*, viz. such as proceeded from him as a *Man*, that were properly and formally *Meritorious*.

And whereas this Author states the Reason of this his horrid Assertion upon the Predictions of the *Prophets*, and the *peremptory Decrees of God* concerning all that belonged to, or befell *Christ*, I do here tell him, That neither *Predictions* nor *Decrees*, though never so punctual and peremptory, do, or can infringe, or take away the freedom of *Man's Choice*, or *Election* about the Things so Decreed, or foretold; how difficult soever it may be for *Humane Reason* to reconcile them; and if this *Man* will affirm the contrary, he must either banish all *Choice* and *Freedom of Action*, or all certain *Predictions* and *peremptory Decrees* out of the *World*; let him.

him choose which of these Two Rocks he will run himself against, for he will be assuredly split upon either. This vile Assertion really deserves the Censure of a Convocation, and it is pity, for the Church's sake, but in due time it should find it.

P A R A D O X.

Concerning *Person* and *Personality* he has these following Assertions, which I have here drawn together from several parts of his Book, viz. *The Mind is a Person*, Page 191. Line 21, 22. *A Soul without a Vital Union to a Body, is a Person*, Page 262. Line 17. *And the Soul is the Person, because it is the Superior governing power, and Constitutes the Person*, Page 268. Line 28. *A Beast which has no Reasonable Soul, but only an Animal Life, is a Person, &c.* Page 262. Line 18, 19, 20. And again, *We may find the Reasonable and Animal Life Subsisting apart, and when they do so, they are Two [Persons] and but One [Person] when United*, Page the same, at the end of it. And lastly, *One Agent is One Person*, Page 268. Line 2.

Answer. In all these *Propositions*, so confidently laid down by this Man, there are almost as many Absurdities and Falsities as there are Words. I have already shewn this of some of them in *Chap. 3.* and therefore I shall be the briefer in my Remarks upon them here.

And first for that Assertion, *That the Mind is a Person.* To this I Answer, That the Mind may be taken Two ways.

First, Either for that, *Intellectual Power, or Faculty,* by which the Soul understands and Reasons. Or,

Secondly, For the *Rational Soul* it self.

In the former fence, it is but an Accident, and particularly a *Quality*: In the second it is an *Essential* part of the Whole Man; and therefore upon neither of these

these Accounts can be a *Person*. For neither an *Accident*, nor a *Part* can be a *Person*; which (as such) must be both a *Substance*, and a *Complete Substance* too.

And secondly, Whereas, he says, *That a Soul without a Vital Union to the Body is a Person*; I tell him, *That the Soul without such an Union, is still an Incomplete Being*; as being Originally and Naturally designed for the *Completion and Composition* of the Whole Man, and therefore for that reason, cannot be a *Person*.

And then Thirdly, Whereas he adds, *That the Soul is the Person, because it is the Superior Governing Power, and Constitutes the Person*. I Answer, That it is the former, and does the latter, only as it is the prime *Essential part* of the whole Man; and for that very cause is an *Incomplete Being*, (as every *part* is and must be) and consequently cannot be a *Person*.

In the next place, For an Answer to his saying, *That a Beast is a Person*. I refer him to his own positive Affirmation, Page 69. Line 18. *That a Person, and an Intelligent Substance, are reciprocal Terms*: And the same may serve for an Answer to his next Absurdity, *That when the Reasonable and the Animal Life subsist apart, they are Two Persons*. For the *Animal Life* separate from the *Rational*, is void of all Reason, and the very Definition of a *Person* is, *That it is Suppositum Rationale, aut Intellegens*.

In the last place, By his saying, *That One Agent is One Person*, (which, I am sure, he affirms universally of every single Agent) he makes every Living Creature under Heaven, a *Person*: For every such Creature is endued with a Principle of *Life* and *Action*, and accordingly *Acts* by it, and by so *Acting*, is properly an *Agent*: From all which it follows, *That this Author (as great as his Retinue may be) has many more Persons in his*

Family, than he is aware of; there being not so much as a Rat or a Mouse within the Walls of his *Deanry*, but, according to this Assertion of his, is as truly and properly a *Person* as himself. So that although he *seldom* (as he says) *makes Visits*, yet he is sure never to want *Company*.

P A R A D O X.

He Asserts, *That every Man has Two distinct Reasons, and Two distinct Wills, and those as distinct as if he had Two Souls*, Page 267. Line 7, 8, 9.

Answer. This Assertion, and the Absurdity of it are perfectly his own. For certainly Two *Reasons* and Two *Wills*, and those as distinct in each Man, as if he had Two *distinct Souls*, were never Asserted to be in any One [meer] Man, by any Person of Sence and Learning before: It has indeed been disputed by Philosophers, *Whether there be Three Souls in the same Man*, viz. *A Rational, a Sensitive, and a Vegetative?* And it has been generally concluded in the Negative, and that the *Gradus Intellectivus, Sensitivus, & Vegetativus* were only Three *distinct Powers, or Faculties* lodged in one and the same Soul: But as for Two *distinct Reasons* and Two *distinct Wills* in one Soul, none that I ever met with, affirmed it. And in Answer to it, it were enough to overwhelm the Affortor of it with the Universal Judgment of all Philosophers holding the contrary, viz. *That in each Individual Person there is only One Individual Reason and Will, and no more.*

But I shall discourse the Matter a little further with this Author; though yet as briefly as I can.

And first of all, I lay down this as certaintly true, *That if One single Reason, and One single Will are sufficient to give an Account of all the Acts, Offices, and Operations belonging to the Nature of Man, then it is superfluous, and consequently*

consequently *Absurd to Assert any more.* But the former is undoubtedly true. And to shew that it is so, we are to consider what Human Reason, and the Offices of it properly are; and so for the Humane Will, and the proper *Acts* and *Functions* of that. Now they are both of them *Intellectual Faculties*, and thereby distinguished from, and Superior to all *Acts* of *Sensation*, whether External, or Internal, and all *Acts* of *Desire* and *Appetition*, proceeding from the Sensitive Appetite. And as they are superior to them, so it is the proper Office of *Reason* to Arbitrate upon, Judge of, and Direct all the Apprehensions and Reports of the Senfes, and upon such a Judgment passed upon them, to declare authoritatively, *What ought, or ought not to be done*; and in the like manner the *Will* is to Govern and Control all the *Inferior Appetites*, *Desires*, and *Inclinations*, by an effectual disposal of them, to *what shall, or shall not be done*. And this is the Order and Oeconomy of all the *Rational* and *Sensitive Powers* and *Faculties* of the *Soul of Man*, and of the *Functions* and *Operations* respectively belonging to them. And now I desire any one to shew me, what use there is of a *second Reason*, and a *second Will*, and what are those particular, proper *Acts* proceeding from them, which are neither *Intellectual*, nor *Sensitive*. For if they are either of these, all such *Acts* have been fully accounted for, from the *Intellectual* and *Sensitive Principles* already mentioned, and therefore must needs be Superfluous. Again, I would know, whether these Two Reasons are *Subordinate*, so that one is subject to and governed by the other, or *Co-ordinate* and *Equal*, and neither of them Subject to, or Governed by the other? If they are *Subordinate*, the Inferior is useless, since the *Acts* proceeding from both, being equally *Acts* of *Reason*, the Superior can and may dictate all that the Inferior can suggest

suggest immediately by it self, and without the *Subordinate Operation* of the other ; and what I have said of an *Humane Reason*, will proportionably hold in an *Humane Will*: But if, on the other side, there are *Two Co-ordinate Reasons*, and *Two Co-ordinate Wills*, neither of them subject to, or governed by the other, then, in the Direction and Disposal of Mens Actions, they either suggest the very same Directions and Commands, or such as are quite different, and sometimes perhaps contrary. If the very same, then *One of the Reasons* and *One of the Wills* are again superfluous : For what need can there be of *Two* to suggest the very same things ? But if these *Two Reasons* suggest different, or contrary Directions, and these *Two Wills* exert *Two* different, or contrary *Influences* upon the Inferior and Sensitive part, then the Soul must be distracted between both, and not able to proceed determinately to Action ; but the *Two Reasons* must dispute the Matter, and the *Two Wills* must fight it out. And this will be the admirable Harmony and State of an *Humane Soul*.

If it be here Objected, That we sometimes find mention in *Scripture* of a *Sensual*, or *Carnal Reason*, and of a *Sensual Will*: and that therefore *Two Reasons*, and *Two Wills* must be admitted in each Man.

I Answer, That we Read in *Scripture* of the *Old Man* and the *New Man*, in *Persons Regenerate*, and yet I cannot from hence infer, That *Two distinct Men* do, or can Subsist in *One Person*. And therefore as to that Objection of a *Carnal, Sensual Will and Reason*,

I Answer, That *Reason* is called *Sensual*, when it directs and prescribes according to the Exorbitant Inclinations and Desires of the *Sensitive Part* ; and the *Will* is called so likewise, when it does not interpose its Sway and Authority, but suffers the *Sensitive Appetites* to take their own

own course without control : So that this Term *Sensual*, or *Carnal* applyed either to *Reason*, or *Will*, does not import, or inferr another *Reason*, or another *Will*, but the same *Reason* and *Will* under different, and sometimes contrary *Qualifications*, and otherwise acting and behav- ing themselves, than, according to their Natural Pre- rogative and Office in the Soul, they ought to do. It is indeed a division *Subjecti in Accidentia*. And this is all that can be drawn from thence.

In fine, I think a stranger and a sillier Paradox could not well be advanced ; and it is great pity but the *Author* of it should be Known by this *Glorious Character*, That this is that great *Philosopher* and *Divine*, who af- firms and holds, *That there are Three distinct Infinite Minds in One God: And Two distinct Reasons, and Two distinct Wills in One and the same Man.* And long may he live to have the fame of such Assertions ringing in both his Ears ; and when he is Dead, I doubt not but he will be remembred by them, though they be never writ upon his Tomb : For certainly he who affirms *Two Reasons* in the same Man, hardly discourses at the rate of *One*.

P A R A D O X.

He Asserts, *That the Body moves at the Command of the Will, and is so far Conscious to its Commands*, Pag. 269. Lin. 18, 19.

In *Answer* to which, I affirm it to be absolutely false, and extremely absurd, to say, *That the Body is at all Conscious to the Commands of the Will.* Forasmuch as *Consci-
ousness* is an *Act of Intellection*, and so must issue from an *Intellective Faculty*, which the *Body* is not endued with, and therefore cannot act by ; and withall, every *Act of the Will* is only an *Intelligible*, and not a *Sensitive Object* ; and consequently cannot be otherwise apprehended and perceived than *Intellectually*. And as for the *Commands of it* ;

it ; a Command operates and moves only by way of *Moral Causation*, viz. by being first known by the Thing, or Agent which it is directed to, which thereupon by such a Knowledge of it, is induced to move, or *Act* accordingly. But now, the *Will* does not thus *Act* upon the *Body*, the *Body* having no Principle whereby to know, or understand what it Commands. And therefore, when we say, That the *Will Commands the Body*, in strictness of Truth, it is only a Metaphorical Expression. For the *Will*, or *Soul* exerting an *Act of Volition*, moves the *Body*, not by *Command*, but by *Physical Impulse* : That is to say, It does by its *Native force, Energy, and Activity*, first move and impell the *Spirits*, and by the Instrumental Mediation of them so moved and impelled, it moves and impells the *Body* ; and this, by as real an *Impulse*, as when I push, or thrust a thing with my hand. For though indeed a *Material* Thing cannot actively, or efficiently move, or work upon an *Immaterial*, yet *Philosophers* grant that an *Immaterial* (as being of the nobler and more active Nature) can move, impell, or work upon a *Material* ; and if we cannot form in our Minds an Idea of the Mechanism of this Motion, it is because neither can we form in our Minds an Idea of a *Spirit* : But nevertheless Reason and Discourse will Evince, That the Thing must be so.

P A R A D O X.

He tells us, *That the Humane Nature of Christ may be Ignorant of some things, notwithstanding its personal Union to the Divine Word ; because it is an Inferior and Subject Nature*, Page 270. Line 12, 13, 14.

Answer. These Words also are both absurd and false. And

First, They are Absurd, because no Rules of Speaking, or Arguing, permit us to say of any Thing, or Person,

Person, *That it may be so, or so*; when necessarily it is, and must be so. For the Term [*may*] imports an *Indifference*, or at least, a *possibility* to both sides of the Contradiction: So that when a Man says, *That a Thing [may be thus, or thus]* he does by consequence say also, [*That it may not be thus, or thus.*] And therefore to say, *That the Humane Nature of Christ, notwithstanding its Personal Union to the Word, may be ignorant of some Things*, when it cannot but be ignorant of *some*; nay, of very many Things, is Absurd.

And in the next place also, *To make the Subjection of the Humane Nature to the Divine, the proper Cause of this Ignorance is false, and the Assignation of a non causa pro causâ*: It being all one, as if I should say, *That such an one cannot be a good Disputant, because he has a blemish in his Eye.* For it is not this *Subjection* of it to the *Divine Nature*, that makes it ignorant of many Things known by that *Nature*; but the vast disparity that is between these *Two Natures*, *viz.* That one of them is *Infinite*, the other *Finite*, which makes it impossible for the *Infinite* to *Communicate* its whole *Knowledge* to the *Finite*. Forasmuch as such a *Knowledge* exceeds its *Capacity*, and cannot be received into it, so as to exist, or abide in it, any more than *Omnipotence*, or *Omnipresence*, or any other *Infinite Divine Perfection* can be lodged in a *Finite Being*.

And besides this, this very *Author*, in the immediately foregoing Page, had not only allowed but affirmed, *That the Body* (which certainly is both *United* to the *Soul*, and of a *Nature Subject* and *Inferior* to it) was yet *Conscious* to the *Dictates and Commands of the Soul*. Wherfore where *Two Natures* are *United*, the bare *Subjection* of one to the other, is not the proper *Cause*, that the *Nature* which is *Subject*, is ignorant of what is known

known by the *Nature* which it is *subject to*. For if *Subjection* were the sole and proper Cause of this Ignorance, the *Inferior Nature* would be equally ignorant of every Thing known by the *Superior*; which yet, according to this Man's own Doctrine of the *Consciousness of the Body to the Soul*, is not so. This Consideration I alledge only as an Argument *ad hominem*, having already, by the former Argument, sufficiently proved the falseness of his Assertion.

But I shall detain my Reader no longer upon this Subject; though I must assure him, that I have given him but a *Modicum*, and (as it were) an handful or two out of that full heap which I had before me; and from which I had actually collected several more Particulars, which I have not here presented him with, being unwilling to swell my Work to too great a Bulk. Nevertheless I look upon this Head of Discourse, as so very useful to place this *Author* in a true Light, that if I might be so bold with my *Reader*, I could wish, that he would vouchsafe this Chapter (of all the rest) a second Perusal; upon which I dare undertake, that it will leave in him such Impressions concerning this Man's fitness to Write about the *Trinity*; as will not wear out of his Mind in haste. And yet after all this, I will not presume to derogate from this *Author's Abilities*, how insolently soever he has trampled upon other Mens; but content my self, that I have fairly laid that before the *Reader*, by which he may take a just, and true measure of them. And so I shall conclude this Chapter with an Observation, which I have, upon several occasions, had cause to make, *viz.* *That Divinity and Philosophy are certainly the worst Things in the World, for any One to be Magisterial in, who does not understand them.*

C H A P. X.

In which the Author's Grammatical, (and such like) Mistakes, as they are found here, and there in his Writings, are set down, and remarked upon.

Could this Author have carried himself with any ordinary degree of Candor and Civility towards those, whom he wrote against, he had never had the least Trouble given him by me upon this Head of Discourse. But when I find him treating Learned Men with so much Disdain and Insolence, and much liker a rough, ill-bred School-Master domineering over his Boys, than a fair Opponent entring the Lists with an *Ingenuous Antagonist*, I must confess, I cannot think my self obliged to treat him upon such Terms, as I would an Adversary of a contrary Temper and Behaviour. One Man (and a very Learned one too) he flirts at, as if he could not distinguish between *Conjunctive* and *Disjunctive* Particles; Vindication of his Case of Allegiance, pag. 76. the Two last Lines. Another he *Scoffs*, or rather *Spits* at, as neither *understanding Greek nor Latine*. Vindic. Trin. Pag. 95. Lin. 25. and thereby, I suppose, would bear himself to the World as no small Critick in both. As for the *Socinians* (of which number this latter is) I do from my Heart Condemn their Opinions, as false, and destructive, not only of the *Christian*, but (in several Instances)

Instances) even of *Natural Theology* and *Religion* it self. Nevertheless I do not find, that these Men use to be reproached for want of Greek, or Latine, or for any Notable Defect of Parts, either Natural, or Acquired. *Faustus Socinus* was a Person undoubtedly of great Wit and Strength of Mind, and of Competent, though not very deep Learning ; but his Uncle *Laelius Socinus* before him, and *Crellius* who lived some time after him, were Persons very well stocked with both ; and so have been many more (indeed too many) besides these. And where the Case stands thus, I think, what the Poet said of *Probity* and *Integrity*, may very well be said of *Learning* also, viz. *That it is Commendable even in an Enemy*, how much soever we may blame him for the ill use of it. But this Author spares neither Friend nor Foe, but comes like a kind of Hurricano upon his Adversary, not vouchsafing him so much as one grain of Allowance, wheresoever he finds (or rather thinks he finds) him Tripping. And therefore, let him not, of all Men, complain that he is hardly dealt with, *if with the same measure, with which he has hitherto meted to others, it be measured to him again.*

Accordingly, I shall in this Chapter proceed to examine his *Grammatical, Vocabular* Mistakes. And that I may do this justly, and without the least shadow of unfair dealing, I will first set down the Table he gives us of the *Typographical Errata*, in the first Edition of his Book ; that so we may distinguish, what ought to be laid at the *Printer's Door*, and what at the *Author's*.

The Table of Errata prefixed to the First Edition of the Vindication of the Blessed Trinity, &c. is as follows.

Page 50. Line 2. read περιχώροντος; P. 51. L. 15. for Corinthus read Cerinthus. P. 93. L. 26. for *ss* read *is*. P. 95. L. 32. for *his* read *Tres*. P. 96. L. 2. for Persons read Personæ, and L. 30. for *the* read *Three*. P. 105. Line 5. for whence read *when*. P. 155. Line 33. for *to* read *too*. Pag. 203. L. 15. for *we* read *He*. P. 214. L. 29. for Convict read Convinc't. P. 227. L. 1c. for *World* read *Word*. P. 238. L. 18. dele it. P. 249. L. 18. read *Challenged*.

This is a true and exact Transcript of the Table of the *Errata* prefixed to that *Book*. (Whether the said Table be True, or no) concerning which, I cannot but observe, That most of these *Errata* are much more easily Corrigible by an Ordinary Reader (without any Admonition) than those that I shall mention, and remark upon. And I shall add further, That, had he but said [That these and the like *Errata* the Reader is desired to Correct as he shall meet with them] he should have heard of none of them from me; though I am pretty well satisfied, and so will any *Judicious Reader* be too, that as none of them in any probability are, so some of them (as they stand here placed in this *Book*) neither are, nor could be any one's but his own. But since he has laid in no such *Salvo*, and this stands as a full Account of the *Errata*; and not only so, but since in the Second Edition some Faults not mentioned in this Table, are Corrected, while others remain the same, or as bad, as in the First Edition, there is all the Reason in the World, that

the Author should be charged with that, from which he himself has thus discharged the *Printer*. And besides, in the Second Edition of his Book, the Reader is desired to take Notice, that there is no Table of *Errata* at all ; by which we may justly conclude, That he reckoned it so *Correct*, as to need no further *Correction*. So that what I find there, I judge my self, to have all the right that can be, to Account with him for.

A Letter
to Anony-
mous, p. 1.
Printed
1683.

And the rather, for that Ten Years ago he publickly declared in Print, *That he was resolved in what he should publish for the future, to Correct the Press himself*; though, on my Conscience, it was one of the unsittest Employments (next to the *Writing of Vindications*) that he could take to ; as, I doubt not, but this Chapter will pretty well shew.

Now the Words, which I intend to Remark upon, shall be of these Two sorts.

First, Such as may be considered singly in themselves. And

Secondly, Such as must be considered in Conjunction with other Words, in Sentences and Forms of Speaking.

Of the first sort the Reader may please to take notice of these that follow.

As in *Page 16. Line 23.* I find an extraordinary word called ἐκπορεόμεται : the meaning of which I would gladly know : For I can no more find it in any *Lexicon*, than I can in the Table of the *Errata*: And yet certainly it must be some excellent Word, as having stood its ground in both Editions of his Book. I confess I have been apt to think it stands for ἐκπορεύμεται ; but why it should do so, the Author (who, no doubt, is a *Grecian* in his Heart) may possibly give us a good Reason ; but I, for my part, cannot.

Such

Such another Word we have cloathed indeed in Greek Characters, but, by no means, of Greek Extraction; and that is ἀνατωρόμιτος, *Pag. 115. Lin. 11.* I have read, I confess, of ἀνατονόματος, signifying *innomina-*
bile, or *quod nominari non potest*; and I do not deny but
that I find ἀνατωρόματος also; and that not only in the
place here cited out of *Greg. Nyssen*, but twice also in
St. Basil's Hexaemeron (from whence I quoted it so
written, *Ch. 7. p. 192.*) But I very much question, Whether
the Word be so wrote in other and Ancienter Copies of
those Father's Works; and that for these Two Reasons.

First, Because it must be derived from the *Preterperfect Tense ὠνόμαται*; and if so, then according to the Rule of Grammar in such *Verbal Derivatives*, the Augment must be thrown away, and the Original Letter retained; as in ἔγερσις ab ἔγερσαι, ὄμαλισμὸς ab ὄμάλισμαι, and consequently ὄνόματος ab ὠνόμαται. And that ὄνόματος with an *Omicron* is the Regular and proper Word, appears from those Cognate Words so common amongst the Grammarians, ὄνοματικὴ & ὄνοματικόν. Nevertheless if ὠνόματος be admitted, it must be by the Attick Dialect; which very often (especially in Compounds) puts an *ω* for an *o*; as in ἀνώμαλος and ἀνώνυμος, and several other like Words.

But my Second Reason, why I think the Ancienter Editions of St. Basil have it ἀνατονόματος with an *Omicron*, is, because I find those *Lexicographers* who write it so, quote this Word out of that very place of St. Basil's *Hexaemeron*, where now it stands wrote ἀνατωρόματος; which surely proves that they found it not there so wrote then, when they quoted it from thence. But admitting that it may be so wrote, *viz.* with an *ω* as well as with an *o*, yet what does, or can this make for our Author's new-coined *ἀνατωρόμιτος*? For till there can be

Tatianus Confutatio Stephanus

be found such Greek Words as ὀροφίζω and ὀροφίζομαι to derive it from (which none ever yet met with, nor ever will) in vain shall we seek for αἰκατωβούσιον any where but in this Author.

In the next place, to pass from Greek Words to Latine, or such at least as are Latinized, I would gladly know, who those Anti-Nicene Fathers were, who are mentioned by him, Pag. 24. Lin. 5. And whether they were Arians, or Novatians; who (as I take it) were the great Opposers of the Nicene Council. But that, I find, cannot be, since our Author tells us, *That the Persons, spoken of by him, were of the same Faith with the Nicene Fathers.* So that upon that Account, I should think, it ought to be the *Ante-Nicene Fathers.* And if so, I think the Author would do well to take notice, that there is a great difference between *Anti-Nicene* and *Ante-Nicene*, between such as lived *before* the Council, and such as were *against* it. And the more particular and exact notice ought he to take of it here, since (though the difference be only in an *Iota*) he yet knows what a Disturbance this little Letter made in the *Homoousian* and *Homoiousian* Controversie, even so great as to occasion the Convening of this Famous Council. Nevertheless, that this word *Anti-Nicene* passed for good and current with this Author, is evident from hence, that it is (as well as some others) free of both Editions of this extraordinary Book.

Again in *Page 105. Line 8.* we are told of the *Favourites* of some Opinions. As to which, I had thought, that Men use to favour and countenance Opinions, and not to be countenanced and favoured by them. And yet the Word *Favourite* signifies *passively*, and so must be taken for one who *receives favour*, and not *actively* for one who *shews it.* And therefore if to represent any one as

as the *Favourite of an Opinion* be not good fence, I know no way, but by striking it out, and putting *Favourer* in the room of it, to make it better.

In *Page 106. Line 16.* I read *Intension* used in the same fence with *Intention*, or *Purpose*; and I must declare, that I never found it so used before.

And in *Page 108. Line 31.* I am told of the *Council of Lateran*; and I wondered a good while, what *Council* it should be; for though I had heard of several *Lateran Councils*, yet I never heard of the *Council of the Lateran*, till I met with it here.

Likewise I find an Extraordinary Person in *Page 43. Line 1.* named *Lucifer Carolitanus*, and was thereupon in some thoughts with my self, whether there might have been any place called in former times *Carolina*, or by some Name like it. But then out comes the Second Edition and alters it into *Caralitanus*; which (in my poor Opinion) looks very suspiciously, as if some Body had a mind to Correct it, but knew not how. As for *Lucifer Calaritanus* so called from *Calaris*, now *Cagliari*, the Metropolis of *Sardinia*, I have heard much of him; but I will suppose our Author had some Body else in his Eye. And upon this occasion, I cannot but take notice of some other *Writers* quoted by him, whom the World seems as much unacquainted with, as with this *Carolitanus*. As for instance St. *Hillary* in his *Apol. P. 15.* at the latter end. And *Albaspinus* in his Defence of Dr. *Stillingfleet*, *Pag. 165. Lin. 22.* And *Nonnas* in his *Knowledge of Christ*, *Pag. 218.* Now St. *Hilary* indeed, a Famous Father of the Church, and Bishop of *Poictiers*, and *Albaspineus* Archbishop of *Orleans*, Eminent for his Learned Works, and *Nonnus* who Wrote a Paraphrase upon St. *John's Gospel*, in Greek Verse, are every one of them known and celebrated by all. But as for St. *Hilary*,

lary, Albaspinus and Nonnas, I never heard of them till this Author was pleased to bless the World with these New Names.

As for *Erronious* instead of *Erroneous*, and *ἀγαιωσύνη* instead of *ἀριωσύνη*, they are small things, and ought to make no difference amongst Friends, though I have known many a poor School-boy forced to Water his Plants for a less Mistake.

But there is a Word of singular note, which I have met with at least six or seven times in this Book, and four times in one Page, viz. 227. and it is *Prosoopœa*, which also, as well as its Companions has given the Catalogue of *Errata* the slip, and so, weathered it out in Two Editions : But what to make of it, I cannot tell. There is indeed a certain Figure in *Rhetorick*, called *Prosoopœia*, which I know well enough, but *Prosoopœa* I am wholly a Stranger to : And surely this Author could not mean the Figure *περσωποποία*; forasmuch as the strict Literal signification of that is *fictio Persona*. And I cannot imagine how this Author should mistake about this *Word* (of all others) having had so Excellent an Hand at the *Thing* signified by it ; as having, I dare say, made more Persons than ever God thought fit to furnish the World with.

And to shew the Reader that our Author's store extends much further than one Book, I will present him with some more of the like Rarities out of some of his other Pieces.

As first in Page 65. of his Answer to the *Protestant Reconciler*, he makes mention of *Exorcisme, Chrysom, Unction, Dipping, Trine Immersion, &c.* as rejected by the *Church of England*. And here I was extremely at a loss to learn what *Chrysom* was ; and after all my search, no *Lexicon* could inform me, till at last I hit upon a certain

tain little *Lexicon*, called, *The Bill of Mortality*, and there I found a Word very near it, as differing from it but by one Letter, which was *Chrisom*, signifying a Child that dies presently after it is Born : But then considering again, that the *Church of England* did not declare her self to reject such, I was as much at a loss as ever ; till at length setting my Guessing Faculty on work, I concluded, that certainly it should be *Chrisme*, which is a *Greek* Word for *Vnction*, as *Immersion* is a *Latine* one for *Dipping*. And this our Author should have taken notice of, for though he quotes it out of the *Reconciler*, yet since he neither rectifies it, nor reflects upon him for it, we may very reasonably suppose, that he took it for good Payment ; and really thought, that it ought to be *Chrysom* as he found it. Otherwise he who had been so quick and sharp upon him at other turns, would, no doubt, have took him upon such an advantage, and well-favouredly expos'd him for so foul a Blunder.

But to go on. In *Page 209. Line 13.* of the same Book, I find mention of the *Quadragesimal Fast*. And this put me as much to a stand, as the other, to imagine what kind of *Fast* this should be. For the nearest and likest Word I could derive it from, was *Quadriga*, signifying a *Coach*, *Cart*, or *Waggon*. And accordingly as the *Jews* had their *Feast of Weeks*, and of *Tabernacles*, so I did not know, but the *Papists*, or some *Christians* like them, might have some *Fast*, called, *The Fast of Coaches, or Waggons*; and might possibly give it that Name from its being carried on with the Discipline of the *Whip* and the *Lash*, as *Coaches* and *Waggons* used to be. This Conjecture, I say, I made with my self. For I concluded, that this Author could not mean it of the *Lenten-Fast*; for that is called *Quadragesima*, or *Jejunium*.

Quadragesimale, and issues from the Numeral *Quadragesima*, and so is quite another Thing from this *Quadragesimal-Fast*; which I cannot find in all the *Rubrick* of our Church; though perhaps when those *Excellent Persons* spoken of, *Apology*, P. 5. Lin. 20. have finished their Intended *Alterations of our Rubrick*, we shall find it there too.

In the next place, let us pass to such of his Words as stand conjoyned with others in Sentences, or Forms of Speaking. And here let us first of all consider his absurd use of that form of Expression [*as I may so speak*] which he has at least Twenty times in this one Book: Now the proper use of these Words, is to bespeak excuse for that which they are joyned to, as for something that is *legendum cum venia*, and containing in it a kind of *Catachresis*, or at least some Inequality, some Defect or other in the Expression, with Reference to the Thing designed to be expressed by it. And this, I am sure, is all the true and proper Reason assignable for the use of these Words [*as I may so speak.*] But this Author applies and uses them, even when he pretends to give the properest and most Literal Account and Explication of Things, and such an one, as is not only better than all others, but even exclusive of them also, as the *only True Account* that can be given of them. As for instance, where he affirms *Self-Consciousness* to be the True and only *Formal Reason* of *Personality*, and *Mutual-Consciousness* to be the same of the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature* in the *Three Persons*, he ushers it in with those Words [*as I may so speak*] *Page 56. Line 6, 7, 8, &c.* which (according to what he holds about these Two Terms) is all one, as if I should say, *God* is an Infinite Eternal, Almighty Being (*as I may so speak*) and *God* is the Creator and Governor of the World (*as I may so speak*) and *Man* is a Rational Creature, having Two
Ey es,

Eyes, Two Arms, and Two Legs ; (*as I may so speak*) all which is egregiously Absurd and Ridiculous. And the more so ; for that this very Author reproaches one of his Adversaries (whether *Owen*, *Baxter*, *Lobb*, or the *Reconciler*, I cannot at present remember, but the Thing I perfectly do) for using the like Expression [*as I may so say,*] with great scoff and scorn, telling him thereupon, *That certainly no Man had ever more need of [so says] than he had.* Now for my own part, I think this *Author's [so speaks]* are every whit as bad and contemptible as his Adversary's [*so says*] unless he can persuade the World, That a Man may speak an Absurd thing much more excusably than he can say it.

To this we may add some more such Absurd Expressions. As for instance, that in *P. 55. Lin. 26.* where he says, *That the Three Divine Persons are so United to each other, as every Man is to himself.* In which Words, besides the falseness of the Proposition ; it being impossible for the *Three Divine Persons* to be so United to each other, as to be but *One Person*, which yet *every Man is*, we ought to note also the Absurdity of the Expression. For all *Union*, or *Unitio[n]*, is *Essentially* between two things at least ; so that unless the *Man* be *One thing*, and *himself* another, He cannot be said to be *United to Himself*. He may, perhaps, be properly enough said to be *One with Himself* ; but to say, *That he is United to himself*, is unpardonable Nonsense. Again, in *Page 85. Line 8.* He tells us, *That the Infinite Wisdom which is in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is [Identically the same]* which is as much as to say, *That a Man is Wisely Wise, Honestly Honest, Learnedly Learned*, and the like : For though I know what it is to be *perfectly, or absolutely the same*, yet to affirm any Thing, or Person to be *Identically the same*, is an Idle, and a Nauseous Tautology. Likewise in

Page 182. Line 19. He tells us, *That God intercedes with no Body but himself.* Concerning which Form of Speaking, I must observe, That when the Term [But] is used as a Particle of *Exception*, it implys the Thing, or, Person excepted from others, to be of the *same kind*, or at least, *condition* with the rest, from which it was excepted. And therefore, unless God were a *Body*, it can with no *Congruity* of Speech be said, *That God intercedes with no Body but himself.* So that this also must pass for another Blunder. With the like Absurdity he tells us in *Page 124. Line 15.* *Where there are Two distinct and divided Operations, if any of them can act alone without the other, there must be Two divided Natures.* Now it is a Maxime in Philosophy, and that such an one, as, I think, ought to take place in Grammar too, *That Actionis non datur Actio.* And accordingly if the *Reason of Things* ought to be the *Rule of Words*, then to say, *That an Operation Acts, or Operates, is extremely Senceless and Ridiculous.*

But to proceed, he has a way of promiscuously applying such Words to *Things* as are properly applicable to *Persons* only, such as are [*who*] and [*whose.*] As for instance, he tells us of the Being of a Thing [*whose*] Nature we cannot conceive, *Page 6. Line 11.* And in the same Page, *Line 23.* *We may know* (says he) *that there are a great many things [whose] Nature and Properties we cannot conceive.* And in *Page 7. Line 18.* *It is so far from being a wonder to meet with any Thing [whose Nature] we do not understand, &c.* But is this Sence, or Grammar? Or does any Man say, *Reach me that Book, [who lies there] or that Chair [who stands there?]* No, certainly, none who understands what proper speaking is, would express himself so. And moreover (to shew that he can speak of *Persons* in a *Dialect* belonging only to *bare Things*, as well as he did of *bare Things* in words, proper

proper only to Persons) he tells us of a Son produced out of the Substance of [its Parent] instead of his Parent, *Page 257. Line 19.* which is a way of speaking every whit as improper and absurd as the other. In the next place he has a custom of joyning a Verb of the Singular Number with a Noun of the Plural, and so *vice versa.* As there is Three Gods, instead of, there are Three Gods, *Page 2. Line 9.* And the Nature of most things [are] very dark and obscure, instead of [is so] *Page 6. Line 20.* which also is so Ungrammatical that it would not be endured in a School-Boy; it being as arrant a Solecism in English, as *Homines currit*, or *Socrates disputant* would be in Latine. Likewise he often uses the Particle [then] instead of [than] as, *The Scripture teaches more [then] Natural Reason does.* *Pag. 148. Line 19.* And a more Glorious Authority [then] he exercises himself, *Page 173. Line 28.* This, I say, is familiar with him, but withal exceedingly Absurd, Improper, and not English. For [then] is a Note of Time, but [than] is a Note of Comparison, importing a greater or lesser degree of that Thing wherein the Comparison is made; and is commonly joyned with the Words *sooner*, or *rather*, but always with some word or other, denoting the Comparative Degree of a Thing. As, such an one has more or less Strength, or Wisdom [than] another. And I will Die sooner, or rather [than] I will do such a Thing, or the like. But no Man who Speaks, or Writes true English, will use these two words indifferently. But I must not omit that Notable Passage, *Page 119. Line 25.* where he tells us, That there is μήτε φύσεως μήτε ἐργασίας τίνα διαφορεῖν ἐπ τῇ Θεότητι. These are the very words, and as they stand (though in conjunction with Two or Three English Words to complete the Sentence) do in my Opinion, carry much of the Air of a Solecism upon them;

so that according to the Construction of them here, if it had been for my Life, instead of saying, *There is τινας Διαφοεῖν*, I would have said, *There is τις Διαφοεῖ*, and so have joyned true Greek and English together.

And thus I have presented the Reader with some of this Author's Ways and Forms of Expression, which Grammarians call *Loquendi Genera*. From all which, according to the singular skill he has shewn in this sort of Learning, it is to be hoped, that as he has already blest the World with a New Divinity and Philosophy, so he will in due time oblige it with a new Grammar too.

And great need (as we shall presently see) there seems to be of such an one. In order to which, I shall mention but one more of this Author's Pieces. And that is a Book, Intituled, *A Defence of Dr. Stillingfleet, &c.*

In the beginning of which, there is a *Table of Errata* prefixed, that fills almost a whole Page; so that I verily thought, that it had so clearly carried off the whole Crop, as to leave no Gleanings behind. Nevertheless I shall present the Reader with this small *Spicilegium* of what I gathered up after it; not mentioning any one Word that stands Corrected there.

In *Page 53.* therefore, and *Line 10.* He tells us of a Counterfeit *Epithite*; but what that is, I do not know. I have indeed often heard of an *Epithete* from the Greek θησέως and θησείον, signifying *quid appositum aut adjetum*, and imports properly, an Adjective joyned to a Substantive, and giving the Substantive a Denomination accordingly. But as for this Author's *Epithite*, it may, for ought appears, signifie something to *stop Bottles*. For as for any other Signification (that I know of) it has none.

In the next place, *Page 64, 65.* he quotes Baxter for an Expression used by him, *viz.* of such People as talk through a Window on the West-end of Moore-Fields; and calls it Mr. Baxter's *Elegant Paraphrases* for Madmen. But here (besides the mistake of *Paraphrases* for *Paraphasis*, which is only one Number put for another) our Learned Author must give me leave to tell him, That by this Passage, he seems not to understand what a *Paraphasis* means. For a *Paraphasis*, or *Paraphrase* (to put it into English for his sake) signifies properly a Translation of some *Writing*, with Additions and Enlargements to Illustrate and Explain the fence of them, and is therefore usually called *Liberior Translatio*. In which fence we read of this or that *Paraphrase upon the Psalms*, and *Erasmus's Paraphrase upon the New Testament*, and the like. So that unlesfs the *Mad-men* here spoken of, were a certain *Book*, or *Writing*, and Mr. Baxter's Words concerning them, an *Explicatory Translation* of the said *Writing*, this Great-Good Man could not properly call them a *Paraphrase*. But what must we call them then? Why truly the forementioned Words might be properly enough called a *Periphrasis*, or *Circumlocution* (which, being so like the word *Paraphasis*, might easily deceive a Man who cares not what he Writes) and when it is so taken, it is a certain Figure in Speech, whereby we express a Thing by several Words, which otherwife might, and, for the most part, is expressed by one. As *Sophronisci filius*, is a *Periphrasis* for *Socrates*, and the *Man who Conquered Pompey the Great*, is a *Periphrasis* for *Julius Cesar*; and so to bring the matter home to Mr. Baxter's Instance; that forementioned Expression of, *Men who talk through the Windows at the West-end of Moore-Fields*, is a proper *Periphrasis* for *Mad-men*. But as for a *Paraphrase upon Madmen*, I leave it to this wonderful

derful Person, to make a *Paraphrase* upon any Man, (whether Mad or Sober) if he can.

Likewise in *Page 112.* and the last Line, he tells us, out of *Calvin's Epistles of a Publica præcum formula.* Concerning which, though I must confess, that I do by no means aspire to be one of the Number of this Author's *Excellent Persons*, who were for altering our Liturgy, or Publick Form of Prayer. Yet, if it were expressed by *Publica præcum formula*, I should be one of the foremost who should desire that *Præcum* might be altered into *Precum*. In the mean time, why should any one who had read but a Page in *Calvin*, quote him for such a word as could not possibly drop from so Learned a Pen?

But it would be endleſs to descant particularly upon all this Author's *New-found Latine*, and Proprieties of Speech. And therefore to set them down briefly as they offer themselves. In *Page 122.* in the Quotation in the Margin, the Reader will find a most choice word, *viz. Conſcionator*, not to be met with in any such puny *Author* as we commonly call *Classick*, but cited by him instead of *Concionator* out of the 57th Canon of our *Church*; which, I must tell him, is not an ordinary slip, but a foul *ſtumble*, attended with Two more in the same Quotation, *viz. Sique* for *Siqui*, and a lesser one, which is *Urum*, for *Utrum*; for that is no greater than the difference of a Noun from an Adverb, which, we know, is below a Person, Paramount to all rule, to take notice of. Though by his good leave the *Church of England* both Writes and Teaches better *Latine* to such as are disposed to learn it.

Again in *Page 139.* in the Quotation on the side, we have these Words cited out of the third Book of *Optatus Milevitanus*. *Recordamini quomodo à vobis jamdudum Matri Ecclesiæ membra distracta sunt, non enim [Unam- quanque*

quamque demum] semel seducere potuisti. Of which Passage I must confess I could make neither Sence nor Grammar, till consulting the Author himself of *Albaspin.eus's* Edition, instead of *Unumquamque demum*, I found it *Unamquamque Domum*; which, no doubt, is an admirable Various Lection (of which this Author ought to have the Glory) upon the Text of such a *Father*. But this is not all the Blunders which this fruitful Sentence affords us; there being yet another, *viz.* *recedit* for *resedit*; and that such an one as utterly perverts the fence of the Author, who speaks here of some who *left*, and some who *remained in the Communion of the Church*, opposing them in this respect to one another; as, *Aut ivit uxor, aut resedit maritus, aut Parentes seducti sunt & filii sequi voluerunt, aut stetit frater migrante sorore, &c.* Thus the Father here speaks; but, pray, what opposition could there be between *aut ivit uxor aut recedit maritus*, any more than there is between *going away* and *departing*? Besides, that all the rest of the Verbs running in the *Preterperfect Tense*, this must needs do so too, or make a very gross fault in the Construction: So that this is an Illiterate Perversion of the sense of this *Father*. Upon which, as well as upon other occasions, I look upon this as the only sure Rule of dealing with this Author's Quotations, *viz.* To trust them no further than one can see them in their Originals.

In like manner, *Page 178.* in the place there quoted in the Margin out of St. Cyprian's 55. Epist. (and not the 52d. as this Author there mistakes it) we meet with these words, *& Coepiscoporum suorum Corpore & ab Ecclesiæ Unitate [disciserit:]* But the word in St. Cyprian is (as it ought to be) *desciseret*, from *descisco* to fall off; between which, and the other word used by this Author, there is a wide difference, *desciseret* being a most pro-

per Latine Word, but discesserit so far from Proper, that it is not so much as Latine.

And in Page 187. Line the last, we find $\omega\delta\mu\nu\sigma\omega\dot{\iota}\alpha$ for $\epsilon\nu\delta\mu\nu\sigma\omega\dot{\iota}\alpha$, which makes the whole Period neither Sence nor Greek. Again, Page 188. Line the last but one we have this Passage, *Videte annon dicantur martyres, sed ..liquid [Alium] dici mereantur*; which being there put for *Aliud*, is a downright Solecism. And lastly, in Page 198. in the Quotation in the Margin, we have those remarkable words, *Simiarum more, [qui] cum homines non sint, homines tamen imitantur?* Which is another Solecism every whit as bad and scandalous as the former.

Now all these words and Passages, I assure the Reader, as they stand in the Authors, from whence they are quoted, carry a very different face, from what this Writer has given them; which shews, that whensoever the words of the *Fathers* are transcribed into any of his Books, they are quite out of their Element. For amongst them (as they stand here) there are some such vile faults, or rather such clamorous sins in *Grammar*, that should a *School-Boy* tender an Exercise to his Master with but Two or Three such in it, he would soon find himself verily roundly and severely *took up* for them; and that perhaps more ways than one. But *Hands that can restore dispossessed Princes*, may Write any Thing, and Authorize what they have Wrote, by their very *Writing* it. For otherwise, the Truth is, the *Latine*, which the forecited Passages are dressed up in, seems a sort of *Providential Latine*, as being above all *Rules* and *Laws* of Speaking and Writing whatsoever.

As for faults about Accents, such as are $\nu\epsilon\epsilon\dot{\iota}\nu\tau\iota\chi\rho\pi\mu\alpha$ for $\nu\epsilon\epsilon\dot{\iota}\nu\tau\iota\dot{\iota}\chi\rho\pi\mu\alpha$. *Vind. P. 102. Line 3.* And $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\chi\omega\rho\epsilon\iota$ for $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\chi\omega\rho\epsilon\iota$, *Page 113. Line 2.* of the Quotation in the Margin, and the like, they are too numerous for me to trouble

trouble the Reader with. But this I desire him to take notice of, upon the whole that has been produced by me, That as none of the forementioned Faults are in the Table of the *Errata*; so some of them in the first Edition of his *Vind. Trin.* stand Corrected in the second; as *δέινυται*, Page 115. Line 1. of the Quotation in the Margin of the first is Corrected into *δέκυνται* in the second: And *όμονσις*, Page 121. Line 21. in the former, is changed into *όμονσιοι*, in the latter. And therefore according to the old Maxime, That *Exceptio firmat Regulam in non Exceptis*, it is to me a sufficient proof, That since this Author Corrected some Passages and not others, which yet need correcting as much, if not more, it was, because *His Acuteness* did not see, that these last needed any Correction at all: And in such a case some are of Opinion that where the Words escape it, the Author himself ought to have it.

But I shall hold my Reader no longer upon this Subject, how diverting foever it may be; this being enough to satisfie any Rational Person, how unfit this Man is to upbraid any one *with want of Greek, or Latine*: Though had I in my first perusal of his several Pieces foreseen this my Engagement with him, I might and would have presented my Reader with a more complete Collection of his *Greek* and *Latine Elegancies*. For I had not gone far in the Reading of him, but I found the Blows come so thick and fast upon poor *Pristian*, that, to prevent downright Blood-shed, still as I drew near to a *Latine Quotation* of any length, I presently advised him as a Friend to get out of the way as fast as he could.

And now, if either he, or any one else for him, shall pretend to slight and despise this charge, and tell me that the Faults and Mistakes here alledged by me, are *small Things*; so, say I, is the point of a Dagger too; but

for all that, it may stab a Man to the Heart ; and, I think, it matters not how small the Thing is, which wounds a Man's Credit, if it chance to bleed to Death of the Wound. But there are some Things in the World, the *Knowledge* of which seems but small, but the *Ignorance* of them is not so. And certainly of all Men living, such as will be Writers, especially provoking, Insulting Writers, are concerned to tread tenderly, and to take every step with the utmost Caution, where they do not find a Grammatical Bottom firm under them. For my own part, I dare account nothing small, or despisable, which may either do a Man a great mischief, or is necessary to prevent one. The first step in any Ascent may be reckoned but a low and a mean thing, nevertheless there is no getting to the top without it. As the

Great St. Basil himself tells us,
That nothing is to be slighted, or
despised by such as are to be instru-
cted and led into the knowledge of
Things. For if a Man (says
he) looks upon the first Elements
as [small incon siderable Things]
(the word by which some are
pleased to call the Rites and
Ceremonies of our Church)

Ἄδειος ὑπερπίλεον τοῖς εἰς τὴν
γνῶσιν εἰσαγομένοις, ως εἴ τις τῶν
πρώτων τοιχείων ως σμικρῶν
ὑπερίδοι, πότε τῶν τελείων τὸ σο-
φίας ἐφίστελαι; Basilius in Libro
ad Amphilochium de Spiritu San-
cto, Tom. 2. p. 292. Edit. Paris.
1637.

when will such a One be able to attain to the Perfection of
Wisdom and Learning?

And so I shall close up the present Subject with this Note, That St. Paul's School is certainly an Excellent School, and St. Paul's Church a most Noble Church ; and therefore, I think, that he directs his Course very prudently, and happily too, who in his Passage to such a Cathedral, takes such a School in his way.

C H A P. XI.

In which is given some Account of this Author's Temper and insolent way of Writing, as well in extolling himself, as in depressing and scorning his Adversaries; in both which he has not his Parallel.

Tough in all Contests and Controversies, how sharp soever on both sides, and just on one, there is still a duty, which every Man ows both to Decency and to Himself, always obliging him to utter only such things, as may become him to speak, whatsoever his Adversary may deserve to hear; yet, as to the Adversary himself, it is, no doubt, a course justifiable beyond all exception, to take ones measures of Treating him, from the measures he has allowed himself of dealing with others. And, as I hope, for my own, and the Churches sake, to acquit my self as to the former part of the Rule, so let my Adversary take his lot as to the other. For I doubt not but to satisfie the World, (were it not superabundantly, from his own Writings, satisfied already) That he is a Person of such an insufferable Insolence both of Style and Temper, that all, that he has met with in the foregoing Chapters, has by no means paid off his Scores. In all his expressions concerning his Antagonists, he is infinitely

scornful ; and not only so, but very often also, extremely spiteful and malicious. For what but the height of spight could make him in his Vindication of his *Case of Allegiance* tax his Learned Adversary, as an *Epicurean and an Atheistical Ridiculer of Providence*, only for maintaining, that the Passages and Events of Providence are not the Rule, which God will have us govern our Actions by ; but the Precepts and Prohibitions of his Law ? And what, but the same malice, could make him insinuate that the same Author was inclined to *Papery and an Infallible Interpreter*, only for saying that one Text of Scripture was *obscure and much controverted*? which yet St. Peter had said of many *Passages of St. Paul's Epistles*, *1 Pet. 3.16.* and yet without giving any wise man the least occasion from thence to think that he was then providing an Argument for the *Infallibility of his supposed Successor*. And Lastly what but the bitterest Rancour could make him charge his Adversary, as if he had compared the swearing Allegiance to K. W. and Q. M. for the great and notorious Impiety of it, with the Villanies foretold by the Prophet of Hazael ; only, because he had told Him, that *as Hazael had changed his mind* ; (notwithstanding his confident Opinion of himself to the contrary;) *so had this Author too?* For who but one of equal Virulence and Ignorance would have stretched the comparison, which respected only the *changing of Minds*, to a Comparison as to the *merits of the Cause*, which it had no relation to at all ? Indeed no more than that Reply of Hazael, *Is thy Servant a Dog?* was design'd to convince the Prophet, *That he had not four Legs*, and not rather only to clear himself from such a currish and belluine temper of mind, as those Actions foretold of him must needs imply ? And I suppose, when a certain Person speaking

Vind. Case, &c.
p. 58. l. 28.

Vind. Case p.
48. and the two
last lines.

Vind. of the
Case, &c. p. 79.
l. 10.

of

of the New Oath to a certain Bishop, said, *My Lord, I^{B. R.} will be Crucified before I will take this Oath,* His meaning was not, that he thought the taking it more Painful and Tormenting than a *Crucifixion*, but that he had a greater unwillingness to take the one, than to undergo the other. And yet this was this Author's way of Treating a very Worthy Man, an old Acquaintance, and a fair Adversary. I am not at all concern'd to espouse or abett the Cause defended by that Learned Person. But this I do and ever shall averr, That there is a *Jus Belli*, in these Controversial, as well as in Military Conflicts, and consequently an obligation to Truth and Justice and common Ingenuity even in the exercise of the greatest Hostilities. But this Man's usage of his forementioned Adversary is not more Senseless and Illogical, than Disingenuous, Barbarous, and Unchristian. And so let the Reader take this as a Specimen of his impotent Spleen and malice. After which, let us shew him in his next good Quality, his *Insolence*; and first in that Branch of it, which concerns his wonderful Opinion and Applause of Himself.

As to which, we shall first of all see him (as we have in some degree shewn him before) preferring himself before all the Fathers, as *much happier in giving an explication of the Trinity than they were*; and this, in such a fleering scoffing way, (scoffing I mean as to the Fathers, but highly *Commendatory* of himself) that it would even turn ones stomach to read his fulsome expressions. For he tells us, (and that with the most profound humility, no doubt) p. 101. l. 1. &c. *If that explication which I have given, be very consistent with, nay, be the true Interpretation of that account the Anti-ents give of a Trinity in Unity, I hope it will not be*

thought an unpardonable Novelty, if I have expressed the same thing in other Words, which give us a more clear and distinct apprehension of it, &c. And again p. 126. l. 2. I hope this is no fault neither, to give an Intelligible explication of that, which all the Fathers taught, but were not equally happy in their explication of it. No; for his comfort, no; to excell and outdo all the Fathers (if a man can do it) can be no fault at all. But before this be allow'd him, I do here require him to name and produce me but one (who acknowledges a Trinity) in the whole World, besides his own modest self, who ever preferr'd his explication of the Trinity for the *Happiness and Intelligibility of it*, before that given by the Fathers. I say, let him produce me so much as one affirming this, if he can. So that, in short, the Comparison here stands between the Fathers, and this Author: and we see the Preheminence given him above all the Fathers by the sole and single Judgment of one Doctor, and that Doctor is *Himself*: nay, and (which is more) to put the matter past all Comparison between him and them for the future, He tells us (as was also observed before in my 7th. Chapter) That the Fathers neither knew how to speak their own Thoughts of the Trinity, nor indeed so much as to conceive of it aright, by reason of the grossness of their Imaginations: whereas, if they had (as he adds) but conceived of it, and expressed themselves about it, as he has done, all would have been plain, easie, and intelligible. And as for *Gregory Nyssen*, (from whom he had Quoted more than from all the rest of the Fathers together) he gives him a cast of his Temper at last, p. 119. l. 5. and sends him away with this rap over the Pate, That he could not tell what to make of him and his Reasonings; for that, in his judgment, he destroyed all Principles of Individuation. And in

in this manner we have him Pluming himself, clapping his Wings, and crowing over all the Fathers; for which and his quarrelsome domineering Nature together, most think, it is high time, that *his Comb were cut.*

In the next place, let us see what Elogies he bestows upon himself for his Atchievements in the Socinian Controversie. Concerning which he tells the Men of that Persuasion, That after his Vindication of the Trinity *He believes they will talk more sparingly of Absurdities and Contradictions for the future.* p. 153. But, why I pray? Is it because this Author has got the *Monopoly* of them, and engrossed them all to himself? and that therefore the Laws will be very severe upon such as invade his Property? For, as for any other Reason, they have none, that I know of, to *talk more sparingly of Absurdities and Contradictions*, than they used to do, having so many more, out of his Writings, to talk of, than ever they had before. But he proceeds, and closes his Work with this Triumph over his Antagonist (and in him, I suppose, over all the rest of that Tribe) p. 272. *That he is pretty confident, that he will never be able to reason to any purpose in this cause again.* As for his confidence, none doubts of it; but as for his Prediction, if he proves no better a Prophet in what he here foretells of his Socinian Opponent, than in what he foretold of that Learned Person, who answered both his *Case of Allegiance*, and his *Vindication of it.* viz. *That if* ^{Vind. Case p.} *he would but well examine his Arguments before he answer the last. ed them, he should expect to hear no more from him:* and if withall this Socinian be but able to handle him at such a Rate, as that close Reasoner has done, I dare undertake for him, that he shall go out of the World the most baffled Person, that ever lived in it. But why, ^{for}

fer God's sake must the *Socinians* Reasoning Abilities (which his great Lord and Patron has given so high, so signal, and so peculiar an *Encomium* of) all of a sudden fail them, upon this Author's Publication of his book? what can the meaning of this be? Why the meaning of it is this. *Hic, vir, hic est,* &c. according to the words by which *Virgil* pointed out *Augustus Cesar*. *This, This, is the Man.* This is that incomparable, mighty, and irrefragable Divine, who has wrote more convincingly and effectually against the *Socinians*, (if you will believe him) than all, that ever wrote against them before, put together. For notwithstanding all that has been wrote by those great Men, who from time to time have appear'd in this Controversie, the Controversie is still alive, and the *Socinians* continue writing and reasoning still: and even by this Author's confession (once at least) *to some Purpose*. For otherwise how could he say of his Socian Adversary, *That he would never be able to reason to any purpose in this cause again*, if he had never reasoned so at all? But so far are the *Socinians* from being put out of Countenance, and much less out of Heart, by what this man has wrote against them, That I assure him, they look upon him as an Opponent according to their hearts desire; as having play'd a fairer Game into their hands than ever was dealt into them before: so that next to their wishing all the World their Friends, they wish they may always have such *Adversaries*. And therefore if they should resolve to *reason against him no more*, he will have great cause to thank either their Inadvertency for overlooking the great advantage given them, or their good Nature for not taking it. For the Book called by him *a Vindication of the Trinity*, is certainly like a kind of Pot or Vessel with handles quite round

*See his four
Sermons on the
1 John 14. P.
71. 72.*

round it ; turn it which way you will, you are sure to find something to take hold of it by.

And the truth is, upon a strict impartial comparing of things together, I cannot see any new Advantage that he has got over the *Socinians*, unless it be That he thinks his *Three Gods* will be too hard for their *One*. And perhaps it is upon Presumption of this, That he discharges that clap of Thunder at them in his Preface, where he tells us; *That having dipp'd his Pen in the Vindication of so glorious a Cause, by the grace of God he will never desert it, while he can hold Pen in hand.* In which words, methinks I see him ready Armed and Mounted (with his face towards the *West*) and brandishing his Sword aloft, all wreaking with *Socinian* blood, and with the very darts of his Eyes looking his poor *forgotten Friends* through and through. For in good earnest the Words sound very terribly to these Men ; but most terribly of all to the Article it self: (which is like to suffer most by his *Vindication*): for thus to threaten that he will never leave off vexing it *as long as he can hold Pen in hand*, (which, I dare say, will be as long as he can tell Mony withit) This, I say again, sounds very dreadfully.

Nevertheless, as fierce and formidable as these words may represent him, he has yet, like a merciful Enemy, very great reserves of compassion. For otherwise how come so many *Socinian* Pieces wrote against him to lye so long unanswered? He has indeed lately wrote an *Apolo-gy for writing against the Socinians*; but where is the Apology for writing in such a prevaricating way against them at first, and for never writing against them since? For has he lost his glorious Polemick *Pen*? or has he lost the *use of his Hand*? or has he run himself *out of Breath*? If this last be his case (as by some *Asthmatick symptoms* one wwould think it is) he vwill do

do well to call in his old Friend, and Defender, the *william Giles Footman*, to second him : especially since the contention, sometimes of which now seems most likely to be, is, who shall *run Mark-lane*. fastest from the Enemy, and keep furthest from Him.

In the mean time I wonder that in the mannage of this disputation, he does not take the same course that other Learned Men in the like cases use to do. For he frequently taxes his Adversary with *Fallacies* ; telling him that this is a *Fallacy* and that is a *Fallacy*: But why does he not express to his Reader, what the particular *Fallacy* is ? there being no Sophism or Fallacy incident to Speech or Argumentation, but what falls under one of the Thirteen reckoned up by *Aristotle*. Moreover, while he is Animadverting upon the History of the *Unitarians*, he will, I believe, hardly get clear of a scurvy lapse in that History himself. For concerning the exposition given by the *Socinians* of that Text in the 3 John 13. where our Saviour tells the Jews, *That he came down from Heaven*. He writes thus: *Did Socinus find it so easie a Thing to reconcile this Text to his Darling Opinion, when he was forced to Fast and Pray for it, and to pretend Revelation because he wanted Reason to support it ? viz. That Christ before he entred on his Prophetick Office, was taken into Heaven to be instructed in the Gospel, and then came down from Heaven again to publish it to the World.* p. 143.l. 19. &c. Now, the Person here spoken of, and intended by this Author, must needs have been *Faustus Socinus*, and I believe he will not pretend that he meant any other ; which being supposed, This Remark of his will appear to have been a very great mistake. For neither was this the Text, about which this *Praying and Pretence of Revelation* was, (for *Fasting* is a word of this Author's putting

putting in :) nor was *Faustus Socinus* the Person who did any of these Things upon this occasion. But the Text was that in the 8 John 58. Πειν' Αλεξανδρινού γνέως ἐγώ είμι. And the Person of whom this was pretended, was *Lelius Socinus* the Uncle of *Faustus*, who interpreted this Text to this sense, *Antequam Abramus factus fuerit Abrahamus*; that is, from the Father of the Faithful enclosed within the Church of the Jews, should become the Father of the Faithful disputed through many Nations, *Christ* was to preach his Gospel to the World ; and by so doing enlarge the Church from the limits of one People, to all Nations throughout the World. So that to the words ἐγώ είμι you are $\alpha\pi\omega\mu\pi\tau\omega$ to supply the words φασ νόσου, importing *Christ's Enlightning* the World by the Publication of his Doctrine. This was *Lelius*'s Interpretation of this Text, which together with the Interpretation of the first Chapter of St. John were the Two Scriptures, which he first set up with, for the founding of his new Hypothesis. Which explication of the Text (as it was indeed very forced and unnatural so) *Erasmus Johannis*, in his Disputation with *Faustus*, cryed shame of it in these Words, *Fateor me per omnem vitam non magis contortam Scripturæ Interpretationem audivisse ; ideoque eam penitus improbo.* To which *Faustus*, who had a much different Opinion of it, replies. *Cum primùm [fatendi] verbum in tuis Scriptis animadvertisi , sperabam te potius fassurum nullam in tui vita Scripturæ Interpretationem audivisse quæ hæc sit aut acutior aut verior, quæque magis divinum quid sapiat , & à Deo ipso patefactam fuisse præse ferat. Ego quidem certè non leves conjecturas habeo, illum [viz. Lelium] qui primus etate nostrâ eam in lucem protulit (hic autem is fuit , qui primus quoquè sententiam de Christi Origine,*

*See this Lear-
nedly confused
by Bp. Pearson
upon the second
Article of the
Creed. p. 219,
220. &c. in*

410.

quam ego constanter defendo, renovavit) Precibus multis ab ipso Christo impetrâsse. Hoc profectò affirmare ausim, cùm Deus illi viro permulta aliis tunc temporis incognita patefecerit, vix quicquim inter illa omnia esse, quod Interpretatione hâc divinius videri queat. Socinus in Refutatione Arg. 4. Erasmi Johan. p. 505 Col. 2 Edit. Fratrum Polonor. Tom. 2-

But as this may satisfie the Reader that the forementioned place in the 8 John 58. was the Text, for which this *Praying* and *Pretence of Revelation* is said to have been, and consequently may suffice to shew this Author's Blunder; so I shall yet further shew, that the other Text in the 3. John and the 13. Concerning Christ's coming down from Heaven was not accounted by *Socinus* of so difficult an Interpretation, as to need those peculiar Methods of *Prayer* and *Revelation* for the Discovery of it, as this Author has been pleased to affirm. And this will appear from these words of *Socinus* concerning it. *Postquam ex Mariâ natus est, in cælo, antequam moreretur, reverâ esse potuit; nec solum potuit, sed (ut ita dicamus) debuit. Si enim homo ille Paulus Christi servus ad Tertium usque Cælum ante mortem raptus est, nullo pacto nobis verisimile est Christum ipsum ante mortem in cælo non fuisse.* And, a few lines after, speaking of the same again with reference to St. Paul's having been taken up into the third Heaven, he thus discourses. *Certe Christus (in quo sine ullâ mensurâ rerum omnium Divinarum cognitio, ut fuit, sic esse debuit, quin ibi (viz. in cælo) per aliquod Tempus antequâ munus cœlesti doctrinâ homines imbuendi sibi à Patre mandatum publicè susciperet, versatus fuerit, nullo modo dubitandum videtur. Socinus in Responsione Priore ad Paræsim Andreæ Volani Tomo 2do. Fratrum Polon. p. 380. Col. 2.* By all which we see that *Soci-*

nus was so far from apprehending any difficulty in finding out this exposition of the Text, That he affirms it was *nullo pacto verisimile*, There was no like-lyhood that it should be otherwise, & *nullo modo dubitandum*, that no doubt could be made, but it was and ought to be so. Which surely are not forms of expression, to shew the difficulty of conceiving, or finding out how the said Thing *could* be so. So that this is a manifest mistake in this Author; and let him set it off with never so much brow and confidence, yet no doubt his Socinian Adversaries despise him for it sufficiently. And the Truth is, one would in all Reason imagine, that to the Answering the *History of the Unitarians*, a little more knowledge of their History would have done no hurt.

But after the many ample and extraordinary Elo-
gies he has passed upon himself for his Writings, me-
thinks it is something Pleasant to see him in his *Continu-
ation of the Defence of Dr. Stillingfleet*, p. 121. l. the 4.
&c. strutting himself in these words, *I am no Arch-
bishop yet.* Which shewes what his most early
thoughts ran upon, and what his Modesty would be at
from the very First. For otherwise, the purpose of the
place, where this comes in, had been fully served by
saying, *If for my part am no Arch-bishop, nor expect to be
one.* But the addition of that little word *yet* was very
significant, and shews that out of the *Abundance of his
heart his mouth spoke.* For though indeed he presently
adds, *And I very much suspect I shall never be one,* yet
those words were put in only *ad frangendum invidiam*,
and to qualifie the fulsome arrogance of the first ex-
pression. Howbeit in that he spoke his mind, in this he
fences against an Inconvenience; in that we have an
account of his Nature, in this only a Copy of his Coun-
tenance.

tenance. And I question not, but by this time his pretended suspicion is passed into a contrary expectation, and that the *Deanry* of *Paul's* begins to make him think himself Heir apparent to *Canterbury*. And therefore no wonder, if while big with such Thoughts, speaking in his *Apology* of *Dr. Wallis*, and *Himself*, he sets himself before Him. p. 29. in these words. *He* (viz. *The Melancholy stander-by*) concludes with an heavy charge upon *my self*, and *Dr. Wallis*. By which, I suppose, he would have *Dr. Wallis* know his proper place. Though I must tell him, that not only common Modesty, but also the common Custom of the World makes wise Men, whensoever they mention themselves with others, place themselves last. And so it might have become this Author too, especially speaking of himself in conjunction with such an one, as *Dr. Wallis*, who was a Person of Fame and eminence, while this Man was learning his Grammar ; if ever he was so.

But to proceed, and pass from his applauding himself to the other Branch of his Arrogance, in his scornful undervaluing all such as write against him, or differ from him, (though yet no more, nor in any other Thing, than in what his Worship had differed from himself). We have him in the 4th. page of his *Preface to his Case of Allegiance*, calling such as in their Writings could not fall in with his last sentiments about the New Oath, *Little Writers*. Concerning whom I must tell him, that it is often with *Writers*, as it is with *Books* ; Amongst which there are many *Little ones*, that exceed the worth, and outlive the Reputation of much *Greater*. If indeed number of Pamphlets makes a great writer, this Author is in no danger of being accounted a *Little One*. But as there is such a Thing, as *multum in parvo*, so there is also *Parvum in multo* ;

multo; and He who will digest the trouble of Reading this Authors Writings, will need no other Argument to prove it so. But as for those excellent Persons, whom he first slighted, then *challenges*, and afterwards *flyes from*, by never replying upon them, I would have him know, that the World has already past it's judgment both upon them and him too: and therefore I would advise his *Haughtiness* for the future to forbear calling his Antagonists *Little Writers*, till by his Answers he has *made them so*.

A further discovery of his rude, undecent way of treating such as he writes against, is the Language he has bestow'd upon a certain Writer, a *Nonconformist* indeed, but yet a Man of Learning (as a much greater Man than this Author has found by experience) whom he calls a *Trifling Scribler*, who *understands little more than Quibbles and Jests*; Charging him withal with *Pertness* and *Folly* to complete his Character. p. 15. of his Preface to his Defence of Dr. *Stillingfleet*. And in the 12. page of the Book it self, and the five first lines, He represents him under the name of the *Inquirer*, as one, who *cannot understand plain and familiar sense*; nor *carry the Connexion of three or four Sentences together*. Very civil Language indeed, becoming a Scholar, a Divine, and a well-bred Man, to a Person who had not in the least provok'd Him. For my own part, I have no knowledge of the Man, but from his Writings; and upon the Stock of that knowledge have often wondred, that one so able to humble this Reviler, would take such gross Reproaches at his hands.

But the Truth is, when I consider (as I noted first in my Preface) how patiently our whole Clergy has hitherto suffered him to call them *Fools* and *Hereticks*, by charging all those, as *such*, who concur not with him in holding the Three Divine Persons to be *Three distinct*

distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits (which, I dare say, not one of them held at the time of his uttering this Lewd Reproach) I say, when I consider this, I have cause to surcease all wonder, that any Private Man should indure this insolent *Huff* to insult over him in such a manner. But I shall insist no further upon this master-piece of his scurrility, having in some measure accounted with him for it already. Only I shall add this, That as it is beyond example marvellous that any one single member of a Church should presume to load all the rest with such a charge, so it is yet a greater marvel that all should bear it.

It would be endless to set down all the dirty stuff that has flowed from his *Billinggate Pen*. But to repeat and bring together so much as we have taken notice of, the Reader may be pleased to bear away in his memory such Expressions, and Appellations as these. viz. *Epicurean*, and *Ridiculer of Providence*, *Popishly inclined*, and looking towards an *Infallible Interpreter*, *Disaffected to*, and a *slanderer of the Government*, *Little Writers*, *Fools and Hereticks*, *errant Fopp*, *Trifling Scribler*, *shamefully Ignorant and Impudent*, *Fit to be sent to School again*, *One that understands little else but Jests and Quibbles*, *One that cannot understand plain and familiar sense*, *One that understands neither Greek nor Latine*, and the like. These are the choice Embellishments of his Style. But above all, that beloved word, *Nonsense*, is always ready at hand with him; and out it flies at all Persons and upon all Occasions. And hardly can he write three or four Pages together, but, right or wrong, he throws it in his Adversaries face. One would think that he was Born with the *Word* in his Mouth, and that it grew up with him from his Infancy, and that in his very Cradle he *Cryed Nonsense*, before he could speak it.

But

But to check this ungovern'd humour of his, in thus using this word at all Adventure ; Let me tell him, that it is both a very rude, unmannerly *Word*; and most commonly, as applyed by him , a very *false Charge*. As for the rudenes, of it, since he owns himself a *Son of the Church of England*, I think he would be much his own friend, if he would remember the Reprimand given him by his old *Acquaintance* and *Antagonist Doctor Owen*; who in his *Vindication*, &c. p. 72. having , upon occasion of some of his profane Scoffs, called him *Goodly Son of the Church of England!* immediately subjoyns, *That he intended it not as a Reflexion upon the Church it self, but only to remind this Man of his Relation to that Church. Which, (he there says) to his Knowledge, taught better Learning and better Manners.* In the next place, as for the falseness of the Charge in his usual application of this Word, I would have him know, That the Charge of *Nonsense* does not properly lye against every one who asserts a false Proposition, or is guilty of a mistake. For *Nonsense* is not properly opposed to strict *Truth*, but to such plain and manifest *Truth* as is obvious to *Common sense*. For *Truth* oftentimes lyes deep, and abstruse, and requires a more than ordinary sagacity to reach and fetch it out ; which that low Pitch of Reason, which we call *Common sense*, cannot always do. For in discourse a Man may be sometimes mistaken in laying his Foundation or Principle, and yet be very Clear and Rational in the Consequences he draws from it ; and sometimes he may fail in drawing Consequences from a True and well-laid Principle ; in both which cases, the whole discourse is certainly false and Inconsistent : Nevertheless (according to the common acception of the Word) this cannot be called *Nonsense*. It may indeed be called Error or Mistake ; which is a weakness

ness cleaving too close to Human Nature, for any one of the same Nature to reproach another for it. But on the contrary, if every Thing, that is not strict Demonstration and certain Truth, must pass for *Nonsense*, I fear, it would overlay whole Volumes, and not only prevent the 2d 3d. and 4th. Editions of many Books, but shrewdly also endanger the Sale of the First : Especially if 2d. and 3d. by the unlucky escape of some scattering Copies, should chance all to appear in the space of Three or Four Dayes, As in the first Publication of a certain Book Entituled *The Case of Allegiance, &c.* it fell out. But great, no doubt, is the Art of Bestowing several Title-Pages, importing divers Editions, upon Books of one and the same Impression: and may serve to teach the World, what a fruitful Thing the Press is, when impregnated by the *Prolifick Genius* of some Writers; and that (when it is for the credit of any extraordinary Book and it's Author) it can bring forth *four, five, or six* Editions of it at the same time. Which certainly is a most Ingenious Contrivance; but whether it were the *Author's* or the *Bookseller's*, is a Question; though, some think, it used to be done by a kind of *mutual-Consciousness* between both.

But to return to the Point in hand. According to the common use of the Word *Nonsense*, He, who Discourses of Things obvious to the ordinary Apprehensions of Men, with gross and palpable contradictions of one thing to another, or with a plain, manifest Incoherence of one part of his Discourse with the other, that Man is properly and justly chargeable with *Nonsense*. And let those (in the Name of *Sense* and *Reason*) take it to themselves, who have most claim to it.

But because the best way of Illustrating Things is by

by example. I shall also take this course here. Thus for instance. For any one to own a Thing for a great and sacred *Mystery* (the very Notion and use of the word *Mystery* importing something *Hidden and Abstruse*) and at the same time to affirm it to be very *Plain, Easie* and *Intelligible*, is *Nonsense*. To say, That in Men Knowledge and Power are *Commensurate*; nay That *Knowledge is Power*; so that whatsoever a Man knows how to do, he is by virtue thereof also able to do it, is contrary to the *Common Sense* of all Mankind, and consequently *Nonsense*. To say, *A Beast is a Person*, and yet to say withall, *That a Person and an Intelligent substance are Terms reciprocal*, is both *Nonsense*, and *Contradiction* too, with a Witness. To affirm, *That a specifical Unity can make any Thing or Person Numerically One*, is *Nonsense*. To affirm, *That there are two distinct Reasons and two distinct Wills in each Man, and those as really distinct, as if the same Man had Two distinct Souls*, is *Nonsense*. And to affirm, *That the Body* (which is utterly void of any Intellectual Power or Faculty) *is conscious to all the Dictates and Commands of the Will*, is gross and inexcusable *Nonsense*. So that whereas this Author (according to his mannerly way) charges his Adversary with *unintelligible Nonsense*. p. 227.l.6.it must needs be granted, that he has much the advantage of him in this Particular; since all must acknowledge that his own *Nonsense* is very *Intelligible*.

And here I could easily direct him where he may be supplyed with several more such Instances, as those newly alledged; but that I think these may suffice for the Purpose they are produced for. In the mean time I would advise him for the future to use this rude Word more sparingly, and cautiously; and to apply it only where the generally received way of speaking applies

it : And now and then also to cast his eye upon his own Writings. These things, I say, I would advise him to ; and to consider withal, how unreasonable and unjust it is, for him to bestow about the *Word* so freely upon others, while he keeps the *Thing* to himself.

CHAP.

C H A P. XII.

*Containing a Brief Review, and Conclusion
of the whole Work.*

I AM at length come to a close of that Work, which I should much more gladly have been Prevented, than engag'd in, by being a *Reader*, rather than the *Author* of a Reply to this Man's strange, unjustifiable Innovations upon this great Article of our Religion. But it is now a considerable Time that the Book, here Animadverted upon, has walked about the World, without any Publick Controll; And though in private Discourse generally censur'd by all, yet, (as to the Point undertook by me) hitherto Answered by none; which may well be Matter of *Melancholy Consideration* to all Hearty Lovers of our Church, and Ancient Christianity. Whereas, I dare say, had this Heterodox Piece been wrote and published in a Language understood by Foreigners, we should long since have had several Confutations of it sent us from abroad; and probably not without some severe Reflexions upon the *English Church*, and Clergy, for their silence in a Cause, which so loudly called for their Defence. To take off therefore this Reproach from our Church (in some degree at least) I have (while

others, far more able to *Defend it*, chuse rather to sit still and *enjoy it* ; ventur'd to set my weak Hand to the Vindication of a Principal Article of her Faith, against the rude Attacks of this bold Undertaker. In which, though I freely own, that all, that has been done by me in it, is extremely below the Dignity of the Subject, which I have employed my self in, yet I am well assured that I have fully and effectually answered this Man ; and if it should prove otherwise, I must ascribe it to a peculiar Misfortune attending me ; since none besides, has hitherto wrote against him, but has confuted him. In the Work I have here presented the Reader with, I have examined and gone over all that, I conceive, requires either Answer or Remark ; and that according to the following Method and Order, which I shall here briefly set down.

I have, in the first place, laid my Foundation in the Explication and State of the Sense of the Word *Mystery*; which I shew, in General, signifies something *Concealed*, *Hidden*, or *Abstruse* in *Religious Matters*; and amongst Christian Writers not only that, but something also neither *Discoverable* nor *Comprehensible* by bare Reason : According to which, I shew, that this Author's frequent affirming, that his *Hypothesis* and Explication of the Trinity rendred the Notion thereof *very Plain*, *Easie*, and *Intelligible*, was utterly incompatible with the *Mysteriousness* of the same. I shew also upon what absurd Grounds he stated the Nature of a *Contradiction*; according to which, joyned with another of his Assertions, I shew, That no Man could be justly charged with *Contradiction*, though he discoursed never so incoherently and falsely upon any Subject whatsoever. From hence I proceeded to consider the *Ancient Terms* constantly received and used by *Councils*, *Fathers* and *Schoolmen*,

Schoolmen, in speaking of the God-head and *Trinity*, which this Author in his Book had confidently and avowedly condemned, as *obscuring* and *confounding* Men's Notions about these great Matters; and upon a distinct Explication of each of them, I shew the Propriety and singular usefulness of them, both against all his exceptions, and above those other Terms, which he would needs substitute in their Room: and under the same Head, I laid open the Contradiction of his *Vindication* and his late *Apology* to one another, as I had done before in my Discourse about the Nature of a *Mystery*. From hence I passed to his New Notions of *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual Consciousness*; in the strength of which two Terms he pretended to make a *Trinity in Unity* a plain, easie, and intelligible Notion; nay so very plain, as to solve all Difficulties about it; these being his very words. And as he pretended *Self Consciousness* to be the formal constituent Reason of Personality Universally, both in Beings Create and Uncreate. I first Demonstrated the contrary in Created Beings; and that both from the general Reason of Things, and from Two manifest Instances; and withal examined and confuted several extremely absurd Propositions, and Assertions advanced by him concerning *Personality*. From this I passed on, and proved that neither could this *Self-Consciousness* be the formal Reason of Personality in the Divine Persons, shewing the impossibility thereof by several clear and unquestionable Arguments. And in the next place, with the same Evidence of Reason I proved, That *mutual Consciousness* could not be the ground or Reason of the Unity or Coalescence of the Three Divine Persons in one and the same Divine Nature; and all this upon known, allowed Principles of Philosophy,

phy, as well as Divinity. And so I Naturally went on to the examination of that monstrous Assertion of his, by which he holds and affirms the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct *Infinite Minds or Spirits*; which I shew unavoidably and irrefragably inferr'd them to be *Three Gods*; It being impossible for the God-head, which is essentially *One single infinite Mind or Spirit*, to be multiplyed into three distinct *Infinite Minds or Spirits*, without being multiplyed into as many Gods. This Opinion of his, I shew, was easie enough to be confuted; But for all that, I must here add further, that for the insufferable Scandal of it, it is much fitter to be *censured by a Convocation*, though even he himself should be *Prolocutor* of it. After this, since he had the Confidence to vouch his Hypothesis for the *constant Doctrine of the Fathers and the Schools*, I first proved it quite otherwise in the Point of *Self Consciousness*, and in his Assertion of Three distinct *infinite Minds*; For the latter of which he quoted *Three or Four Fathers*, and *One Sentence* out of one *Schoolman*, viz. *P. Lombard* (which, one would think, was far from proving it the *constant Doctrine* either of the *Fathers*, or, the *Schools*) and yet even these very *Quotations*, I shew were no more to his Purpose, than if he had alledged them to prove that Twice Three makes Twenty. And as for *Self Consciousness*, which is one of the Two main Branches, or members of his Hypothesis, he does not produce, nor so much as mention one *Father* or *Schoolman* in the behalf of it; so exact is he in proving his *Doctrine* the very same with Theirs. And then, in the next place, for the proof of his *mutual Consciousness* from the *Fathers and Schoolmen*, I have distinctly considered his allegations for it, and forming them into

Argu-

Arguments (such as the matter would afford) found them the saddest wofullest things to be called by that Name, that perhaps ever appeared in the World, since Argumentation was in use. And to complete his excellent and peculiar way of Arguing from the *Fathers* (for not so much as one *Schoolman* is cited in favour of *mutual Consciousness*) His whole business, I shew, was to reproach the *Fathers* as neither able to conceive rightly of the Trinity, nor yet express themselves Properly and Intelligibly about the same; and all this, because they neither conceived of it, nor expressed it, according to his Terms and Hypothesis, which yet he affirmed to be the *Constant Avowed Sentiments of those very Fathers*; though (God help them, poor Men) they were not so happy, as to know it. And this, I hope all the World will acknowledge, to be a most extraordinary way of proving a Thing from the Authority of the *Fathers*, by thus representing them as a Company of Dolts, who neither knew how to think or speak; as they should, upon the subject which they were professedly treating of. Upon which Head having finished my Answer as to the main Point I first engaged in, I proceeded to mark out, and Animadvert upon several of his *Paradoxical Absurd Assertions*, both in Divinity and Philosophy. And I did not only allege them for such, but also by the most commonly received and current Principles of both, effectually proved them such; and I referr it to any Man of clear and impartial Sense, upon a survey of the Particulars there distinctly examined and remarked upon, to pass as Judge between this Author and my self, whether the Proof falls at all short of the Charge. Next to which, because of his Insolent Reflexions upon some Learned Men, I took into consideration also his *vocabular Sins, and manifold Trans-*

Transgressions of the Laws of Grammar and Philology: and whereas he had vilified his Adversary as *having neither Greek nor Latine*, I shew, that albeit the Charge had been never so true, yet that he was one of the un-tittest Persons living to make it, for some certain Reasons fairly presented to him in that Chapter. And lastly to bring up the Rear of all, I thought it expedient to lay open the Temper of the Man, and his way of Writing ; His Immoderate applauses of himself above all *before* him, or *about* him, together with his disdainful Treatment of all that come in his way, as if they were not worthy to *carry his Books after him*. Though (by what some of them have Wrote against him) it appears, that they have made too good use of their *own Books*, to be fit to *carry his*. In fine I have, in my Perusal of this Man's Writings, with the utmost exactness I was able, observed his way of speaking both of himself, and others ; and upon the result of all do most seriously and sincerely affirm, That never did I (nor perhaps any one else) meet with so much confidence with so thin a Bottom to support it ; and yet surely that Man ought to stand upon a very broad and firm Bottom indeed, who ventures to defie all the World.

And thus, to relieve the Readers memory, I have given him this brief draught or Scheme of the whole Work. In which, as it is this Author alone, whom I have undertook, so I think fit to declare, that if any one besides him, shall attempt an answer to this Discourse, I shall not in the least trouble or concern myself about him, whosoever he be ; but if this Author himself shall be disposed to defend his New Notions and Hypothesis by a just and Scholastick Reply to what I have here offered against them, I will not fail (God

(God affording me such a measure of Health and Strength as may enable me for Study) to attend his Motions upon this Subject, as soon, and as often as he pleases. For I can hardly perswade my self that I have yet paid him all, that I owe him. Nevertheless I must leave this Admonition with him, That I neither can, nor shall account such a Pamphlet, as his late *Apology*, a just and sufficiert Answer to these *Animadversions*.

In the mean time, since the Reverend Dr. *J. W.* (spoken of in the precedeing Chapter) in his *Letters* about the *Trinity*, and *W. I.* another very Learned Person, in his *2d. Letter* to the said Doctor, upon the same subje&t, have both of them been pleased to commend this Author for several excellent Things in this Book, I do with the greatest earnestness of Entreaty, as well as with the profoundest deference of Respect to their great Judgments beg of them, that they would by a kind of charitable Benefaction to such low, and mean Understandings as mine, vouchsafe to point out in Particular, what those excellent Things are, and in what Part of his Book they may be found ; and whether I have hit upon any of them in my Three immediately foregoing Chapters. For I have read the Book over and over; as (after I had took up Thoughts of Answering it) it concerned me, in all Reason, to do. And I do thereupon solemnly profess, that, according to the best of my poor Judgment, and that ordinary Measure of Learning which God has vouchsafed me, I can hardly find throughout the whole Work (unless perhaps, here and there a Passage or two against the *Socinians*) so much as one True, Through stroke either in *Divinity*, or *Philosophy*, or *Logick*, or even in *Grammar*; and I confidently appeal to the ingenuous, and

An humble Address to the Learned Doctor. J. W. and W. I.

unbyass'd Reader, whether I have not in the foregoing *Animadversions* given very pregnant and particular Instances of this Author's gross Defects in every one of these. And therefore my poor Opinion and Advice is, That if these two Learned Men are resolved to persist in their Commendations of this Author (as there is nothing by which they can oblige him more) and withal to commend him upon sure, undeniable Grounds, they would hereafter wave all the fore-mentioned Topicks of Commendation, and pitch up-
on his true excellency by commanding him for his *Preferment*; for that certainly is very commendable.

And now, that I am taking my Leave of my Reader, (for this time at least) that I may not leave him with any just Distast or Grudg in his Mind against me, as if I had treated this Man too severely, I do assure him, that nothing has been here utter'd by Chance, or in the heat of any present Passion, but upon a due, calm, and sedate Consideration of what he had said *falsly* of others, as a Warrant for what was to be *truly* said of him. And I do further assure the Reader, that I would by no means have treated a Candid, Civil and well-bred Adversary, at the Rate, I have treated him, who has shewn no sign of any one of these Qualifications, either in his Writings or Behaviour. And therefore thought to *accept Persons* be a Fault in the Sight of God and Man, yet certainly to *distinguish* them is none. I have used him, as I found him; and for what I found him, he may thank himself.

The Truth is, he has carryed on an offensive War with most that have Wrote; and there are very few, whom he has not, one way or other, struck at and Defied. So that the Matter being in effect brought to this

this Point, whether He shall be too hard for the World, or the World for Him, I hope it will not be long deciding. He has for a great while, and in a very audacious manner been Preying, and Privateering upon many a Worthy and good Name, and as far as he was able made prize of the Reputation of Men better than Himself : And therefore it is now high time for such to think of repaying the good Turns done them, and for the injured World to retaliate upon the lawless *Aggressor*. For this is, and has been the *Custom of Nations* ; and all must grant it to be a most just, equal, and allowed course ; and since it is so, 'tis to be hop'd, that this is not the last *Reprisal* that will be made upon him.

To the most Holy and Blessed Trinity, Three Glorious Persons in one and the same Undivided God-head, be rendred and ascribed all Honour and Praise, Thanksgiving and Adoration, now and for evermore. Amen.

T H E E N D.

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A TABLE of the Additions and Alterations made in the Second Edition of the Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock's Book of the Trinity.

Preface, Page 3. over against Line 22. *this Passage is added in the Margin, [Dr. Owen in his Vindication of Himself against this Author, gives him the Character of a Scoffer, and a Censurer of other Mens Labours, Judgments, and Expressions. Which Witness of his is True; and since it is so, Whether he, of whom it is True, deserves a Rebuke, or no, is left to the World to judge. Owen's Vindic. against Sh. p. 129.]*

Preface, p. 5. line 4. *This Passage in the first Edition, which shews, That Tender Consciences are such Things as may some time or other put the Church not only to part with its Liturgy, Rites and Ceremonies, but its very Faith also for their sake, is thus altered in the Second Edition; [which shews, That there are some such Tender Consciences in the World, as (when opportunity serves) may put the Church not only to part with its Liturgy, Rites and Ceremonies, but its very Creed also for their sake.]*

Preface, p. 12. l. 26. after the words paying the Scores of both, *this Discourse follows in the Second Edition.*

[*But now if either He himself, or any for him shall plead, That it was not fairly done to charge him with those Blasphemies,*

which he may (and perhaps does) pretend to have been uttered by Him in the Person of his Adversary, and as the genuine Consequences of the Doctrine maintained by him.

To this I Answer. First; That he, who pretends to speak in the Person of another, ought, according to all Justice and Decorum, to speak only such Things as that other, whom he personates, uses to speak, and consonant to his known, Avowed Sence. But did his Adversary, Dr. Owen, ever speak so? Or use the Expressions here uttered by this Author? Whereas he declares himself concerning the said Expressions thus, viz. That he cannot mention them without begging Pardon for repeating such horrid and desperate Blasphemies. Owen's *Vindication against Sherlock*, p. 46. That they were fitter for a Jew, or a Mahometan, for *Servetus*, or *Socinus*, than a Son of this Church, p. 47. That he abhorred the Rehearsal of such horrid Profaneness, p. 49. That they were odious Satanical Exprobations of the Truth of Christ's Satisfaction, *ibid.* And now can this Man pretend to speak these Things in the Person of one who thus Abhors, Abominates, and Detests them? The Truth is, his whole Book is such a lewd Misrepresentation both of the Words and Sence of his Adversary, that if he has any Blood in his Body, it must needs fly in his Face, and bid him Blush for such Unconscionable Falsifications.

But Secondly, If he charges these Assertions as Consequences of the Doctrine maintained by his Adversary, I must put him in mind of these two Things.

1. That to the just charging of any Man with the Consequences of his Doctrine, or Opinion, the Things so charged, ought to be not only the Real, but also the Plain, Direct, and Immediate Consequences of that Opinion. Forasmuch as no Man ought in reason to be charged with the Remote far-fetched Consequences of any Proposition held by him;

him ; since he may in all Equity (if he disclaims them) be supposed ignorant of them, and that inculpably too.

2. This Author is to know, That to the just charging of even any Doctrine, or Opinion, with such and such Consequences, though they follow never so really and truly from it, yet if they also lie any thing remote, and at some distance from the same, they ought first by clear undeniable Arguments to be proved to follow from thence, before they can justly and fairly be charged to do so.

Which two Observations thus premised ; that I may lay the whole Matter before the Reader more particularly ; he is to take Notice, That the Doctrine, which this Author loads with these Blasphemous Consequences ; is, That of the Necessity of a Satisfaction to be paid to God's Justice in order to the Pardon of Sin, and the Justification of Sinners. And this I affirm to have been the received Doctrine of the Church, and the General Opinion of Divines in the Case ; all asserting the Necessity of such a Satisfaction ; though not All, I confess, upon the same ground.

For First, Some found this Necessity upon the Necessary Egress of God's Vindictive Justice, naturally acting and exerting it self where it meets with a Proper Object.

But Secondly, Others state this Necessity upon the Decree or Purpose of God, resolving to take this course for the Pardon of Sin, and no other. Which Decree and Purpose, though made freely, yet being actually passed and declared, it was not free for God to baulk the execution of it. His Veracity, Wisdom and Honour, as Supreme Governour of the World, not suffering him to let the Violation of his Laws pass without a due satisfaction made to his Justice. And this has been the Opinion of most Divines in this matter.

Nevertheless, (whether upon either of these grounds, or some other) it is certain, that the Necessity of a Satisfaction was still held,

held, and owned by the Church : And yet upon supposal of this Necessity alone it is, (whatsoever ground it be stated upon) that this Author sets God forth in a most Profane manner, as an Impotent Man venting his Rage and Passion without any sufficient Ground or Reason for it. For, I am sure, no other Consideration can Answer, or come up to the Impiety of the forecited Expressions. And I freely appeal to the Learned, and Unbyassed Reader, Whether the said Passages can be placed to any other Account whatsoever.

And if they cannot, I ask with what Conscience could this Man, of his own Head, invent such Hideous, Abominable Words, and then thrust them into his Adversary's Mouth, whether he would, or no? Or charge them as the necessary Consequences of his Doctrine, without proving, or by any formed Argument so much as offering to prove them so? For surely he ought to have done this in the first place, and (since he knew that the Learned Assertors of this Doctrine, did and would deny these to be the Consequences of it to the very Death) he should by clear and solid Ratiocination have proved against them, (in spight of their Denial) that these were indeed the True and Natural Consequences of the said Doctrine, before he reproached them as such. But, it seems he was for doing execution first, and for proceeding to Tryal afterwards; though, as hasty as he was in the former, he has not yet done the latter, nor, I believe, ever will.

Upon the whole Matter it is manifest, That it was not so much any thing Personal in Dr. Owen (how bitter soever he was against him) as the Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction asserted by the said Doctor, in common with the whole Christian Church, which this Author so vilely reflected upon; and discharged all those Blasphemous Scoffs at, in that Book of his; and consequently so far as he was the Author both of the Book and the Scoffs in it, he was as fit a Person to have joyned in the Address

to the Morocco Ambassador, as any Man in England besides.

I do, I confess, charge this Author with Asserting Three Gods (though He does not in Terminis express it) because of his Asserting Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits ; but then the Case here on my part is quite different from what it was on his. For in this, the Consequence of Three Gods from Three distinct Infinite Spirits, is Direct, Manifest, and Immediate ; or rather, in Truth, is not so properly a Consequence, or one Assertion following from another, as one and the very same thing expressed in other words, which is the true account of this Matter : For the Words [Infinite Mind, or Spirit] are but a Periphrasis of the Thing signified by the Term [God :] And their perfect equivalence shall be fully demonstrated in my Fifth Chapter.

From all which I conclude, That since there are (beyond all pretence of denial) several Horrid Blasphemous Expressions in this Author's forementioned Book, which must and ought to be charged somewhere ; and since his Adversary utterly disowns them all, both as to Words and Sence ; and since the Doctrine it self, maintained by him, infers no such Thing, nor has this Author proved that it does so ; but that the said Representations of it are peculiarly his own, and occur no where but in his Book (except possibly in the Writings of some of his old Friends the Socinians, and those such as the Transilvanian Ministers) it follows, that according to the strictest Laws of fair and just Quotation, all the black Dirt of those Impious and foul Passages which I have Cited from him, and charged upon him, ought to lie wholly at his Door, and let him (and his Porter) shovel it away thence as they are able.

See a most Virulent and Blasphemous Book Wrote by these Men, and entituled, *Præmonitiones Christi & Apostolorum de abolendo vero Christo per Antichristum.*

As to what concerns the Licensing this Book, so severely and so justly reflected upon by Dr. Owen, it did (it must be confessed) meet with a Person (as it were) framed for the very purpose, &c.]

In the Book, p. 24. between l. 12. and 27. of the First Edition, this Addition and Alteration is made in the Second.

[I must here remind him of Two Things.

First, That he would be pleased to tell us how Men can Write plainer and plainer of the Trinity every Day after his New Notion of it has solved all the Difficulties about it, as in the forecited p. 85. l. 27. he positively tells us, it does. For (as I take it) where there remains no Difficulty, there must be the utmost degree of plainness; and withal, when Men are come to the utmost of any Thing, they can then go no further.

*Secondly, I must remind him also, That the word Plainer in the Comparative Degree, does not couch under it the positive signification of Plain, &c. And much less *very plain and easie*: [Nay, so very plain as to have *all the difficulties of it solved*, as this Author has expressly affirmed]. So that if this be a *Scandalous Imputation*, it is easie to see to whom the *Scandal of it must belong*, &c.*

*P. 27. l. 25. after the word Contradicted, this Parenthesis is inserted in the Second Edition (*as nothing ought to be, which cannot be comprehended.*)*

*P. 74. l. 30. after the word *whatsoever*, three Lines from the bottom in the First Edition, this following Parenthesis is inserted in the Second. (For an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition, viz. Such an one as makes a Compound Hypostasis, are quite different things: And this Author shall in due time be taught so much, if he has any thing to object against it.) Or, &c.*

Page 291. over against Line 12. of the First Edition, the following Latine Quotation is added in the Margin of the Second. *Qui personas in Deo modos tantummodo existendi, sive τρόπων ὑπάρχεις esse dicunt, ipsam Deitatem nequaquam excludunt, in quā conveniunt; Sed nihil aliud esse volunt, quam Existendi modum, in quo differunt. Quare Pater non est modus tantum existendi, sed Deus est, quemadmodum & ceterae Personae, verū Deus est cum certo modo existendi, qui neque Filio convenit, neque Spiritui Sancto. Sic & Filius Deus est, non modus tantum existendi, Sed Deus est cum certo modo Existendi, qualis neque Patri convenit, neque Spiritui Sancto. Ad eundem modum discriminis, & Spiritus Sanctus Deus est, non modus existendi tantum; Sed deus est cum certo modo existendi, qualis nec Patri convenit neque Filio. Summa est, Personas in Deo non differre essentia, quia sunt unus Deus, sed Proprietate & modo Subsistendi.* Twissus in Responsione ad Arminii Prefationem in extremâ Pag. Lin. 20. editionis Amstelodamensis apud Janssonium anno 1632.

Page 342. after these words [joyned true Greek and English together] in the 4th Line, this following Discourse is to be inserted.

[But there is an extraordinary Passage in his Book of Judgment, Chap. 2. Sect. 1. p. 164. of the last Edition, (which should be the most correct) and I was doubting, whether I should charge it upon his Ignorance, or his Insolence; but both of them play their Parts very remarkably in it. For first he makes a most false, illiterate, and absurd Translation of a Verse, or rather part of a Verse in the New Testament, and then reproaches the received Translation as wrong, and very faulty, for rendering it otherwise. The place is in 2 Pet. c. 2. v. 4. εἰ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς γνησίων καὶ ἐφάσαλον αὐλακὸν σειραῖς χόφες ταρπάρωσας παρεδώκεν εἰς κελυφὸν τεληρημόνιον. In which he considers

siders only the words *τειχῖς ζόφε ταπλαρώτας*, dividing them from the rest of the Sentence, viz. *ταρίδωκεν εἰς κέισιν τεληρημένες*, and by that means from the *Verb* in this latter part of it, which should govern the *Noun* in the former; thereby making *τειχῖς* to be governed not by *ταρίδωκεν* (as it ought to be) but most falsely and Ungrammatically by *ταπλαρώτας*, and so he renders *τειχῖς ζόφε ταπλαρώτας*, casting them, viz. the Apostate Angels, down into Chains of darkness. And this interpretation he builds partly upon the pretended Reason of the Thing here discoursed of, and partly upon the signification of the word *ταπλαρών*, but upon both of them very absurdly. From the Reason of the Thing he argues, that if *ταπλαρώτας* should signify the Apostate Angels being cast down into Hell, how could they be said upon Sentence passed upon them at the last Judgment, to be then cast into Hell, if they were there before? To which the Answer is very easie and obvious, That immediately upon their sin they were cast down into, and kept in those lower Regions called *ταπλαρών*, or Hell locally, but not cast into Hell-Torments, till the last Judgment has passed upon them; so that with full accord both to Scripture and Reason we are to distinguish the place of Hell, where they now are, from the Judicial penal Torments of Hell, which they shall be adjudged to, and endure in that place hereafter; as we distinguish the Prison wherein Malefactors are kept, from the execution which they are there kept for; As indeed this Text with great significance alludes to both: So that his Argument from hence falls to nothing. His other Reason is from the signification of the word *ταπλαρών*, which he affirms to signify only to cast down. But on the contrary, I must here tell him first, That *ταπλαρών*, does not only import the Act of casting down, but (being derived

derived from *ταρπλαρ*.) signifies also the Term *ad quem*, or the Place, into which this casting down is. And I refer him to all the Greek Lexicographers (not one of them excepted) whether they do not render *ταρπλαιώω* by *in Tartarum detrudo*, *dejicio*, or *principito*; and if so, how can *σειργίς* possibly here agree with *ταρπλαρώσας*; for if *ταρπλαρ* be the Term *ad quem* of the Act, how can *σειργίς* be so too; since one single Act can have but one Ultimate Term *ad quem*? And even this Man himself does not allow *ταρπλαρ* and *σειργίς* to be one and the same thing. And besides this, I must tell him further, That if *σειργίς* imported the Term, Thing, or Place, into which God cast down the Apostle Angels, it ought not to have been *σειργίς ταρπλαρώσας*, but *eis σειργάς*, forasmuch as the motion of casting down, importing a *Local descent* to something, the Dative Case cannot in true Grammar answer it.

And therefore the old *Latine* Version makes *σειργίς* to import, not the Term to which, but the Instruments or means by which these Angels were thus brought down, rendering the Text thus, *Rudentibus Inferni detractos in Tartarum tradidit*, &c. which, as it is not strictly a *Translation*, but an arbitrary *Paraphrase*, so it is a very forced and unnatural one too; as importing not a *casting* but a *drawing down* these Angels into Hell. In which case, who must be the Person drawing them? For since God (to whom *ταρπλαρώσας* does and must here agree) ought to be considered by us as in the Highest Heaven, how can this drawing *down* be applied to him, which, in the Nature of it, supposes the Person *drawing* to be in that lower place, to which he is drawing others? For all *Traction* is a motion of the Agent forcibly bringing something to himself, but *Trusion* a motion by which he removes or forces something from himself.

It is clear therefore, that according to all the Rules of Grammatical Construction, and proper speaking, *οεις* cannot be governed by *ταπλαρώσας* · and that, therefore something else must be sought for to govern it, which can be nothing besides *ωρέδωκεν*. And then the whole Sentence will be properly and plainly translated thus. *Ταπλαρώσας* [God] *having cast or thrust them* [viz. the *Apostate Angels*] *down into Hell* [or the *Lower Regions*] *ωρέδωκεν οεις* [οφειλόμενος], delivered, or put them into Chains of darkness, *τεληρημόνεις εἰς κρίσιν*, kept, or reserved to [or for] Judgment. And this is fence and propriety of Speech, agreeable both to the Natural Signification, and the Grammatical Syntax of the Words. But the Translation so imperiously and ignorantly given by this Man (in correction of that of the Church) is agreeable to neither. For it both divides one part of the Sentence from the other, from which it must not be divided, and then makes *οεις* to be governed by *ταπλαρώσας*, which cannot govern it, and quite cuts it off from *ωρέδωκεν*, which alone can.

And now, ought it not to be matter of Amazement to all Men of Sense and Sobriety, to see a Puny, who is not able to master three words of *Greek*, presume to controul such great Masters of that Language, as the Translators of the New Testament into *English* undoubtedly were? Nay, and thereby to reflect upon the Church her self, which has received and owned this Translation, and to whose Judgment and Authority (if he be so nearly related to her, as he pretends) he ows so great and *filial* a Deference? Let him rather instead of correcting the *English* Translation (a Work which he was never born for) thank God, and the Translators for it; there being few Men living more beholden to it than himself. And therefore leaving his forlorn Criticisme

(as

[as new every whit as his Divinity) to shift for it self; I, for my part, like my English Bible, for his dislike of any part of it, better than before. For I can by no means see any force or consequence in this Argument, *viz.* That because this Author is much better at quoting a Greek Sentence than at construing it; therefore the English Translation of this Text in St. Peter is a very bad Translation: I say, I cannot admit, or yield to this Consequence.]

Page 347. of the First Edition after this Sentence [In such a Case some are of Opinion, that where the words escape it, the Author himself ought to have it] the following Discourse comes in P. 351. Lin. 8. of the Second Edition beginning with these words.

[But because some perhaps will hardly be satisfied with so General a Charge without an Allegation of more Particulars, I shall here give the Reader a Catalogue of this Author's Greek Errata in the Second Edition of his Vindication of the Trinity (which should in Reason be thought the most correct) together with their Correction confronting them.

Greek Errata.

Νοεῖν τὶ χρῆμα
εἴπεν
ἐν εἴμι
ἐν ἐσμὲν--ἐν ἐσμὲν

Punctum interrogationis post ἐσμεν pro Semicol.

τελείαν

‘Ομούσιον ἔτιν

ἔπιδέχεται

σύιας:

Correction.

Νοεῖν τι χρῆμα
εἴπεν
ἐν εἴμι
ἐν ἐσμεν

Punctum interrogationis post ἐσμεν pro Semicol.

τελείαν

‘Ομούσιον έτιν

ἔπιδέχεται

σύιας

Pag. 102.
Quotat.

Pag. 107.
Quotat.

Greek Errata.

ἀνθρωπῷ ἐτίν
ἄνγελος
ἢ--η
ἄγγελῷ ἐτίν

Punctum interrogationis post ἐτίν pro Semicol.

Pag. 107. Θεός ἐτίν

I. 14. Ταῦτις σιον

Pag. 110. Συνεμένες

Quotat. συνηθεία

ἐτὶ bis

πρᾶς

ὑποσάσεις

Θεότητα

Pag. 113. Ἐτὶ

Quotat. πολευθείας

παρηποστατο

μὴ τις

νομιμεῖη

2d Quot. συγχώρει

ibid.

πεφυθεμένη

διαφόρεις

υσίας

πληθοῦντικῆ

Pag. 115. Υποτινός

Quotat. ἀλλά τι

Pag. 116. Καθ' ἑαυτὸν

Quotat. ἐκάτη

ἐνέργεια

ὄνομαζονται

Pag. 119. Ἡθεία τι

Quotat. η

Correction.

ἀνθρωπός ἐτίν

ἄγγελος

ἢ

ἄγγελός ἐτίν

Θεός ἐτίν

ταῦτισιον

Συνημένες

συνηθεία

ἐτὶ

πρᾶς

ὑποσάσεις

Θεότητα

"Ἐτὶ

πολυθείας

παρηποστατο

μὴ τις

νομιμεῖη

συγχώρει

πεφυθεμένη

διαφόρεις

υσίας

πληθυντικῆ

"Υπό τινι

ἀλλά τι

Καθ' ἑαυτὸν

ἐκάτη

ἐνέργεια

ὄνομαζονται

"Ἡθεία τε

ἢ

ἀπαρ-

*Greek Errata.**ἀπαρρίλλαχτο**διωφοεῖν**μίξιν τινά
ἢ**ἀπαρρίλληκτο**όμοοσιότης**Ἄυτη ἐν**λόγῳ**ἔτι**αὐτε-**αλλήλαις**δύο**ανάπαλιν**ἐν**διὸ τὲ**συναίδιον**τὴν τε**συμπνοιαν**εξυσίας**Συνάμεως**Punctum interrogationis post ταῦτα pro Semicol.**αλλήλαις**όμοοσιότης**ἔξωθεν τῷ
παῖδες ἔτι
ἀδιαρέτως**Correction.**ἀπαρρίλλαχτο**διαφοεῖν**μίξιν τινά
ἢ**ἀπαρρίλληκτο**όμοοσιότης**Αὐτῇ ἐν**λόγῳ**ἔτι**αὐτε-**αλλήλαις**δύο**ανάπαλιν**ἐν**διὸ τε**συναίδιον**τὴν τε**συμπνοιαν**εξυσίας**δύο αὔτεως**όμοοσιότης**ἔξωθεν τῷ
παῖδες ἔτι
ἀδιαρέτως*Pag. 119.
l. 28.Pag. 120.
l. 26.l. 27.
Pag. 121.
l. 24, 25.Pag. 122.
l. 27.ibid.
Pag. 122.
Quotat.Pag. 125.
Quotat.Pag. 128.
l. 19.
Quotat.

Greek Errata.

Correction.

Pag. 129. $\alpha\pi\lambda\theta\tau\tau$ τι
1. 27.

Pag. 166. $\alpha\gamma\alpha\omega\sigma\bar{u}ns$
1. 6.

Pag. 200. $\delta\acute{\alpha}\delta\acute{o}s\mu\bar{s}$ $\delta\acute{\alpha}\delta\acute{o}s\mu\bar{s}$
1. 6. $\delta\acute{\alpha}\delta\acute{o}s\mu\bar{s}, \delta\acute{\alpha}\delta\acute{o}s\mu\bar{s}$

Now all these *Errata*, one would think, make up a jolly *Company* to rendezvous together in the *compsis* of less than half a dozen Pages of an *English Book*; a *Company* fit for our Author to march Triumphant in the Head of.

Page 360. After [William] Giles some time of *Mark Lane* in the First Edition in the Margin, is added in the Margin of the Second [who Wrote (forsooth) in defence of our Author against the Papists.]

Page 374. Lines 12, 13, 14. That Passage [*It is much fitter to be Censured by a Convocation, though even He Himself should be Prolocutor of it.*] is altered in Page 377. Line 9. thus----- [*Though even He Himself (since John Goodwin and Hugh Peters are gone off) should be Prolocutor of it.*]

And now, upon the issue of the whole Matter, I hope all Ingenuous, and Impartial Readers, all True Friends of our *English Church* and Old Divinity will allow, that I have treated an Insolent, Imposing Innovator, no otherwise than he has deserved; or rather indeed much short of it; and that None will Tax, or Censure me for what I have Wrote, but such as can think it reasonable for one Man to Trample upon, and Insult over his whole Profession, and to be Applauded, or at least endured in such a Presumption.

For

For my own part, I can by no means judge so ;
and as I abhor such Pride in others ; so, I hope, I
shall never be guilty of the least degree of it my
self. I thank God, I account not the meanest of my
own Profession my Inferior ; and if I should be
tempted to think any one *Below* me, it should be only
such an one as thinks himself *Above* all the World
besides.

F I N I S.

Howe you our lord I have no way to thank
you I say I am not fit to be in your service; for I have
never been so busy of this last degree of all my
life I thank God I recovered from this malady
so well I have now nothing but remembrance of my
former blisdest life and one good memory to
comfort me while I live and I hope to see you
again before I die

perhiles.

FINIS







